首页 > 最新文献

Asia Policy最新文献

英文 中文
Indonesia's Great-Power Management in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing Behavior of a "Dove State" 印尼在印太地区的大国管理:“鸽国”的平衡行为
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0062
V. Shekhar
executive summary:This essay investigates Indonesia's strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers shaping Indonesia's strategic choices and the challenges facing Indonesian diplomacy in the region.main argument The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers' efforts to forge new strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, is headed for a multi-tiered polarization that provides a challenging geostrategic context for Indonesia in the coming years. The U.S. and China form the two poles shaping the global and regional balance of power. Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China relationship in the Indo-Pacific region, and this gloomy view has prompted Jakarta to craft a foreign policy that mirrors what some experts refer to as "dove state" behavior. As a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry. However, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country's ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture.policy implications • Indonesia is a status-quo power and is likely to oppose any policy initiative that amplifies the risk of great-power conflict or instability in the region.• As a developing country, a populist democracy, and an emerging market, Indonesia will respond proactively and positively to overtures that advance the country's economic development.• Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta's development agenda.
摘要:本文调查了在大国政治不断变化的情况下,印尼对印太地区的战略思维,并考察了影响印尼战略选择的主要驱动因素和印尼在该地区外交面临的挑战,在大国努力建立新的战略联盟和重置亚洲力量平衡的基础上,印尼正走向多层极化,这为印尼未来几年提供了具有挑战性的地缘战略背景。美国和中国构成了影响全球和地区力量平衡的两极。印尼对美中在印太地区的关系不再持积极看法,这种悲观的看法促使雅加达制定了一项外交政策,反映了一些专家所说的“鸽派国家”行为。作为一个鸽派国家,印尼在应对大国竞争的不确定性的同时,寻求平衡自身利益。然而印尼外交的力量可能取决于该国走中间道路的能力,以及将东盟团结在一起并将其定位为可信的地区架构的能力地区。•作为一个发展中国家、民粹主义民主国家和新兴市场,印度尼西亚将积极主动地回应推动该国经济发展的提议。•大国的好战和东盟的削弱可能会促使印尼更加孤立,专注于支持雅加达发展议程的伙伴关系。
{"title":"Indonesia's Great-Power Management in the Indo-Pacific: The Balancing Behavior of a \"Dove State\"","authors":"V. Shekhar","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0062","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay investigates Indonesia's strategic thinking toward the Indo-Pacific region amid changing great-power politics and examines both the principal drivers shaping Indonesia's strategic choices and the challenges facing Indonesian diplomacy in the region.main argument The Indo-Pacific region, born out of the great powers' efforts to forge new strategic alignments and reset the balance of power in Asia, is headed for a multi-tiered polarization that provides a challenging geostrategic context for Indonesia in the coming years. The U.S. and China form the two poles shaping the global and regional balance of power. Indonesia no longer holds a positive view toward the U.S.-China relationship in the Indo-Pacific region, and this gloomy view has prompted Jakarta to craft a foreign policy that mirrors what some experts refer to as \"dove state\" behavior. As a dove state, Indonesia has sought to balance its interests while navigating the uncertainties of the great-power rivalry. However, the strength of Indonesian diplomacy is likely to depend on the country's ability to walk a middle path as well as its ability to both keep ASEAN together and position the grouping as a credible regional architecture.policy implications • Indonesia is a status-quo power and is likely to oppose any policy initiative that amplifies the risk of great-power conflict or instability in the region.• As a developing country, a populist democracy, and an emerging market, Indonesia will respond proactively and positively to overtures that advance the country's economic development.• Great-power bellicosity and a weakened ASEAN may push Indonesia to be more insular and concentrate on partnerships that support Jakarta's development agenda.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"123 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46843521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad 信号、威慑和四方
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0069
Ketian Zhang
T he United States and its allies have the capability to deter China, and have successfully done so, from their worst-case scenario—a major militarized conflict. However, three factors reduce the effectiveness of their deterrence: the lack of clear signals, excessive media exposure, and divergent interests among Quad members. The Quad can be useful, but only if the United States maintains well-defined signals of commitment while clarifying the stakes. As it currently stands, the Quad does not successfully deter Chinese actions in territorial disputes. China has not shied away from using military coercion in its land border disputes with India. In June 2020, for instance, Chinese and Indian troops clashed violently along the disputed land border in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides.1 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told India to “stop transgressions into China-controlled territories” and to “refrain from actions changing the status quo along the border,” representing a clear indication of coercive intent.2 Moreover, although China prefers to utilize nonmilitary—or so-called gray-zone—coercion in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, such coercive measures can themselves be destabilizing.3 This essay assesses factors influencing the likelihood of successful deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by using China’s land and maritime territorial disputes as examples. It addresses two questions: what signals of resolve are necessary for effective deterrence, and does the Quad enhance
美国及其盟友有能力阻止中国,并且已经成功地阻止了最坏的情况——一场重大的军事化冲突。然而,有三个因素降低了其威慑的有效性:缺乏明确的信号、媒体过度曝光以及四方成员之间的利益分歧。四方会谈可能是有用的,但前提是美国在澄清利害关系的同时保持明确的承诺信号。按照目前的情况,四方会谈并没有成功阻止中国在领土争端中的行动。中国在与印度的陆地边界争端中没有回避使用军事胁迫。例如,2020年6月,中国和印度军队在加勒万河谷有争议的陆地边界发生激烈冲突,导致双方人员伤亡。1中国外交部长王毅告诉印度“停止侵犯中国控制的领土”,“不要采取改变边境现状的行动”,这显然表明了胁迫意图。2此外,尽管中国倾向于在南海和东海的海洋争端中使用非军事胁迫,即所谓的灰色地带胁迫,但这种胁迫措施本身可能会破坏稳定。3本文以中国的陆地和海洋领土争端为例,评估了影响在印太地区成功威慑的因素。它解决了两个问题:什么样的决心信号对有效威慑是必要的,四方会谈是否加强了
{"title":"Signals, Deterrence, and the Quad","authors":"Ketian Zhang","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0069","url":null,"abstract":"T he United States and its allies have the capability to deter China, and have successfully done so, from their worst-case scenario—a major militarized conflict. However, three factors reduce the effectiveness of their deterrence: the lack of clear signals, excessive media exposure, and divergent interests among Quad members. The Quad can be useful, but only if the United States maintains well-defined signals of commitment while clarifying the stakes. As it currently stands, the Quad does not successfully deter Chinese actions in territorial disputes. China has not shied away from using military coercion in its land border disputes with India. In June 2020, for instance, Chinese and Indian troops clashed violently along the disputed land border in the Galwan Valley, resulting in casualties on both sides.1 Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi told India to “stop transgressions into China-controlled territories” and to “refrain from actions changing the status quo along the border,” representing a clear indication of coercive intent.2 Moreover, although China prefers to utilize nonmilitary—or so-called gray-zone—coercion in maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, such coercive measures can themselves be destabilizing.3 This essay assesses factors influencing the likelihood of successful deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region by using China’s land and maritime territorial disputes as examples. It addresses two questions: what signals of resolve are necessary for effective deterrence, and does the Quad enhance","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"43 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49333156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition 夹在中间?中美竞争中的中等大国
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0058
Hoo Tiang Boon, Sarah Teo
executive summary:This essay provides an overview of this special issue, which seeks to better understand middle-power thinking and strategies in coping with the escalating competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Competition is now the primary format of U.S.-China relations, spanning key dimensions of international politics. The pressures radiating from this structural shift have led Indo-Pacific states to calibrate their policies to this new geostrategic circumstance. This special issue focuses on the responses of a category of regional states understood as middle powers. How have regional middle powers adapted to the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry? What are the considerations and drivers that inform their coping strategies? To address these salient, policy-relevant questions, this special issue spotlights six Indo-Pacific middle powers—namely, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan—and unpacks their logic and ways of navigating the complexities of the Sino-U.S. rivalry. The insights derived in this issue contribute to broader policy thinking on the evolving choices of middle powers and are instructive for the strategic policies of other regional states in an era of great-power competition.policy implications • Amid the growing U.S.-China contest, regional middle powers perceive a narrowing strategic space for maneuverability.• This reduced strategic space does not equate to decreasing strategic autonomy, however. Regional middle powers retain considerable agency to mold their own paths and that of the broader strategic environment, including developing options to mitigate any fallout from the Sino-U.S. rivalry.• A considerable degree of this middle-power agency is animated by elite calculations of the respective domestic interests at stake.• Strategic ambiguity toward China and the U.S. remains the dominant policy preference of most middle powers probed in this issue.
摘要:本文概述了本期特刊,旨在更好地理解中等大国在应对美中之间不断升级的竞争中的思维和策略。竞争现在是中美关系的主要形式,跨越了国际政治的关键领域。这种结构性转变所带来的压力促使印太国家根据这种新的地缘战略环境调整其政策。本期特刊关注的是一类被称为中等强国的地区国家的反应。该地区的中等大国如何适应日益加剧的美中竞争?影响他们应对策略的因素和驱动因素是什么?为了解决这些突出的、与政策相关的问题,本期特刊聚焦了六个印太中部大国——即澳大利亚、韩国、印度尼西亚、越南、泰国和巴基斯坦——并揭示了它们在复杂的中美关系中航行的逻辑和方式。竞争。本文的见解有助于对中等大国不断演变的选择进行更广泛的政策思考,并对其他地区国家在大国竞争时代的战略政策具有指导意义。•在美中竞争日益激烈的情况下,该地区的中等大国认为,可操作性的战略空间正在缩小。然而,减少战略空间并不等于减少战略自主权。该地区的中等大国保留了相当大的权力来塑造自己的道路和更广泛的战略环境,包括制定各种选择来减轻中美关系的影响。竞争。•这个中等大国机构在很大程度上是由精英们对各自国内利益的考量所驱动的。•在这个问题上,对中国和美国的战略模糊性仍然是大多数中等大国的主要政策偏好。
{"title":"Caught in the Middle? Middle Powers amid U.S.-China Competition","authors":"Hoo Tiang Boon, Sarah Teo","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0058","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay provides an overview of this special issue, which seeks to better understand middle-power thinking and strategies in coping with the escalating competition between the U.S. and China.main argument Competition is now the primary format of U.S.-China relations, spanning key dimensions of international politics. The pressures radiating from this structural shift have led Indo-Pacific states to calibrate their policies to this new geostrategic circumstance. This special issue focuses on the responses of a category of regional states understood as middle powers. How have regional middle powers adapted to the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry? What are the considerations and drivers that inform their coping strategies? To address these salient, policy-relevant questions, this special issue spotlights six Indo-Pacific middle powers—namely, Australia, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Pakistan—and unpacks their logic and ways of navigating the complexities of the Sino-U.S. rivalry. The insights derived in this issue contribute to broader policy thinking on the evolving choices of middle powers and are instructive for the strategic policies of other regional states in an era of great-power competition.policy implications • Amid the growing U.S.-China contest, regional middle powers perceive a narrowing strategic space for maneuverability.• This reduced strategic space does not equate to decreasing strategic autonomy, however. Regional middle powers retain considerable agency to mold their own paths and that of the broader strategic environment, including developing options to mitigate any fallout from the Sino-U.S. rivalry.• A considerable degree of this middle-power agency is animated by elite calculations of the respective domestic interests at stake.• Strategic ambiguity toward China and the U.S. remains the dominant policy preference of most middle powers probed in this issue.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"59 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46960152","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Quad as a Security Actor Quad作为一个安全演员
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0065
Tanvi Madan
When the Quad briefly emerged in 2007-8 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, this minilateral was referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although some member states occasionally still use that term-often casually-it has been eschewed as a formal designation. Indeed, Quad members have gone out of their way to highlight a softer purpose rather than a security framing for the coalition. They have emphasized the idea of the group as a solutions provider for regional problems, including the Covid-19 crisis and climate change, while simultaneously officials have either denied or downplayed the grouping's security dimension.1 In September 2021, for instance, a senior U.S. official emphasized that the Quad "is not a regional security organization." The official further added that "there is not a military dimension...or security dimension" to the grouping.2However, while the Quad is not a regional security organization or alliance and does not involve formal security commitments or treaty obligations, it does have security and even some military dimensions. This element may not be evident in members' public statements, but as this essay argues, it is a key component of the Quad and the cooperation between its members.The Quad's resurrection lay in the need to respond to a security challenge-a more assertive and powerful China. This was not the only driver, but without it, the Quad was neither necessary nor possible. The member states' desire to respond to this challenge by shaping a favorable balance of power and building resilience in the region has led to several lines of effort, including in the defense and security domains. Among other elements, these interactions have involved building on a relatively low base of member-state interconnection in these sectors, particularly with India. Members' engagement in these realms has been evident in three areas: (1) security consultations and activities via the Quad, (2) sub-Quad activities, involving the deepening of ties between the Quad partners bilaterally and trilaterally, and (3) supra-Quad activities, consisting of member-state cooperation with other like-minded partners.
当澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国在2007-8年短暂举行四方安全对话时,这种小型对话被称为四方安全对话。尽管一些成员国偶尔仍会随意使用这个词,但它已被作为正式名称而避开。事实上,四方成员国已经不遗余力地强调了一个更温和的目标,而不是联盟的安全框架。他们强调了该组织作为地区问题(包括新冠肺炎危机和气候变化)解决方案提供商的想法,同时官员们否认或淡化了该组织的安全层面。1例如,2021年9月,一名美国高级官员强调,四方“不是一个地区安全组织”。这位官员进一步补充说,“没有军事层面。。。或安全维度“然而,尽管四方会谈不是一个地区安全组织或联盟,也不涉及正式的安全承诺或条约义务,但它确实具有安全甚至一些军事层面。这一因素可能在成员的公开声明中不明显,但正如本文所述,它是四方会谈及其成员之间合作的关键组成部分结果是需要应对安全挑战——一个更加自信和强大的中国。这不是唯一的驱动程序,但如果没有它,Quad既不必要也不可能。成员国希望通过在该地区形成有利的力量平衡和建立韧性来应对这一挑战,这导致了包括国防和安全领域在内的多条努力路线。除其他因素外,这些互动涉及在这些部门建立相对较低的成员国互联互通基础,特别是与印度的互联互通。成员国在这些领域的参与在三个领域表现得很明显:(1)通过四方安全磋商和活动,(2)次四方活动,涉及深化四方伙伴双边和三边关系,以及(3)超四方活动,包括成员国与其他志同道合的伙伴的合作。
{"title":"The Quad as a Security Actor","authors":"Tanvi Madan","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0065","url":null,"abstract":"When the Quad briefly emerged in 2007-8 among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, this minilateral was referred to as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. Although some member states occasionally still use that term-often casually-it has been eschewed as a formal designation. Indeed, Quad members have gone out of their way to highlight a softer purpose rather than a security framing for the coalition. They have emphasized the idea of the group as a solutions provider for regional problems, including the Covid-19 crisis and climate change, while simultaneously officials have either denied or downplayed the grouping's security dimension.1 In September 2021, for instance, a senior U.S. official emphasized that the Quad \"is not a regional security organization.\" The official further added that \"there is not a military dimension...or security dimension\" to the grouping.2However, while the Quad is not a regional security organization or alliance and does not involve formal security commitments or treaty obligations, it does have security and even some military dimensions. This element may not be evident in members' public statements, but as this essay argues, it is a key component of the Quad and the cooperation between its members.The Quad's resurrection lay in the need to respond to a security challenge-a more assertive and powerful China. This was not the only driver, but without it, the Quad was neither necessary nor possible. The member states' desire to respond to this challenge by shaping a favorable balance of power and building resilience in the region has led to several lines of effort, including in the defense and security domains. Among other elements, these interactions have involved building on a relatively low base of member-state interconnection in these sectors, particularly with India. Members' engagement in these realms has been evident in three areas: (1) security consultations and activities via the Quad, (2) sub-Quad activities, involving the deepening of ties between the Quad partners bilaterally and trilaterally, and (3) supra-Quad activities, consisting of member-state cooperation with other like-minded partners.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"49 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41498037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
"No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides": Vietnam as a Self-Reliant Middle Power “没有人能强迫越南选边站队”:越南是一个自力更生的中间大国
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0061
Phan Xuan Dung
executive summary:This essay examines how Vietnam is adapting to U.S.-China rivalry and argues that Vietnam's room for strategic maneuverability is diminishing as it faces growing internal and external pressure for policy adjustments.main argument In the past few years, Vietnam has been increasingly labeled as a middle power. Vietnam's emerging middle-power status coincides with a shifting strategic environment marked by China's expansionism that has nudged Vietnam toward closer U.S. relations. However, Vietnam's persistent foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, informed by the country's historical experiences and concerns over regime security, ensures that Hanoi stays nonaligned. Thus, while retaining autonomy in developing closer U.S. ties, Vietnam strikes a delicate balance between the two superpowers. Instead of relying on a single security guarantor, Vietnam has actively sought to promote rules-based principles and multilateralism in advancing its national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the Mekong River. However, external and internal developments have strained Vietnam's ability to balance between the two superpowers.policy implications • While increasingly wary of China's behavior, Vietnam is unlikely to enter a formal alliance with the U.S. due to its firmly held values of self-reliance and independence.• Vietnam will continue to leverage multidirectional diplomacy to shape regional security and economic architectures in an effort to counterbalance China's influence and reduce Vietnamese dependence on China.• Vietnam should exercise more flexibility and show greater resolve in protecting its national interests. To this end, without abandoning its foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, Vietnam should explore new options to advance security cooperation with other major and middle powers with which it shares strategic interests.
摘要:本文考察了越南是如何适应美中竞争的,并认为随着越南面临越来越大的内部和外部政策调整压力,其战略可操作性的空间正在缩小。越南正在崛起的中间大国地位恰逢以中国扩张主义为标志的战略环境的转变,中国的扩张主义促使越南与美国关系更加密切。然而,根据越南的历史经验和对政权安全的担忧,越南坚持自力更生和独立的外交政策,确保了河内保持不结盟。因此,在保持发展更紧密的美国关系的自主权的同时,越南在这两个超级大国之间取得了微妙的平衡。越南没有依赖单一的安全保障,而是积极寻求促进基于规则的原则和多边主义,以促进其国家利益,特别是在南中国海和湄公河问题上。然而,外部和内部的事态发展使越南在两个超级大国之间取得平衡的能力变得紧张。政策影响•尽管越南对中国的行为越来越警惕,但由于其坚定的自力更生和独立价值观,越南不太可能与美国结成正式联盟。•越南将继续利用多方向外交来塑造地区安全和经济架构,以平衡中国的影响力,减少越南对中国的依赖。•越南应该在保护国家利益方面表现出更大的灵活性和决心。为此,在不放弃自力更生和独立的外交政策的情况下,越南应该探索新的选择,以推进与它有共同战略利益的其他主要和中等大国的安全合作。
{"title":"\"No One Can Force Vietnam to Choose Sides\": Vietnam as a Self-Reliant Middle Power","authors":"Phan Xuan Dung","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0061","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines how Vietnam is adapting to U.S.-China rivalry and argues that Vietnam's room for strategic maneuverability is diminishing as it faces growing internal and external pressure for policy adjustments.main argument In the past few years, Vietnam has been increasingly labeled as a middle power. Vietnam's emerging middle-power status coincides with a shifting strategic environment marked by China's expansionism that has nudged Vietnam toward closer U.S. relations. However, Vietnam's persistent foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, informed by the country's historical experiences and concerns over regime security, ensures that Hanoi stays nonaligned. Thus, while retaining autonomy in developing closer U.S. ties, Vietnam strikes a delicate balance between the two superpowers. Instead of relying on a single security guarantor, Vietnam has actively sought to promote rules-based principles and multilateralism in advancing its national interests, particularly vis-à-vis the South China Sea and the Mekong River. However, external and internal developments have strained Vietnam's ability to balance between the two superpowers.policy implications • While increasingly wary of China's behavior, Vietnam is unlikely to enter a formal alliance with the U.S. due to its firmly held values of self-reliance and independence.• Vietnam will continue to leverage multidirectional diplomacy to shape regional security and economic architectures in an effort to counterbalance China's influence and reduce Vietnamese dependence on China.• Vietnam should exercise more flexibility and show greater resolve in protecting its national interests. To this end, without abandoning its foreign policy of self-reliance and independence, Vietnam should explore new options to advance security cooperation with other major and middle powers with which it shares strategic interests.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"151 - 179"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41907800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
U.S.-China "Extreme Competition" and the Drumbeat of War 美中“极限竞赛”与战争的鼓点
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0074
Susan Thornton
{"title":"U.S.-China \"Extreme Competition\" and the Drumbeat of War","authors":"Susan Thornton","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"240 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41444486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus 多边关系与威慑:关键的新关系
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0068
Arzan Tarapore, Brendan Taylor
As countries around the Indo-Pacific strive to manage the challenges of China’s growing power and assertiveness, they have emphasized two concepts. First, they have increasingly embraced “minilateral” groupings—small, issue-based, informal, and uninstitutionalized partnerships—as a way of coordinating international policy action. This trend has been building gradually for over two decades, ever since the emergence of mechanisms such as the U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in the late 1990s and the U.S.Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue during the early 2000s. But these groupings sharply expanded in number and ambition in the 2010s. The standard-bearer of the minilateral model is the Quad—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which was resuscitated in 2017 and now involves regular summit-level meetings. The boldest minilateral is AUKUS, announced in 2021, which brings together alreadyclose allies Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to further deepen defense technology cooperation, including the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Second, the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Japan, have renewed their commitment to deterrence to maintain regional stability. Rather than relying on institutions to deepen regional integration, which was their preferred option after the end of the Cold War, they are designing defense policies to dissuade potential adversaries, especially China, from revisionist behavior. For example, “integrated deterrence” has been highlighted as the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s emerging
当印太地区的国家努力应对中国日益强大的实力和自信带来的挑战时,他们强调了两个概念。首先,他们越来越多地接受“小型”团体——以问题为基础的小型、非正式和非制度化的伙伴关系——作为协调国际政策行动的一种方式。自20世纪90年代末美日韩三方协调和监督小组和21世纪初美澳-贾潘三方战略对话等机制出现以来,这一趋势已经逐渐形成了20多年。但在2010年代,这些组织的数量和雄心急剧扩大。小型横向模式的旗手是由澳大利亚、印度、日本和美国组成的四方会谈,该会谈于2017年恢复,现在定期举行峰会。最大胆的小型潜艇是2021年宣布的AUKUS,它汇集了已经成熟的盟友澳大利亚、英国和美国,进一步深化国防技术合作,包括向澳大利亚提供核动力潜艇。其次,美国及其盟友,如澳大利亚和日本,重新承诺威慑,以维护地区稳定。他们没有依赖机构来深化区域一体化(这是冷战结束后他们的首选),而是在设计国防政策,劝阻潜在对手,尤其是中国,不要采取修正主义行为。例如,“综合威慑”已被强调为拜登政府新兴战略的核心
{"title":"Minilaterals and Deterrence: A Critical New Nexus","authors":"Arzan Tarapore, Brendan Taylor","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0068","url":null,"abstract":"As countries around the Indo-Pacific strive to manage the challenges of China’s growing power and assertiveness, they have emphasized two concepts. First, they have increasingly embraced “minilateral” groupings—small, issue-based, informal, and uninstitutionalized partnerships—as a way of coordinating international policy action. This trend has been building gradually for over two decades, ever since the emergence of mechanisms such as the U.S.-Japan-Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group in the late 1990s and the U.S.Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue during the early 2000s. But these groupings sharply expanded in number and ambition in the 2010s. The standard-bearer of the minilateral model is the Quad—comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—which was resuscitated in 2017 and now involves regular summit-level meetings. The boldest minilateral is AUKUS, announced in 2021, which brings together alreadyclose allies Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to further deepen defense technology cooperation, including the provision of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. Second, the United States and its allies, such as Australia and Japan, have renewed their commitment to deterrence to maintain regional stability. Rather than relying on institutions to deepen regional integration, which was their preferred option after the end of the Cold War, they are designing defense policies to dissuade potential adversaries, especially China, from revisionist behavior. For example, “integrated deterrence” has been highlighted as the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s emerging","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"2 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48051520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Recasting U.S.-Japan Ties in a New Era of Economic Security 在经济安全的新时代重新审视美日关系
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0055
S. Goto
executive summary:This essay examines the evolution of U.S.-Japan economic relations from competition for global markets to cooperation in staving off the threats confronting the rules-based economic order by focusing on the challenges both countries face from China's weaponization of economic dominance.main argument Once the biggest thorn to bilateral relations, trade is no longer the obstacle between Japan and the U.S. that it once was. Instead, shared economic interests not only are bringing Tokyo and Washington together more closely but the two countries are leading the way to coordinate efforts to protect the rules-based liberal economic order and stave off economic coercion from China. But Japan and the U.S. need the support of other countries in Asia, Europe, and beyond to develop an economic security framework that protects the critical technologies of this new economic era and prevents abuse of economic influence. Tokyo's ability to reach across the Indo-Pacific and establish trust in building an economic architecture with new rules of engagement is leading to more equalized relations between Japan and the U.S. and a larger voice for Japan in regional affairs.policy implications • A baseline understanding between Japan and the U.S. regarding what constitutes economic security and what the threats are to protecting growth has been made clear. A slew of bilateral and multilateral initiatives has ensued as a result, but there is significant overlap among them. If the partnerships are to be effective, efforts should be consolidated and streamlined.• Japan's more realist approach to dealing with the China challenge, whereby values-based diplomacy does not supersede efforts to focus on common interests and shared challenges, resonates in the Indo-Pacific. If the U.S. continues to look to Japan's political and economic leadership, the prospects for engaging more successfully with Southeast Asian states will improve.• Protecting technologies and cooperation in technology innovation is vital for defense purposes as well as for economic expansion. At the same time, the global economy continues to face significant challenges from the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and rising geopolitical risks. A focus on conventional economic concerns, including growth prospects and market access, cannot be sidelined if there is to be effective cooperation between industrialized nations and the global South.
摘要:本文探讨了美日经济关系从争夺全球市场到合作抵御基于规则的经济秩序所面临的威胁的演变,重点是两国都面临着中国经济主导权武器化的挑战,贸易不再是日本和美国之间曾经的障碍。相反,共同的经济利益不仅使东京和华盛顿更加紧密地团结在一起,而且两国正在带头协调努力,保护基于规则的自由经济秩序,避免来自中国的经济胁迫。但日本和美国需要亚洲、欧洲和其他国家的支持,以制定一个经济安全框架,保护这个新经济时代的关键技术,防止滥用经济影响力。东京有能力跨越印太地区,并在建立一个具有新接触规则的经济架构方面建立信任,这将导致日美关系更加平等,日本在地区事务中有更大的发言权保护经济增长已经明确。随之而来的是一系列双边和多边倡议,但它们之间有很大的重叠。如果伙伴关系要有效,就应该加强和精简努力日本在应对中国挑战时采取了更现实的做法,即基于价值观的外交不会取代关注共同利益和共同挑战的努力,这在印太地区引起了共鸣。如果美国继续期待日本的政治和经济领导力,那么与东南亚国家更成功接触的前景将有所改善。•保护技术和技术创新合作对国防和经济扩张至关重要。与此同时,全球经济继续面临新冠肺炎疫情造成的混乱和地缘政治风险上升带来的重大挑战。如果工业化国家和全球南方之间要进行有效合作,就不能忽视对包括增长前景和市场准入在内的传统经济关切的关注。
{"title":"Recasting U.S.-Japan Ties in a New Era of Economic Security","authors":"S. Goto","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0055","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay examines the evolution of U.S.-Japan economic relations from competition for global markets to cooperation in staving off the threats confronting the rules-based economic order by focusing on the challenges both countries face from China's weaponization of economic dominance.main argument Once the biggest thorn to bilateral relations, trade is no longer the obstacle between Japan and the U.S. that it once was. Instead, shared economic interests not only are bringing Tokyo and Washington together more closely but the two countries are leading the way to coordinate efforts to protect the rules-based liberal economic order and stave off economic coercion from China. But Japan and the U.S. need the support of other countries in Asia, Europe, and beyond to develop an economic security framework that protects the critical technologies of this new economic era and prevents abuse of economic influence. Tokyo's ability to reach across the Indo-Pacific and establish trust in building an economic architecture with new rules of engagement is leading to more equalized relations between Japan and the U.S. and a larger voice for Japan in regional affairs.policy implications • A baseline understanding between Japan and the U.S. regarding what constitutes economic security and what the threats are to protecting growth has been made clear. A slew of bilateral and multilateral initiatives has ensued as a result, but there is significant overlap among them. If the partnerships are to be effective, efforts should be consolidated and streamlined.• Japan's more realist approach to dealing with the China challenge, whereby values-based diplomacy does not supersede efforts to focus on common interests and shared challenges, resonates in the Indo-Pacific. If the U.S. continues to look to Japan's political and economic leadership, the prospects for engaging more successfully with Southeast Asian states will improve.• Protecting technologies and cooperation in technology innovation is vital for defense purposes as well as for economic expansion. At the same time, the global economy continues to face significant challenges from the disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and rising geopolitical risks. A focus on conventional economic concerns, including growth prospects and market access, cannot be sidelined if there is to be effective cooperation between industrialized nations and the global South.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"225 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45619596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Circles of Strategy, Circuits of Risk: Rudd's Guide to Xi's China
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0072
R. Medcalf
F ormer leaders rarely hit the mark when writing books proclaiming expertise and sage advice on world affairs. In his book The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China, Kevin Rudd thankfully breaks that rule. This book is largely what the title implies—an insightful overview on China’s strategic goals, the danger of conflict with the United States, and ideas to reduce those risks. That makes this book particularly refreshing for what it is not. As a former prime minister and foreign minister, and still a close confidante of many international leaders, Rudd could easily have foregrounded his own experience, accomplishments, frustrations, and conversations. As an Australian, he could have emphasized the agency of third countries, such as his own, in shaping regional security or supposedly mediating great-power differences. As a China expert—which he unquestionably is—he could have articulated Beijing’s policy imperatives in ways that feigned clarity while actually signifying that nonspecialists could never hope to divine the mysteries of Chinese statecraft. And in stressing the hazards of war between the United States and China, he could have wallowed in sanctimony, blame, and doom. Mercifully, these temptations have been resisted. Instead, this book is genuinely useful, accessible, and timely, and it deserves to be widely read by policymakers, journalists, students, businesspeople, and concerned citizens alike. The style and format suggest many years of thinking behind a compressed burst of writing. This is, therefore, not an academic tome—the text does not contain a single footnote or reference—but it should not be skimmed through as simply a long piece of opinion or journalism. The Avoidable War is also highly readable. As a political leader, Rudd’s reputation included a tendency to the technocratic. This makes it doubly refreshing that the style of this book is largely jargon-free, engaging, and to the point. In a sense, this book is two in one: an objective explainer of Xi Jinping’s worldview and a survival (or, more precisely, coexistence) guide to the deepening U.S.-China struggle. Combining the two is logical, as the
前任领导人很少在写关于世界事务的专业知识和明智建议的书时达到目的。 这本书在很大程度上就是书名所暗示的——对中国的战略目标、与美国冲突的危险以及降低这些风险的想法进行了深刻的概述。这使得这本书特别令人耳目一新。作为前总理和外交部长,陆克文仍然是许多国际领导人的密友,他可以很容易地预见自己的经历、成就、挫折和对话。作为一名澳大利亚人,他本可以强调第三国,比如他自己的国家,在塑造地区安全或所谓调解大国分歧方面的作用。作为一名中国问题专家——毫无疑问,他是这样——他本可以以假装清晰的方式阐述北京的政策要求,同时实际上意味着非专业人士永远无法预测中国治国之道的奥秘。在强调美国和中国之间战争的危险时,他本可以沉浸在道貌岸然、指责和厄运中。幸运的是,这些诱惑遭到了抵制。相反,这本书真正有用、通俗易懂、及时,值得政策制定者、记者、学生、商界人士和关心此事的公民广泛阅读。这种风格和形式暗示了压缩的写作背后多年的思考。因此,这不是一本学术巨著——文本中没有一个脚注或参考文献——但它不应该被简单地当作一篇长篇观点或新闻报道来浏览。《可避免的战争》的可读性也很高。作为一名政治领袖,陆克文的名声包括技术官僚的倾向。这让人耳目一新的是,这本书的风格基本上没有行话,引人入胜,切中要害。 将两者结合起来是合乎逻辑的,因为
{"title":"Circles of Strategy, Circuits of Risk: Rudd's Guide to Xi's China","authors":"R. Medcalf","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0072","url":null,"abstract":"F ormer leaders rarely hit the mark when writing books proclaiming expertise and sage advice on world affairs. In his book The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China, Kevin Rudd thankfully breaks that rule. This book is largely what the title implies—an insightful overview on China’s strategic goals, the danger of conflict with the United States, and ideas to reduce those risks. That makes this book particularly refreshing for what it is not. As a former prime minister and foreign minister, and still a close confidante of many international leaders, Rudd could easily have foregrounded his own experience, accomplishments, frustrations, and conversations. As an Australian, he could have emphasized the agency of third countries, such as his own, in shaping regional security or supposedly mediating great-power differences. As a China expert—which he unquestionably is—he could have articulated Beijing’s policy imperatives in ways that feigned clarity while actually signifying that nonspecialists could never hope to divine the mysteries of Chinese statecraft. And in stressing the hazards of war between the United States and China, he could have wallowed in sanctimony, blame, and doom. Mercifully, these temptations have been resisted. Instead, this book is genuinely useful, accessible, and timely, and it deserves to be widely read by policymakers, journalists, students, businesspeople, and concerned citizens alike. The style and format suggest many years of thinking behind a compressed burst of writing. This is, therefore, not an academic tome—the text does not contain a single footnote or reference—but it should not be skimmed through as simply a long piece of opinion or journalism. The Avoidable War is also highly readable. As a political leader, Rudd’s reputation included a tendency to the technocratic. This makes it doubly refreshing that the style of this book is largely jargon-free, engaging, and to the point. In a sense, this book is two in one: an objective explainer of Xi Jinping’s worldview and a survival (or, more precisely, coexistence) guide to the deepening U.S.-China struggle. Combining the two is logical, as the","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"244 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43268197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Australia's Great-Power Threat Perceptions and Leadership Responses 澳大利亚对大国威胁的认识和领导层的回应
IF 1.3 Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI: 10.1353/asp.2022.0059
Peter K. Lee, A. Carr
executive summary:This essay argues that Australia's choices in the U.S.-China rivalry have been significantly shaped by the different role conceptions of the country's prime ministers, producing outcomes at odds with structural expectations for middle-power behavior.main argument Australia's relations with China and the U.S. are in a state of flux. Relations with Beijing have turned antagonistic, though trade continues apace. Meanwhile, relations with Washington seem infused by intimacy, yet also feature regular bouts of divergence. Three explanations are commonly offered to explain Australia's evolving relations with both great powers: the changing balance of power, alliance pressure, and national interests. However, none of these sufficiently explain variations in why and how Australia has behaved in recent years. Instead, the different role conceptions of Australia's three prime ministers between 2013 and 2022—Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull, and Scott Morrison—better explain Australia's choices. Specifically, a typology of role conceptions based on these leaders' domains of interest and desire for change shows how they responded differently to similar external pressures and thus demonstrates the decisive impact of leaders in how middle powers respond to great powers. It is still too early to identify Anthony Albanese's leadership role conception, given his recent election in May 2022, but a domestic role conception is likely.policy implications • Australia's recent choices and actions toward China and the U.S. have been far more contingent and leader-driven than is often reflected in the debate over middle-power responses to great-power competition.• A deeper appreciation of domestic political dynamics and the personal motivations of national leaders can help explain responses that do not conform to straightforward balancing choices.• There is considerable scope for middle-power agency even as domestic and international constraints narrow the availability of alternative leadership role conceptions.
执行摘要:本文认为,澳大利亚在美中竞争中的选择在很大程度上受到了该国总理不同角色概念的影响,产生的结果与对中等权力行为的结构性预期不一致。尽管贸易仍在快速发展,但与北京的关系已变得对立。与此同时,与华盛顿的关系似乎充满了亲密感,但也经常出现分歧。通常有三种解释来解释澳大利亚与两个大国不断发展的关系:不断变化的力量平衡、联盟压力和国家利益。然而,这些都不能充分解释澳大利亚近年来表现的原因和方式的变化。相反,2013年至2022年间,澳大利亚三位总理——托尼·阿博特、马尔科姆·特恩布尔和斯科特·莫里森——的不同角色观更好地解释了澳大利亚的选择。具体而言,基于这些领导人的兴趣和变革欲望领域的角色概念类型显示了他们如何以不同的方式应对类似的外部压力,从而表明了领导人对中等大国如何应对大国的决定性影响。考虑到安东尼·阿尔巴内塞最近于2022年5月当选,现在确定他的领导角色概念还为时过早,但国内角色概念很可能。政策含义•澳大利亚最近对中国和美国的选择和行动远比关于中等大国对大国竞争的反应的辩论中所反映的更具偶然性和领导者驱动性。•更深入地了解国内政治动态和国家领导人的个人动机,有助于解释不符合直接平衡选择的反应。•即使国内和国际限制缩小了替代领导角色概念的可用性,中等权力机构仍有相当大的空间。
{"title":"Australia's Great-Power Threat Perceptions and Leadership Responses","authors":"Peter K. Lee, A. Carr","doi":"10.1353/asp.2022.0059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2022.0059","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This essay argues that Australia's choices in the U.S.-China rivalry have been significantly shaped by the different role conceptions of the country's prime ministers, producing outcomes at odds with structural expectations for middle-power behavior.main argument Australia's relations with China and the U.S. are in a state of flux. Relations with Beijing have turned antagonistic, though trade continues apace. Meanwhile, relations with Washington seem infused by intimacy, yet also feature regular bouts of divergence. Three explanations are commonly offered to explain Australia's evolving relations with both great powers: the changing balance of power, alliance pressure, and national interests. However, none of these sufficiently explain variations in why and how Australia has behaved in recent years. Instead, the different role conceptions of Australia's three prime ministers between 2013 and 2022—Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull, and Scott Morrison—better explain Australia's choices. Specifically, a typology of role conceptions based on these leaders' domains of interest and desire for change shows how they responded differently to similar external pressures and thus demonstrates the decisive impact of leaders in how middle powers respond to great powers. It is still too early to identify Anthony Albanese's leadership role conception, given his recent election in May 2022, but a domestic role conception is likely.policy implications • Australia's recent choices and actions toward China and the U.S. have been far more contingent and leader-driven than is often reflected in the debate over middle-power responses to great-power competition.• A deeper appreciation of domestic political dynamics and the personal motivations of national leaders can help explain responses that do not conform to straightforward balancing choices.• There is considerable scope for middle-power agency even as domestic and international constraints narrow the availability of alternative leadership role conceptions.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"29 1","pages":"77 - 99"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45535785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
期刊
Asia Policy
全部 Acc. Chem. Res. ACS Applied Bio Materials ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. ACS Appl. Energy Mater. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces ACS Appl. Nano Mater. ACS Appl. Polym. Mater. ACS BIOMATER-SCI ENG ACS Catal. ACS Cent. Sci. ACS Chem. Biol. ACS Chemical Health & Safety ACS Chem. Neurosci. ACS Comb. Sci. ACS Earth Space Chem. ACS Energy Lett. ACS Infect. Dis. ACS Macro Lett. ACS Mater. Lett. ACS Med. Chem. Lett. ACS Nano ACS Omega ACS Photonics ACS Sens. ACS Sustainable Chem. Eng. ACS Synth. Biol. Anal. Chem. BIOCHEMISTRY-US Bioconjugate Chem. BIOMACROMOLECULES Chem. Res. Toxicol. Chem. Rev. Chem. Mater. CRYST GROWTH DES ENERG FUEL Environ. Sci. Technol. Environ. Sci. Technol. Lett. Eur. J. Inorg. Chem. IND ENG CHEM RES Inorg. Chem. J. Agric. Food. Chem. J. Chem. Eng. Data J. Chem. Educ. J. Chem. Inf. Model. J. Chem. Theory Comput. J. Med. Chem. J. Nat. Prod. J PROTEOME RES J. Am. Chem. Soc. LANGMUIR MACROMOLECULES Mol. Pharmaceutics Nano Lett. Org. Lett. ORG PROCESS RES DEV ORGANOMETALLICS J. Org. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. J. Phys. Chem. A J. Phys. Chem. B J. Phys. Chem. C J. Phys. Chem. Lett. Analyst Anal. Methods Biomater. Sci. Catal. Sci. Technol. Chem. Commun. Chem. Soc. Rev. CHEM EDUC RES PRACT CRYSTENGCOMM Dalton Trans. Energy Environ. Sci. ENVIRON SCI-NANO ENVIRON SCI-PROC IMP ENVIRON SCI-WAT RES Faraday Discuss. Food Funct. Green Chem. Inorg. Chem. Front. Integr. Biol. J. Anal. At. Spectrom. J. Mater. Chem. A J. Mater. Chem. B J. Mater. Chem. C Lab Chip Mater. Chem. Front. Mater. Horiz. MEDCHEMCOMM Metallomics Mol. Biosyst. Mol. Syst. Des. Eng. Nanoscale Nanoscale Horiz. Nat. Prod. Rep. New J. Chem. Org. Biomol. Chem. Org. Chem. Front. PHOTOCH PHOTOBIO SCI PCCP Polym. Chem.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1