Pub Date : 2022-07-12DOI: 10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-1-91-95
O. Zhukova
The article actualizes the philosophical discourse about Russia in the heritage of P.B. Struve as well as it opens a discussion about the social ideal in his creative work. This question is formulated in a theoretical and historical-philosophical way. In our opinion, today it is necessary to return to the problem of the social ideal which was posed by Struve and the authors of his circle, considering it in a cultural-historical and epistemological perspective. The topic of the social ideal is of decisive importance in P.B. Struve’s philosophical and journalistic texts devoted to Russia. The ideological and political struggle of the thinker is essentially a struggle for great Russia. The desired image of a better Russia is the ideal-forming beginning of his philosophical work and the main motive of his political activity. The purpose of the article is to conceptualize the problem of the social ideal in Struve’s works of the 1930s based on the reconstruction of the social and cultural-historical aspects of his political and philosophical concept as well as to identify continuity in the development of the idea of Great Russia in the pre-revolutionary and emigrant period.
{"title":"Discourse about Russia and the Problem of the Social Ideal in P.B. Struve’s Works of the 1930s","authors":"O. Zhukova","doi":"10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-1-91-95","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2022-27-1-91-95","url":null,"abstract":"The article actualizes the philosophical discourse about Russia in the heritage of P.B. Struve as well as it opens a discussion about the social ideal in his creative work. This question is formulated in a theoretical and historical-philosophical way. In our opinion, today it is necessary to return to the problem of the social ideal which was posed by Struve and the authors of his circle, considering it in a cultural-historical and epistemological perspective. The topic of the social ideal is of decisive importance in P.B. Struve’s philosophical and journalistic texts devoted to Russia. The ideological and political struggle of the thinker is essentially a struggle for great Russia. The desired image of a better Russia is the ideal-forming beginning of his philosophical work and the main motive of his political activity. The purpose of the article is to conceptualize the problem of the social ideal in Struve’s works of the 1930s based on the reconstruction of the social and cultural-historical aspects of his political and philosophical concept as well as to identify continuity in the development of the idea of Great Russia in the pre-revolutionary and emigrant period.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"45 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73976773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.3.05
J. Saunders
This paper draws attention to two problems with Kant's claim that transcendental freedom is timeless. The problems are that this causes conceptual difficulties and fails to vindicate important parts of our moral practices. I then put forward three ways in which we can respond to these charges on Kant's behalf. The first is to defend Kant's claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. The second is to reject this claim, but try to maintain transcendental idealism. And the third is to reject both Kant's claim about the timelessness of freedom and also transcendental idealism itself.
{"title":"Timeless Freedom in Kant","authors":"J. Saunders","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper draws attention to two problems with Kant's claim that transcendental freedom is timeless. The problems are that this causes conceptual difficulties and fails to vindicate important parts of our moral practices. I then put forward three ways in which we can respond to these charges on Kant's behalf. The first is to defend Kant's claim that transcendental freedom occurs outside of time. The second is to reject this claim, but try to maintain transcendental idealism. And the third is to reject both Kant's claim about the timelessness of freedom and also transcendental idealism itself.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43732033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.3.01
Alexander Stöpfgeshoff
A trait that is often associated with a good person is caring about the truth. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, describes a virtue that concerns truths (truthfulness). However, he limits the virtue to being truthful about who one is and what one's achievements are. This restriction seems almost arbitrary and exceedingly narrow. In this paper, I explore the motivation for Aquinas's restricted account and argue that his view is motivated by broader virtue theoretical commitments and that his approach to the role of truth for being a good person is distinct and worthwhile.
{"title":"Thomas Aquinas on Truthfulness, Character, and What We Owe Each Other","authors":"Alexander Stöpfgeshoff","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A trait that is often associated with a good person is caring about the truth. Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, describes a virtue that concerns truths (truthfulness). However, he limits the virtue to being truthful about who one is and what one's achievements are. This restriction seems almost arbitrary and exceedingly narrow. In this paper, I explore the motivation for Aquinas's restricted account and argue that his view is motivated by broader virtue theoretical commitments and that his approach to the role of truth for being a good person is distinct and worthwhile.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41799768","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.3.06
M. Wreen
Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up on some suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them.
{"title":"Chisholm on the Necessary A Posteriori","authors":"M. Wreen","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up on some suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44504070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.3.03
Dylan Flint
This paper locates a source of contingency1 for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking.23 This interpretative line has been previously thought to be a dead-end because it appears inconsistent with Leibniz's own conception of God, as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being (Adams 1994). This paper points out that the best argument on offer which seeks to demonstrate this inconsistency fails. The paper then argues that the supposition that God does otherwise implies for Leibniz (at least) that God would not be praiseworthy, which is an absurd implication—or a violation of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—but that this is not, strictly speaking, an inconsistency—or a violation of the principle of contradiction (POC).4 While praiseworthiness is a perfection—and is compossible with God's other perfections—and so God must in some sense instantiate it, this paper argues that, given the nature of praiseworthiness for Leibniz, it in fact makes sense to say that praiseworthiness is merely a contingent perfection of God.5
{"title":"God Can Do Otherwise","authors":"Dylan Flint","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper locates a source of contingency1 for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking.23 This interpretative line has been previously thought to be a dead-end because it appears inconsistent with Leibniz's own conception of God, as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being (Adams 1994). This paper points out that the best argument on offer which seeks to demonstrate this inconsistency fails. The paper then argues that the supposition that God does otherwise implies for Leibniz (at least) that God would not be praiseworthy, which is an absurd implication—or a violation of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—but that this is not, strictly speaking, an inconsistency—or a violation of the principle of contradiction (POC).4 While praiseworthiness is a perfection—and is compossible with God's other perfections—and so God must in some sense instantiate it, this paper argues that, given the nature of praiseworthiness for Leibniz, it in fact makes sense to say that praiseworthiness is merely a contingent perfection of God.5","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42402759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.3.04
Banafsheh Beizaei
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant draws a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, characterizing the latter as uncognizable. While arguing that all we can cognize are appearances, Kant nevertheless maintains that there are things in themselves. This has struck many as questionable: how can we be in a position to affirm, of things stipulated to be uncognizable, that they exist? In this paper, I take up the challenge of establishing the existence of things in themselves. I begin by making the case that, given Kant's epistemological strictures, the existence of things in themselves must follow analytically from the existence of appearances. After examining the pitfalls of a recent attempt at establishing the existence of things in themselves, I go on to argue that the feature of appearances in virtue of which their existence analytically entails the existence of themselves is the subjectivity of their form. It is implicit in the notion of something with a subjective form that its matter is provided via affection from without. Moreover, the things providing the matter of appearances can't be located in space and time, because appearances themselves depend on our sensibility for their formal features.
{"title":"Establishing the Existence of Things in Themselves","authors":"Banafsheh Beizaei","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant draws a distinction between appearances and things in themselves, characterizing the latter as uncognizable. While arguing that all we can cognize are appearances, Kant nevertheless maintains that there are things in themselves. This has struck many as questionable: how can we be in a position to affirm, of things stipulated to be uncognizable, that they exist? In this paper, I take up the challenge of establishing the existence of things in themselves. I begin by making the case that, given Kant's epistemological strictures, the existence of things in themselves must follow analytically from the existence of appearances. After examining the pitfalls of a recent attempt at establishing the existence of things in themselves, I go on to argue that the feature of appearances in virtue of which their existence analytically entails the existence of themselves is the subjectivity of their form. It is implicit in the notion of something with a subjective form that its matter is provided via affection from without. Moreover, the things providing the matter of appearances can't be located in space and time, because appearances themselves depend on our sensibility for their formal features.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44054242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.3.02
J. C. Flores
Against the ancient background, the paper shows how philosophy, as a form of love, is transformed in the medieval period. Henry of Ghent's view of the aim of contemplation exemplifies this transformation, and indicates how medieval love of wisdom, as the synthesis of reason and revelation, can be an enhancement of the desire that animates ancient philosophy. In this telling case and at a fundamental level, faith and revelation stimulate love of wisdom even as reason endeavors to be reconciled with the details of theological doctrine.
{"title":"Ancient Love of Wisdom and its Medieval Transformation","authors":"J. C. Flores","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.02","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Against the ancient background, the paper shows how philosophy, as a form of love, is transformed in the medieval period. Henry of Ghent's view of the aim of contemplation exemplifies this transformation, and indicates how medieval love of wisdom, as the synthesis of reason and revelation, can be an enhancement of the desire that animates ancient philosophy. In this telling case and at a fundamental level, faith and revelation stimulate love of wisdom even as reason endeavors to be reconciled with the details of theological doctrine.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42346521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.2.06
Robert R. Clewis
Aesthetic normativity continues to be of interest in contemporary aesthetics, and significant contributions to the topic can be found in neo-Kantianism. This article examines the account of aesthetic normativity presented by Jonas Cohn (1869–1947), a member of the Southwestern school of neo-Kantianism and author of a 1901 book on aesthetics. Cohn's Kantian-Hegelian theory of aesthetic normativity deserves more examination than it has so far received. Even if one does not accept all of its main arguments, Cohn's theory offers an interesting alternative to the third Critique's account of the universal validity of aesthetic judgments, and it reveals how Kant's aesthetic theory was appropriated at the turn of the century. Since a number of objections can be raised against Cohn's account, however, at the end of the paper I raise several of them.
{"title":"Aesthetic Normativity in Freiburg","authors":"Robert R. Clewis","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.2.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.2.06","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Aesthetic normativity continues to be of interest in contemporary aesthetics, and significant contributions to the topic can be found in neo-Kantianism. This article examines the account of aesthetic normativity presented by Jonas Cohn (1869–1947), a member of the Southwestern school of neo-Kantianism and author of a 1901 book on aesthetics. Cohn's Kantian-Hegelian theory of aesthetic normativity deserves more examination than it has so far received. Even if one does not accept all of its main arguments, Cohn's theory offers an interesting alternative to the third Critique's account of the universal validity of aesthetic judgments, and it reveals how Kant's aesthetic theory was appropriated at the turn of the century. Since a number of objections can be raised against Cohn's account, however, at the end of the paper I raise several of them.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49306985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.2.03
C. Kyriacou
Charles Jarrett and P. D. Zuk have argued on independent grounds that Spinoza's Ethics delineates a moral antirealist/constructivist position. I reconstruct their basic arguments, present their textual evidence, and suggest that the evidence is, in principle, compatible with moral realism. As I argue, Jarrett and Zuk have opted for an antirealist/constructivist interpretation of the adduced textual evidence because they tacitly rely on a mistaken metaethical assumption: that relational normativity entails moral antirealism/constructivism. I explain why this is not the case by reference to Aristotle's virtue ethics, as well as by reference to various contemporary metaethical positions that conjoin relational normativity and moral realism. I conclude that the textual evidence Jarrett and Zuk rely on does not suffice to render Spinoza's Ethics unequivocally morally antirealist/constructivist and that the morally realist interpretation remains defensible.
Charles Jarrett和p.d. Zuk以各自独立的理由认为，斯宾诺莎的伦理学描绘了道德的反现实主义/建构主义立场。我重构了他们的基本论点，提出了他们的文本证据，并建议这些证据原则上与道德现实主义相容。正如我所说，Jarrett和Zuk选择了一种反现实主义/建构主义对引用的文本证据的解释，因为他们默认地依赖于一个错误的元伦理假设:关系规范性需要道德的反现实主义/建构主义。我将通过参考亚里士多德的美德伦理学，以及结合关系规范性和道德现实主义的各种当代元伦理学立场来解释为什么情况并非如此。我的结论是，Jarrett和Zuk所依赖的文本证据不足以使斯宾诺莎的伦理学明确地在道德上是反现实主义/建构主义的，道德现实主义的解释仍然是可辩护的。
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Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.5406/21521026.39.2.05
Kimberly Brewer
Kant's theory of the intuitive intellect has a broad and substantial role in the development and exposition of his critical philosophy. An emphasis on this theory's reception and appropriation on the part of the German idealists has tended to divert attention from Kant's own treatment of the topic. In this essay, I seek an adequate overview of the theory Kant advances in support of his critical enterprise. I examine the nature of the intuitive intellect's object; its epistemic relation to its object; its mode of comprehension; the relationship between these cognitive elements; and I ask which minds Kant regards as intuitive intellects.
{"title":"Kant's Theory of the Intuitive Intellect","authors":"Kimberly Brewer","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.2.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.2.05","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Kant's theory of the intuitive intellect has a broad and substantial role in the development and exposition of his critical philosophy. An emphasis on this theory's reception and appropriation on the part of the German idealists has tended to divert attention from Kant's own treatment of the topic. In this essay, I seek an adequate overview of the theory Kant advances in support of his critical enterprise. I examine the nature of the intuitive intellect's object; its epistemic relation to its object; its mode of comprehension; the relationship between these cognitive elements; and I ask which minds Kant regards as intuitive intellects.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48011126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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