Understanding the role of network externalities in product, firm and market settings is at the top of many modern economists’ research agenda. With network externalities “the utility that a user derives from consumption of [a] good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good” (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The downside of network externalities is that the smallest of historical accidents, perhaps a careless choice by a technology pioneer responding to some random influence, has the potential to lock in future generations to an inefficient technology. The result is a market failure. Thus, there exists the possibility that all people might use the same telephone service, or all companies might use the same ERP software for human resource or the same XML technology for e-commerce, though these technologies may not be the best-of-breed.
{"title":"Winners, Losers and Microsoft. Competition and Antitrust in High Technology - Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis","authors":"C. Didier","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1167","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1167","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the role of network externalities in product, firm and market settings is at the top of many modern economists’ research agenda. With network externalities “the utility that a user derives from consumption of [a] good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good” (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). The downside of network externalities is that the smallest of historical accidents, perhaps a careless choice by a technology pioneer responding to some random influence, has the potential to lock in future generations to an inefficient technology. The result is a market failure. Thus, there exists the possibility that all people might use the same telephone service, or all companies might use the same ERP software for human resource or the same XML technology for e-commerce, though these technologies may not be the best-of-breed.","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82661104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Deux ques t ions impor tantes sont rarement posees a propos de lintroduction possible de Quotas Individuels Transferables (QIT) dans les pecheries : Pourquoi ny a-t-il que deux pays dans le monde, lIslande et la Nouvelle Zelande, qui ont introduit un systeme comprehensible de QIT dans leurs pecheries ? et : qui soccupe de la privatisation des biens dacces libre ? Lexperience de lIslande peut donner quelques reponses. Dans une premiere partie, levolution du systeme de QIT en Islande entre 1975 et 2000 est decrite comme un processus difficile de marchandage. Dune part les couts de marchandage furent abaisses par la crainte repandue de la disparition des stocks de poisson, et par la relative homogeneite dans les pecheries pelagiques. Dautre part ces couts furent augmentes, par lheterogeneite dans les pecheries demersales, avec des differences immenses entre les proprietaires de petits bateaux et ceux de grands chalutiers, ainsi que des differences entre les regions. Dans la seconde partie, est decrite la nature du systeme de QIT: alors que ceux qui detiennent des QIT jouissent de droits dextraction plutot que de la propriete, lintroduction du systeme de QIT equivaut a cloturer partiellement les stocks de poisson dans les eaux dIslande, resolvant ainsi la plupart des problemes associes a la tragedie des communs. Le systeme a plutot bien opere mis a part quelques problemes subsistants, en particulier le statut legal incertain des QIT et les prises de premier choix. La troisieme partie decrit les controverses actuelles au sujet du systeme des QIT. Nous demontrons que le seul moyen de rendre lintroduction de ce systeme acceptable pour les proprietaires dun capital de peche etait dallouer des quotas sur la base de lhistoire des prises, et quune taxe speciale sur la location des ressources serait injuste car elle frapperait ceux qui ont choisi de rester dans les pecheries et non ceux qui ont ete mis a lecart.Two important questions are rarely asked about the possible introduction of ITQs in fisheries: Why are there only two countries in the world, Iceland and New Zealand, which have introduced a comprehensive ITQ system into their fisheries? and: Who cares whether the commons is privatized? The experience in Iceland may provide some answers. In Part 1, the evolution of the ITQ system in Iceland in 1975-2000 is described as a difficult process of bargaining. Costs of bargaining were lowered by the widespread fear of the collapse of the fish stocks, and by the relative homogeneity in the pelagic fisheries. Those costs were increased, on the other hand, by the heterogeneity in the demersal fisheries, with vast differences between owners of small boats and large trawlers, and also between regions. In Part II, the nature of the ITQ system is described: while those who hold ITQs enjoy rights of extraction rather than property, the introduction of the ITQ system amounts to the partial enclosure of the fish stocks in Icelandic waters, solving most of the problems
两个重要离子很少在一个领域一些t说到lintroduction iq可以转让(QIT pecheries中的):两国为何ny说,全世界lIslande和新西兰,都引入了一个理解的itq制度纳入其pecheries ?还有:谁在支持免费dacces商品的私有化?lIslande的经验可以提供一些答案。在第一部分中，冰岛从1975年到2000年的QIT体系的发展被描述为一个艰难的讨价还价过程。一方面，由于人们普遍担心鱼类资源的消失，以及远洋渔业的相对同质性，谈判成本很低。此外，海底渔业的异质性增加了这些成本，小型渔船和大型拖网渔船的所有者之间存在巨大差异，地区之间也存在差异。在后半段,itq制度的本质是的适用范围:虽然那些arhcle QIT dextraction行使公共权利,享有所有权,lintroduction QIT a mg cloturer建模系统的部分水域的鱼类种群dIslande,从而结束了大多数相关高校悲剧艺术的共性。除了一些仍然存在的问题，特别是QIT和首选捕获的法律地位不确定外，该系统运行得相当好。第三部分描述了当前关于QIT系统的争议。我们demontrons惟一使这个系统,为业主们接受lintroduction dun资本裹dallouer钓鱼lhistoire基础上采取配额制,要么太speciale资源租赁税是不公平的,因为它会打击那些选择留在pecheries并不是那些ete lecart了。黑胡椒are Two重要问题的优势,尽可能about the introduction of fisheries ITQs: Why are only Two in the world),冰岛的国家以及有新西兰,which have a的综合性贸易配额system into their渔业?= =地理= =根据美国人口普查，这个县的总面积是，其中，土地和(1.694平方公里)水。冰岛的经历可能提供了一些答案。In Part 1的进化》,1975配额system In leave In is as a歌很难process of求情。费用”求情,by the widespread were of the collapse of the fish恐惧库存相对,and by the homogeneity in the海洋渔业。它的成本会,on the other hand, by the heterogeneity in the demersal fisheries, with玻特块之间巨大的差异意味着of small and trawlers, and also between区域广。In Part II》(the nature of the配额,但是system is歌》:while上降落的ITQs享有rights of萃取而不是the introduction of the property,房舍和配额system to the偏enclosure waters of the fish In Icelandic库存,解决associated with the most of the问题典型of the commons)。has The system面前时,那么您虽然礼物,加上一些问题的谈话一定legal status of The ITQs and高。In Part III, current controversies system are about the贸易配额的歌》。It is that, the only way to make the introduction of the system of fishing块度接受资本开支和为一切配额摔跤on the basis of history and that would be a special resource rent税、伤害、since It would东西to hit上降落的礼物的时代out in the fisheries, who were not戴。
{"title":"When Ideas Conspire with Circumstances: Introducing Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries","authors":"H. GissurarsonHannes","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1149","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1149","url":null,"abstract":"Deux ques t ions impor tantes sont rarement posees a propos de lintroduction possible de Quotas Individuels Transferables (QIT) dans les pecheries : Pourquoi ny a-t-il que deux pays dans le monde, lIslande et la Nouvelle Zelande, qui ont introduit un systeme comprehensible de QIT dans leurs pecheries ? et : qui soccupe de la privatisation des biens dacces libre ? Lexperience de lIslande peut donner quelques reponses. Dans une premiere partie, levolution du systeme de QIT en Islande entre 1975 et 2000 est decrite comme un processus difficile de marchandage. Dune part les couts de marchandage furent abaisses par la crainte repandue de la disparition des stocks de poisson, et par la relative homogeneite dans les pecheries pelagiques. Dautre part ces couts furent augmentes, par lheterogeneite dans les pecheries demersales, avec des differences immenses entre les proprietaires de petits bateaux et ceux de grands chalutiers, ainsi que des differences entre les regions. Dans la seconde partie, est decrite la nature du systeme de QIT: alors que ceux qui detiennent des QIT jouissent de droits dextraction plutot que de la propriete, lintroduction du systeme de QIT equivaut a cloturer partiellement les stocks de poisson dans les eaux dIslande, resolvant ainsi la plupart des problemes associes a la tragedie des communs. Le systeme a plutot bien opere mis a part quelques problemes subsistants, en particulier le statut legal incertain des QIT et les prises de premier choix. La troisieme partie decrit les controverses actuelles au sujet du systeme des QIT. Nous demontrons que le seul moyen de rendre lintroduction de ce systeme acceptable pour les proprietaires dun capital de peche etait dallouer des quotas sur la base de lhistoire des prises, et quune taxe speciale sur la location des ressources serait injuste car elle frapperait ceux qui ont choisi de rester dans les pecheries et non ceux qui ont ete mis a lecart.Two important questions are rarely asked about the possible introduction of ITQs in fisheries: Why are there only two countries in the world, Iceland and New Zealand, which have introduced a comprehensive ITQ system into their fisheries? and: Who cares whether the commons is privatized? The experience in Iceland may provide some answers. In Part 1, the evolution of the ITQ system in Iceland in 1975-2000 is described as a difficult process of bargaining. Costs of bargaining were lowered by the widespread fear of the collapse of the fish stocks, and by the relative homogeneity in the pelagic fisheries. Those costs were increased, on the other hand, by the heterogeneity in the demersal fisheries, with vast differences between owners of small boats and large trawlers, and also between regions. In Part II, the nature of the ITQ system is described: while those who hold ITQs enjoy rights of extraction rather than property, the introduction of the ITQ system amounts to the partial enclosure of the fish stocks in Icelandic waters, solving most of the problems","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82277706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"An Essay on the Unmagic of Norms and Rules and of Markets","authors":"W. Samuels","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1153","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76560468","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aujourdhui, le gouvernement federal entreprend de diriger les situation durgence, un tâche si intimidante quelle fait appel a la panoplie de reglementation et de pouvoirs economiques residant dans les institutions et les bureaucraties federales. LAdministration Federale de Gestion des Situations dUrgence occupe la pole position dans cet effort massif. Mais une societe qui autorise le gouvernement a repondre face aux catastrophes naturelles et autres calamites de ce type peut-elle esperer preserver sa liberte ? Non. En fait, le gouvernement dune societe libre peut gouverner efficacement sans detruire la liberte, si et seulement si ses citoyens en ont decide ainsi.Today, the federal government undertakes to manage emergencies, a task so daunting that it must call forth all of the concentrated regulatory and economic power that resides in federal institutions and bureaucracies. The Federal Emergency Management Administration takes the point position in this massive effort. But can a society which authorizes government to respond to natural disasters and other such calamities hope to preserve its liberty? No. In fact, the government of a free society can govern effectively without destroying freedom, if and only if the citizens are willing to be so governed.
{"title":"A Fool's Errand?","authors":"A. John","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1135","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1135","url":null,"abstract":"Aujourdhui, le gouvernement federal entreprend de diriger les situation durgence, un tâche si intimidante quelle fait appel a la panoplie de reglementation et de pouvoirs economiques residant dans les institutions et les bureaucraties federales. LAdministration Federale de Gestion des Situations dUrgence occupe la pole position dans cet effort massif. Mais une societe qui autorise le gouvernement a repondre face aux catastrophes naturelles et autres calamites de ce type peut-elle esperer preserver sa liberte ? Non. En fait, le gouvernement dune societe libre peut gouverner efficacement sans detruire la liberte, si et seulement si ses citoyens en ont decide ainsi.Today, the federal government undertakes to manage emergencies, a task so daunting that it must call forth all of the concentrated regulatory and economic power that resides in federal institutions and bureaucracies. The Federal Emergency Management Administration takes the point position in this massive effort. But can a society which authorizes government to respond to natural disasters and other such calamities hope to preserve its liberty? No. In fact, the government of a free society can govern effectively without destroying freedom, if and only if the citizens are willing to be so governed.","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88858725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cet article presente une analyse statistique de la position des economistes francais et des specialistes francais des sciences de gestion parmi les chercheurs europeens de haut rang. La preuve empirique revele que la France ne developpe pas fortement ses ressources humaines sur la scene internationale. La position de la France en Europe, reperee par les citations (pour les economistes) et les nominations par les pairs (pour les specialistes des sciences de gestion) des chercheurs de haut rang et normalisee par la taille de la population, est seulement au neuvieme rang en ce qui concerne les sciences economiques et au huitieme rang pour les sciences de gestion. Cela laisse penser que la politique scientifique a encore beaucoup a faire pour ameliorer la situation.This note provides a statistical analysis of the position of French economists and French management scientists among the leading European scholars. The evidence shows that France does not strongly develop its human resources in the international setting. Frances position in Europe based on citations (for economists) and peer nominations (for management scientists) of the leading scholars normalized by the size of the population is only rank 9 with respect to economics, and rank 8 with respect to management science. This suggests that there is considerable scope for science policy to improve this situation.
本文对法国经济学家和法国管理专家在欧洲顶级研究人员中的地位进行了统计分析。经验证据表明，法国在国际舞台上并没有大力开发其人力资源。法国在欧洲的地位,reperee段语录(经济学家)和任命(对于科学的专家同行normalisee)高级研究人员管理和人口规模,仅排在第九届而言是经济科学和管理科学名列第八。这表明，科学政策仍有许多工作要做，以改善这种情况。This注provides a statistical analysis of the of French)经济学家的立场和French管理科学家做儿子,领先欧洲学者。有证据表明，法国没有在国际环境下大力开发其人力资源。法国在欧洲的地位基于领先学者的引用(经济学家)和同行提名(管理科学家)，按人口规模标准化，在经济学方面仅排名第九，在管理科学方面仅排名第八。这表明，科学政策有相当大的范围来改善这种情况。
{"title":"The Ranking of Economists and Management Scientists in Europe","authors":"B. Frey, R. Eichenberger","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1140","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article presente une analyse statistique de la position des economistes francais et des specialistes francais des sciences de gestion parmi les chercheurs europeens de haut rang. La preuve empirique revele que la France ne developpe pas fortement ses ressources humaines sur la scene internationale. La position de la France en Europe, reperee par les citations (pour les economistes) et les nominations par les pairs (pour les specialistes des sciences de gestion) des chercheurs de haut rang et normalisee par la taille de la population, est seulement au neuvieme rang en ce qui concerne les sciences economiques et au huitieme rang pour les sciences de gestion. Cela laisse penser que la politique scientifique a encore beaucoup a faire pour ameliorer la situation.This note provides a statistical analysis of the position of French economists and French management scientists among the leading European scholars. The evidence shows that France does not strongly develop its human resources in the international setting. Frances position in Europe based on citations (for economists) and peer nominations (for management scientists) of the leading scholars normalized by the size of the population is only rank 9 with respect to economics, and rank 8 with respect to management science. This suggests that there is considerable scope for science policy to improve this situation.","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83816610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aux Etats-Unis les gouvernements des Etats tout autant que le gouvernement federal jouent un role important dans le traitement des effets des sinistres naturels. Le gouvernement federal subventionne lassurance-inondations pour les individus, les entreprises privees et les gouvernements dEtats et locaux, et il affecte des fonds sur une base ad hoc pour reconstruire apres de tres importants sinistres naturels tels que de fortes inondations ou des tremblements de terre. Les gouvernements des Etats reglementent lassurance-seisme (en Californie) et lassurance-ouragan (en Floride) en imposant a lensemble des assurances et a certains de leurs utilisateurs de subventionner dautres assures. Cet article analyse les diverses formes dimplications gouvernementales dans lassistance des sinistres et evalue de maniere critique les arguments normatifs pour ces formes de participations et de reglementations. Il propose que le gouvernement federal se retire du marche de lassurance-inondation et que les gouvernements des etats arretent de reglementer les marches dassurance prives qui obligent des gens a subventionner lassurance pour dautres.Government at both the state and federal level in the United States has an extensive role in dealing with the effects of natural disasters. The federal government provides subsidized flood insurance to private individuals, businesses, and state and local government, and it appropriates f unds on an ad hoc basis for rebuilding after highly visible natural disasters such as large floods and earthquakes. State governments regulate earthquake insurance (California) and hurricane insurance (in Florida) in ways that force the insurance industry and some of its customers to subsidize other policyholders. This essay details the various forms of government involvement in disaster assistance and critically evaluates the normative arguments for these forms of government involvement and regulation. It proposes that the federal government should withdraw from the flood insurance market and that state governments should stop regulating private insurance markets in such a way that some people are forced to subsidize insurance for others.
{"title":"The Role of Government in Responding to Natural Catastrophes","authors":"Arnold N. Scott","doi":"10.1515/JEEH-2000-0404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JEEH-2000-0404","url":null,"abstract":"Aux Etats-Unis les gouvernements des Etats tout autant que le gouvernement federal jouent un role important dans le traitement des effets des sinistres naturels. Le gouvernement federal subventionne lassurance-inondations pour les individus, les entreprises privees et les gouvernements dEtats et locaux, et il affecte des fonds sur une base ad hoc pour reconstruire apres de tres importants sinistres naturels tels que de fortes inondations ou des tremblements de terre. Les gouvernements des Etats reglementent lassurance-seisme (en Californie) et lassurance-ouragan (en Floride) en imposant a lensemble des assurances et a certains de leurs utilisateurs de subventionner dautres assures. Cet article analyse les diverses formes dimplications gouvernementales dans lassistance des sinistres et evalue de maniere critique les arguments normatifs pour ces formes de participations et de reglementations. Il propose que le gouvernement federal se retire du marche de lassurance-inondation et que les gouvernements des etats arretent de reglementer les marches dassurance prives qui obligent des gens a subventionner lassurance pour dautres.Government at both the state and federal level in the United States has an extensive role in dealing with the effects of natural disasters. The federal government provides subsidized flood insurance to private individuals, businesses, and state and local government, and it appropriates f unds on an ad hoc basis for rebuilding after highly visible natural disasters such as large floods and earthquakes. State governments regulate earthquake insurance (California) and hurricane insurance (in Florida) in ways that force the insurance industry and some of its customers to subsidize other policyholders. This essay details the various forms of government involvement in disaster assistance and critically evaluates the normative arguments for these forms of government involvement and regulation. It proposes that the federal government should withdraw from the flood insurance market and that state governments should stop regulating private insurance markets in such a way that some people are forced to subsidize insurance for others.","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85276048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
En post-scriptum de la Constitution de la Liberte, Friedrich Hayek situa le coeur de ses convictions ou il percut quetait leur place dans lhistoire des idees. Il etait, il insistait, simplement un vieux Whig impenitent, en insistant sur le vieux. Le Whiggisme, il venait de le soutenir, etait le nom du seul et unique courant de pensee qui sopposa serieusement a tout pouvoir arbitraire. En mettant en avant le fait que le vrai liberalisme navait pas de nom reconnaissable afin de le distinguer du faux liberalisme, Hayek suggera celui de vieux Whig bien quil sembla plus proche de sa validite historique que de son utilite dans le monde reel. Cet essai tente dillustrer ce quHayek voulait dire en sappelant lui meme vieux Whig ou Whig Burkeen, comme il se decrivit plus tard. Il souleve des questions quant a la validite de la conception quHayek avait de lui, et quant a la vraie nature des vieux Whig historiques. Cet article explore le modele historique cree par Hayek, centre sur levenement cle de la Revolution Francaise, pour expliquer ce quil appela une contre-renaissance en faveur du collectivisme.In is postscript to The Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich Hayek placed his core beliefs into what he perceived as their proper place in the history of ideas. He was, he insisted, simply an unrepentant Old Whig with the stress on the old. Whiggism, he went on to assert, was the name of the only set of ideals that had consistently opposed all arbitrary power. Highlighting the fact that true liberalism had no recognisable name with which to distinguish itself from false liberalism, Hayek tossed Old Whig into the ring as his suggestion though he seemed more confident of its historical validity than its real-world usefulness. This essay attempts to illustrate just what Hayek meant by calling himself an Old Whig, or Burkean Whig, as he later described himself. It raises some questions about the validity of Hayeks self-conception, and the true nature of the historical Old Whigs. It also explores the historical model that Hayek created, centred on the key event of the French Revolution, to explain what he called a counterrenaissance in favour of collectivism.
在《自由宪法》的后记中，弗里德里希·哈耶克将他的信念的核心置于思想的历史中。他坚持说，他只是一个顽固的老辉格党，坚持说他是一个老辉格党。他刚才支持的辉格党，是唯一一种思想流派的名称，这种思想流派严重蔑视一切专制权力。哈耶克指出，真正的自由主义没有一个可识别的名字来区分它和虚假的自由主义，他暗示了老辉格党，尽管这似乎更接近它的历史有效性，而不是它在现实世界中的用处。这篇文章试图淡化库哈耶克的意思，称自己为“老辉格党”或“伯克辉格党”，正如他后来所描述的那样。他质疑库哈耶克对他的看法的有效性，以及历史上老辉格党的真实性质。这篇文章探讨了哈耶克的历史模型，哈耶克是法国革命的关键人物，来解释他所称的有利于集体主义的反复兴。postscript In is to The Constitution of Liberty),弗里德里希·哈耶克和爱的朋友的儿子core的into what he as their In The history of ideas)的位置。我是etait，我是坚持，我是一个没有悔过的老辉格党，我是一个有压力的老辉格党。我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们，我的朋友们。Highlighting the fact that true自由主义had no recognisable笔名with which to它本身from假自由主义的Old Whig into the ring,哈耶克顺利拿到儿子像这样的建议下,半是more of its历史“心腹than its real-world证书。这篇文章试图说明哈耶克的意思是一个老辉格党，或者伯克基辉格党，来描述一下。about It raises诗问题Hayeks有效性self-conception, and the true of the Old Whigs历史的本质。它还探索了哈耶克创造的历史模式，以法国革命的关键事件为中心，以解释他所谓的对集体主义的反对。
{"title":"Unrepentant “Old” Whig","authors":"M. RebanksJames","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1141","url":null,"abstract":"En post-scriptum de la Constitution de la Liberte, Friedrich Hayek situa le coeur de ses convictions ou il percut quetait leur place dans lhistoire des idees. Il etait, il insistait, simplement un vieux Whig impenitent, en insistant sur le vieux. Le Whiggisme, il venait de le soutenir, etait le nom du seul et unique courant de pensee qui sopposa serieusement a tout pouvoir arbitraire. En mettant en avant le fait que le vrai liberalisme navait pas de nom reconnaissable afin de le distinguer du faux liberalisme, Hayek suggera celui de vieux Whig bien quil sembla plus proche de sa validite historique que de son utilite dans le monde reel. Cet essai tente dillustrer ce quHayek voulait dire en sappelant lui meme vieux Whig ou Whig Burkeen, comme il se decrivit plus tard. Il souleve des questions quant a la validite de la conception quHayek avait de lui, et quant a la vraie nature des vieux Whig historiques. Cet article explore le modele historique cree par Hayek, centre sur levenement cle de la Revolution Francaise, pour expliquer ce quil appela une contre-renaissance en faveur du collectivisme.In is postscript to The Constitution of Liberty, Friedrich Hayek placed his core beliefs into what he perceived as their proper place in the history of ideas. He was, he insisted, simply an unrepentant Old Whig with the stress on the old. Whiggism, he went on to assert, was the name of the only set of ideals that had consistently opposed all arbitrary power. Highlighting the fact that true liberalism had no recognisable name with which to distinguish itself from false liberalism, Hayek tossed Old Whig into the ring as his suggestion though he seemed more confident of its historical validity than its real-world usefulness. This essay attempts to illustrate just what Hayek meant by calling himself an Old Whig, or Burkean Whig, as he later described himself. It raises some questions about the validity of Hayeks self-conception, and the true nature of the historical Old Whigs. It also explores the historical model that Hayek created, centred on the key event of the French Revolution, to explain what he called a counterrenaissance in favour of collectivism.","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84212255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cet article examine la concurrence entre des structures de gouvernance des entreprises. Il y est souligne quune panoplie de structures constitutionnelles peut etre observee dans le cadre marchand et que cette variete a servi des objectifs transactionnels importants sur un plan historique. Larticle met en contraste les approches coasienne et autrichienne de lexplication des structures de gouvernance. Nous examinons la tendance recente du deplacement de la propriete des entreprises vers les investisseurs par opposition aux arrangements cooperatifs et mutuels. L a r gument a t ion sout i ent que lintervention etatique peut etre une explication importante des tendances recentes au Royaume Uni, notamment dans le domaine des institutions financieres. Les suggestions selon lesquelles des modeles de gouvernance des entreprises par les partenaires devraient etre introduits a travers lintervention de lEtat ignorent a la fois les couts de transaction et limportance dassurer laffectation du talent entrepreneurial en direction des ressources economiques.This paper considers competition between governance arrangements for firms. It is argued that a variety of constitutional structures can be observed in the market and that historically this variety has served important transactional purposes. The Coasian and Austrian approaches to the explanation of governance arrangements are contrasted. Recent trends towards investor ownership of firms and away from co-operative and mutual arrangements are considered. It is argued that government regulatory intervention may be an important explanation for recent trends in the UK, especially in the area of financial institutions. Suggestions that stakeholder models of firm governance should be introduced through state intervention ignore considerations both of transactions costs and the importance of ensuring the allocation of entrepreneurial talent to the direction of economic resources.
{"title":"Competitive Processes and the Evolution of Governance Structures","authors":"Ricketts Martin","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1147","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article examine la concurrence entre des structures de gouvernance des entreprises. Il y est souligne quune panoplie de structures constitutionnelles peut etre observee dans le cadre marchand et que cette variete a servi des objectifs transactionnels importants sur un plan historique. Larticle met en contraste les approches coasienne et autrichienne de lexplication des structures de gouvernance. Nous examinons la tendance recente du deplacement de la propriete des entreprises vers les investisseurs par opposition aux arrangements cooperatifs et mutuels. L a r gument a t ion sout i ent que lintervention etatique peut etre une explication importante des tendances recentes au Royaume Uni, notamment dans le domaine des institutions financieres. Les suggestions selon lesquelles des modeles de gouvernance des entreprises par les partenaires devraient etre introduits a travers lintervention de lEtat ignorent a la fois les couts de transaction et limportance dassurer laffectation du talent entrepreneurial en direction des ressources economiques.This paper considers competition between governance arrangements for firms. It is argued that a variety of constitutional structures can be observed in the market and that historically this variety has served important transactional purposes. The Coasian and Austrian approaches to the explanation of governance arrangements are contrasted. Recent trends towards investor ownership of firms and away from co-operative and mutual arrangements are considered. It is argued that government regulatory intervention may be an important explanation for recent trends in the UK, especially in the area of financial institutions. Suggestions that stakeholder models of firm governance should be introduced through state intervention ignore considerations both of transactions costs and the importance of ensuring the allocation of entrepreneurial talent to the direction of economic resources.","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84987343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Ideas Conspire with Circumstances","authors":"H. GissurarsonHannes","doi":"10.1515/JEEH-2000-0203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JEEH-2000-0203","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76512961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Economic Principles and Monetary Institutions. Review Essay on The Theory of Monetary Institutions - Lawrence H. White","authors":"Hülsmann Jörg Guido","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1157","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53483,"journal":{"name":"Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79716223","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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