Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819121000437
I. Rumfitt
Abstract This essay assesses the account of truth presented in Wiggins's 2002 paper ‘An indefinibilist cum normative view of truth and the marks of truth'. I agree with Wiggins that we should seek, not to define truth, but to elucidate it by unfolding its connections with other basic notions. However, I give reasons for preferring an elucidation based on Ramsey's account of truth to Wiggins's Tarski-inspired approach. I also cast doubt on Wiggins's thesis that convergence is a mark of truth, arguing instead that a claim which is up for assessment as true or false must be one to which different speakers/hearers can attach, and know that they are attaching, the same sense. I use this principle to rule out an account of indicative conditionals, and bring (albeit inconclusively) some considerations to bear on the question of whether those conditionals have truth values. An appendix revisits a debate about the determinateness of distinctness.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s0031819122000158
C. Peacocke
My first encounter with David Wiggins’ thought occurred a few weeks before I took my undergraduate final examinations in Oxford in 1971. In Blackwell's Bookshop I came across a slim blue volume Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. I purchased it and read it cover-to-cover the same day. It was immediately clear that this was contemporary writing in a different league from anything I had previously read on the topic.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000183
J. Frey
R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (London: Routledge, 2004). R. F. Holland, Against Empiricism: On Education, Epistemology and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). T.Nagel, ‘Review:DavidWiggins,Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality.’ Times Literary Supplement, (October 20, 2006), 6–7. S. Weil, ‘The Iliad or the Poem of Force’, trans. M. McCarthy, Pendle Hill Pamphlet 91 (1956); reprinted in Chicago Review 18 (1965) 2: 5–30. D. Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth. 3 Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
{"title":"Solidarity and the Root of the Ethical by David Wiggins (University of Kansas Department of Philosophy, 2008).","authors":"J. Frey","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000183","url":null,"abstract":"R. Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (London: Routledge, 2004). R. F. Holland, Against Empiricism: On Education, Epistemology and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980). T.Nagel, ‘Review:DavidWiggins,Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality.’ Times Literary Supplement, (October 20, 2006), 6–7. S. Weil, ‘The Iliad or the Poem of Force’, trans. M. McCarthy, Pendle Hill Pamphlet 91 (1956); reprinted in Chicago Review 18 (1965) 2: 5–30. D. Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth. 3 Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"407 - 412"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48738190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000018
Adam Etinson
Abstract This short essay offers a commentary on Chapter 11 of David Wiggins’, Ethics (2006). The essay asks how we should interpret Wiggins’ defense of ethical ‘objectivity’ given his subjectivist metaethics. An interpretation is drawn from Sharon Street's work on metaethical constructivism, of which Wiggins’ view is taken to be one variety.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/s0031819122000249
María Álvarez, B. Brewer
essays – Sophie-Grace Chappell on Needs, Values, Truth (1997-2002); Guy Longworth on Ethics. Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality (2006); and Jennifer Frey on Solidarity and the Root of the Ethical (2008) – confirm the immense achievement and lasting significance of David Wiggins, a real philosopher.
散文-索菲·格蕾丝·查佩尔关于需要、价值观、真理（1997-2002）；盖伊·朗沃斯谈伦理学。《道德哲学十二讲》（2006年）；詹妮弗·弗雷（Jennifer Frey）的《团结与伦理根源》（Solidarity and the Root of the Ethical）（2008）证实了真正的哲学家大卫·威金斯（David Wiggins）的巨大成就和持久意义。
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000067
G. Longworth
everything into the language of planning, execution, and command. Better counsel, counsel too rarely heeded but familiar from the writings of Bernard Williams, will be to study our moral ideas for themselves and for all they are worth, avoiding every preconception of what they ‘must’ be like...Let us leave the expression ‘moral theory’ in the hands of those who relish its present connotation of reconstruction or believe that it is the business ofmoral philosophy to trespass on the preserve of themoralist by remaking firstordermorality...At the outset, let us bracket all preconceptions and allow the notions we already have to speak to us for themselves. (Wiggins, 2006, pp. 4–7)
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819121000310
C. Misak
Abstract This essay traces the evolution of the pragmatist elements in Wiggins's distinctive view of truth and shows its connections to the founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce and one of Peirce's greatest successors, F.P. Ramsey. Wiggin's pragmatism, like that of Peirce and Ramsey, is a pragmatism that attempts to arrive at what Wiggins calls ‘a sensible subjectivism’ – an account of truth that respects both the human inventiveness and the objectivity that are each a part of our search for the truth
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Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1017/S0031819122000225
J. O'Neill
Abstract On the dominant economic approach to environmental policy, environmental goods are conceptualised as forms of capital that provide services for human well-being. These services are assigned a monetary value to be weighed against the values of other goods and services. David Wiggins has offered a set of arguments against central assumptions about the nature of well-being, practical reason and ethical deliberation that underpin this dominant economic approach. In this paper I outline these arguments and consider their implications for understanding ethical demands across generations. The paper focuses, in particular, on their implications for understanding the nature and requirements of sustainability.
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