I n the post–Cold War era, incumbents in authoritarian regimes have increased their toolkit for repression. In addition to blatant, forceful forms of repression (such as making mass arrests and shooting protesters), less visible, more sophisticated means of coercion have become vital components of a regime’s repertoire to stifle unrest. Joining a bourgeoning literature on authoritarian repression, Lynette H. Ong’s book Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China presents a rigorous account of how the Chinese state takes advantage of nonstate actors to impose violent and nonviolent methods of social control. In particular, the book elaborates on how authorities hire private agents (e.g., thugs and gangsters) and rely on grassroots brokers (including local elders and members of urban residents’ committees) to neutralize social protests against land appropriation and housing demolition in urban and rural China. Outsourcing Repression is highly relevant for anyone seeking to understand state repression, urbanization, and Chinese politics. Regarding violent acts carried out by thugs-for-hire, Ong describes these thugs’ typical profile and the conditions under which they operate. She argues that such everyday repression is a lower-cost strategy that can minimize the likelihood of social protest and violent backlash—as long as any violence remains low-intensity, severe casualties or significant confrontations do not result, and no overt government complicity is involved. Yet, once any of these conditions fails to be satisfied, thugs-for-hire are no longer a low-cost repressive measure but a liability to the hiring authority. This paves the way for the state to increasingly turn to brokers and nonviolent tactics to resolve conflicts in demolition projects. These brokers are classified into three types (political, social, and economic), depending on the sources of their brokerage—whether their power or legitimacy stems from their state or quasi-state status, their social capital, or their role in bridging information asymmetry between state and society.
在后冷战时代，专制政权的在位者增加了镇压手段。除了明目张胆的强力镇压(如大规模逮捕和射杀抗议者)，不那么明显、更复杂的强制手段已成为一个政权压制骚乱的重要手段。Lynette H. Ong的书《外包镇压:当代中国的日常国家权力》加入了一个新兴的关于专制镇压的文献，该书严谨地描述了中国政府如何利用非国家行为体来实施暴力和非暴力的社会控制方法。特别是，这本书详细阐述了当局如何雇用私人代理人(如暴徒和黑帮)并依靠基层经纪人(包括当地长老和城市居民委员会成员)来中和中国城乡反对土地征用和房屋拆迁的社会抗议活动。对于任何想要了解国家镇压、城市化和中国政治的人来说，外包镇压都是非常重要的。关于雇佣暴徒的暴力行为，王描述了这些暴徒的典型特征和他们的运作条件。她认为，这种日常镇压是一种低成本的策略，可以最大限度地减少社会抗议和暴力反弹的可能性——只要任何暴力保持低强度，不会造成严重伤亡或重大对抗，并且没有公开的政府共谋。然而，一旦这些条件中的任何一个没有得到满足，雇佣暴徒就不再是一种低成本的镇压手段，而是雇佣当局的责任。这为政府越来越多地转向经纪人和非暴力策略来解决拆迁项目中的冲突铺平了道路。这些经纪人被分为三种类型(政治、社会和经济)，这取决于他们的经纪来源——他们的权力或合法性是来自他们的国家或准国家地位、他们的社会资本，还是他们在弥合国家和社会之间信息不对称方面的作用。
{"title":"Exposing Repression Behind the Scenes","authors":"Yao Li","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0013","url":null,"abstract":"I n the post–Cold War era, incumbents in authoritarian regimes have increased their toolkit for repression. In addition to blatant, forceful forms of repression (such as making mass arrests and shooting protesters), less visible, more sophisticated means of coercion have become vital components of a regime’s repertoire to stifle unrest. Joining a bourgeoning literature on authoritarian repression, Lynette H. Ong’s book Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China presents a rigorous account of how the Chinese state takes advantage of nonstate actors to impose violent and nonviolent methods of social control. In particular, the book elaborates on how authorities hire private agents (e.g., thugs and gangsters) and rely on grassroots brokers (including local elders and members of urban residents’ committees) to neutralize social protests against land appropriation and housing demolition in urban and rural China. Outsourcing Repression is highly relevant for anyone seeking to understand state repression, urbanization, and Chinese politics. Regarding violent acts carried out by thugs-for-hire, Ong describes these thugs’ typical profile and the conditions under which they operate. She argues that such everyday repression is a lower-cost strategy that can minimize the likelihood of social protest and violent backlash—as long as any violence remains low-intensity, severe casualties or significant confrontations do not result, and no overt government complicity is involved. Yet, once any of these conditions fails to be satisfied, thugs-for-hire are no longer a low-cost repressive measure but a liability to the hiring authority. This paves the way for the state to increasingly turn to brokers and nonviolent tactics to resolve conflicts in demolition projects. These brokers are classified into three types (political, social, and economic), depending on the sources of their brokerage—whether their power or legitimacy stems from their state or quasi-state status, their social capital, or their role in bridging information asymmetry between state and society.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"172 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48842905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay examines the potential for shifts in Russia's strategy toward the Korean Peninsula in light of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and South Korea's reaction.main argumentFor nearly 30 years, Russia has pursued a strategy of "diplomatic equidistance" toward the Korean Peninsula. By striving to maintain relatively balanced ties with both North and South Korea, the Kremlin has attempted to preserve a degree of influence on its eastern periphery in Northeast Asia, which is largely dominated by the U.S. and China. Pyongyang's and Seoul's respective responses to Russia's military aggression in Eastern Europe, however, have opened the possibility that Moscow could shift toward a strategy that favors North Korea over South Korea.policy implications• Should Russia decide to pursue closer ties with North Korea at a time when Russia–South Korea relations have cooled, the Kremlin may find that supporting the North could increase its influence in Northeast Asia as well as present a challenge to the U.S. Nevertheless, Moscow would also risk losing the limited influence on the Korean Peninsula it has acquired as a result of its equidistance strategy.• South Korea faces a period of uncertainty in relations with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. While it is unlikely that Moscow and Seoul will enact the economic cooperation that they had previously envisioned, South Korea may hope to salvage ties with Russia to improve the balance on the Korean Peninsula. Yet with increased fears that North Korea–Russia relations may strengthen, South Korea has reason to be skeptical of cooperation.• The U.S. will need to be prepared for several possible developments in terms of Russia's standing on the Korean Peninsula. Should South Korea elect to try to preserve cooperation with Russia, this may cause a further rift in the U.S.–South Korea alliance. If Moscow doubles down on its relationship with Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington will need to be prepared to jointly address such a development with implications for the Northeast Asian subregion and Russia-U.S. ties.
{"title":"The Russia–South Korea Relationship after Russia's Invasion of Ukraine and Implications for the U.S.-ROK Alliance","authors":"Anthony V. Rinna","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0009","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines the potential for shifts in Russia's strategy toward the Korean Peninsula in light of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and South Korea's reaction.main argumentFor nearly 30 years, Russia has pursued a strategy of \"diplomatic equidistance\" toward the Korean Peninsula. By striving to maintain relatively balanced ties with both North and South Korea, the Kremlin has attempted to preserve a degree of influence on its eastern periphery in Northeast Asia, which is largely dominated by the U.S. and China. Pyongyang's and Seoul's respective responses to Russia's military aggression in Eastern Europe, however, have opened the possibility that Moscow could shift toward a strategy that favors North Korea over South Korea.policy implications• Should Russia decide to pursue closer ties with North Korea at a time when Russia–South Korea relations have cooled, the Kremlin may find that supporting the North could increase its influence in Northeast Asia as well as present a challenge to the U.S. Nevertheless, Moscow would also risk losing the limited influence on the Korean Peninsula it has acquired as a result of its equidistance strategy.• South Korea faces a period of uncertainty in relations with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. While it is unlikely that Moscow and Seoul will enact the economic cooperation that they had previously envisioned, South Korea may hope to salvage ties with Russia to improve the balance on the Korean Peninsula. Yet with increased fears that North Korea–Russia relations may strengthen, South Korea has reason to be skeptical of cooperation.• The U.S. will need to be prepared for several possible developments in terms of Russia's standing on the Korean Peninsula. Should South Korea elect to try to preserve cooperation with Russia, this may cause a further rift in the U.S.–South Korea alliance. If Moscow doubles down on its relationship with Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington will need to be prepared to jointly address such a development with implications for the Northeast Asian subregion and Russia-U.S. ties.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"113 - 95"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44732014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T oday’s military balance in the western Pacific is the product of the successful 25-year effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build a military capability that specifically targets and holds at risk U.S. air and maritime forces. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s, China has worked diligently to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. forces and mitigate U.S. strengths. The PRC’s geography, strategy, and military systems place the U.S. military—and the interests it defends—at significant risk. There is reason to believe that Beijing could now successfully launch a lightning attack that would seize a strategic advantage or objective. This, in turn, would force Washington either to accept the result of an attempted fait accompli or to engage in a high-risk military conflict to dislodge People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces from their target. This wicked problem is further exacerbated by the time horizons that the United States and its allies confront when planning to address the PLA as a challenge over multiple decades. Anything is possible in the arena of defense planning when timelines are pushed well into the future. It is convenient for Washington to focus on the military challenge the PRC will pose in the 2030s and beyond, when exciting emerging technologies and new military hardware promise to offer operational capabilities that can theoretically close the gap between the two militaries but do not yet exist. Yet Washington would be falling into a temporal planning trap if it only organized to address the PRC military dilemma of 2035. As the past year has demonstrated, Beijing has escalated its use of coercion and aggression in areas of significant U.S. interest in the western Pacific. Given this reality, the Pentagon, lawmakers, and the White House need a strategy that can effectively deter the PLA in the near to medium term (2025–30). The grave costs, potential for miscalculation, and impact of the eroding military
{"title":"A Strategy of Distribution for Addressing the PLA of 2025–30","authors":"Eric W. Sayers","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0067","url":null,"abstract":"T oday’s military balance in the western Pacific is the product of the successful 25-year effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build a military capability that specifically targets and holds at risk U.S. air and maritime forces. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s, China has worked diligently to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. forces and mitigate U.S. strengths. The PRC’s geography, strategy, and military systems place the U.S. military—and the interests it defends—at significant risk. There is reason to believe that Beijing could now successfully launch a lightning attack that would seize a strategic advantage or objective. This, in turn, would force Washington either to accept the result of an attempted fait accompli or to engage in a high-risk military conflict to dislodge People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces from their target. This wicked problem is further exacerbated by the time horizons that the United States and its allies confront when planning to address the PLA as a challenge over multiple decades. Anything is possible in the arena of defense planning when timelines are pushed well into the future. It is convenient for Washington to focus on the military challenge the PRC will pose in the 2030s and beyond, when exciting emerging technologies and new military hardware promise to offer operational capabilities that can theoretically close the gap between the two militaries but do not yet exist. Yet Washington would be falling into a temporal planning trap if it only organized to address the PRC military dilemma of 2035. As the past year has demonstrated, Beijing has escalated its use of coercion and aggression in areas of significant U.S. interest in the western Pacific. Given this reality, the Pentagon, lawmakers, and the White House need a strategy that can effectively deter the PLA in the near to medium term (2025–30). The grave costs, potential for miscalculation, and impact of the eroding military","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"19 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46961640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I n examining the development of minilaterals anchored in Southeast Asia, this essay considers whether and, if so, how this subregion could contribute to broader capabilities to deter military aggression. The essay argues that Southeast Asia’s experience with minilateralism is much more limited, focused, and functionally driven by specific security challenges such as armed robbery. It is unlikely that Southeast Asian states will be comfortable with a broader minilateral arrangement involving extraregional powers designed to deter China or sideline existing mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For better or worse, a more limited and functionally driven minilateralism gives Southeast Asian states more control over the direction, scope, and quality of cooperation. As well, analysts from the subregion have warned of the possibility that Indo-Pacific minilateral arrangements could become platforms for major powers to extend their influence.1 The essay is divided into three parts. First, it provides an overview of the recent history of minilateralism in Southeast Asia, with a focus on the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as well as trilateral security cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It also briefly notes other experiences of minilateralism involving Southeast Asian states beyond the security realm. Next, the essay highlights the different features of minilateralism anchored in Southeast Asia in contrast to U.S.-anchored minilateralism and assesses the likelihood of Southeast Asian–led arrangements contributing to a broader deterrence effort against China. Finally, the essay offers several policy considerations regarding whether and, if so, how Southeast Asian–led minilateralism can be of strategic salience in the Indo-Pacific security landscape.
{"title":"Fit for Purpose: Can Southeast Asian Minilateralism Deter?","authors":"Evan A. Laksmana.","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0064","url":null,"abstract":"I n examining the development of minilaterals anchored in Southeast Asia, this essay considers whether and, if so, how this subregion could contribute to broader capabilities to deter military aggression. The essay argues that Southeast Asia’s experience with minilateralism is much more limited, focused, and functionally driven by specific security challenges such as armed robbery. It is unlikely that Southeast Asian states will be comfortable with a broader minilateral arrangement involving extraregional powers designed to deter China or sideline existing mechanisms led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). For better or worse, a more limited and functionally driven minilateralism gives Southeast Asian states more control over the direction, scope, and quality of cooperation. As well, analysts from the subregion have warned of the possibility that Indo-Pacific minilateral arrangements could become platforms for major powers to extend their influence.1 The essay is divided into three parts. First, it provides an overview of the recent history of minilateralism in Southeast Asia, with a focus on the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) between Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand as well as trilateral security cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. It also briefly notes other experiences of minilateralism involving Southeast Asian states beyond the security realm. Next, the essay highlights the different features of minilateralism anchored in Southeast Asia in contrast to U.S.-anchored minilateralism and assesses the likelihood of Southeast Asian–led arrangements contributing to a broader deterrence effort against China. Finally, the essay offers several policy considerations regarding whether and, if so, how Southeast Asian–led minilateralism can be of strategic salience in the Indo-Pacific security landscape.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"35 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43828473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay argues that South Korea's deliberate efforts to find nexuses between its New Southern Policy (NSP) and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is an investment in insurance for the U.S.-ROK alliance.main argument South Korea has been exploring connections between its NSP and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy at the request of, if not pressure from, the U.S. South Korea has expanded the NSP's scope to include nontraditional security and target areas in the South Pacific. This policy choice is, in part, an investment in insurance for the U.S.-ROK alliance to bolster the partnership and ensure a U.S. security commitment to the Korean Peninsula. Were South Korea not to accommodate the U.S. strategy, Washington might reduce its commitment to the alliance in response. However, adjusting to some elements of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy also gives South Korea leeway to engage more with China without causing the perception that it is strategically tilting toward China.policy implications • As the U.S. and South Korea increase their cooperation for infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands, South Korea should demonstrate its interest in coordinating in minilateral settings with Japan, Australia, and India. Doing so would create greater space for South Korea to also participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative more broadly without causing the U.S. to misperceive that South Korea is tilting toward China.• Enhancing cooperation with the Quad states in regional maritime security can give South Korea more room to engage with China in responding to regional nontraditional security issues.
{"title":"South Korea's Investment in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: A Case Study of the New Southern Policy","authors":"Jae Jeok Park, E. Tan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0060","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay argues that South Korea's deliberate efforts to find nexuses between its New Southern Policy (NSP) and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is an investment in insurance for the U.S.-ROK alliance.main argument South Korea has been exploring connections between its NSP and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy at the request of, if not pressure from, the U.S. South Korea has expanded the NSP's scope to include nontraditional security and target areas in the South Pacific. This policy choice is, in part, an investment in insurance for the U.S.-ROK alliance to bolster the partnership and ensure a U.S. security commitment to the Korean Peninsula. Were South Korea not to accommodate the U.S. strategy, Washington might reduce its commitment to the alliance in response. However, adjusting to some elements of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy also gives South Korea leeway to engage more with China without causing the perception that it is strategically tilting toward China.policy implications • As the U.S. and South Korea increase their cooperation for infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific Islands, South Korea should demonstrate its interest in coordinating in minilateral settings with Japan, Australia, and India. Doing so would create greater space for South Korea to also participate in China's Belt and Road Initiative more broadly without causing the U.S. to misperceive that South Korea is tilting toward China.• Enhancing cooperation with the Quad states in regional maritime security can give South Korea more room to engage with China in responding to regional nontraditional security issues.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"101 - 122"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41505142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay explores the strategies that Thailand has used to navigate the great-power competition between the U.S. and China as well as the factors that are driving contemporary Thailand's foreign policy orientation and dilemmas.main argument Recent Thai governments, whether authoritarian or democratically elected, have maintained amicable relations with Beijing while retaining close military cooperation with Washington. However, domestic political dynamics within Thailand are critical to the past and future trajectory of Thailand's bilateral relations with the U.S. and China. Bangkok's reversion toward authoritarian military rule over the past few years has created a different logic in its foreign relations. For the U.S., Thailand's authoritarian turn, although not to Washington's liking, can be tolerated as long as Thailand continues to serve U.S. strategic interests in the region. For China, cordial relations with the incumbent military government of Thailand pave the way for closer economic and political relations, yet anti-authoritarian sentiment within Thailand holds China liable and condemns China's complicity in Thailand's turn to military rule. Thus, balancing Thailand's domestic political dynamic with the foreign policy interests of the U.S. and China is the defining feature of Bangkok's maneuvering act between the two great powers.policy implications • As U.S.-China relations grow more tense, countries in Southeast Asia are feeling the squeeze from both sides. These states sense they need to prepare for choosing between the two powers while trying to delay or prevent such a choice from being necessary.• Thailand's turn toward domestic authoritarian rule creates a dilemma for both the U.S. and China. For the U.S., there is a need to tolerate an authoritarian government in Bangkok to maintain stable military and security cooperation. For China, Thailand's domestic political situation creates a backlash against Chinese interests in the country.• The current military government in Thailand is likely to prioritize its own domestic political legitimacy over relations with either power and will take advantage of the Sino-U.S. competition however best suits its own regime survival.• If Thailand reverts to a democratically elected government with popular support, healthy relationships with both China and the U.S. are more likely to result and endure.
{"title":"Entrenching Authoritarian Rule and Thailand's Foreign Policy Dilemma as a Middle Power","authors":"Enze Han","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0056","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay explores the strategies that Thailand has used to navigate the great-power competition between the U.S. and China as well as the factors that are driving contemporary Thailand's foreign policy orientation and dilemmas.main argument Recent Thai governments, whether authoritarian or democratically elected, have maintained amicable relations with Beijing while retaining close military cooperation with Washington. However, domestic political dynamics within Thailand are critical to the past and future trajectory of Thailand's bilateral relations with the U.S. and China. Bangkok's reversion toward authoritarian military rule over the past few years has created a different logic in its foreign relations. For the U.S., Thailand's authoritarian turn, although not to Washington's liking, can be tolerated as long as Thailand continues to serve U.S. strategic interests in the region. For China, cordial relations with the incumbent military government of Thailand pave the way for closer economic and political relations, yet anti-authoritarian sentiment within Thailand holds China liable and condemns China's complicity in Thailand's turn to military rule. Thus, balancing Thailand's domestic political dynamic with the foreign policy interests of the U.S. and China is the defining feature of Bangkok's maneuvering act between the two great powers.policy implications • As U.S.-China relations grow more tense, countries in Southeast Asia are feeling the squeeze from both sides. These states sense they need to prepare for choosing between the two powers while trying to delay or prevent such a choice from being necessary.• Thailand's turn toward domestic authoritarian rule creates a dilemma for both the U.S. and China. For the U.S., there is a need to tolerate an authoritarian government in Bangkok to maintain stable military and security cooperation. For China, Thailand's domestic political situation creates a backlash against Chinese interests in the country.• The current military government in Thailand is likely to prioritize its own domestic political legitimacy over relations with either power and will take advantage of the Sino-U.S. competition however best suits its own regime survival.• If Thailand reverts to a democratically elected government with popular support, healthy relationships with both China and the U.S. are more likely to result and endure.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"181 - 198"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41654024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A s China’s military might and tendency toward regional aggression grow, the United States and its allies are increasingly concerned with deterrence. Their strategies seek to prevent Beijing from disrupting the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific by, for example, invading Taiwan or conducting gray-zone operations in the South China Sea. One of those strategies was to revive the Quad grouping with Australia, Japan, India, and the United States in 2017 to protect freedom of navigation and promote democratic values.1 In the period since, the Quad has become implicitly—or explicitly, at least on the part of the United States—aimed at countering China’s malign activities in the Indo-Pacific region.2 Statements from the February 2022 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting highlighted the threat of “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force and coercion” in the South and East China Seas while also reaffirming the Quad’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.3 Although the Quad has been reluctant to directly address security cooperation, the 2020 and 2021 joint military Malabar exercises revealed a shared focus on improving interoperability.4 Yet deterring China with minilateral groupings of states is more complex and difficult than traditional deterrence theory might suggest. This essay lays out some of the unique characteristics of the China challenge before considering how minilaterals can best enhance deterrence in these circumstances.
{"title":"Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"O. Mastro","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0066","url":null,"abstract":"A s China’s military might and tendency toward regional aggression grow, the United States and its allies are increasingly concerned with deterrence. Their strategies seek to prevent Beijing from disrupting the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific by, for example, invading Taiwan or conducting gray-zone operations in the South China Sea. One of those strategies was to revive the Quad grouping with Australia, Japan, India, and the United States in 2017 to protect freedom of navigation and promote democratic values.1 In the period since, the Quad has become implicitly—or explicitly, at least on the part of the United States—aimed at countering China’s malign activities in the Indo-Pacific region.2 Statements from the February 2022 Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting highlighted the threat of “unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force and coercion” in the South and East China Seas while also reaffirming the Quad’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.3 Although the Quad has been reluctant to directly address security cooperation, the 2020 and 2021 joint military Malabar exercises revealed a shared focus on improving interoperability.4 Yet deterring China with minilateral groupings of states is more complex and difficult than traditional deterrence theory might suggest. This essay lays out some of the unique characteristics of the China challenge before considering how minilaterals can best enhance deterrence in these circumstances.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"18 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42524665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W hat happens when a rising power meets an established power? This is a fundamental question that has exercised strategic thinkers for centuries, in the process producing a voluminous scholarship that can easily fill multiple libraries. Crucially, however, this is not an abstract question that merely fans the flames of intellectual curiosity. If ongoing developments on the global stage are any measure, it is the signal question of our time—and will remain so for some years to come—as the world witnesses the alarmingly steep descent of Sino-U.S. relations into the realms of great-power competition and rivalry. This being the case, how to prevent both powers from drifting into war has become of paramount importance not only for them but for the entire international community. The main theme of The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China is the management of the Sino-U.S. relationship for the purpose of avoiding open conflict in the coming decade. Few are as well-placed to write this book as its author Kevin Rudd, the Mandarin-speaking former prime minister of Australia and current president of the Asia Society. In it, Rudd brings his wealth of experience and considerable powers of analysis to bear on efforts to navigate the twists and turns of this most vital yet complex of great-power bilateral relationships, helping the reader understand not only how we came to the present state of affairs but, just as important, how both great powers can best manage their competitive relationship so as to prevent the outbreak of war. In essence, The Avoidable War sets out to do three things. First, it provides a thoughtful discussion that describes how and why the bilateral relationship has arrived at this point. This discussion commands the lion’s share of attention in the book. While Rudd does not attribute blame exclusively to China—indeed, he correctly highlights the dearth of understanding and familiarity in the United States with China that has led to inaccurate views and mischaracterizations—he does nevertheless draw attention to the outcome of the more assertive turn in international affairs that has taken place under the leadership of Chinese president
{"title":"Is War in the Asia-Pacific Avoidable?","authors":"J. Liow","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0071","url":null,"abstract":"W hat happens when a rising power meets an established power? This is a fundamental question that has exercised strategic thinkers for centuries, in the process producing a voluminous scholarship that can easily fill multiple libraries. Crucially, however, this is not an abstract question that merely fans the flames of intellectual curiosity. If ongoing developments on the global stage are any measure, it is the signal question of our time—and will remain so for some years to come—as the world witnesses the alarmingly steep descent of Sino-U.S. relations into the realms of great-power competition and rivalry. This being the case, how to prevent both powers from drifting into war has become of paramount importance not only for them but for the entire international community. The main theme of The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China is the management of the Sino-U.S. relationship for the purpose of avoiding open conflict in the coming decade. Few are as well-placed to write this book as its author Kevin Rudd, the Mandarin-speaking former prime minister of Australia and current president of the Asia Society. In it, Rudd brings his wealth of experience and considerable powers of analysis to bear on efforts to navigate the twists and turns of this most vital yet complex of great-power bilateral relationships, helping the reader understand not only how we came to the present state of affairs but, just as important, how both great powers can best manage their competitive relationship so as to prevent the outbreak of war. In essence, The Avoidable War sets out to do three things. First, it provides a thoughtful discussion that describes how and why the bilateral relationship has arrived at this point. This discussion commands the lion’s share of attention in the book. While Rudd does not attribute blame exclusively to China—indeed, he correctly highlights the dearth of understanding and familiarity in the United States with China that has led to inaccurate views and mischaracterizations—he does nevertheless draw attention to the outcome of the more assertive turn in international affairs that has taken place under the leadership of Chinese president","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"247 - 251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44814736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F or scholars and practitioners alike, few tasks are more important than understanding why wars happen. Wars, to paraphrase Martin Luther or Benito Mussolini, turn the wheels of history—they can catapult states to power or topple them into the ash heap of history. But as long as there have been wars, there have been disagreements over their causes. To quote the writer Svetlana Alexievich, “War remains, as it always has been, one of the chief human mysteries.”1 Perhaps the unpredictability, complexity, and occasional inscrutability of wars’ origins make structuralist explanations for them so appealing. The roots of realism lie in the contemplation of warfare. Thucydides, that Greek font of classical realism, reacted to the Peloponnesian War; Machiavelli to the Italian wars of the Renaissance; E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and other foundational scholars of “modern” realism to the horrors of World Wars I and II. Through the wide aperture of systemic international political theory, wars are the consequence of disruptive shifts in the distribution of international power. This is a simple and powerful idea—but it is not entirely persuasive, as evidenced by the enduring debates within realism and between realism and other schools of international relations theory, to say nothing of the gap between the worlds of academia and policymaking. After all, conflict has not accompanied all power shifts. This suggests that power shifts and wars do not have to go hand in hand. War, in other words, is avoidable. For experts who watch changes to the relative distribution of international power, it has been apparent for decades that a power shift is underway. However, it was not until around the 2008 global financial crisis that this shift became undeniable—the People’s Republic of China had emerged as a serious rival to the United States. An idea which had quietly percolated within both states for years, that they were on an ineluctable
{"title":"The Challenge of Avoiding War","authors":"Carla P. Freeman","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0070","url":null,"abstract":"F or scholars and practitioners alike, few tasks are more important than understanding why wars happen. Wars, to paraphrase Martin Luther or Benito Mussolini, turn the wheels of history—they can catapult states to power or topple them into the ash heap of history. But as long as there have been wars, there have been disagreements over their causes. To quote the writer Svetlana Alexievich, “War remains, as it always has been, one of the chief human mysteries.”1 Perhaps the unpredictability, complexity, and occasional inscrutability of wars’ origins make structuralist explanations for them so appealing. The roots of realism lie in the contemplation of warfare. Thucydides, that Greek font of classical realism, reacted to the Peloponnesian War; Machiavelli to the Italian wars of the Renaissance; E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and other foundational scholars of “modern” realism to the horrors of World Wars I and II. Through the wide aperture of systemic international political theory, wars are the consequence of disruptive shifts in the distribution of international power. This is a simple and powerful idea—but it is not entirely persuasive, as evidenced by the enduring debates within realism and between realism and other schools of international relations theory, to say nothing of the gap between the worlds of academia and policymaking. After all, conflict has not accompanied all power shifts. This suggests that power shifts and wars do not have to go hand in hand. War, in other words, is avoidable. For experts who watch changes to the relative distribution of international power, it has been apparent for decades that a power shift is underway. However, it was not until around the 2008 global financial crisis that this shift became undeniable—the People’s Republic of China had emerged as a serious rival to the United States. An idea which had quietly percolated within both states for years, that they were on an ineluctable","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"252 - 256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41624367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay draws on insights from hedging theory to examine how Pakistan, as a middle power, can navigate key strategic and domestic factors in its policies in response to the growing great-power competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Until recently, Pakistan had deftly taken advantage of its position in the U.S.-China-Pakistan strategic triangle to improve its security vis-à-vis India. Intensification of U.S.-China great-power competition, with the U.S. embracing India as a bulwark against China and the closer alignment of Pakistan-China strategic interests, puts Pakistan in a security dilemma. Islamabad faces challenges in navigating this great-power competition as the role of middle powers increases. Hedging theory shows how Islamabad could gain from a working relationship with Washington on strategic interests, despite Pakistan's aligned interests with China. Pakistan's new national policy, with an emphasis on geoeconomics over geopolitics, will be important for work with both powers.policy implications • Pakistan can count on China's consistent friendship, given Chinese economic and security investments, irrespective of Beijing's own strategic interests in fostering this relationship.• Even if broad-based, nontransactional relations seem unlikely in the near future, areas of mutual interest remain between the U.S. and Pakistan. Through engagement and frank conversation, the U.S. can improve nuclear facilities and safeguard nuclear assets, which would also address Islamabad's suspicion that Washington aims to defang its nuclear capabilities and sabotage Chinese investment in Pakistan.• The U.S. can aid Pakistan in its policy paradigm shift from security to geoeconomics, which would help address Washington's own long-pending demands that Islamabad ease security paranoia about India. By aiding economic reforms and reducing India-Pakistan tensions, the U.S. can foster internal stability and external peace for Pakistan, preventing Islamabad from completely embracing Beijing.
{"title":"Navigating the Great-Power Competition: Pakistan and Its Relationship with the United States and China","authors":"Y. Hassan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0057","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay draws on insights from hedging theory to examine how Pakistan, as a middle power, can navigate key strategic and domestic factors in its policies in response to the growing great-power competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Until recently, Pakistan had deftly taken advantage of its position in the U.S.-China-Pakistan strategic triangle to improve its security vis-à-vis India. Intensification of U.S.-China great-power competition, with the U.S. embracing India as a bulwark against China and the closer alignment of Pakistan-China strategic interests, puts Pakistan in a security dilemma. Islamabad faces challenges in navigating this great-power competition as the role of middle powers increases. Hedging theory shows how Islamabad could gain from a working relationship with Washington on strategic interests, despite Pakistan's aligned interests with China. Pakistan's new national policy, with an emphasis on geoeconomics over geopolitics, will be important for work with both powers.policy implications • Pakistan can count on China's consistent friendship, given Chinese economic and security investments, irrespective of Beijing's own strategic interests in fostering this relationship.• Even if broad-based, nontransactional relations seem unlikely in the near future, areas of mutual interest remain between the U.S. and Pakistan. Through engagement and frank conversation, the U.S. can improve nuclear facilities and safeguard nuclear assets, which would also address Islamabad's suspicion that Washington aims to defang its nuclear capabilities and sabotage Chinese investment in Pakistan.• The U.S. can aid Pakistan in its policy paradigm shift from security to geoeconomics, which would help address Washington's own long-pending demands that Islamabad ease security paranoia about India. By aiding economic reforms and reducing India-Pakistan tensions, the U.S. can foster internal stability and external peace for Pakistan, preventing Islamabad from completely embracing Beijing.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"199 - 223"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45166831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：