J apan’s security policy has undergone several drastic changes in past decade: the establishment of the National Security Council in 2013; the easing of defense equipment exports in 2014; and, most recently, the publication of the new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program white papers in late 2022, combined with the increase of the defense budget to 2% of GDP and plans to establish new measures like a counterstrike capability. While many analysts have highlighted these developments as significant shifts in Japan’s strategic priorities, a single major factor looms in the background that continues to hinder developments—Japan’s aging population. Japan’s attempt to become a “normal nation”—a country with an effective security policy that can accept the use of force as a potential policy tool—is constrained today by a declining birth rate, an aging population that both stresses the government’s budget and limits the recruitment pool for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and the slow pace of technology adoption in the JSDF. Tom Phuong Le’s book Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century addresses these major challenges and uniquely explores the intersection between Japanese defense policy and the country’s demographic crisis, detailing exactly why and how these issues are causational. First, fewer children mean fewer potential military recruits. Second, an older, aging population requires a larger budget for institutions like the pension system, leaving less money for defense matters, such as recruiting and retaining troops. Le carefully describes both the uniqueness and individuality of the problem; while most developed economies today are experiencing declining birth rates, Japan’s crisis has arguably attracted the most attention as a social phenomenon over the last two decades. In exploring how the abovementioned demographic shift affects Japan’s defense, Le compares Japan with its neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Singapore, which all have some form of mandatory conscription. Yet, each of these countries faces the same issue of an aging population—and
{"title":"The Next Generation of Japan's National Security","authors":"Marina Fujita Dickson, Y. Funabashi","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0022","url":null,"abstract":"J apan’s security policy has undergone several drastic changes in past decade: the establishment of the National Security Council in 2013; the easing of defense equipment exports in 2014; and, most recently, the publication of the new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program white papers in late 2022, combined with the increase of the defense budget to 2% of GDP and plans to establish new measures like a counterstrike capability. While many analysts have highlighted these developments as significant shifts in Japan’s strategic priorities, a single major factor looms in the background that continues to hinder developments—Japan’s aging population. Japan’s attempt to become a “normal nation”—a country with an effective security policy that can accept the use of force as a potential policy tool—is constrained today by a declining birth rate, an aging population that both stresses the government’s budget and limits the recruitment pool for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and the slow pace of technology adoption in the JSDF. Tom Phuong Le’s book Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century addresses these major challenges and uniquely explores the intersection between Japanese defense policy and the country’s demographic crisis, detailing exactly why and how these issues are causational. First, fewer children mean fewer potential military recruits. Second, an older, aging population requires a larger budget for institutions like the pension system, leaving less money for defense matters, such as recruiting and retaining troops. Le carefully describes both the uniqueness and individuality of the problem; while most developed economies today are experiencing declining birth rates, Japan’s crisis has arguably attracted the most attention as a social phenomenon over the last two decades. In exploring how the abovementioned demographic shift affects Japan’s defense, Le compares Japan with its neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Singapore, which all have some form of mandatory conscription. Yet, each of these countries faces the same issue of an aging population—and","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46069793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Russia-Ukraine War and the Impact on the Persian Gulf States","authors":"K. Ulrichsen","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46903212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I t would be a platitude to state that the Russia-Ukraine war has had a massive impact on the European security system, but it is essential to emphasize that the fast and profound reconstruction of this traditionally well-structured system addresses primarily the most immediate security challenges, while midand long-term problems remain clouded in uncertainty. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, unleashed on February 24, 2022, after eight years of violent conflict, produced a painful shock for most European politicians and publics. Although Russia, through its invasion of Ukraine, hoped to create confusion and discord among its neighbors, the European Union has risen to the challenge, recognizing the invasion of Ukraine as a direct threat to the security of all stakeholders in regional peace. The immediacy of this threat has brought together Europe’s interest-based and value-based policies and focused them on the common goal of ending the war with a just peace, ensured by resolve to increase investments in collective security. Europe has sustained its remarkable unity behind the commitment to ensure Russia’s defeat, as the proceedings of the 2023 Munich Security Conference confirm.1 Impressive as these efforts have been, however, perhaps inevitably they deal only with the foreseeable future, the horizon of which may turn out to be very close indeed.
{"title":"Europe Reinvents Its Security System—for the Short Term","authors":"P. Baev","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0029","url":null,"abstract":"I t would be a platitude to state that the Russia-Ukraine war has had a massive impact on the European security system, but it is essential to emphasize that the fast and profound reconstruction of this traditionally well-structured system addresses primarily the most immediate security challenges, while midand long-term problems remain clouded in uncertainty. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, unleashed on February 24, 2022, after eight years of violent conflict, produced a painful shock for most European politicians and publics. Although Russia, through its invasion of Ukraine, hoped to create confusion and discord among its neighbors, the European Union has risen to the challenge, recognizing the invasion of Ukraine as a direct threat to the security of all stakeholders in regional peace. The immediacy of this threat has brought together Europe’s interest-based and value-based policies and focused them on the common goal of ending the war with a just peace, ensured by resolve to increase investments in collective security. Europe has sustained its remarkable unity behind the commitment to ensure Russia’s defeat, as the proceedings of the 2023 Munich Security Conference confirm.1 Impressive as these efforts have been, however, perhaps inevitably they deal only with the foreseeable future, the horizon of which may turn out to be very close indeed.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44033217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I f we have learned anything about the international relations of Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, it is that exogenous shocks to the system can be highly disruptive to assumptions about the emerging regional order. Many scholars and governments expected an intensification of U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry in the early years of the George W. Bush administration, for example, but the events of September 11 shifted U.S. strategic priorities in a new direction. Rather than designating China as a “strategic competitor” as the Bush campaign had promised, the 2002 U.S. national security strategy declared that, while the United States would remain attentive to the possibilities for great-power rivalry, the common threat of terrorism gave an unprecedented opportunity “to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”1 The 2008–9 global financial crisis had an equally profound impact on China’s assumptions about the emerging regional order, convincing leaders in Beijing that the Western democracies were incompetent and that the United States was entering a period of secular decline. This reignited greater geopolitical rivalry rather than cooperation. At first, the Covid-19 pandemic seemed to confirm Beijing’s thesis that the East is rising and the West declining, but later phases of the pandemic undermined confidence in China’s own secular rise while reinforcing U.S. strategies for technology decoupling from China and closer U.S. alignment with allies and partners. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the fourth major exogenous shock to Northeast Asian order since the end of the Cold War. In terms of national security, it is likely to be the most profound. One is always tempted to draw such conclusions when in the midst of a crisis and lacking perspective,2 but in this instance there are several reasons to expect that the impacts of
如果说我们从冷战结束以来的东北亚国际关系中学到了什么的话，那就是对该体系的外部冲击可能会对新兴地区秩序的假设产生高度破坏。例如，许多学者和政府预计，在小布什(George W. Bush)政府执政初期，美中地缘政治竞争会加剧，但911事件将美国的战略重点转向了一个新的方向。2002年美国国家安全战略没有像布什竞选时承诺的那样将中国列为“战略竞争者”，而是宣称，尽管美国将继续关注大国竞争的可能性，但恐怖主义的共同威胁提供了一个前所未有的机会，“建立一个大国在和平中竞争而不是准备战争的世界”。2008 - 2009年的全球金融危机同样深刻地影响了中国对新兴地区秩序的设想，使北京的领导人相信西方民主国家是无能的，美国正在进入一个长期衰落的时期。这重新点燃了更大的地缘政治竞争，而不是合作。起初，新冠肺炎大流行似乎证实了北京的论点，即东方正在崛起，西方正在衰落，但疫情的后期阶段削弱了对中国自身长期崛起的信心，同时加强了美国与中国的技术脱钩战略，并加强了美国与盟友和伙伴的紧密联系。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰是冷战结束以来对东北亚秩序的第四次重大外生冲击。就国家安全而言，这可能是最深刻的。当处于危机之中，缺乏远见时，人们总是忍不住得出这样的结论，但在这种情况下，有几个理由可以预期
{"title":"The Ukraine War and Northeast Asia","authors":"M. Green","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0031","url":null,"abstract":"I f we have learned anything about the international relations of Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, it is that exogenous shocks to the system can be highly disruptive to assumptions about the emerging regional order. Many scholars and governments expected an intensification of U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry in the early years of the George W. Bush administration, for example, but the events of September 11 shifted U.S. strategic priorities in a new direction. Rather than designating China as a “strategic competitor” as the Bush campaign had promised, the 2002 U.S. national security strategy declared that, while the United States would remain attentive to the possibilities for great-power rivalry, the common threat of terrorism gave an unprecedented opportunity “to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”1 The 2008–9 global financial crisis had an equally profound impact on China’s assumptions about the emerging regional order, convincing leaders in Beijing that the Western democracies were incompetent and that the United States was entering a period of secular decline. This reignited greater geopolitical rivalry rather than cooperation. At first, the Covid-19 pandemic seemed to confirm Beijing’s thesis that the East is rising and the West declining, but later phases of the pandemic undermined confidence in China’s own secular rise while reinforcing U.S. strategies for technology decoupling from China and closer U.S. alignment with allies and partners. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the fourth major exogenous shock to Northeast Asian order since the end of the Cold War. In terms of national security, it is likely to be the most profound. One is always tempted to draw such conclusions when in the midst of a crisis and lacking perspective,2 but in this instance there are several reasons to expect that the impacts of","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46275050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is potentially a turning point in global politics, serving as the indicator of a transition from a unipolar order to a new bipolar Cold War between the United States and China. While global political changes often have direct regional consequences, especially on the economies and fortunes of states in the region, their effect on the policies and attitudes of individual states may be exaggerated. Regional international politics have a rhythm that is more autonomous of the global order, even significant developments such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its aftereffects. This is because, on the one hand, for most states, local concerns usually predominate over global ones and, on the other hand, the effects of global changes on local issues are usually limited. Indeed, the potential effects of global changes tend to be viewed through a parochial lens and thus do not often lead to significant policy or attitudinal shifts. The implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for how South Asian states view their security problems is a good example. While several South Asian states have felt the knock-on effects of the Russian invasion, especially on their already struggling economies, it is unclear that security planners in the region see any clear lessons to be drawn from the war. India is an exception, as I outline below. However, even in the Indian case, the lessons from the war mostly appear to reinforce existing sentiments and policy approaches. The other South Asian states, except Pakistan, have neither the wherewithal nor the need to consider lessons from the faraway war. Pakistan, though more consequential, has been too beset by significant domestic political and economic problems to pay much attention or seriously consider these lessons either. Thus, this brief essay, which evaluates South Asia’s consideration of the security lessons of the Ukraine war, will largely, though not exclusively, confine itself to examining how India has assessed the war. Following the introduction, the first section of the essay will broadly outline the effects the Ukraine war has had on the South Asian region.
{"title":"Faraway War: Effects of the Ukraine War on South Asian Security Thinking","authors":"R. Rajagopalan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0019","url":null,"abstract":"The Russian invasion of Ukraine is potentially a turning point in global politics, serving as the indicator of a transition from a unipolar order to a new bipolar Cold War between the United States and China. While global political changes often have direct regional consequences, especially on the economies and fortunes of states in the region, their effect on the policies and attitudes of individual states may be exaggerated. Regional international politics have a rhythm that is more autonomous of the global order, even significant developments such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its aftereffects. This is because, on the one hand, for most states, local concerns usually predominate over global ones and, on the other hand, the effects of global changes on local issues are usually limited. Indeed, the potential effects of global changes tend to be viewed through a parochial lens and thus do not often lead to significant policy or attitudinal shifts. The implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for how South Asian states view their security problems is a good example. While several South Asian states have felt the knock-on effects of the Russian invasion, especially on their already struggling economies, it is unclear that security planners in the region see any clear lessons to be drawn from the war. India is an exception, as I outline below. However, even in the Indian case, the lessons from the war mostly appear to reinforce existing sentiments and policy approaches. The other South Asian states, except Pakistan, have neither the wherewithal nor the need to consider lessons from the faraway war. Pakistan, though more consequential, has been too beset by significant domestic political and economic problems to pay much attention or seriously consider these lessons either. Thus, this brief essay, which evaluates South Asia’s consideration of the security lessons of the Ukraine war, will largely, though not exclusively, confine itself to examining how India has assessed the war. Following the introduction, the first section of the essay will broadly outline the effects the Ukraine war has had on the South Asian region.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45014562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article assesses the role of maritime law-enforcement (MLE) vessels in an apparent trend of heightened competition in the South China Sea and identifies patterns in the maritime policing by MLE vessels of the disputing South China Sea claimants during unplanned encounters at sea.main argumentThe South China Sea disputes, involving six political entities—China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines—have been a political flashpoint in Southeast Asia since the 1970s. The emergence and growing prominence of civilian MLE vessels (conventionally known as marine police or coast guard vessels) suggests that disputants are taking new measures to assert their claims without overtly militarizing them. Maritime policing has increased in frequency and intensity in the past decade. Yet, when considering four factors—the use of forcible measures, physical damage, human injuries/casualties, and diplomatic protests—an analysis of publicly reported naval incidents in the South China Sea between 2010 and 2022 suggests that conflict escalation primarily happens at sea between the crews. Such incidents, which range from single-day events to months-long confrontations, have, in the worst cases, resulted in intense diplomatic standoffs lasting longer than two months. In general, however, disputants have refrained from taking hostile political or legal actions against harassment at sea.policy implications• Given that reducing misunderstanding and mitigating the risks of physical confrontations is of benefit to all the South China Sea disputants, ongoing talks for a code of conduct for the sea should include a proper legal framework for MLE operations. This framework—to be separate from the existing Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, which only applies to naval vessels—should stipulate the threat and/or use of force at sea by MLE vessels because coast guard enforcement duties may require different levels of force.• Disputants should re-establish and refocus talks to address joint fisheries and marine resource management in disputed waters. They would also benefit from reinforcing the regional hotline for maritime emergencies and setting up a crisis management hotline at the coast guard level.• Regional MLE agencies should increase communications both onshore and offshore and hold joint exercises and exchanges that would increase mutual understanding and trust, which would subsequently help prevent unexpected consequences.
{"title":"Law and (Dis)order in the South China Sea: Analyzing Maritime Law-Enforcement Activities in 2010–22","authors":"Hong-Kong T. Nguyen","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0027","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article assesses the role of maritime law-enforcement (MLE) vessels in an apparent trend of heightened competition in the South China Sea and identifies patterns in the maritime policing by MLE vessels of the disputing South China Sea claimants during unplanned encounters at sea.main argumentThe South China Sea disputes, involving six political entities—China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines—have been a political flashpoint in Southeast Asia since the 1970s. The emergence and growing prominence of civilian MLE vessels (conventionally known as marine police or coast guard vessels) suggests that disputants are taking new measures to assert their claims without overtly militarizing them. Maritime policing has increased in frequency and intensity in the past decade. Yet, when considering four factors—the use of forcible measures, physical damage, human injuries/casualties, and diplomatic protests—an analysis of publicly reported naval incidents in the South China Sea between 2010 and 2022 suggests that conflict escalation primarily happens at sea between the crews. Such incidents, which range from single-day events to months-long confrontations, have, in the worst cases, resulted in intense diplomatic standoffs lasting longer than two months. In general, however, disputants have refrained from taking hostile political or legal actions against harassment at sea.policy implications• Given that reducing misunderstanding and mitigating the risks of physical confrontations is of benefit to all the South China Sea disputants, ongoing talks for a code of conduct for the sea should include a proper legal framework for MLE operations. This framework—to be separate from the existing Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, which only applies to naval vessels—should stipulate the threat and/or use of force at sea by MLE vessels because coast guard enforcement duties may require different levels of force.• Disputants should re-establish and refocus talks to address joint fisheries and marine resource management in disputed waters. They would also benefit from reinforcing the regional hotline for maritime emergencies and setting up a crisis management hotline at the coast guard level.• Regional MLE agencies should increase communications both onshore and offshore and hold joint exercises and exchanges that would increase mutual understanding and trust, which would subsequently help prevent unexpected consequences.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44380555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Author's Response: Demographics Is Destiny—It's Just Difficult to Pinpoint When It Will Arrive and How Much It Will Hurt","authors":"T. Le","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49577702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T he end of 2022 marked a watershed moment for Japan’s military planning. A new National Security Strategy offered a sober assessment of the security environment in East Asia, clearly identifying the serious threats posed by Russia, North Korea, and especially China. The accompanying procurement plans included a commitment to making across-the-board improvements in defense capabilities, from acquiring new weapons systems such as long-range missiles to establishing a joint command to oversee the three Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) branches, expanding investments in space and cyber domains, and upgrading systems intelligence. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida further pledged to double Japan’s defense spending to 2% of GDP, eschewing a long-held norm that limited such spending to no more than 1%. These developments are sure to make many who follow Japan interested in reading Tom Phuong Le’s new book, Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century, which offers both important historical context and insights into the factors that are likely to shape Japan’s strategic choices for decades to come. Crucially, for Le, increases in Japan’s defense spending and capabilities do not necessarily mean that the country is remilitarizing. To the contrary, Le boldly asserts that Japan’s “antimilitarism ecosystem” is alive and well. This ecosystem is powerfully sustained by a set of material constraints and ideational restraints that “have limited [Japan’s] embrace of conventional militarism as a tool of statecraft” (p. 6). In other words, Japan may develop capabilities to better defend itself, but Le argues that the country will remain committed to only limited uses of force for the foreseeable future. As suggested by the title, aging is an important theme of the book—with “aging” here referring both literally to the immense challenges posed by Japan’s rapidly aging population and figuratively to interpretations that can carry either positive (e.g., wisdom) or negative (e.g., being out of date) connotations. Demographics are thus only part of the story, as the
{"title":"Japan's Aging Antimilitarism Is Alive and Well","authors":"C. McClean","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0025","url":null,"abstract":"T he end of 2022 marked a watershed moment for Japan’s military planning. A new National Security Strategy offered a sober assessment of the security environment in East Asia, clearly identifying the serious threats posed by Russia, North Korea, and especially China. The accompanying procurement plans included a commitment to making across-the-board improvements in defense capabilities, from acquiring new weapons systems such as long-range missiles to establishing a joint command to oversee the three Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) branches, expanding investments in space and cyber domains, and upgrading systems intelligence. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida further pledged to double Japan’s defense spending to 2% of GDP, eschewing a long-held norm that limited such spending to no more than 1%. These developments are sure to make many who follow Japan interested in reading Tom Phuong Le’s new book, Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century, which offers both important historical context and insights into the factors that are likely to shape Japan’s strategic choices for decades to come. Crucially, for Le, increases in Japan’s defense spending and capabilities do not necessarily mean that the country is remilitarizing. To the contrary, Le boldly asserts that Japan’s “antimilitarism ecosystem” is alive and well. This ecosystem is powerfully sustained by a set of material constraints and ideational restraints that “have limited [Japan’s] embrace of conventional militarism as a tool of statecraft” (p. 6). In other words, Japan may develop capabilities to better defend itself, but Le argues that the country will remain committed to only limited uses of force for the foreseeable future. As suggested by the title, aging is an important theme of the book—with “aging” here referring both literally to the immense challenges posed by Japan’s rapidly aging population and figuratively to interpretations that can carry either positive (e.g., wisdom) or negative (e.g., being out of date) connotations. Demographics are thus only part of the story, as the","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42438974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W ith Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century, Tom Phuong Le has written what is arguably the most comprehensive and compelling scholarly book-length study to address the question “can Japan become a major military power?” Moreover, the book answers with a resounding “no.” Le devotes two chapters to explaining the demographic and technical-infrastructural constraints on Japan’s industry and economy that he identifies as major barriers to Japan’s reemergence as a major military power. Nonetheless, at the heart of Le’s argument are claims that antimilitarism, peace culture, and normative restraints prevent Japan from reemerging as a major military power, which is what one would expect from an unabashedly constructivist work. Two years after its publication, the material constraints identified in Le’s book, especially demographic, but also technological and economic, have changed little or become even more binding. But what about the ideational constraints on the country’s reemergence as a military power, specifically antimilitarism, peace culture, and political and normative restraints? While they still exist, it is easy to argue that since 2021, and especially 2022, these ideational constraints have become far less limiting. Many observers argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s large-scale military exercises around Taiwan following the visit of U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to that island in August 2022, have redrawn the baseline for how the Japanese public views issues of war and peace, creating a far more permissive environment for Japan to “finally cast off pacifism” (something that pundits have been telling us at regular intervals over the past thirty years has just been achieved) and reemerge as a great military power. Certainly, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, opinion polls in Japan showed a jump in support for increasing military spending. A plurality or small majority of those polled also supported Japan’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, which would allow the country to attack military bases in foreign countries. Following this shift, the Kishida administration announced a dramatic increase in Japan’s defense spending (although less than the doubling that had originally been discussed) as well as plans to
{"title":"Is Japan's Aging Peace Aging Gracefully?","authors":"P. Midford","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0026","url":null,"abstract":"W ith Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century, Tom Phuong Le has written what is arguably the most comprehensive and compelling scholarly book-length study to address the question “can Japan become a major military power?” Moreover, the book answers with a resounding “no.” Le devotes two chapters to explaining the demographic and technical-infrastructural constraints on Japan’s industry and economy that he identifies as major barriers to Japan’s reemergence as a major military power. Nonetheless, at the heart of Le’s argument are claims that antimilitarism, peace culture, and normative restraints prevent Japan from reemerging as a major military power, which is what one would expect from an unabashedly constructivist work. Two years after its publication, the material constraints identified in Le’s book, especially demographic, but also technological and economic, have changed little or become even more binding. But what about the ideational constraints on the country’s reemergence as a military power, specifically antimilitarism, peace culture, and political and normative restraints? While they still exist, it is easy to argue that since 2021, and especially 2022, these ideational constraints have become far less limiting. Many observers argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s large-scale military exercises around Taiwan following the visit of U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to that island in August 2022, have redrawn the baseline for how the Japanese public views issues of war and peace, creating a far more permissive environment for Japan to “finally cast off pacifism” (something that pundits have been telling us at regular intervals over the past thirty years has just been achieved) and reemerge as a great military power. Certainly, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, opinion polls in Japan showed a jump in support for increasing military spending. A plurality or small majority of those polled also supported Japan’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities, which would allow the country to attack military bases in foreign countries. Following this shift, the Kishida administration announced a dramatic increase in Japan’s defense spending (although less than the doubling that had originally been discussed) as well as plans to","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47458425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article argues that, for India, economic decoupling from China in the aftermath of the 2020 Galwan Valley clash that led to casualties on both sides is difficult in the short to medium term and is detrimental to the Indian economy.main argumentIndia's recent attempts at economic decoupling—attempts to reduce its economic dependence on China—have so far failed as evidenced by an increase in bilateral trade in 2021 relative to 2019 and 2020. Economic decoupling from China is infeasible in the near to medium term because the Chinese economy is deeply intertwined with the Indian economy. It will be expensive, and in some cases impossible, to replace China as a supplier in economic value chains. Moreover, reducing imports from China or restricting Chinese investment does not greatly hurt or punish China because its exports to and investments in India are a very small proportion of its global exports and investments. On the contrary, restricting investments from China into India will damage India much more than it will China. Chinese investments in India can play an important role in enhancing economic growth in the post-pandemic period by creating employment, strengthening the manufacturing sector, improving infrastructure, and increasing exports under Indian government's Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan ("self-reliant India campaign").policy implications• Economic decoupling will not restore the status quo ante on the disputed border.• India should focus on enhancing exports and improving market access in China to reduce its trade deficit.• Since Chinese enterprises intend to stay in India and there will always be security concerns regarding Chinese investments in the country, it is imperative for India to develop transparent and rational protocols to increase Chinese investments in a sensible and secure manner.• The Indian government should realize that protectionism is not a solution for the country's economic and political problems and instead undertake further economic reforms to boost national economic growth.
{"title":"India's Economic Decoupling from China: A Critical Analysis","authors":"R. Verma","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0011","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article argues that, for India, economic decoupling from China in the aftermath of the 2020 Galwan Valley clash that led to casualties on both sides is difficult in the short to medium term and is detrimental to the Indian economy.main argumentIndia's recent attempts at economic decoupling—attempts to reduce its economic dependence on China—have so far failed as evidenced by an increase in bilateral trade in 2021 relative to 2019 and 2020. Economic decoupling from China is infeasible in the near to medium term because the Chinese economy is deeply intertwined with the Indian economy. It will be expensive, and in some cases impossible, to replace China as a supplier in economic value chains. Moreover, reducing imports from China or restricting Chinese investment does not greatly hurt or punish China because its exports to and investments in India are a very small proportion of its global exports and investments. On the contrary, restricting investments from China into India will damage India much more than it will China. Chinese investments in India can play an important role in enhancing economic growth in the post-pandemic period by creating employment, strengthening the manufacturing sector, improving infrastructure, and increasing exports under Indian government's Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan (\"self-reliant India campaign\").policy implications• Economic decoupling will not restore the status quo ante on the disputed border.• India should focus on enhancing exports and improving market access in China to reduce its trade deficit.• Since Chinese enterprises intend to stay in India and there will always be security concerns regarding Chinese investments in the country, it is imperative for India to develop transparent and rational protocols to increase Chinese investments in a sensible and secure manner.• The Indian government should realize that protectionism is not a solution for the country's economic and political problems and instead undertake further economic reforms to boost national economic growth.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45723744","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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