{"title":"Author's Response: Walking China and the United States Back from the Abyss","authors":"Kevin Rudd","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0073","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"257 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44239902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T he emergence of “strategic minilateralism” has been a trend in the Indo-Pacific since the second half of the 2010s. Although minilateral cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners started in the early 2000s, the late 2010s saw more institutionalized and strategically oriented forms of minilateral security collaboration begin to emerge from two main drivers: the rise of China and the lack of effective regional security mechanisms for responding to that rise.1 China’s rejection of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling in July 2016 served as a particular catalyst for this new “strategic minilateralism” in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Beijing’s growing regional influence, including through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has become more visible, drawing diplomatic support for China’s presence from its neighbors. In response to China’s rise and the threat it poses to U.S. regional primacy, Washington has attempted to link its bilateral alliances and partnerships together since the early 2000s, as shown in the establishment of the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2002. Nevertheless, this effort has not yet proved to be sufficiently effective in pushing back against China. In this context, new strategic minilaterals, such as the Quad (comprising Australia, Japan, India, and the United States) and AUKUS (comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), have been constructed. Examining the institutional development and key characteristics of the Indo-Pacific’s new strategic minilateralism, particularly the Quad and AUKUS, this essay argues that such frameworks are largely a Western construct that attempt to fill the expectation and capability gaps in regional security systems for underwriting the existing regional order. There are basically two types of minilateralism: one aims to shape the regional order through ruleand norm-making, while the other focuses on military cooperation to check rising powers’ behavior. Both share the same strategic
{"title":"A New Strategic Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"K. Koga","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0063","url":null,"abstract":"T he emergence of “strategic minilateralism” has been a trend in the Indo-Pacific since the second half of the 2010s. Although minilateral cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners started in the early 2000s, the late 2010s saw more institutionalized and strategically oriented forms of minilateral security collaboration begin to emerge from two main drivers: the rise of China and the lack of effective regional security mechanisms for responding to that rise.1 China’s rejection of the South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal ruling in July 2016 served as a particular catalyst for this new “strategic minilateralism” in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, Beijing’s growing regional influence, including through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has become more visible, drawing diplomatic support for China’s presence from its neighbors. In response to China’s rise and the threat it poses to U.S. regional primacy, Washington has attempted to link its bilateral alliances and partnerships together since the early 2000s, as shown in the establishment of the Australia-Japan-U.S. Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2002. Nevertheless, this effort has not yet proved to be sufficiently effective in pushing back against China. In this context, new strategic minilaterals, such as the Quad (comprising Australia, Japan, India, and the United States) and AUKUS (comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), have been constructed. Examining the institutional development and key characteristics of the Indo-Pacific’s new strategic minilateralism, particularly the Quad and AUKUS, this essay argues that such frameworks are largely a Western construct that attempt to fill the expectation and capability gaps in regional security systems for underwriting the existing regional order. There are basically two types of minilateralism: one aims to shape the regional order through ruleand norm-making, while the other focuses on military cooperation to check rising powers’ behavior. Both share the same strategic","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"27 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44380294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M edicine has long played a key role in the Africa-China relationship. Since 1963, China has sent teams of medical volunteers to the continent annually to provide primary healthcare to underserved countries and targeted care related to particular diseases, notably malaria.1 China has also been instrumental in the development of a new generation of malaria medication, and the Ebola crisis of the 2010s created space for collaboration between China and other external partners on the continent. But most recently and most starkly, the Covid-19 pandemic has both validated and raised doubts about China-Africa medical cooperation, even as the virus ruthlessly exposed the realities of Africa’s wider global position. This essay assesses China’s diplomacy and cooperation with African countries in two stages of the Covid-19 pandemic: the early phase that focused on virus mitigation through personal protective equipment (PPE) and healthcare supplies, and a second phase that has focused on Covid-19 vaccine production and distribution. It argues that although China was more successful in partnering with Africa early in the pandemic, China has enjoyed diplomatic gains from the second stage due to the failure of the global North and its multilateral institutions to live up to their promises regarding sharing vaccines and vaccine intellectual property (IP). The essay examines China’s diplomacy and then turns to look at similar efforts of the global North. It concludes with observations about the recent Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the lasting effects Covid-19 responses may have on Africa’s relationships with China and with traditional Western partners.
{"title":"Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy in Africa","authors":"Cobus van Staden","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0054","url":null,"abstract":"M edicine has long played a key role in the Africa-China relationship. Since 1963, China has sent teams of medical volunteers to the continent annually to provide primary healthcare to underserved countries and targeted care related to particular diseases, notably malaria.1 China has also been instrumental in the development of a new generation of malaria medication, and the Ebola crisis of the 2010s created space for collaboration between China and other external partners on the continent. But most recently and most starkly, the Covid-19 pandemic has both validated and raised doubts about China-Africa medical cooperation, even as the virus ruthlessly exposed the realities of Africa’s wider global position. This essay assesses China’s diplomacy and cooperation with African countries in two stages of the Covid-19 pandemic: the early phase that focused on virus mitigation through personal protective equipment (PPE) and healthcare supplies, and a second phase that has focused on Covid-19 vaccine production and distribution. It argues that although China was more successful in partnering with Africa early in the pandemic, China has enjoyed diplomatic gains from the second stage due to the failure of the global North and its multilateral institutions to live up to their promises regarding sharing vaccines and vaccine intellectual property (IP). The essay examines China’s diplomacy and then turns to look at similar efforts of the global North. It concludes with observations about the recent Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the lasting effects Covid-19 responses may have on Africa’s relationships with China and with traditional Western partners.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"17 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46331792","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article explores how middle powers in the Indo-Pacific are engaging in a new type of diplomacy, one that includes lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law, to protect their national interests from Sino-U.S. strategic competition.main argument The change in the power balance associated with China's re-emergence as Asia's largest economy has brought concerns about Sino-U.S. strategic competition and raised questions about U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region among many U.S.-aligned middle powers, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and India. Specific challenges that China is creating include fomenting instability in the maritime domain, fracturing the openness of the emerging digital economy, and practicing coercive economic behavior, to which middle powers are especially vulnerable. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific's middle powers are aligning to adapt to these changing dynamics and transforming their diplomacy and cooperation into "neo-middle-power diplomacy." This new type of diplomacy is proactive and engages in behavior that includes lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law. It aims to ensure that middle powers' interests are not deleteriously affected by the Sino-U.S. rivalry.policy implications • Like-minded middle powers should actively seek out alignment partners inside and outside the region based on a convergence of interests. U.S. involvement is preferred but not a prerequisite for alignment and cooperation.• Middle powers should focus cooperation on key areas based on the synergy of their respective comparative advantages. Ideally, these would stress capability-based contributions, such as intelligence gathering, rather than the capacity of the resources available for cooperation. Examples include regularized humanitarian and disaster-relief activities; maritime cooperation in the East and South China Seas, Taiwan Strait, and Indian Ocean; and joint transits in the Indo-Pacific.• Middle powers should prioritize their interests in free trade and "data free flow with trust" in the digital economy to both provide economic incentives to emerging states in the region and develop trade safety-net agreements that will allow them to support each other when subject to economic coercion.
{"title":"Middle-Power Alignment in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Securing Agency through Neo-Middle-Power Diplomacy","authors":"S. Nagy","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0039","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article explores how middle powers in the Indo-Pacific are engaging in a new type of diplomacy, one that includes lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law, to protect their national interests from Sino-U.S. strategic competition.main argument The change in the power balance associated with China's re-emergence as Asia's largest economy has brought concerns about Sino-U.S. strategic competition and raised questions about U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific region among many U.S.-aligned middle powers, such as Australia, Japan, Canada, and India. Specific challenges that China is creating include fomenting instability in the maritime domain, fracturing the openness of the emerging digital economy, and practicing coercive economic behavior, to which middle powers are especially vulnerable. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific's middle powers are aligning to adapt to these changing dynamics and transforming their diplomacy and cooperation into \"neo-middle-power diplomacy.\" This new type of diplomacy is proactive and engages in behavior that includes lobbying, insulating, and rulemaking in the realms of security, trade, and international law. It aims to ensure that middle powers' interests are not deleteriously affected by the Sino-U.S. rivalry.policy implications • Like-minded middle powers should actively seek out alignment partners inside and outside the region based on a convergence of interests. U.S. involvement is preferred but not a prerequisite for alignment and cooperation.• Middle powers should focus cooperation on key areas based on the synergy of their respective comparative advantages. Ideally, these would stress capability-based contributions, such as intelligence gathering, rather than the capacity of the resources available for cooperation. Examples include regularized humanitarian and disaster-relief activities; maritime cooperation in the East and South China Seas, Taiwan Strait, and Indian Ocean; and joint transits in the Indo-Pacific.• Middle powers should prioritize their interests in free trade and \"data free flow with trust\" in the digital economy to both provide economic incentives to emerging states in the region and develop trade safety-net agreements that will allow them to support each other when subject to economic coercion.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"161 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48397515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S everal months into the latest phase of the Russia-Ukraine War, it may seem like a strange time to refer to Russian president Vladimir Putin or his system of governance as “weak.” It certainly does not feel that way on the frontlines of Donbas as Russia brings to bear all its conventional might in a war of conquest, the type of conflict many analysts thought had gone out of fashion in Europe after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If you had asked Russia watchers in the summer of 2021 about the likelihood of over 100,000 Russian soldiers marching into Ukraine, most would have seen the scenario as far-fetched. The entire field of Russian studies deserves tough questions about the adequacy of its methods for understanding Russian politics. If anyone has a credible claim to understand and explain Russian politics, though, it is Timothy Frye, who is arguably the leading figure in a new school of political science research that seeks to elucidate the inner logics of the Russian political system. Alongside numerous coauthors and former students, Frye’s research has examined topics such as the significance of Russian elections, public opinion, lobbying and corruption, and property rights and the rule of law. Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia is Frye’s brilliant distillation of nearly 30 years of research on these themes. Despite this new wave of research about how Russia’s political system works, as Frye notes, there is a long history of relying on tropes rather than analysis in the field of Russian studies. It isn’t only Westerners like Churchill who have seen Russia as a land of riddles and enigmas; Russians’ analyses of their own country’s politics frequently rely on references to the country’s supposedly unique history, culture, or spirituality. Frye asks his readers to situate contemporary Russia not in the context of Ivan the Terrible or Leo Tolstoy but in that of other contemporary authoritarian states, ranging from Recep Erdogan’s Turkey to Viktor Orban’s Hungary to Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela. As Weak Strongman shows, not everything about Russia is enigmatic. And despite his strongman image, Putin has an ability to control the Russian political system and state apparatus that is more circumscribed than it often appears.
{"title":"Understanding the Enigma of Putin's Russia","authors":"Christopher R. Miller","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0044","url":null,"abstract":"S everal months into the latest phase of the Russia-Ukraine War, it may seem like a strange time to refer to Russian president Vladimir Putin or his system of governance as “weak.” It certainly does not feel that way on the frontlines of Donbas as Russia brings to bear all its conventional might in a war of conquest, the type of conflict many analysts thought had gone out of fashion in Europe after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If you had asked Russia watchers in the summer of 2021 about the likelihood of over 100,000 Russian soldiers marching into Ukraine, most would have seen the scenario as far-fetched. The entire field of Russian studies deserves tough questions about the adequacy of its methods for understanding Russian politics. If anyone has a credible claim to understand and explain Russian politics, though, it is Timothy Frye, who is arguably the leading figure in a new school of political science research that seeks to elucidate the inner logics of the Russian political system. Alongside numerous coauthors and former students, Frye’s research has examined topics such as the significance of Russian elections, public opinion, lobbying and corruption, and property rights and the rule of law. Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia is Frye’s brilliant distillation of nearly 30 years of research on these themes. Despite this new wave of research about how Russia’s political system works, as Frye notes, there is a long history of relying on tropes rather than analysis in the field of Russian studies. It isn’t only Westerners like Churchill who have seen Russia as a land of riddles and enigmas; Russians’ analyses of their own country’s politics frequently rely on references to the country’s supposedly unique history, culture, or spirituality. Frye asks his readers to situate contemporary Russia not in the context of Ivan the Terrible or Leo Tolstoy but in that of other contemporary authoritarian states, ranging from Recep Erdogan’s Turkey to Viktor Orban’s Hungary to Nicolás Maduro’s Venezuela. As Weak Strongman shows, not everything about Russia is enigmatic. And despite his strongman image, Putin has an ability to control the Russian political system and state apparatus that is more circumscribed than it often appears.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"186 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47052375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T o better understand how Africans feel about China’s growing presence and influence on the continent, it is important to look both at the headlines and beyond them to explain how ordinary people may be interpreting events and forming opinions. This essay homes in on one country, Zambia, to try to better understand public perceptions about Chinese engagement. Measured in per capita terms, this southern African country is one of the leading destinations for Chinese investment. The growing presence of Chinese citizens in Zambia, along with their money and involvement in different areas of the economy, has caused controversy and even tragedy, including the loss of both Chinese and Zambian lives. In May 2020, three Chinese nationals were murdered by locals in the Zambian capital Lusaka. The attack followed repeated media reports of Chinese employers allegedly making workers stay on business premises for weeks to maintain production during the country’s first Covid-19 lockdown. The then mayor of Lusaka, Miles Sampa, was accused of stoking anti-China sentiment prior to the attack by blaming China for the Covid-19 pandemic and participating in raids on Chinese-owned businesses. He claimed he had uncovered labor abuses and discrimination against Zambians, describing their working conditions as “slavery.” Sampa also used racist language in videos of the raids that were posted on Facebook. Sampa later apologized for his actions and language in a statement to the media and assured foreign investors that his office would “support their businesses 100%.”1 But it is highly unlikely his apology ameliorated any damage he may have caused. Chinese involvement in Zambia was fraught long before he became mayor, mostly over issues regarding the treatment of Zambian workers by Chinese employers, which have been covered by both local and international media. In 2011, Human Rights Watch released a damning report that detailed abuse at Chinese-owned copper mines in
{"title":"Status Complicated: In Zambia, China-Africa Is a Partnership Washington Should Not Necessarily Envy","authors":"Chiponda Chimbelu","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0048","url":null,"abstract":"T o better understand how Africans feel about China’s growing presence and influence on the continent, it is important to look both at the headlines and beyond them to explain how ordinary people may be interpreting events and forming opinions. This essay homes in on one country, Zambia, to try to better understand public perceptions about Chinese engagement. Measured in per capita terms, this southern African country is one of the leading destinations for Chinese investment. The growing presence of Chinese citizens in Zambia, along with their money and involvement in different areas of the economy, has caused controversy and even tragedy, including the loss of both Chinese and Zambian lives. In May 2020, three Chinese nationals were murdered by locals in the Zambian capital Lusaka. The attack followed repeated media reports of Chinese employers allegedly making workers stay on business premises for weeks to maintain production during the country’s first Covid-19 lockdown. The then mayor of Lusaka, Miles Sampa, was accused of stoking anti-China sentiment prior to the attack by blaming China for the Covid-19 pandemic and participating in raids on Chinese-owned businesses. He claimed he had uncovered labor abuses and discrimination against Zambians, describing their working conditions as “slavery.” Sampa also used racist language in videos of the raids that were posted on Facebook. Sampa later apologized for his actions and language in a statement to the media and assured foreign investors that his office would “support their businesses 100%.”1 But it is highly unlikely his apology ameliorated any damage he may have caused. Chinese involvement in Zambia was fraught long before he became mayor, mostly over issues regarding the treatment of Zambian workers by Chinese employers, which have been covered by both local and international media. In 2011, Human Rights Watch released a damning report that detailed abuse at Chinese-owned copper mines in","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"61 - 69"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48337226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This essay explores why the U.S. and China have both come to adopt a more cautious view of globalization as their strategic frictions have intensified.main argument The U.S. and China were perhaps the two greatest beneficiaries of the phase of globalization that dated from roughly the mid-1970s to the 2008–9 global financial crisis. Now, however, each country assesses that a combination of intensifying domestic pressures and increasing external turbulence—in significant part the result of growing strategic frictions between the two states—is heightening the need for self-reliance. U.S.-China relations are poised to continue deteriorating as Washington and Beijing both take a dimmer view of their economic entanglement. That deterioration will shape but not dictate Asia's economic evolution.policy implications • The U.S. and China are both increasingly likely to see their economic interdependence not as a source of stability but as a vector of vulnerability.• Even so, the rhetoric around decoupling presently outpaces the reality; the U.S. and China will likely find it far more challenging to unwind their interdependence than they would like.• The extent to which the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework succeeds in shoring up U.S. economic competitiveness will be a crucial litmus test of Washington's staying power in Asia.
{"title":"The Evolving Geopolitics of Economic Interdependence between the United States and China: Reflections on a Deteriorating Great-Power Relationship","authors":"Ali S. Wyne","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0046","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay explores why the U.S. and China have both come to adopt a more cautious view of globalization as their strategic frictions have intensified.main argument The U.S. and China were perhaps the two greatest beneficiaries of the phase of globalization that dated from roughly the mid-1970s to the 2008–9 global financial crisis. Now, however, each country assesses that a combination of intensifying domestic pressures and increasing external turbulence—in significant part the result of growing strategic frictions between the two states—is heightening the need for self-reliance. U.S.-China relations are poised to continue deteriorating as Washington and Beijing both take a dimmer view of their economic entanglement. That deterioration will shape but not dictate Asia's economic evolution.policy implications • The U.S. and China are both increasingly likely to see their economic interdependence not as a source of stability but as a vector of vulnerability.• Even so, the rhetoric around decoupling presently outpaces the reality; the U.S. and China will likely find it far more challenging to unwind their interdependence than they would like.• The extent to which the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework succeeds in shoring up U.S. economic competitiveness will be a crucial litmus test of Washington's staying power in Asia.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"187 ","pages":"105 - 81"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41275414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
O ver the last decade, China’s presence on the global stage has shifted dramatically: the country is now an economic powerhouse and increasingly influential in international organizations. As China rises, questions also arise pertaining to its strategic objectives toward many regions and in many domains. China appears to be seeking a “loose, partial, and malleable” hegemony over the global South—making the African continent a strategic priority for Beijing.1 This Asia Policy roundtable is a result of a current research initiative at the National Bureau of Asian Research, “Into Africa: China’s Emerging Strategy,” which aims to better understand China’s strategic ambitions in Africa and assess how the continent fits into China’s envisioned global order. The first three reports in this project to date have examined China’s expansion into Africa from Beijing’s perspective, often relying on Chinese-language sources to draw conclusions and analyze China’s strategy.2 Yet, only looking at Beijing’s viewpoint to get a fuller grasp on China-Africa relations would be a gross oversight that would provide an incomplete impression of China’s engagement with the continent. Africa is a continent with 54 countries and a population of more than 1.3 billion people. China’s engagement with the continent, of course, does not have the same level of impact or influence in all these countries, and not all states share the same opinion regarding China’s presence. This roundtable seeks to share, highlight, and examine African perspectives regarding China’s engagement with and influence on the continent. The essays here provide both regional and functional case studies examining different facets of the China-Africa relationship from the perspective of African
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"R. Bernstein","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0053","url":null,"abstract":"O ver the last decade, China’s presence on the global stage has shifted dramatically: the country is now an economic powerhouse and increasingly influential in international organizations. As China rises, questions also arise pertaining to its strategic objectives toward many regions and in many domains. China appears to be seeking a “loose, partial, and malleable” hegemony over the global South—making the African continent a strategic priority for Beijing.1 This Asia Policy roundtable is a result of a current research initiative at the National Bureau of Asian Research, “Into Africa: China’s Emerging Strategy,” which aims to better understand China’s strategic ambitions in Africa and assess how the continent fits into China’s envisioned global order. The first three reports in this project to date have examined China’s expansion into Africa from Beijing’s perspective, often relying on Chinese-language sources to draw conclusions and analyze China’s strategy.2 Yet, only looking at Beijing’s viewpoint to get a fuller grasp on China-Africa relations would be a gross oversight that would provide an incomplete impression of China’s engagement with the continent. Africa is a continent with 54 countries and a population of more than 1.3 billion people. China’s engagement with the continent, of course, does not have the same level of impact or influence in all these countries, and not all states share the same opinion regarding China’s presence. This roundtable seeks to share, highlight, and examine African perspectives regarding China’s engagement with and influence on the continent. The essays here provide both regional and functional case studies examining different facets of the China-Africa relationship from the perspective of African","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"1 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47054534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
T hrough an extensive portfolio of infrastructure investments, China has played a crucial role in helping Africa reduce deficits in its infrastructure. Over the past decade and a half, Chinese state-owned or state-aligned construction and engineering companies have strategically entered African markets with assistance from the Chinese government. Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese companies took on mega-infrastructure projects, especially in the energy and transport sectors, that could aid African countries with achieving higher levels of development. However, these mega-BRI projects came with hefty price tags that have contributed to compounding the debt stress of several African nations. In this regard, many international (and especially Western) actors have accused China of predatory lending practices and debt-trap diplomacy. This narrative has been further amplified amid the Covid-19 pandemic, which has had significant ramifications for BRI projects in Africa and around the world. The pandemic has created some doubt about whether Chinese-funded and -built infrastructure projects can be completed and, more importantly, whether African states have the fiscal capacity to repay these development loans. With reduced revenues available to African governments, the risk of defaulting on loan repayments is high. Moreover, because of the burden of loan repayments, African states are handicapped in their response measures to Covid-19 and its economic consequences. The Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021 demonstrated that due to changing realities—including China’s domestic economic concerns, U.S.-China trade tensions, the global economic impact of Covid-19, and Africa’s pandemic-induced debt stress—Beijing seems to have realized that it cannot continue to be Africa’s go-to bank for financing infrastructure development. This essay outlines that China may not be as willing as it was in past years to finance infrastructure development projects in Africa. It explores the impact of Covid-19 on the development of BRI infrastructure projects in Africa and briefly assesses the validity of the debt-trap and predatory lending accusations leveled against China. Additionally, the essay addresses
{"title":"Changing Realities: China-Africa Infrastructure Development","authors":"Mandira Bagwandeen","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0047","url":null,"abstract":"T hrough an extensive portfolio of infrastructure investments, China has played a crucial role in helping Africa reduce deficits in its infrastructure. Over the past decade and a half, Chinese state-owned or state-aligned construction and engineering companies have strategically entered African markets with assistance from the Chinese government. Under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese companies took on mega-infrastructure projects, especially in the energy and transport sectors, that could aid African countries with achieving higher levels of development. However, these mega-BRI projects came with hefty price tags that have contributed to compounding the debt stress of several African nations. In this regard, many international (and especially Western) actors have accused China of predatory lending practices and debt-trap diplomacy. This narrative has been further amplified amid the Covid-19 pandemic, which has had significant ramifications for BRI projects in Africa and around the world. The pandemic has created some doubt about whether Chinese-funded and -built infrastructure projects can be completed and, more importantly, whether African states have the fiscal capacity to repay these development loans. With reduced revenues available to African governments, the risk of defaulting on loan repayments is high. Moreover, because of the burden of loan repayments, African states are handicapped in their response measures to Covid-19 and its economic consequences. The Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2021 demonstrated that due to changing realities—including China’s domestic economic concerns, U.S.-China trade tensions, the global economic impact of Covid-19, and Africa’s pandemic-induced debt stress—Beijing seems to have realized that it cannot continue to be Africa’s go-to bank for financing infrastructure development. This essay outlines that China may not be as willing as it was in past years to finance infrastructure development projects in Africa. It explores the impact of Covid-19 on the development of BRI infrastructure projects in Africa and briefly assesses the validity of the debt-trap and predatory lending accusations leveled against China. Additionally, the essay addresses","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"18 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49019900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C onventional wisdom holds that populations support autocrats only because they are coerced, bribed, or brainwashed into obedience. Driven by this perception, much of the public discourse and analysis of contemporary dictatorships ignores the role of societies in the rise and operation of these regimes. Similarly, many of the checks on authoritarian power are downplayed. Elections are assumed to be so reliably manipulated, protest and opposition so effectively quashed, and all other institutions and elites so thoroughly co-opted that they do not meaningfully shape politics in these countries. Unsurprisingly, most of the ink is spilled on the seemingly all-powerful puppet masters. Dictators’ personalities, obsessions, and purported worldviews are obsessively scrutinized as the ultimate resource on politics in these regimes. These accounts of court intrigue and leadership produce gripping narratives. But their pervasiveness creates an illusion that autocrats operate with very few constraints. They also make us lose sight of the fact that dictators are products of the circumstances in which they rule at least as much as they create them. Timothy Frye’s Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia is thus an exceptionally timely and prescient treatise, addressing these pathologies in the study of one of the most consequential present-day dictatorships: Russia under Vladimir Putin. Weak Strongman is not based on new research by the author; instead, the book is an exceedingly rare species: an effort to distill the cumulative wisdom of political science research on the Russian and other autocracies, and in a way that makes it widely accessible beyond narrow scholarly circles. The book’s core mission—and achievement—is to bridge the gap between the scholarship on Putinism and similar regimes and how these are understood in policy circles and by the public. In this sense, Weak Strongman tries to reverse a frustrating trend. Over the two decades of
传统智慧认为，民众支持独裁者只是因为他们受到胁迫、贿赂或洗脑而服从。在这种看法的驱动下，许多关于当代独裁政权的公共话语和分析忽视了社会在这些政权崛起和运作中的作用。同样，许多对独裁权力的制约也被淡化了。选举被认为是如此可靠地操纵，抗议和反对被如此有效地镇压，所有其他机构和精英都被如此彻底地拉拢，以至于他们没有对这些国家的政治产生有意义的影响。不出所料，大部分墨水都洒在了看似无所不能的木偶大师身上。独裁者的个性、痴迷和所谓的世界观被痴迷地审视为这些政权中政治的终极资源。这些关于宫廷阴谋和领导能力的叙述产生了扣人心弦的叙述。但它们的普遍性造成了一种错觉，即独裁者的运作几乎没有受到限制。它们也让我们忽视了一个事实，即独裁者是他们统治的环境的产物，至少和他们创造的一样多。蒂莫西·弗莱（Timothy Frye）的《软弱的强人：普京统治下的俄罗斯的权力极限》（The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia）是一篇非常及时和有先见之明的论文，在研究当今最重要的独裁政权之一：弗拉基米尔·普京（Vladimir Putin）领导下的俄罗斯时，阐述了这些病态。《弱强者》并非基于作者的新研究；相反，这本书是一个极其罕见的物种：它努力提炼政治学研究对俄罗斯和其他独裁政权的累积智慧，并使其在狭窄的学术圈子之外广泛传播。这本书的核心使命和成就是弥合普京主义和类似政权的学术研究之间的差距，以及政策界和公众对这些政权的理解。从这个意义上说，《弱强者》试图扭转一种令人沮丧的趋势。在
{"title":"How Does the Weak Strongman Stay in Power? Exposing the Roots of Vladimir Putin's Rule in Russia","authors":"A. Matovski","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0043","url":null,"abstract":"C onventional wisdom holds that populations support autocrats only because they are coerced, bribed, or brainwashed into obedience. Driven by this perception, much of the public discourse and analysis of contemporary dictatorships ignores the role of societies in the rise and operation of these regimes. Similarly, many of the checks on authoritarian power are downplayed. Elections are assumed to be so reliably manipulated, protest and opposition so effectively quashed, and all other institutions and elites so thoroughly co-opted that they do not meaningfully shape politics in these countries. Unsurprisingly, most of the ink is spilled on the seemingly all-powerful puppet masters. Dictators’ personalities, obsessions, and purported worldviews are obsessively scrutinized as the ultimate resource on politics in these regimes. These accounts of court intrigue and leadership produce gripping narratives. But their pervasiveness creates an illusion that autocrats operate with very few constraints. They also make us lose sight of the fact that dictators are products of the circumstances in which they rule at least as much as they create them. Timothy Frye’s Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin’s Russia is thus an exceptionally timely and prescient treatise, addressing these pathologies in the study of one of the most consequential present-day dictatorships: Russia under Vladimir Putin. Weak Strongman is not based on new research by the author; instead, the book is an exceedingly rare species: an effort to distill the cumulative wisdom of political science research on the Russian and other autocracies, and in a way that makes it widely accessible beyond narrow scholarly circles. The book’s core mission—and achievement—is to bridge the gap between the scholarship on Putinism and similar regimes and how these are understood in policy circles and by the public. In this sense, Weak Strongman tries to reverse a frustrating trend. Over the two decades of","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":" ","pages":"181 - 185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49285779","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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