Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1353/asp.2023.a903865
Céline Pajon
F rance was the first European country to announce an Indo-Pacific strategy, launching it in 2018.1 France is a resident power in the region. It maintains territories in both the Indian Ocean (the islands of Mayotte and Réunion, the Scattered Islands, and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories) and the Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton Island), with 1.5 million citizens living in these territories and in other regional countries, and more than 90% of its large exclusive economic zone (9 million square kilometers) located in the two oceans. To take care of this vast area, France maintains a military presence of 8,000 personnel in the region. Its original position derives from the country’s sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific and aims to propose a way out of the U.S.-China rivalry through an inclusive and multilateral approach to regional affairs that also maintains the rules-based order. Since 2021, the French approach of “strategic autonomy” has been challenged by several developments, specifically by the AUKUS defense pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States but also more broadly by growing Chinese assertiveness, the ideological turn of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, and the implications of the war in Ukraine. However, as geopolitical polarization grows and international security worsens, the feasibility and sustainability of an Indo-Pacific strategy in which France acts as a “balancing power”—a puissance d’équilibre(s)—are seriously called into question. There is indeed a significant gap between the political rhetoric of French priority and ambition for the Indo-Pacific and the reality of the resources it has committed to the region. Against this background,
{"title":"France in the Indo-Pacific: From a Balancing Power to a Constructive Stakeholder","authors":"Céline Pajon","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.a903865","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.a903865","url":null,"abstract":"F rance was the first European country to announce an Indo-Pacific strategy, launching it in 2018.1 France is a resident power in the region. It maintains territories in both the Indian Ocean (the islands of Mayotte and Réunion, the Scattered Islands, and the French Southern and Antarctic Territories) and the Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton Island), with 1.5 million citizens living in these territories and in other regional countries, and more than 90% of its large exclusive economic zone (9 million square kilometers) located in the two oceans. To take care of this vast area, France maintains a military presence of 8,000 personnel in the region. Its original position derives from the country’s sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific and aims to propose a way out of the U.S.-China rivalry through an inclusive and multilateral approach to regional affairs that also maintains the rules-based order. Since 2021, the French approach of “strategic autonomy” has been challenged by several developments, specifically by the AUKUS defense pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States but also more broadly by growing Chinese assertiveness, the ideological turn of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, and the implications of the war in Ukraine. However, as geopolitical polarization grows and international security worsens, the feasibility and sustainability of an Indo-Pacific strategy in which France acts as a “balancing power”—a puissance d’équilibre(s)—are seriously called into question. There is indeed a significant gap between the political rhetoric of French priority and ambition for the Indo-Pacific and the reality of the resources it has committed to the region. Against this background,","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"69 - 81"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41327339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J ust as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West’s respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia’s aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia’s militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia’s invasion in the group’s joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement’s drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia’s actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance
{"title":"Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War","authors":"J. Reeves","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0020","url":null,"abstract":"J ust as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West’s respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia’s aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia’s militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia’s invasion in the group’s joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement’s drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia’s actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"55 - 63"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47850776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J apan’s postwar military posture has always demanded careful analysis, given its intricacies and implications for East Asian security. Right now, it warrants even greater attention with the government’s avowed intention in its 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) to “fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities.”1 Tom Phuong Le’s Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century forms a key part of the debate on Japan’s military trajectory and should be read by all scholars and practitioners engaged in this topic. It contains much that is valuable, innovative, and provocative. At the same time, the volume presents overextended claims and argumentation that undermine its conclusions and impact. These issues were evident upon the volume’s release in mid-2021, and events thereafter—Japan’s further “major shift” or “major transformation” of its defense posture—have confirmed these flaws.2 The essential contention of Japan’s Aging Peace is that many scholars and practitioners, and particularly “realists,” have too readily accepted the factors contributing to Japanese “remilitarization” or “normalization” but have not focused enough on the continuing and dominant strength of internal obstacles—both material and ideational—in forming an “antimilitarism ecosystem” (p. 33) that prevents Japan from remilitarizing, or at least remilitarizing along a certain trajectory. If Japan is experiencing any change in its military posture, then it is toward types of “militarism” that leave the constraints of the past intact and contribute to nontraditional security objectives, such as UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
贾潘战后的军事态势一直需要仔细分析，因为其复杂性和对东亚安全的影响。目前，政府在其2022年国家安全战略（NSS）和国防战略（NDS）中公开表示，要“从根本上加强日本的防御能力”，这一点值得更多关注。“1 Tom Phuong Le的《日本的老龄化和平：二十一世纪的和平主义和军国主义》是关于日本军事轨迹的辩论的关键部分，所有从事这一主题的学者和从业者都应该阅读。它包含了许多有价值、创新和挑衅性的东西。同时，该卷提出了过度扩张的主张和论证，破坏了其结论和影响。这些问题在该卷于2021年年中发行时就很明显了，此后发生的事件——日本国防态势的进一步“重大转变”或“重大转型”——也证实了这些缺陷，特别是“现实主义者”，过于容易接受促成日本“再军事化”或“正常化”的因素，但在形成阻止日本再军事化的“反军事生态系统”（第33页）时，没有足够关注内部障碍的持续和主导力量，包括物质和思想障碍，或者至少沿着某一轨迹重新军事化。如果说日本的军事态势发生了任何变化，那么它将走向一种“军国主义”，这种“军国主义“保留了过去的限制，有助于实现非传统的安全目标，如联合国维和行动、人道主义援助和救灾。
{"title":"Japan's Decaying Antimilitarism Ecosystem","authors":"C. Hughes","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0023","url":null,"abstract":"J apan’s postwar military posture has always demanded careful analysis, given its intricacies and implications for East Asian security. Right now, it warrants even greater attention with the government’s avowed intention in its 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) to “fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities.”1 Tom Phuong Le’s Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century forms a key part of the debate on Japan’s military trajectory and should be read by all scholars and practitioners engaged in this topic. It contains much that is valuable, innovative, and provocative. At the same time, the volume presents overextended claims and argumentation that undermine its conclusions and impact. These issues were evident upon the volume’s release in mid-2021, and events thereafter—Japan’s further “major shift” or “major transformation” of its defense posture—have confirmed these flaws.2 The essential contention of Japan’s Aging Peace is that many scholars and practitioners, and particularly “realists,” have too readily accepted the factors contributing to Japanese “remilitarization” or “normalization” but have not focused enough on the continuing and dominant strength of internal obstacles—both material and ideational—in forming an “antimilitarism ecosystem” (p. 33) that prevents Japan from remilitarizing, or at least remilitarizing along a certain trajectory. If Japan is experiencing any change in its military posture, then it is toward types of “militarism” that leave the constraints of the past intact and contribute to nontraditional security objectives, such as UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"173 - 178"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43958029","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article explains the impact of "dual graying"—the concurrent phenomena of rapid population aging and the proliferation of gray-zone conflicts—on the security planning and postures of Northeast Asian states and considers the implications of these trends in the broader context of Indo-Pacific demographics.main argumentThe major Northeast Asian powers (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as Russia are at the leading edge of one of the most consequential challenges of the 21st century: the rapid aging of their populations at a rate unprecedented in human history that is resulting in a shrinkage of their total population sizes. In addition to the graying of their populations, these powers face a range of new "gray" conflicts—interactions residing somewhere between war and peace—that exacerbate long-standing military concerns. Contrary to predictions that rapid aging will diminish the likelihood of interstate war, security tensions are rising among graying rivals in this region of the world, and states are increasing both military spending and military development. This "dual graying" underscores the need for new approaches to the U.S. network of regional security partners.policy implications• The rapid aging among regional powers does not so far suggest that an "aging peace" is likely to develop; rather, tensions are increasing over old and new areas of conflict.• The escalation of regional gray-zone conflicts is taxing U.S. allies and partners with graying and shrinking populations. Demographic changes in several of these major partners may necessitate a re-examination of roles and commitments within the U.S. alliance network.• Innovations in military and civilian technologies may eventually offset many of the challenges resulting from shrinking and rapidly aging populations, but in the meantime growing labor shortages will force many militaries to seek to adapt in other ways to maintain robust force postures.• In the wider Indo-Pacific, differential aging and population growth among major security actors suggests a growing role for several middle-power states (such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) that may benefit from a "demographic dividend" over the next several decades.
{"title":"The Rising Security Challenge of East Asia's \"Dual Graying\": Implications for U.S.-Led Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"Andrew L. Oros","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0028","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article explains the impact of \"dual graying\"—the concurrent phenomena of rapid population aging and the proliferation of gray-zone conflicts—on the security planning and postures of Northeast Asian states and considers the implications of these trends in the broader context of Indo-Pacific demographics.main argumentThe major Northeast Asian powers (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as Russia are at the leading edge of one of the most consequential challenges of the 21st century: the rapid aging of their populations at a rate unprecedented in human history that is resulting in a shrinkage of their total population sizes. In addition to the graying of their populations, these powers face a range of new \"gray\" conflicts—interactions residing somewhere between war and peace—that exacerbate long-standing military concerns. Contrary to predictions that rapid aging will diminish the likelihood of interstate war, security tensions are rising among graying rivals in this region of the world, and states are increasing both military spending and military development. This \"dual graying\" underscores the need for new approaches to the U.S. network of regional security partners.policy implications• The rapid aging among regional powers does not so far suggest that an \"aging peace\" is likely to develop; rather, tensions are increasing over old and new areas of conflict.• The escalation of regional gray-zone conflicts is taxing U.S. allies and partners with graying and shrinking populations. Demographic changes in several of these major partners may necessitate a re-examination of roles and commitments within the U.S. alliance network.• Innovations in military and civilian technologies may eventually offset many of the challenges resulting from shrinking and rapidly aging populations, but in the meantime growing labor shortages will force many militaries to seek to adapt in other ways to maintain robust force postures.• In the wider Indo-Pacific, differential aging and population growth among major security actors suggests a growing role for several middle-power states (such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) that may benefit from a \"demographic dividend\" over the next several decades.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"100 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46975179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
executive summary:This article proposes that Southeast Asia is an ideal space for cooperation between Japan and South Korea, given that both countries share strategic priorities in the region.main argumentAlthough Japan and South Korea's bilateral ties are typically defined by long-standing issues over historical issues and territorial disputes, each country shares a wide set of geopolitical interests, leading to an "Asian paradox" of mismatched priorities. This paradox is clearly visible in Southeast Asia. While Tokyo's strategic ties with the subregion, often via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeper and predate Seoul's, South Korea is increasingly expanding its own relations with the region alongside its growing security outreach across the Asia-Pacific. As a result, Japan's and South Korea's interests and activities are meeting in strategic spaces in Southeast Asia, such as the South China Sea and the Mekong River basin. Despite sharing common goals in these spaces, so far Seoul and Tokyo have not collaborated in their efforts. While many hurdles still limit direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, even indirect cooperation in shared strategic spaces in Southeast Asia could provide both countries an opportunity to build trust and provide security benefits to countries in Southeast Asia.policy implications• The U.S. can incentivize Japan–South Korea cooperation in Southeast Asia through the Quad Plus framework.• Expanding the General Security of Military Information Agreement between Japan and South Korea could be a method of increasing their cooperation in Southeast Asia.• To achieve greater cooperation toward these aims, the U.S. should support strategic latitude for Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia.
摘要:本文认为东南亚是日韩两国合作的理想空间，因为两国在该地区有着共同的战略重点。虽然日本和韩国的双边关系通常是由历史问题和领土争端等长期问题决定的，但两国都有广泛的地缘政治利益，这导致了优先事项不匹配的“亚洲悖论”。这种矛盾在东南亚尤为明显。虽然东京通常通过东南亚国家联盟(Association of Southeast Asian Nations，简称东盟)与该地区的战略关系更为深厚，而且早于韩国，但韩国也在不断扩大自己与该地区的关系，同时在整个亚太地区不断扩大安全触角。因此，日本和韩国的利益和活动在东南亚的战略空间相遇，比如南中国海和湄公河流域。尽管在这些空间中有共同的目标，但到目前为止，首尔和东京还没有合作。虽然日本和韩国之间的直接安全合作仍然受到许多障碍的限制，但即使是在东南亚共享战略空间的间接合作也可以为两国提供建立信任和为东南亚国家提供安全利益的机会。•美国可以通过“四国+”框架激励日韩在东南亚的合作。•扩大日本和韩国之间的《军事信息安全总协定》(General Security of Military Information Agreement)，可能是加强两国在东南亚合作的一种方法。•为了在这些目标上实现更大的合作，美国应该支持日本和韩国在东南亚的战略纬度。
{"title":"Common Waters: Japan, South Korea, and Maritime Security Assistance in Southeast Asia","authors":"Ryan Ashley, Jada Fraser","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0021","url":null,"abstract":"executive summary:This article proposes that Southeast Asia is an ideal space for cooperation between Japan and South Korea, given that both countries share strategic priorities in the region.main argumentAlthough Japan and South Korea's bilateral ties are typically defined by long-standing issues over historical issues and territorial disputes, each country shares a wide set of geopolitical interests, leading to an \"Asian paradox\" of mismatched priorities. This paradox is clearly visible in Southeast Asia. While Tokyo's strategic ties with the subregion, often via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), are deeper and predate Seoul's, South Korea is increasingly expanding its own relations with the region alongside its growing security outreach across the Asia-Pacific. As a result, Japan's and South Korea's interests and activities are meeting in strategic spaces in Southeast Asia, such as the South China Sea and the Mekong River basin. Despite sharing common goals in these spaces, so far Seoul and Tokyo have not collaborated in their efforts. While many hurdles still limit direct security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, even indirect cooperation in shared strategic spaces in Southeast Asia could provide both countries an opportunity to build trust and provide security benefits to countries in Southeast Asia.policy implications• The U.S. can incentivize Japan–South Korea cooperation in Southeast Asia through the Quad Plus framework.• Expanding the General Security of Military Information Agreement between Japan and South Korea could be a method of increasing their cooperation in Southeast Asia.• To achieve greater cooperation toward these aims, the U.S. should support strategic latitude for Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"101 - 126"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48795776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C entral Asia is the Asian subregion most directly affected by Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is part of Russia’s “near abroad,” and Moscow feels a special attachment and entitlement to this post-Soviet space. For the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), the Kremlin’s denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s incorporation of Ukrainian territories is very bad news because it undermines the founding principles of the post-Soviet security and political order—the mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty and the existing borders at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. Will the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian states be respected by Russia? Kazakhstan is particularly concerned since it shares a long border with Russia, and its northern regions are sometimes claimed to be part of “historical Russia.” This essay examines the position of the Central Asian states relative to the Russia-Ukraine war and the delicate balancing act these states are undertaking between Russia and their other partners. It first looks at how Russia has upset its long-held arrangements with the Central Asian states before turning to assess four policy trends within the region. It then focuses on Kazakhstan, which shares similarities (as well as differences) with Ukraine and has been the most wary and proactive in response to the Russia-Ukraine war.
{"title":"Central Asia's Balancing Act","authors":"N. Kassenova","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0017","url":null,"abstract":"C entral Asia is the Asian subregion most directly affected by Russia’s war against Ukraine. It is part of Russia’s “near abroad,” and Moscow feels a special attachment and entitlement to this post-Soviet space. For the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), the Kremlin’s denial of Ukraine’s sovereignty and Russia’s incorporation of Ukrainian territories is very bad news because it undermines the founding principles of the post-Soviet security and political order—the mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty and the existing borders at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991. Will the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Central Asian states be respected by Russia? Kazakhstan is particularly concerned since it shares a long border with Russia, and its northern regions are sometimes claimed to be part of “historical Russia.” This essay examines the position of the Central Asian states relative to the Russia-Ukraine war and the delicate balancing act these states are undertaking between Russia and their other partners. It first looks at how Russia has upset its long-held arrangements with the Central Asian states before turning to assess four policy trends within the region. It then focuses on Kazakhstan, which shares similarities (as well as differences) with Ukraine and has been the most wary and proactive in response to the Russia-Ukraine war.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"20 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48308018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W hat lessons should the United States draw from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? While the invasion has been a shock to the European global and security architecture and a humanitarian tragedy, it has also been a laboratory for understanding the future of warfare. This essay reviews the major lessons Washington has learned and provides recommendations to policymakers. The invasion has sparked an intense debate about how to deal with the “two peer challenger” problem and whether the United States can provide support to Ukraine while still meeting other demands, such as countering a revisionist China in the Indo-Pacific. This essay argues that the sides of this debate are in fact further apart in rhetoric than reality and that there is an emerging broad consensus on some of the steps necessary to deal with the two-peer-challenger problem. It also reviews lessons learned related to military basics, emerging technology, Taiwan, nuclear deterrence, and other key issues. The essay recommends that the United States (1) develop a defense strategy and force posture capable of dealing with China and Russia simultaneously, (2) increase defense spending, (3) adapt defense innovation adoption, (4) augment its security assistance program, and (5) strengthen nuclear deterrence.
{"title":"U.S. Lessons from Russia's War on Ukraine","authors":"M. Kroenig, Clementine G. Starling","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0018","url":null,"abstract":"W hat lessons should the United States draw from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? While the invasion has been a shock to the European global and security architecture and a humanitarian tragedy, it has also been a laboratory for understanding the future of warfare. This essay reviews the major lessons Washington has learned and provides recommendations to policymakers. The invasion has sparked an intense debate about how to deal with the “two peer challenger” problem and whether the United States can provide support to Ukraine while still meeting other demands, such as countering a revisionist China in the Indo-Pacific. This essay argues that the sides of this debate are in fact further apart in rhetoric than reality and that there is an emerging broad consensus on some of the steps necessary to deal with the two-peer-challenger problem. It also reviews lessons learned related to military basics, emerging technology, Taiwan, nuclear deterrence, and other key issues. The essay recommends that the United States (1) develop a defense strategy and force posture capable of dealing with China and Russia simultaneously, (2) increase defense spending, (3) adapt defense innovation adoption, (4) augment its security assistance program, and (5) strengthen nuclear deterrence.","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"64 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45017003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J apan’s security policy has undergone several drastic changes in past decade: the establishment of the National Security Council in 2013; the easing of defense equipment exports in 2014; and, most recently, the publication of the new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program white papers in late 2022, combined with the increase of the defense budget to 2% of GDP and plans to establish new measures like a counterstrike capability. While many analysts have highlighted these developments as significant shifts in Japan’s strategic priorities, a single major factor looms in the background that continues to hinder developments—Japan’s aging population. Japan’s attempt to become a “normal nation”—a country with an effective security policy that can accept the use of force as a potential policy tool—is constrained today by a declining birth rate, an aging population that both stresses the government’s budget and limits the recruitment pool for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and the slow pace of technology adoption in the JSDF. Tom Phuong Le’s book Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century addresses these major challenges and uniquely explores the intersection between Japanese defense policy and the country’s demographic crisis, detailing exactly why and how these issues are causational. First, fewer children mean fewer potential military recruits. Second, an older, aging population requires a larger budget for institutions like the pension system, leaving less money for defense matters, such as recruiting and retaining troops. Le carefully describes both the uniqueness and individuality of the problem; while most developed economies today are experiencing declining birth rates, Japan’s crisis has arguably attracted the most attention as a social phenomenon over the last two decades. In exploring how the abovementioned demographic shift affects Japan’s defense, Le compares Japan with its neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Singapore, which all have some form of mandatory conscription. Yet, each of these countries faces the same issue of an aging population—and
{"title":"The Next Generation of Japan's National Security","authors":"Marina Fujita Dickson, Y. Funabashi","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0022","url":null,"abstract":"J apan’s security policy has undergone several drastic changes in past decade: the establishment of the National Security Council in 2013; the easing of defense equipment exports in 2014; and, most recently, the publication of the new National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program white papers in late 2022, combined with the increase of the defense budget to 2% of GDP and plans to establish new measures like a counterstrike capability. While many analysts have highlighted these developments as significant shifts in Japan’s strategic priorities, a single major factor looms in the background that continues to hinder developments—Japan’s aging population. Japan’s attempt to become a “normal nation”—a country with an effective security policy that can accept the use of force as a potential policy tool—is constrained today by a declining birth rate, an aging population that both stresses the government’s budget and limits the recruitment pool for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and the slow pace of technology adoption in the JSDF. Tom Phuong Le’s book Japan’s Aging Peace: Pacifism and Militarism in the Twenty-First Century addresses these major challenges and uniquely explores the intersection between Japanese defense policy and the country’s demographic crisis, detailing exactly why and how these issues are causational. First, fewer children mean fewer potential military recruits. Second, an older, aging population requires a larger budget for institutions like the pension system, leaving less money for defense matters, such as recruiting and retaining troops. Le carefully describes both the uniqueness and individuality of the problem; while most developed economies today are experiencing declining birth rates, Japan’s crisis has arguably attracted the most attention as a social phenomenon over the last two decades. In exploring how the abovementioned demographic shift affects Japan’s defense, Le compares Japan with its neighbors South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Singapore, which all have some form of mandatory conscription. Yet, each of these countries faces the same issue of an aging population—and","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"169 - 172"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46069793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Russia-Ukraine War and the Impact on the Persian Gulf States","authors":"K. Ulrichsen","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"39 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46903212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I f we have learned anything about the international relations of Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, it is that exogenous shocks to the system can be highly disruptive to assumptions about the emerging regional order. Many scholars and governments expected an intensification of U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry in the early years of the George W. Bush administration, for example, but the events of September 11 shifted U.S. strategic priorities in a new direction. Rather than designating China as a “strategic competitor” as the Bush campaign had promised, the 2002 U.S. national security strategy declared that, while the United States would remain attentive to the possibilities for great-power rivalry, the common threat of terrorism gave an unprecedented opportunity “to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”1 The 2008–9 global financial crisis had an equally profound impact on China’s assumptions about the emerging regional order, convincing leaders in Beijing that the Western democracies were incompetent and that the United States was entering a period of secular decline. This reignited greater geopolitical rivalry rather than cooperation. At first, the Covid-19 pandemic seemed to confirm Beijing’s thesis that the East is rising and the West declining, but later phases of the pandemic undermined confidence in China’s own secular rise while reinforcing U.S. strategies for technology decoupling from China and closer U.S. alignment with allies and partners. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the fourth major exogenous shock to Northeast Asian order since the end of the Cold War. In terms of national security, it is likely to be the most profound. One is always tempted to draw such conclusions when in the midst of a crisis and lacking perspective,2 but in this instance there are several reasons to expect that the impacts of
如果说我们从冷战结束以来的东北亚国际关系中学到了什么的话，那就是对该体系的外部冲击可能会对新兴地区秩序的假设产生高度破坏。例如，许多学者和政府预计，在小布什(George W. Bush)政府执政初期，美中地缘政治竞争会加剧，但911事件将美国的战略重点转向了一个新的方向。2002年美国国家安全战略没有像布什竞选时承诺的那样将中国列为“战略竞争者”，而是宣称，尽管美国将继续关注大国竞争的可能性，但恐怖主义的共同威胁提供了一个前所未有的机会，“建立一个大国在和平中竞争而不是准备战争的世界”。2008 - 2009年的全球金融危机同样深刻地影响了中国对新兴地区秩序的设想，使北京的领导人相信西方民主国家是无能的，美国正在进入一个长期衰落的时期。这重新点燃了更大的地缘政治竞争，而不是合作。起初，新冠肺炎大流行似乎证实了北京的论点，即东方正在崛起，西方正在衰落，但疫情的后期阶段削弱了对中国自身长期崛起的信心，同时加强了美国与中国的技术脱钩战略，并加强了美国与盟友和伙伴的紧密联系。俄罗斯入侵乌克兰是冷战结束以来对东北亚秩序的第四次重大外生冲击。就国家安全而言，这可能是最深刻的。当处于危机之中，缺乏远见时，人们总是忍不住得出这样的结论，但在这种情况下，有几个理由可以预期
{"title":"The Ukraine War and Northeast Asia","authors":"M. Green","doi":"10.1353/asp.2023.0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0031","url":null,"abstract":"I f we have learned anything about the international relations of Northeast Asia since the end of the Cold War, it is that exogenous shocks to the system can be highly disruptive to assumptions about the emerging regional order. Many scholars and governments expected an intensification of U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry in the early years of the George W. Bush administration, for example, but the events of September 11 shifted U.S. strategic priorities in a new direction. Rather than designating China as a “strategic competitor” as the Bush campaign had promised, the 2002 U.S. national security strategy declared that, while the United States would remain attentive to the possibilities for great-power rivalry, the common threat of terrorism gave an unprecedented opportunity “to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”1 The 2008–9 global financial crisis had an equally profound impact on China’s assumptions about the emerging regional order, convincing leaders in Beijing that the Western democracies were incompetent and that the United States was entering a period of secular decline. This reignited greater geopolitical rivalry rather than cooperation. At first, the Covid-19 pandemic seemed to confirm Beijing’s thesis that the East is rising and the West declining, but later phases of the pandemic undermined confidence in China’s own secular rise while reinforcing U.S. strategies for technology decoupling from China and closer U.S. alignment with allies and partners. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the fourth major exogenous shock to Northeast Asian order since the end of the Cold War. In terms of national security, it is likely to be the most profound. One is always tempted to draw such conclusions when in the midst of a crisis and lacking perspective,2 but in this instance there are several reasons to expect that the impacts of","PeriodicalId":53442,"journal":{"name":"Asia Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"19 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46275050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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