Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.40.1.01
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue: Time","authors":"","doi":"10.5406/21521026.40.1.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.40.1.01","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42931190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.40.1.02
Todd Ryan, Jani Hakkarainen
In this paper we consider a puzzle concerning Hume's account of time and what he calls “steadfast unchanging objects”—that is, unchanging objects coexisting with temporal successions. On the one hand, Hume maintains that steadfast unchanging objects are temporally indivisible. On the other, he allows that such unchanging objects are capable of undergoing a determinate number of alterations in a given length of time, which seems to imply that they are at least potentially temporally divisible. After arguing that Donald Baxter's influential interpretation of Hume's theory of time cannot resolve this tension, we propose that Hume offers a skeptical resolution of the difficulty.
{"title":"Hume on Time and Steadfast Unchanging Objects","authors":"Todd Ryan, Jani Hakkarainen","doi":"10.5406/21521026.40.1.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.40.1.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper we consider a puzzle concerning Hume's account of time and what he calls “steadfast unchanging objects”—that is, unchanging objects coexisting with temporal successions. On the one hand, Hume maintains that steadfast unchanging objects are temporally indivisible. On the other, he allows that such unchanging objects are capable of undergoing a determinate number of alterations in a given length of time, which seems to imply that they are at least potentially temporally divisible. After arguing that Donald Baxter's influential interpretation of Hume's theory of time cannot resolve this tension, we propose that Hume offers a skeptical resolution of the difficulty.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47818972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.40.1.05
Mach repudiated Newton's argument for absolute time. He denied there is such a thing as time itself that exists independently of any external change. In doing so, Mach failed to appreciate Newton's scientific practice. Absolute time is intrinsically related to Newton's laws of motion and the method of fluxions. Commentators have noted similarities between Mach's rejection of Newtonian time and his rejection of the independent existence of atoms. In this article, it shall be argued that the juxtaposition of absolute time and the atomic theory is unsound. Mach had good reasons to question the existence of substantial time, and he went on to provide an alternative, ontologically relational account. Whereas his dismissal of atoms can be seen as a questionable form of “phenomenalism” or “positivism,” this is not the case regarding his position on time.
{"title":"Mach's Denial of Absolute Time","authors":"","doi":"10.5406/21521026.40.1.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.40.1.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Mach repudiated Newton's argument for absolute time. He denied there is such a thing as time itself that exists independently of any external change. In doing so, Mach failed to appreciate Newton's scientific practice. Absolute time is intrinsically related to Newton's laws of motion and the method of fluxions. Commentators have noted similarities between Mach's rejection of Newtonian time and his rejection of the independent existence of atoms. In this article, it shall be argued that the juxtaposition of absolute time and the atomic theory is unsound. Mach had good reasons to question the existence of substantial time, and he went on to provide an alternative, ontologically relational account. Whereas his dismissal of atoms can be seen as a questionable form of “phenomenalism” or “positivism,” this is not the case regarding his position on time.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49180396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.40.1.04
Matyáš Moravec, Peter West
In this paper, we argue that the French philosopher Henri Bergson was a hidden interlocutor in Susan Stebbing's critique of Arthur Eddington in her Philosophy and the Physicists. First, we outline Stebbing's critique of Eddington's philosophical-physical writings with a particular emphasis on her case against Eddington's account of the passage of time. Second, we provide evidence that Eddington's philosophy is, at its core, Bergsonian and make the case that Eddington was directly influenced by Bergson's philosophy of la durée. Third, we lay out Stebbing's critique of Bergsonism in her Pragmatism and French Voluntarism and identify important similarities with her critique of Eddington over twenty years later. In doing so, we show that it is Eddington's Bergsonism that she is attacking. Finally, we situate Stebbing's criticisms of both Eddington and Bergson within two wider conflicts that emerged in early twentieth century British philosophy: one between an objectively describable time of physics and subjective temporal experience, and the other between science and intuition.
{"title":"Stebbing and Eddington in the Shadow of Bergson","authors":"Matyáš Moravec, Peter West","doi":"10.5406/21521026.40.1.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.40.1.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we argue that the French philosopher Henri Bergson was a hidden interlocutor in Susan Stebbing's critique of Arthur Eddington in her Philosophy and the Physicists. First, we outline Stebbing's critique of Eddington's philosophical-physical writings with a particular emphasis on her case against Eddington's account of the passage of time. Second, we provide evidence that Eddington's philosophy is, at its core, Bergsonian and make the case that Eddington was directly influenced by Bergson's philosophy of la durée. Third, we lay out Stebbing's critique of Bergsonism in her Pragmatism and French Voluntarism and identify important similarities with her critique of Eddington over twenty years later. In doing so, we show that it is Eddington's Bergsonism that she is attacking. Finally, we situate Stebbing's criticisms of both Eddington and Bergson within two wider conflicts that emerged in early twentieth century British philosophy: one between an objectively describable time of physics and subjective temporal experience, and the other between science and intuition.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46703764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-10DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89
N. Efremova
This publication is an another one in a cycle of our translations done from the work of the prominent Arab Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) which is famous not only as the most fundamental interpretation of the Aristotel’s treatise “On the Soul” in the culture of classical Islam, but also for an original concept developed in it about a single intellect for all people (mononoism). In the first three fragments of the commentary to the opening part of chapter III.4 of this treatise (429a10–18), the analogy of thinking and feeling serves as the basis for the conclusion about the human mind as an unaffected recipient. The forward, notes, and appendix to the translation draw on relevant passages from the Ibn-Rushed’ Short and Middle commentaries to this Aristotel’s treatise, highlight the discussion in the research literature about the chronological sequence of the middle and major versions, note the most important exegetical innovations of these fragments, and set out some assumptions about their possible motives.
{"title":"On Ibn Rushd’s Interpretation of the Aristotelian Concept of the Unaffectability of the Intellect","authors":"N. Efremova","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-74-89","url":null,"abstract":"This publication is an another one in a cycle of our translations done from the work of the prominent Arab Muslim philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1126–1198) which is famous not only as the most fundamental interpretation of the Aristotel’s treatise “On the Soul” in the culture of classical Islam, but also for an original concept developed in it about a single intellect for all people (mononoism). In the first three fragments of the commentary to the opening part of chapter III.4 of this treatise (429a10–18), the analogy of thinking and feeling serves as the basis for the conclusion about the human mind as an unaffected recipient. The forward, notes, and appendix to the translation draw on relevant passages from the Ibn-Rushed’ Short and Middle commentaries to this Aristotel’s treatise, highlight the discussion in the research literature about the chronological sequence of the middle and major versions, note the most important exegetical innovations of these fragments, and set out some assumptions about their possible motives.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85080652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-10DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-27-41
A. Krouglov
By providing symbolic (operates by means of signs) and intuitive (operates without signs) types of cognition, G.W. Leibniz in the “Reasoning about cognition, truth and ideas” laid the foundation for the problem of visibility discussions in 18th century. Proceeding from Leibniz’s ideas, Chr. Wolff in the “German metaphysics” built a detailed doctrine about figurative and contemplating cognition, giving priority in the field of application and the degree of clarity to the first type. Wolff’s doctrine almost immediately became classic and found a lot of supporters. J.G. Darjes and G.F. Meier moved the metaphysical distinction of cognition distinctions to logic. A.G. Baumgarten in the “Metaphysics” offered a new criterion of symbolic and intuitive cognition distinction. J.N. Tetens scrutinized the opposition of symbolic and contemplating cognition from the point of a priori and a posteriori opposition. J.H. Lambert in the “New Organon” brings the interest back to the figurative cognition.
{"title":"Figurative, Symbolic and Contemplative Cognition Part I: From F. Viet and G.W. Leibniz to J.H. Lambert","authors":"A. Krouglov","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-27-41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-27-41","url":null,"abstract":"By providing symbolic (operates by means of signs) and intuitive (operates without signs) types of cognition, G.W. Leibniz in the “Reasoning about cognition, truth and ideas” laid the foundation for the problem of visibility discussions in 18th century. Proceeding from Leibniz’s ideas, Chr. Wolff in the “German metaphysics” built a detailed doctrine about figurative and contemplating cognition, giving priority in the field of application and the degree of clarity to the first type. Wolff’s doctrine almost immediately became classic and found a lot of supporters. J.G. Darjes and G.F. Meier moved the metaphysical distinction of cognition distinctions to logic. A.G. Baumgarten in the “Metaphysics” offered a new criterion of symbolic and intuitive cognition distinction. J.N. Tetens scrutinized the opposition of symbolic and contemplating cognition from the point of a priori and a posteriori opposition. J.H. Lambert in the “New Organon” brings the interest back to the figurative cognition.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"15 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90653634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-10DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-90-116
T. Rezvykh, A. Tsygankov
The article presents the history of foundation of the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin based on German archival materials and periodicals of the 1920s–1930s. The role of the Germans in the institutionalization, as well as the importance of the Institute in the creative biography of S.L. Frank have been analyzed. Special attention is paid to the lecture courses of the Russian philosopher, which were given at the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin. It is emphasized that with the work of S.L. Frank an appeal was introduced to the study of the problems of Russian thought and spiritual culture, which in general was not common for the philosopher in the preemigrant period. Thus, the Institute provided to S.L. Frank the institutional legitimation of research, which partly corresponded to the aspirations and expectations of the German side that participated in the foundation of the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin. In the appendix archival materials – transcripts of four lectures of the philosopher under the general theme “Modern trends in philosophy”, given under the auspices of the Institute in late 1928 – early 1929 and stored in the Bakhmetev Archives of Columbia University (New York, USA) are also published.
{"title":"S.L. Frank and the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin","authors":"T. Rezvykh, A. Tsygankov","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-90-116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-90-116","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the history of foundation of the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin based on German archival materials and periodicals of the 1920s–1930s. The role of the Germans in the institutionalization, as well as the importance of the Institute in the creative biography of S.L. Frank have been analyzed. Special attention is paid to the lecture courses of the Russian philosopher, which were given at the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin. It is emphasized that with the work of S.L. Frank an appeal was introduced to the study of the problems of Russian thought and spiritual culture, which in general was not common for the philosopher in the preemigrant period. Thus, the Institute provided to S.L. Frank the institutional legitimation of research, which partly corresponded to the aspirations and expectations of the German side that participated in the foundation of the Russian Scientific Institute in Berlin. In the appendix archival materials – transcripts of four lectures of the philosopher under the general theme “Modern trends in philosophy”, given under the auspices of the Institute in late 1928 – early 1929 and stored in the Bakhmetev Archives of Columbia University (New York, USA) are also published.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"27 Suppl 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80306730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-10DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-55-63
Aytek Zakir gizi Mammadova
The article describes the creative heritage of the great Turkish philosopher and sociologist Hilmi Ziya Ulken (1901–1974). His work includes fundamental works on both theory and the history of philosophy. Ulken’s works devoted to the history of philosophy broadly reflect the interrelationship of Eastern Muslim and Western philosophy, as well as the influence of Eastern philosophy on Western thought. Hilmi Ziya Ulken considered both religious and philosophical trends, such as Sufism, Fiqh, Kalam, and scientific philosophical teachings – Eastern peripatetism, Ishraqism. The object of Ulken’s study was also the history of Turkish thought as part of Eastern philosophy. In his work, an important place is occupied by the study of the stages of the history of Turkic thinking from antiquity to the present. The article summarizes Hilmi Ziya Ulken’s views on the scientific and cultural environment and philosophy of Russia in the 20th century.
{"title":"Historical and Philosophical Problems in the Work of Hilmi Ziya Ulken","authors":"Aytek Zakir gizi Mammadova","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-55-63","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-55-63","url":null,"abstract":"The article describes the creative heritage of the great Turkish philosopher and sociologist Hilmi Ziya Ulken (1901–1974). His work includes fundamental works on both theory and the history of philosophy. Ulken’s works devoted to the history of philosophy broadly reflect the interrelationship of Eastern Muslim and Western philosophy, as well as the influence of Eastern philosophy on Western thought. Hilmi Ziya Ulken considered both religious and philosophical trends, such as Sufism, Fiqh, Kalam, and scientific philosophical teachings – Eastern peripatetism, Ishraqism. The object of Ulken’s study was also the history of Turkish thought as part of Eastern philosophy. In his work, an important place is occupied by the study of the stages of the history of Turkic thinking from antiquity to the present. The article summarizes Hilmi Ziya Ulken’s views on the scientific and cultural environment and philosophy of Russia in the 20th century.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86748042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-10DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-5-15
A. Krotov
The article analyzes the features of understanding of the history of philosophical process by the leading representative of French Neo-Kantianism. The binary scheme, thoroughly substantiated by Renоuvier in the “Sketch of the Systematic Classification of Philosophical Doctrines”, was a certain result of his previous creative way. In the “Textbook of Philosophy of the New Age”, he, highlighting the pantheism–idealism dilemma, expresses his sympathies for eclecticism. In the “Textbook of Ancient Philosophy”, he advocates giving philosophy a scientific character by combining the laws of reason and history. In “Experiences of General Criticism” he builds a system of neo-criticism, identifying phenomena with reality. Finally, the “Sketch” presents an attempt at an objective consideration of the history of philosophy. Renоuvier identifies six oppositions passing through the entire history of thought (thing–consciousness, infinite–finite, evolution–creation, necessity–freedom, happiness–duty, evidence–belief). The strength of his method is the desire to make a choice between opposing trends, taking into account intellectual motives, passions, practical inducements of varying degrees of community. But both elements of reductionism and unfounded optimism about the lack of influence of all kinds of systems on his own constructions are present in his approach.
{"title":"The Method of Search and Analysis of Oppositions as the Basis of Historical Systematization of Philosophy (about the Concept of Charles Renouvier)","authors":"A. Krotov","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-5-15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-5-15","url":null,"abstract":"The article analyzes the features of understanding of the history of philosophical process by the leading representative of French Neo-Kantianism. The binary scheme, thoroughly substantiated by Renоuvier in the “Sketch of the Systematic Classification of Philosophical Doctrines”, was a certain result of his previous creative way. In the “Textbook of Philosophy of the New Age”, he, highlighting the pantheism–idealism dilemma, expresses his sympathies for eclecticism. In the “Textbook of Ancient Philosophy”, he advocates giving philosophy a scientific character by combining the laws of reason and history. In “Experiences of General Criticism” he builds a system of neo-criticism, identifying phenomena with reality. Finally, the “Sketch” presents an attempt at an objective consideration of the history of philosophy. Renоuvier identifies six oppositions passing through the entire history of thought (thing–consciousness, infinite–finite, evolution–creation, necessity–freedom, happiness–duty, evidence–belief). The strength of his method is the desire to make a choice between opposing trends, taking into account intellectual motives, passions, practical inducements of varying degrees of community. But both elements of reductionism and unfounded optimism about the lack of influence of all kinds of systems on his own constructions are present in his approach.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"152 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86206912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-10DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-42-54
E. S. Smyshlyaeva
The article attempts to reveal the mutual relations between: the figure of the Greek god Dionysus, inseparable companion of the philosopher throughout his work, and, in contrast, the somewhat mysterious figure of the overman, who burst like a meteor in the first pages of the book “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”. Genetically linked not only to Greek mythology but also to Schopenhauer’s will, Nietzsche’s Dionysus already in “The Birth of Tragedy” appears on the other side of good and evil and sanctions the supremacy of aesthetic values over moral values; in the middle stage of Nietzsche's work Dionysianism leads the philosopher to the idea of the eternal recurrence; finally, in the third stage Dionysus is drawn into a war with Christianity and is polemically sharpened in the formula “Dionysus Versus the Crucified”. At different stages of Nietzsche’s work almost all of his major philosophical ideas – except one – either derived directly from Dionysianism or were aligned with it. The image of the overman at the moment of its appearance was so out of the general picture of the philosopher's doctrine, that in the course of time he had to “correct” it. The overman loses his most outstanding, but, as it turned out, superfluous features in “Twilight of Idols”, “The Anti-Christian”, and “Ecce Homo”. Having lost interest in the idea of the overman, Nietzsche tries in his last works to structure and complete his philosophical doctrine, returning to Dionysus. By analysing his later works, the author hopes to draw the attention of researchers to these attempts of the philosopher.
{"title":"Dionysus and the Overman. Two Characters in the Philosophy of F. Nietzsche","authors":"E. S. Smyshlyaeva","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-42-54","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-2-42-54","url":null,"abstract":"The article attempts to reveal the mutual relations between: the figure of the Greek god Dionysus, inseparable companion of the philosopher throughout his work, and, in contrast, the somewhat mysterious figure of the overman, who burst like a meteor in the first pages of the book “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”. Genetically linked not only to Greek mythology but also to Schopenhauer’s will, Nietzsche’s Dionysus already in “The Birth of Tragedy” appears on the other side of good and evil and sanctions the supremacy of aesthetic values over moral values; in the middle stage of Nietzsche's work Dionysianism leads the philosopher to the idea of the eternal recurrence; finally, in the third stage Dionysus is drawn into a war with Christianity and is polemically sharpened in the formula “Dionysus Versus the Crucified”. At different stages of Nietzsche’s work almost all of his major philosophical ideas – except one – either derived directly from Dionysianism or were aligned with it. The image of the overman at the moment of its appearance was so out of the general picture of the philosopher's doctrine, that in the course of time he had to “correct” it. The overman loses his most outstanding, but, as it turned out, superfluous features in “Twilight of Idols”, “The Anti-Christian”, and “Ecce Homo”. Having lost interest in the idea of the overman, Nietzsche tries in his last works to structure and complete his philosophical doctrine, returning to Dionysus. By analysing his later works, the author hopes to draw the attention of researchers to these attempts of the philosopher.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79445982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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