{"title":"Author's Response: A New Research Agenda on Blurring State-Society Boundaries and \"Reimagining State Power\" in China?","authors":"Lynette H. Ong","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42546334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A mid multiple global crises and conflicts, the often-cited concept of Arctic exceptionalism—the unique governance that has facilitated cooperation in the region—has come under strain.1 A series of overlapping and multilayered geopolitical issues present challenges to Arctic governance, which is often assumed to be resistant to conflict elsewhere, and to cooperation, the “norm” of the region. From escalating tensions between the United States and China to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the ever-accelerating climate crisis, the Arctic is undeniably at a point of inflection. With the Arctic Council’s activities currently paused due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerns over the role of the council’s observer states, including Asian states Singapore, China, Japan, South Korea, and India, have been raised. However, despite this pause in the region’s preeminent high-level intergovernmental forum and the Covid-19 pandemic, not all activity in the high north has been frozen. States have remained active within the Arctic—observer states have continued to articulate official strategies and pay senior-level official visits to the region, while hopeful observers, such as Estonia, are advocating for admission to the Arctic Council.2 It is clear that non-Arctic states’ interest in the polar region
{"title":"An Arctic in Flux: Singapore's Perspective","authors":"H. Nadarajah","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0006","url":null,"abstract":"A mid multiple global crises and conflicts, the often-cited concept of Arctic exceptionalism—the unique governance that has facilitated cooperation in the region—has come under strain.1 A series of overlapping and multilayered geopolitical issues present challenges to Arctic governance, which is often assumed to be resistant to conflict elsewhere, and to cooperation, the “norm” of the region. From escalating tensions between the United States and China to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the ever-accelerating climate crisis, the Arctic is undeniably at a point of inflection. With the Arctic Council’s activities currently paused due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, concerns over the role of the council’s observer states, including Asian states Singapore, China, Japan, South Korea, and India, have been raised. However, despite this pause in the region’s preeminent high-level intergovernmental forum and the Covid-19 pandemic, not all activity in the high north has been frozen. States have remained active within the Arctic—observer states have continued to articulate official strategies and pay senior-level official visits to the region, while hopeful observers, such as Estonia, are advocating for admission to the Arctic Council.2 It is clear that non-Arctic states’ interest in the polar region","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47269127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the Arctic, temperatures are rising three times as fast as the global average. Global warming has caused rapid and widespread changes in sea and land ice (glaciers and ice sheets), permafrost, snow cover, and other geological elements. Warmer Atlantic and Pacific waters flowing into the Arctic Ocean and reduced sea ice cover are resulting in the northward range expansions of sub-Arctic fish and marine mammals.1 These swift environmental changes have also led to increased use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) through the polar region and greater resource development in the Arctic Ocean as international interests in the region continue to develop rapidly. Japan is not an Arctic state, but it is easily affected by the climate change taking place in the high north through oceanic and atmospheric circulation. It is the closest Asian country to the Arctic Ocean and as a result enjoys many opportunities in the region’s economic and commercial sectors, such as access to the Arctic sea routes. Japan has been participating in and contributing to the Arctic Council discussions since it first gained observer status in 2013, and it has continued its observation and research activities on environmental changes in the Arctic. Japan expects to continue to actively contribute to the Arctic region. This essay reviews the history of Japan’s Arctic policy and discusses the extent of the country’s involvement in the Arctic region in recent years. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, international relations in the Arctic have been rapidly changing. The functioning of the Arctic Council has all but ceased, and international research cooperation and data sharing with Russia have also been discontinued. Amid such complicated international relations, this essay outlines how Japan should be involved in the Arctic region.
{"title":"Japan's Arctic Policy: Status and Future Prospects","authors":"Sakiko Hataya","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0004","url":null,"abstract":"In the Arctic, temperatures are rising three times as fast as the global average. Global warming has caused rapid and widespread changes in sea and land ice (glaciers and ice sheets), permafrost, snow cover, and other geological elements. Warmer Atlantic and Pacific waters flowing into the Arctic Ocean and reduced sea ice cover are resulting in the northward range expansions of sub-Arctic fish and marine mammals.1 These swift environmental changes have also led to increased use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) through the polar region and greater resource development in the Arctic Ocean as international interests in the region continue to develop rapidly. Japan is not an Arctic state, but it is easily affected by the climate change taking place in the high north through oceanic and atmospheric circulation. It is the closest Asian country to the Arctic Ocean and as a result enjoys many opportunities in the region’s economic and commercial sectors, such as access to the Arctic sea routes. Japan has been participating in and contributing to the Arctic Council discussions since it first gained observer status in 2013, and it has continued its observation and research activities on environmental changes in the Arctic. Japan expects to continue to actively contribute to the Arctic region. This essay reviews the history of Japan’s Arctic policy and discusses the extent of the country’s involvement in the Arctic region in recent years. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, international relations in the Arctic have been rapidly changing. The functioning of the Arctic Council has all but ceased, and international research cooperation and data sharing with Russia have also been discontinued. Amid such complicated international relations, this essay outlines how Japan should be involved in the Arctic region.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48298495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A t the time of writing, young Chinese are gathering in cities across China, as well as on university campuses around the world, to protest their country’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy. And they are raising demands that are bracingly political, including calls for freedom of speech, for an end to concentration camps for Uighurs, and for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to step down. With this historic upsurge seizing our attention, it is worth remembering that protests are actually extremely common in China but normally take a less overtly political form. Farmers clash with police over water pollution. Workers routinely strike over low wages. Homeowners demand compensation when city redevelopment projects threaten their apartments. In her excellent new book, Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China, Lynette H. Ong examines the “everyday state power” deployed to contain these instances of what James C. Scott has called “everyday resistance.” Focusing on conflicts related to urbanization, in particular, Ong theorizes two approaches used by local authorities: handing violence off to thugs-for-hire in an effort at ensuring deniability, and relying on volunteer brokers with different degrees of independence from the state to use personal relationships to “mobilize the masses” into supporting, or at least acquiescing to, government plans. Although one of these approaches is coercive and the other is largely persuasive, they both involve exercising power “via society itself” (p. 5). Ong’s volume adds to a growing body of work that explores the great variety of Chinese actors either on the far fringes of the state or in a gray zone between state and society that help the government realize its objectives.1 Anyone who has conducted research or done business or worked
{"title":"China's Informal Tools of Grassroots Control","authors":"M. Elfstrom","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0012","url":null,"abstract":"A t the time of writing, young Chinese are gathering in cities across China, as well as on university campuses around the world, to protest their country’s harsh “zero-Covid” policy. And they are raising demands that are bracingly political, including calls for freedom of speech, for an end to concentration camps for Uighurs, and for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to step down. With this historic upsurge seizing our attention, it is worth remembering that protests are actually extremely common in China but normally take a less overtly political form. Farmers clash with police over water pollution. Workers routinely strike over low wages. Homeowners demand compensation when city redevelopment projects threaten their apartments. In her excellent new book, Outsourcing Repression: Everyday State Power in Contemporary China, Lynette H. Ong examines the “everyday state power” deployed to contain these instances of what James C. Scott has called “everyday resistance.” Focusing on conflicts related to urbanization, in particular, Ong theorizes two approaches used by local authorities: handing violence off to thugs-for-hire in an effort at ensuring deniability, and relying on volunteer brokers with different degrees of independence from the state to use personal relationships to “mobilize the masses” into supporting, or at least acquiescing to, government plans. Although one of these approaches is coercive and the other is largely persuasive, they both involve exercising power “via society itself” (p. 5). Ong’s volume adds to a growing body of work that explores the great variety of Chinese actors either on the far fringes of the state or in a gray zone between state and society that help the government realize its objectives.1 Anyone who has conducted research or done business or worked","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47317219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
F or decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to—if not in excess of—any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1 Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.3 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy
{"title":"For Canada, Insularism Leads to a Lost Opportunity in the Arctic and Asia","authors":"J. Reeves","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0003","url":null,"abstract":"F or decades, China, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea have invested in and expanded their presence in the Arctic, often working together with each other or cooperating with Russia or the Nordic Arctic states to increase their regional impact. Indeed, in terms of institutional development, climate change research, port development, or icebreaker technologies, these four Asian actors have been at the forefront of Arctic activity since the early 2000s, bringing both state-backed development plans and resources to the region. As a result, Beijing, Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore have become essential actors in the high north, as they singularly and collectively provide finance and capabilities equal to—if not in excess of—any littoral state. Whereas the 20th century was the trans-Atlantic era of Arctic development, the growth of activity by Asian states suggests that 21st-century Arctic affairs will be decidedly more global, if not also more Asian, in orientation.1 Traditional Arctic actors Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia have embraced engagement with Asian states interested in the Arctic and established bilateral and multilateral modalities to facilitate even deeper regional cooperation.2 Norway and Russia, for instance, have worked with Asian countries on matters of regional governance, particularly with respect to fisheries agreements, natural resource management, shipping, and environmental protection.3 Similarly, Sweden has integrated bilateral and multilateral engagement with several Asian states into its own strategic approach to the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional trade facilitation and expansion, scientific governance, and geothermal energy","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47900946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T he Arctic is experiencing greatly accelerated change under the influence of climate change, economic globalization, and world power shifts. After China became an official observer state of the Arctic Council in 2013, its involvement in Arctic affairs has grown increasingly and intensively. It has been particularly prominent in three areas: science, economics, and governance. When China became an observer state, few people could have predicted the extent to which the world would change over the next decade. At that time, China did not stand out so much from the other four new observer countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India). Features such as Japan’s close scientific cooperation with Arctic countries, South Korea’s shipbuilding skills, and Singapore’s important shipping position are why they have been granted observer status. A year later, however, a series of black swan events occurred, starting with the Crimean crisis in 2014. Like dominoes, the world landscape has since shifted dramatically. In 2016, Britain announced its departure from the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. After then U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered an infamous speech at the ministerial meeting in 2019 warning China and Russia against “aggressive behavior,” the Arctic Council closed for the first time without issuing a joint statement.1 In the speech, Pompeo used metaphorical and parallel questions to warn about China’s presence in the Arctic, such as “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”2 However, this situation cannot happen because China has no legal right to claim any territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. Moreover, the only territorial dispute in the Arctic—over the small island Hans Island between Canada
{"title":"China's Arctic Policy and Engagement: Review and Prospects","authors":"Yitong Chen","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0005","url":null,"abstract":"T he Arctic is experiencing greatly accelerated change under the influence of climate change, economic globalization, and world power shifts. After China became an official observer state of the Arctic Council in 2013, its involvement in Arctic affairs has grown increasingly and intensively. It has been particularly prominent in three areas: science, economics, and governance. When China became an observer state, few people could have predicted the extent to which the world would change over the next decade. At that time, China did not stand out so much from the other four new observer countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India). Features such as Japan’s close scientific cooperation with Arctic countries, South Korea’s shipbuilding skills, and Singapore’s important shipping position are why they have been granted observer status. A year later, however, a series of black swan events occurred, starting with the Crimean crisis in 2014. Like dominoes, the world landscape has since shifted dramatically. In 2016, Britain announced its departure from the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. After then U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered an infamous speech at the ministerial meeting in 2019 warning China and Russia against “aggressive behavior,” the Arctic Council closed for the first time without issuing a joint statement.1 In the speech, Pompeo used metaphorical and parallel questions to warn about China’s presence in the Arctic, such as “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”2 However, this situation cannot happen because China has no legal right to claim any territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. Moreover, the only territorial dispute in the Arctic—over the small island Hans Island between Canada","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42636511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article examines how Beijing's economic sanctions on Australia have encouraged Canberra to double down on its balancing strategy toward China.main argumentWith the relationship already under pressure, political discord between Australia and China was exacerbated in April 2020 by Australia's call for an independent investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 virus. In response, Beijing has since targeted several Australian industries with economic sanctions, using economic coercion to express its hostility toward Canberra's actions. Far from causing Australia to acquiesce to Beijing's preferences, however, China's economic coercion has perversely empowered Canberra and given it confidence to shore up the country's influence in the Indo-Pacific area and balance against China on both conventional and new fronts. At the same time, the source of this confidence may not be sustainable, and balancing should not be the only feature of Australia's policy toward China or preclude efforts to reset the relationship.policy implications• China is not a strategic competitor to Australia, and Australia's strategic interests cannot be achieved without a functioning, constructive relationship with China. Diplomacy, reassurances, and cooperation must also accompany other efforts to balance China.• To attain a bilateral relationship with China that benefits Australia's overall national interest, the Australian government should carefully manage the diplomatic signals it sends to guide China's expectations of Australia, and it should at the same time manage its own expectations of China.• Australian policymakers should improve their understanding of the psychological makeup of Chinese leaders and their strategic culture to help avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings in China's motives and foreign policies and to better interpret signals from Beijing aimed at thawing the relationship.
{"title":"Balancing against China with Confidence: Australia's Foreign Policy toward China in 2020–22","authors":"Ye Xue","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0010","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article examines how Beijing's economic sanctions on Australia have encouraged Canberra to double down on its balancing strategy toward China.main argumentWith the relationship already under pressure, political discord between Australia and China was exacerbated in April 2020 by Australia's call for an independent investigation into the origins of the Covid-19 virus. In response, Beijing has since targeted several Australian industries with economic sanctions, using economic coercion to express its hostility toward Canberra's actions. Far from causing Australia to acquiesce to Beijing's preferences, however, China's economic coercion has perversely empowered Canberra and given it confidence to shore up the country's influence in the Indo-Pacific area and balance against China on both conventional and new fronts. At the same time, the source of this confidence may not be sustainable, and balancing should not be the only feature of Australia's policy toward China or preclude efforts to reset the relationship.policy implications• China is not a strategic competitor to Australia, and Australia's strategic interests cannot be achieved without a functioning, constructive relationship with China. Diplomacy, reassurances, and cooperation must also accompany other efforts to balance China.• To attain a bilateral relationship with China that benefits Australia's overall national interest, the Australian government should carefully manage the diplomatic signals it sends to guide China's expectations of Australia, and it should at the same time manage its own expectations of China.• Australian policymakers should improve their understanding of the psychological makeup of Chinese leaders and their strategic culture to help avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings in China's motives and foreign policies and to better interpret signals from Beijing aimed at thawing the relationship.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46801705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Asian States and the Arctic Ocean","authors":"H. Sakaguchi","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44396734","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
B y the late 2030s, the Arctic may be largely ice-free in the summers. Ongoing environmental changes in the Arctic, such as those resulting from climate change, both pose a significant threat to the ecosystems and livelihoods of the Indigenous peoples there and serve as a warning about the precariousness of the global climate system. Unfortunately, however, even as these changes are already underway, we still need more data about many aspects of the Arctic. For example, the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, ratified in 2021, regulated commercial fishing in the region due to inadequate information about the fish species available. Thus, we need to collaborate with various stakeholders to ensure a sustainable Arctic. First, it is vital to deepen discussions and knowledge exchanges about the Arctic between nations through multilateral and serial events, including the Arctic Circle Forums, the meetings of the International Symposium on Arctic Research, the Arctic Frontiers conferences, and the meetings of the Arctic Encounter Symposium. Second, the efforts of Track 1.5 diplomacy—such as the Arctic Cooperation Seminar hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada that formed the basis for this roundtable—are also important. We need academics and think tank experts to act as knowledge brokers to facilitate information sharing between governments and the public and to promote evidence-based research about the Arctic in interdisciplinary fields. Finally, I would like to encourage more Arctic youth forums. Young people are future leaders and should take a proactive role in shaping global environmental issues. The Arctic region must embody international cooperation and be the “ocean of collaboration.” Data sharing between the Arctic and non-Arctic nations is especially critical to facilitate scientific understanding and peace in the region. As Arctic affairs are shared issues for all humankind, non-Arctic states in Asia and elsewhere should be included in these critical dialogues. This inclusivity sends a powerful message under the theme of “knowledge for a sustainable Arctic” that can strengthen a functional and effective international cooperative system for the future.
{"title":"Prefatory Notes to the Roundtable: Arctic Collaboration","authors":"Yoko Kamikawa","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0000","url":null,"abstract":"B y the late 2030s, the Arctic may be largely ice-free in the summers. Ongoing environmental changes in the Arctic, such as those resulting from climate change, both pose a significant threat to the ecosystems and livelihoods of the Indigenous peoples there and serve as a warning about the precariousness of the global climate system. Unfortunately, however, even as these changes are already underway, we still need more data about many aspects of the Arctic. For example, the International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, ratified in 2021, regulated commercial fishing in the region due to inadequate information about the fish species available. Thus, we need to collaborate with various stakeholders to ensure a sustainable Arctic. First, it is vital to deepen discussions and knowledge exchanges about the Arctic between nations through multilateral and serial events, including the Arctic Circle Forums, the meetings of the International Symposium on Arctic Research, the Arctic Frontiers conferences, and the meetings of the Arctic Encounter Symposium. Second, the efforts of Track 1.5 diplomacy—such as the Arctic Cooperation Seminar hosted by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada that formed the basis for this roundtable—are also important. We need academics and think tank experts to act as knowledge brokers to facilitate information sharing between governments and the public and to promote evidence-based research about the Arctic in interdisciplinary fields. Finally, I would like to encourage more Arctic youth forums. Young people are future leaders and should take a proactive role in shaping global environmental issues. The Arctic region must embody international cooperation and be the “ocean of collaboration.” Data sharing between the Arctic and non-Arctic nations is especially critical to facilitate scientific understanding and peace in the region. As Arctic affairs are shared issues for all humankind, non-Arctic states in Asia and elsewhere should be included in these critical dialogues. This inclusivity sends a powerful message under the theme of “knowledge for a sustainable Arctic” that can strengthen a functional and effective international cooperative system for the future.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46475286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article evaluates China's strategy in the Yellow Sea by synthesizing relevant discourse, interests, capabilities, and behavior through an analysis of Chinese sources and the compilation of an original dataset of Chinese military activities in these waters.main argumentChina's Yellow Sea strategy has received less scholarly and policy attention than its approaches to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. However, China has significant economic and strategic reasons to prioritize its presence in these waters, including ongoing sovereignty disputes with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Chinese military exercises in the Yellow Sea have increased in recent years, with gray-zone activities playing a distant, secondary role to traditional military exercises. Moreover, China's propaganda approach has been relatively limited and moderate, and thus there is still time to shape Beijing's thinking and approach to these waters.policy implications• While Chinese maritime ambitions are arguably more limited in the Yellow Sea than the South and East China Seas, China's expanding military capabilities and subsequent uptick in military activity demand a greater policy focus there.• The U.S. should pursue a proactive hedging strategy toward China in the Yellow Sea. This could entail seeking cooperation with Beijing to address shared security threats, like North Korean WMD proliferation, while also preparing to respond strongly if China's ambitions change or if it begins a more extensive coercive campaign for exclusive control of these waters.• The U.S.-ROK alliance should adapt to China's increasing activities in the Yellow Sea by increasing joint monitoring, contingency planning, and consultations about the degree to which the alliance covers the protection of ROK forces, aircraft, and civilian vessels operating in the sea.
{"title":"The Next Flashpoint? China, the Republic of Korea, and the Yellow Sea","authors":"O. Mastro","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0008","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article evaluates China's strategy in the Yellow Sea by synthesizing relevant discourse, interests, capabilities, and behavior through an analysis of Chinese sources and the compilation of an original dataset of Chinese military activities in these waters.main argumentChina's Yellow Sea strategy has received less scholarly and policy attention than its approaches to the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. However, China has significant economic and strategic reasons to prioritize its presence in these waters, including ongoing sovereignty disputes with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Chinese military exercises in the Yellow Sea have increased in recent years, with gray-zone activities playing a distant, secondary role to traditional military exercises. Moreover, China's propaganda approach has been relatively limited and moderate, and thus there is still time to shape Beijing's thinking and approach to these waters.policy implications• While Chinese maritime ambitions are arguably more limited in the Yellow Sea than the South and East China Seas, China's expanding military capabilities and subsequent uptick in military activity demand a greater policy focus there.• The U.S. should pursue a proactive hedging strategy toward China in the Yellow Sea. This could entail seeking cooperation with Beijing to address shared security threats, like North Korean WMD proliferation, while also preparing to respond strongly if China's ambitions change or if it begins a more extensive coercive campaign for exclusive control of these waters.• The U.S.-ROK alliance should adapt to China's increasing activities in the Yellow Sea by increasing joint monitoring, contingency planning, and consultations about the degree to which the alliance covers the protection of ROK forces, aircraft, and civilian vessels operating in the sea.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48955104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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