F or decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to—if not in excess of—any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1 Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.3 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy
{"title":"For Canada, Insularism Leads to a Lost Opportunity in the Arctic and Asia","authors":"J. Reeves","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"F or decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to—if not in excess of—any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1 Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.3 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"12 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47900946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A t the time of writing, young Chinese are gathering in cities across China, as well as on university campuses around the world, to protest their country’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy. And they are raising demands that are bracingly political, including calls for freedom of speech, for an end to concentration camps for Uighurs, and for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to step down. With this historic upsurge seizing our attention, it is worth remembering that protests are actually extremely common in China but normally take a less overtly political form. Farmers clash with police over water pollution. Workers routinely strike over low wages. Homeowners demand compensation when city redevelopment projects threaten their apartments. In her excellent new book, Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China, Lynette H. Ong examines the “everyday state power” deployed to contain these instances of what James C. Scott has called “everyday resistance.” Focusing on conflicts related to urbanization, in particular, Ong theorizes two approaches used by local authorities: handing violence off to thugs-for-hire in an effort at ensuring deniability, and relying on volunteer brokers with different degrees of independence from the state to use personal relationships to “mobilize the masses” into supporting, or at least acquiescing to, government plans. Although one of these approaches is coercive and the other is largely persuasive, they both involve exercising power “via society itself” (p. 5). Ong’s volume adds to a growing body of work that explores the great variety of Chinese actors either on the far fringes of the state or in a gray zone between state and society that help the government realize its objectives.1 Anyone who has conducted research or done business or worked
{"title":"China's Informal Tools of Grassroots Control","authors":"M. Elfstrom","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0012","url":null,"abstract":"A t the time of writing, young Chinese are gathering in cities across China, as well as on university campuses around the world, to protest their country’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy. And they are raising demands that are bracingly political, including calls for freedom of speech, for an end to concentration camps for Uighurs, and for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to step down. With this historic upsurge seizing our attention, it is worth remembering that protests are actually extremely common in China but normally take a less overtly political form. Farmers clash with police over water pollution. Workers routinely strike over low wages. Homeowners demand compensation when city redevelopment projects threaten their apartments. In her excellent new book, Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China, Lynette H. Ong examines the “everyday state power” deployed to contain these instances of what James C. Scott has called “everyday resistance.” Focusing on conflicts related to urbanization, in particular, Ong theorizes two approaches used by local authorities: handing violence off to thugs-for-hire in an effort at ensuring deniability, and relying on volunteer brokers with different degrees of independence from the state to use personal relationships to “mobilize the masses” into supporting, or at least acquiescing to, government plans. Although one of these approaches is coercive and the other is largely persuasive, they both involve exercising power “via society itself” (p. 5). Ong’s volume adds to a growing body of work that explores the great variety of Chinese actors either on the far fringes of the state or in a gray zone between state and society that help the government realize its objectives.1 Anyone who has conducted research or done business or worked","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"168 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47317219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T he Arctic is experiencing greatly accelerated change under the influence of climate change, economic globalization, and world power shifts. After China became an official observer state of the Arctic Council in 2013, its involvement in Arctic affairs has grown increasingly and intensively. It has been particularly prominent in three areas: science, economics, and governance. When China became an observer state, few people could have predicted the extent to which the world would change over the next decade. At that time, China did not stand out so much from the other four new observer countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India). Features such as Japan’s close scientific cooperation with Arctic countries, South Korea’s shipbuilding skills, and Singapore’s important shipping position are why they have been granted observer status. A year later, however, a series of black swan events occurred, starting with the Crimean crisis in 2014. Like dominoes, the world landscape has since shifted dramatically. In 2016, Britain announced its departure from the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. After then U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered an infamous speech at the ministerial meeting in 2019 warning China and Russia against “aggressive behavior,” the Arctic Council closed for the first time without issuing a joint statement.1 In the speech, Pompeo used metaphorical and parallel questions to warn about China’s presence in the Arctic, such as “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”2 However, this situation cannot happen because China has no legal right to claim any territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. Moreover, the only territorial dispute in the Arctic—over the small island Hans Island between Canada
{"title":"China's Arctic Policy and Engagement: Review and Prospects","authors":"Yitong Chen","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0005","url":null,"abstract":"T he Arctic is experiencing greatly accelerated change under the influence of climate change, economic globalization, and world power shifts. After China became an official observer state of the Arctic Council in 2013, its involvement in Arctic affairs has grown increasingly and intensively. It has been particularly prominent in three areas: science, economics, and governance. When China became an observer state, few people could have predicted the extent to which the world would change over the next decade. At that time, China did not stand out so much from the other four new observer countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India). Features such as Japan’s close scientific cooperation with Arctic countries, South Korea’s shipbuilding skills, and Singapore’s important shipping position are why they have been granted observer status. A year later, however, a series of black swan events occurred, starting with the Crimean crisis in 2014. Like dominoes, the world landscape has since shifted dramatically. In 2016, Britain announced its departure from the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. After then U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered an infamous speech at the ministerial meeting in 2019 warning China and Russia against “aggressive behavior,” the Arctic Council closed for the first time without issuing a joint statement.1 In the speech, Pompeo used metaphorical and parallel questions to warn about China’s presence in the Arctic, such as “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”2 However, this situation cannot happen because China has no legal right to claim any territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. Moreover, the only territorial dispute in the Arctic—over the small island Hans Island between Canada","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"29 - 38"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42636511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article examines how Beijing's economic sanctions on Australia have encouraged Canberra to double down on its balancing strategy toward China.main argumentWith the relationship already under pressure, political discord between Australia and China was exacerbated in April 2020 by Australia's call for an independent investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 virus. In response, Beijing has since targeted several Australian industries with economic sanctions, using economic coercion to express its hostility toward Canberra's actions. Far from causing Australia to acquiesce to Beijing's preferences, however, China's economic coercion has perversely empowered Canberra and given it confidence to shore up the country's influence in the Indo-Pacific area and balance against China on both conventional and new fronts. At the same time, the source of this confidence may not be sustainable, and balancing should not be the only feature of Australia's policy toward China or preclude efforts to reset the relationship.policy implications• China is not a strategic competitor to Australia, and Australia's strategic interests cannot be achieved without a functioning, constructive relationship with China. Diplomacy, reassurances, and cooperation must also accompany other efforts to balance China.• To attain a bilateral relationship with China that benefits Australia's overall national interest, the Australian government should carefully manage the diplomatic signals it sends to guide China's expectations of Australia, and it should at the same time manage its own expectations of China.• Australian policymakers should improve their understanding of the psychological makeup of Chinese leaders and their strategic culture to help avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings in China's motives and foreign policies and to better interpret signals from Beijing aimed at thawing the relationship.
{"title":"Balancing against China with Confidence: Australia's Foreign Policy toward China in 2020–22","authors":"Ye Xue","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article examines how Beijing's economic sanctions on Australia have encouraged Canberra to double down on its balancing strategy toward China.main argumentWith the relationship already under pressure, political discord between Australia and China was exacerbated in April 2020 by Australia's call for an independent investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 virus. In response, Beijing has since targeted several Australian industries with economic sanctions, using economic coercion to express its hostility toward Canberra's actions. Far from causing Australia to acquiesce to Beijing's preferences, however, China's economic coercion has perversely empowered Canberra and given it confidence to shore up the country's influence in the Indo-Pacific area and balance against China on both conventional and new fronts. At the same time, the source of this confidence may not be sustainable, and balancing should not be the only feature of Australia's policy toward China or preclude efforts to reset the relationship.policy implications• China is not a strategic competitor to Australia, and Australia's strategic interests cannot be achieved without a functioning, constructive relationship with China. Diplomacy, reassurances, and cooperation must also accompany other efforts to balance China.• To attain a bilateral relationship with China that benefits Australia's overall national interest, the Australian government should carefully manage the diplomatic signals it sends to guide China's expectations of Australia, and it should at the same time manage its own expectations of China.• Australian policymakers should improve their understanding of the psychological makeup of Chinese leaders and their strategic culture to help avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings in China's motives and foreign policies and to better interpret signals from Beijing aimed at thawing the relationship.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"115 - 141"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46801705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I t is difficult to read Lynette H. Ong’s Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China and not be constantly reminded of China’s pandemic response, in which the Chinese party-state implemented often harsh and controversial lockdowns. The local nature of the lockdowns, however, allowed the top leadership to distance itself from excesses, with Xi Jinping early in the pandemic even blaming “some localities” for misimplementation and “criminal acts.”1 But this tactic is not only a privilege of the central government. The local party-state also deploys third-party agents to shield itself from blame for oftentimes crude implementation and to enhance its capacity. Outsourcing Repression, based on Ong’s fieldwork conducted before the Covid-19 outbreak, exposes these mechanisms used by the local party-states and reveals deeper underlying structures in their operations. The book, therefore, is timely, examining how the government can marshal third-party agents to implement often unpopular policies and exact compliance from the citizenry. In the book, Ong distinguishes between “thugs-for-hire” and “brokers” that together constitute “everyday state power” (p. 3), which she defines as “the state’s exercise of power through society, or via society itself” (p. 5). As she notes, the categories are “conceptually distinct and by and large mutually exclusive” (p. 99). Thugs-for-hire use violent coercion (p. 31) to impose the party-state’s will, thereby representing the “stick” that, in the ideal case, lends plausible deniability to the state. “Brokers,” on the other hand, are largely nonviolent (p. 99), use emotional mobilization to persuade and psychologically coerce participants, and are “legitimizing vehicles of state repression” (p. 33). Their success hinges on “legitimacy, or legitimation by the actor who persuades” (p. 36). While this might augment state
{"title":"Puppets or Agents? \"Thugs-for-Hire\" and Brokers between State and Society","authors":"J. Mittelstaedt","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0014","url":null,"abstract":"I t is difficult to read Lynette H. Ong’s Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China and not be constantly reminded of China’s pandemic response, in which the Chinese party-state implemented often harsh and controversial lockdowns. The local nature of the lockdowns, however, allowed the top leadership to distance itself from excesses, with Xi Jinping early in the pandemic even blaming “some localities” for misimplementation and “criminal acts.”1 But this tactic is not only a privilege of the central government. The local party-state also deploys third-party agents to shield itself from blame for oftentimes crude implementation and to enhance its capacity. Outsourcing Repression, based on Ong’s fieldwork conducted before the Covid-19 outbreak, exposes these mechanisms used by the local party-states and reveals deeper underlying structures in their operations. The book, therefore, is timely, examining how the government can marshal third-party agents to implement often unpopular policies and exact compliance from the citizenry. In the book, Ong distinguishes between “thugs-for-hire” and “brokers” that together constitute “everyday state power” (p. 3), which she defines as “the state’s exercise of power through society, or via society itself” (p. 5). As she notes, the categories are “conceptually distinct and by and large mutually exclusive” (p. 99). Thugs-for-hire use violent coercion (p. 31) to impose the party-state’s will, thereby representing the “stick” that, in the ideal case, lends plausible deniability to the state. “Brokers,” on the other hand, are largely nonviolent (p. 99), use emotional mobilization to persuade and psychologically coerce participants, and are “legitimizing vehicles of state repression” (p. 33). Their success hinges on “legitimacy, or legitimation by the actor who persuades” (p. 36). While this might augment state","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"175 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43253128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B y the late 2030s, the Arctic may be largely ice-free in the summers. Ongoing environmental changes in the Arctic, such as those resulting from climate change, both pose a significant threat to the ecosystems and livelihoods of the Indigenous peoples there and serve as a warning about the precariousness of the global climate system. Unfortunately, however, even as these changes are already underway, we still need more data about many aspects of the Arctic. For example, the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, ratified in 2021, regulated commercial fishing in the region due to inadequate information about the fish species available. Thus, we need to collaborate with various stakeholders to ensure a sustainable Arctic. First, it is vital to deepen discussions and knowledge exchanges about the Arctic between nations through multilateral and serial events, including the Arctic Circle Forums, the meetings of the International Symposium on Arctic Research, the Arctic Frontiers conferences, and the meetings of the Arctic Encounter Symposium. Second, the efforts of Track 1.5 diplomacy—such as the Arctic Cooperation Seminar hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada that formed the basis for this roundtable—are also important. We need academics and think tank experts to act as knowledge brokers to facilitate information sharing between governments and the public and to promote evidence-based research about the Arctic in interdisciplinary fields. Finally, I would like to encourage more Arctic youth forums. Young people are future leaders and should take a proactive role in shaping global environmental issues. The Arctic region must embody international cooperation and be the “ocean of collaboration.” Data sharing between the Arctic and non-Arctic nations is especially critical to facilitate scientific understanding and peace in the region. As Arctic affairs are shared issues for all humankind, non-Arctic states in Asia and elsewhere should be included in these critical dialogues. This inclusivity sends a powerful message under the theme of “knowledge for a sustainable Arctic” that can strengthen a functional and effective international cooperative system for the future.
{"title":"Prefatory Notes to the Roundtable: Arctic Collaboration","authors":"Yoko Kamikawa","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"B y the late 2030s, the Arctic may be largely ice-free in the summers. Ongoing environmental changes in the Arctic, such as those resulting from climate change, both pose a significant threat to the ecosystems and livelihoods of the Indigenous peoples there and serve as a warning about the precariousness of the global climate system. Unfortunately, however, even as these changes are already underway, we still need more data about many aspects of the Arctic. For example, the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, ratified in 2021, regulated commercial fishing in the region due to inadequate information about the fish species available. Thus, we need to collaborate with various stakeholders to ensure a sustainable Arctic. First, it is vital to deepen discussions and knowledge exchanges about the Arctic between nations through multilateral and serial events, including the Arctic Circle Forums, the meetings of the International Symposium on Arctic Research, the Arctic Frontiers conferences, and the meetings of the Arctic Encounter Symposium. Second, the efforts of Track 1.5 diplomacy—such as the Arctic Cooperation Seminar hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada that formed the basis for this roundtable—are also important. We need academics and think tank experts to act as knowledge brokers to facilitate information sharing between governments and the public and to promote evidence-based research about the Arctic in interdisciplinary fields. Finally, I would like to encourage more Arctic youth forums. Young people are future leaders and should take a proactive role in shaping global environmental issues. The Arctic region must embody international cooperation and be the “ocean of collaboration.” Data sharing between the Arctic and non-Arctic nations is especially critical to facilitate scientific understanding and peace in the region. As Arctic affairs are shared issues for all humankind, non-Arctic states in Asia and elsewhere should be included in these critical dialogues. This inclusivity sends a powerful message under the theme of “knowledge for a sustainable Arctic” that can strengthen a functional and effective international cooperative system for the future.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"2 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46475286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T raditionally an isolated and low-tension region, the Arctic is known for its extraordinary beauty and pristine wilderness. The region is recognized as one of the last resource-rich frontiers—it holds 22% of the world’s oil and natural gas resources, is home to more than 21,000 known species, and contains two commercially viable shipping routes that could potentially reshape the future of international trade.1 As the sea ice over the central Arctic Ocean has long kept the region inaccessible, Arctic affairs have customarily been prioritized on the policy agendas of only the eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. However, this situation has begun to change in recent decades as the region becomes more accessible due to climate change, ecological degradation, and a consequent rise in economic and geostrategic opportunities. The Arctic is now a new frontier that has piqued the interest of international actors, especially ones from the Asia-Pacific region. In 2013, at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in Sweden, the Arctic Council granted China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Singapore the status of observer states.2 The Arctic Council is a critical governmental forum for Arctic cooperation with decisions made by the eight Arctic nations and the permanent participants.3 Although observer members are limited to observation of the work of the council and involvement in specific working groups, prior to the Kiruna decision the council’s observer states only comprised European countries. The admission of these Asian observers was
{"title":"Introduction: The Rise of Asian State Actors in the Arctic","authors":"Angela Wang","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0002","url":null,"abstract":"T raditionally an isolated and low-tension region, the Arctic is known for its extraordinary beauty and pristine wilderness. The region is recognized as one of the last resource-rich frontiers—it holds 22% of the world’s oil and natural gas resources, is home to more than 21,000 known species, and contains two commercially viable shipping routes that could potentially reshape the future of international trade.1 As the sea ice over the central Arctic Ocean has long kept the region inaccessible, Arctic affairs have customarily been prioritized on the policy agendas of only the eight Arctic states—Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. However, this situation has begun to change in recent decades as the region becomes more accessible due to climate change, ecological degradation, and a consequent rise in economic and geostrategic opportunities. The Arctic is now a new frontier that has piqued the interest of international actors, especially ones from the Asia-Pacific region. In 2013, at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting in Sweden, the Arctic Council granted China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Singapore the status of observer states.2 The Arctic Council is a critical governmental forum for Arctic cooperation with decisions made by the eight Arctic nations and the permanent participants.3 Although observer members are limited to observation of the work of the council and involvement in specific working groups, prior to the Kiruna decision the council’s observer states only comprised European countries. The admission of these Asian observers was","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"11 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41603584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article evaluates China's strategy in the Yellow Sea by synthesizing relevant discourse, interests, capabilities, and behavior through an analysis of Chinese sources and the compilation of an original dataset of Chinese military activities in these waters.main argumentChina's Yellow Sea strategy has received less scholarly and policy attention than its approaches to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. However, China has significant economic and strategic reasons to prioritize its presence in these waters, including ongoing sovereignty disputes with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Chinese military exercises in the Yellow Sea have increased in recent years, with gray-zone activities playing a distant, secondary role to traditional military exercises. Moreover, China's propaganda approach has been relatively limited and moderate, and thus there is still time to shape Beijing's thinking and approach to these waters.policy implications• While Chinese maritime ambitions are arguably more limited in the Yellow Sea than the South and East China Seas, China's expanding military capabilities and subsequent uptick in military activity demand a greater policy focus there.• The U.S. should pursue a proactive hedging strategy toward China in the Yellow Sea. This could entail seeking cooperation with Beijing to address shared security threats, like North Korean WMD proliferation, while also preparing to respond strongly if China's ambitions change or if it begins a more extensive coercive campaign for exclusive control of these waters.• The U.S.-ROK alliance should adapt to China's increasing activities in the Yellow Sea by increasing joint monitoring, contingency planning, and consultations about the degree to which the alliance covers the protection of ROK forces, aircraft, and civilian vessels operating in the sea.
{"title":"The Next Flashpoint? China, the Republic of Korea, and the Yellow Sea","authors":"O. Mastro","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0008","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article evaluates China's strategy in the Yellow Sea by synthesizing relevant discourse, interests, capabilities, and behavior through an analysis of Chinese sources and the compilation of an original dataset of Chinese military activities in these waters.main argumentChina's Yellow Sea strategy has received less scholarly and policy attention than its approaches to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. However, China has significant economic and strategic reasons to prioritize its presence in these waters, including ongoing sovereignty disputes with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Chinese military exercises in the Yellow Sea have increased in recent years, with gray-zone activities playing a distant, secondary role to traditional military exercises. Moreover, China's propaganda approach has been relatively limited and moderate, and thus there is still time to shape Beijing's thinking and approach to these waters.policy implications• While Chinese maritime ambitions are arguably more limited in the Yellow Sea than the South and East China Seas, China's expanding military capabilities and subsequent uptick in military activity demand a greater policy focus there.• The U.S. should pursue a proactive hedging strategy toward China in the Yellow Sea. This could entail seeking cooperation with Beijing to address shared security threats, like North Korean WMD proliferation, while also preparing to respond strongly if China's ambitions change or if it begins a more extensive coercive campaign for exclusive control of these waters.• The U.S.-ROK alliance should adapt to China's increasing activities in the Yellow Sea by increasing joint monitoring, contingency planning, and consultations about the degree to which the alliance covers the protection of ROK forces, aircraft, and civilian vessels operating in the sea.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"67 - 93"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48955104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asian States and the Arctic Ocean","authors":"H. Sakaguchi","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"3 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44396734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay summarizes key trends and drivers in Japan's climate policy, with an emphasis on the acceleration of commitments and policies that has taken place during the Suga and Kishida cabinets, and reviews the policy implications.main argumentJapan's climate policy development has been dominated by a technocratic policy triangle that includes the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; politicians within the dominant Liberal Democratic Party; and industry. This triangle has generated cautious policymaking characterized by gradualism and a focus on the long-term viability of existing industrial assets. However, the acceleration of climate policy under the Suga and Kishida governments of the last two years has been driven by political leadership in response to both competition in East Asia and overtures from the Biden administration. Most crucially, Japan's stepped-up commitments include a comprehensive vision of economic and energy security that views the current competition over green technology in the Indo-Pacific as crucial for future economic competitiveness. Under the Green Transformation (GX) strategy, industrial policy is back.policy implications • Energy security and industrial competitiveness are driving the new Japanese approach to climate policy. In the context of a tighter geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific area, this approach opens more avenues for cooperation with key allies and partners.• The Kishida cabinet is emphasizing several key policy sectors: solar energy, nuclear energy revival, ammonia and hydrogen innovation in combination with continued clean coal use, and electric vehicles.• Japan's climate policy approach will have a strong focus on innovation, competition, and industrial renewal, focusing as much on the supply side as the demand side.
{"title":"Kishida's Climate Policy and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Cooperation","authors":"Yves Tiberghien","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0007","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay summarizes key trends and drivers in Japan's climate policy, with an emphasis on the acceleration of commitments and policies that has taken place during the Suga and Kishida cabinets, and reviews the policy implications.main argumentJapan's climate policy development has been dominated by a technocratic policy triangle that includes the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; politicians within the dominant Liberal Democratic Party; and industry. This triangle has generated cautious policymaking characterized by gradualism and a focus on the long-term viability of existing industrial assets. However, the acceleration of climate policy under the Suga and Kishida governments of the last two years has been driven by political leadership in response to both competition in East Asia and overtures from the Biden administration. Most crucially, Japan's stepped-up commitments include a comprehensive vision of economic and energy security that views the current competition over green technology in the Indo-Pacific as crucial for future economic competitiveness. Under the Green Transformation (GX) strategy, industrial policy is back.policy implications • Energy security and industrial competitiveness are driving the new Japanese approach to climate policy. In the context of a tighter geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific area, this approach opens more avenues for cooperation with key allies and partners.• The Kishida cabinet is emphasizing several key policy sectors: solar energy, nuclear energy revival, ammonia and hydrogen innovation in combination with continued clean coal use, and electric vehicles.• Japan's climate policy approach will have a strong focus on innovation, competition, and industrial renewal, focusing as much on the supply side as the demand side.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"49 - 65"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66395577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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