Foundations of Science最新文献

This paper conducts a Bayesian analysis of the Hubble tension, which addresses the discrepancy between local measurements of the Hubble Constant (H_0) and the value predicted by the (Lambda )CDM model based on Cosmic Microwave Background data. By incorporating new, independent data from the James Webb Space Telescope released in August 2024, the analysis shows that, unlike before, there is no longer strong evidence to suggest that the (Lambda )CDM model is incorrect. As a result, the Hubble tension appears to ease somewhat, indicating that the previously perceived crisis in cosmology may have been overstated, and the standard model remains robust.

To model a (particular kind of) physical system, the perspective that encompasses preparations, tests and the interplay between them is crucial. In this paper, we employ the conceptual and technical framework presented by Buffernoir (2023) to model physical systems through this pivotal lens, utilizing Chu spaces. With some intuitive and operational axioms we manage to reproduce the following fundamental and abstract results, as well as (part of) the involved reasoning: (1) the states corresponding to a property form a (bi-orthogonally) closed set; (2) the properties form an orthomodular lattice. Adding some idealistic axioms, we can derive: (1) the pure states form a quantum Kripke frame in the sense of Zhong (2017, 2021, 2023); (2) the properties form an irreducible propositional system in the sense of Piron (1976), isomorphic to the lattice of closed sets of pure states. Our axioms are different from those in Buffernoir (2023): on the one hand, they say less about the structure of mixed states; on the other hand, they are arguably more intuitive and operational. The work formalizes some important reasoning about quantum systems, reveals some implicit idealization behind the Hilbert space formalism of quantum theory and hints at other possible formalisms. Finally, it is argued that the framework can be applied to classical physics at an abstract level as well as naturally extended with probabilities.

It is contended that one of the promising directions for brooding over the problem of incommensurability of paradigms, coined by T. Kuhn and P. Feyerabend, may be associated with the trend of neo-Kantian epistemology, embodied by the writings of Ernst Cassirer. According to Cassirer, the statements fixing connections and relationships between mathematical ideal constructs render a reliable ‘neutral language’ that can serve as a firm ground for comparing the ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigms. The aim of the paper is to offer Maxwell’s work as a test case against the incommensurability thesis. A case study of the genesis and functioning of a neutral mathematical language related to the Maxwellian solid synthesis of optics and electromagnetism is provided. It is elicited that its basis is constituted by stodgy language of continuum mechanics. The main function of the neutral language was to project the consequences of all the unified partial theoretical schemes (‘old’ rival paradigms) of Ampѐre, Faraday, Biot, Savar et al. onto the grand mathematical model, ‘rewrite’ all known laws in this pervasive mathematical language, compare their conclusions with each other to eliminate contradictions. Eventually the stuff was generalized in a self-consistent system of Maxwell’s equations.

The article is an exploration into the problem of the ethos of modern science viewed from the representationalist and interventionist perspectives. The representationalist account of science is associated with the position of theoreticism, while the interventionist account pertains to the concept of new experimentalism. The former of these approaches is dominated by the ethos of science which Robert K. Merton defined as comprising four sets of institutional imperatives referred to as ‘Mertonian norms’: universalism, communitarism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. In the latter approach, the concept of ethos is far more intricate. It can be described as a hybrid mix of elements derived from Mertonian norms and some constituents from the area of science that John Ziman calls “industrial science”. This article compares the two types of ethos, highlighting the need to identify and investigate nuances in the ethos embraced by individual disciplines within the area of the interventionist approach to science. It is argued that the need can be attributed to the escalating process of substituting the ideal of value-free science for the ideal of value-laden science. The phenomenon is especially evident in the field of laboratory sciences, as exemplified by the research conducted on synthetic mRNA technology. The author also draws attention to the problem of the social responsibility of disciplines from the interventionist approach to science.

In this paper, I adopt the view that the form which is embodied in matter gives it its essence and converts it into substance (Aristotle). I furthermore understand information as the transmissible state of the form. Living beings as substances can create order in their environment adapted to their needs. The environment in turn has the potential to change the form and other causes such as matter, efficiency/functionality, and goal/intention. Living beings can internalize these changes, propagate them through replication, or share them as information with others. Living beings have progressively acquired through this process advanced form- and information-processing and generation abilities. This positive feedback loop with enhancement in form and information has become one of the main drivers of biological evolution. Based on these considerations, I will address the nature of form and information and the changes that they have undergone during biological evolution.

Model organism databases are used extensively for knowledge retrieval and knowledge sharing among biologists. With the invention of genome sequencing and protein profiling technologies, large amount of molecular data provides practical insights into the molecular study of model organisms. The knowledge-intensive characteristic of model organism databases provides a reference point for the comparative study of other species. In this paper, I argue that algorithms could be used to facilitate cross-species research. I emphasize the epistemic significance of algorithms in the integration of data for cross-species research. I examine (1) how algorithms guide data integration in model organism databases; and (2) the importance of algorithms for the use of model organism database in the cross-species research. I argue that an extrapolation from the stored data to other species is possible in virtue of the fact that algorithms can facilitate two modes of data integration—viz., inter-level and cross-species integration. Lastly, I examine the implication of the data integration role of an algorithm in light of mechanistic explanation.

The concept of molecular structure is one of the most important concepts of chemistry. In fact, molecular structure is closely related to the concept of chemical substance and its set of properties, and it is the main factor in the explanation of reactivity. In fact, much of the behavior of substances is explained in terms of the structure of their component molecules. This may explain why people tend to take the notion of molecular structure for granted. However, the problem begins already when it comes to specifying the concept, since there is no clear definition of ‘molecular structure’ valid for all chemistry. The purpose of the present article is to show that the term ‘molecular structure’ subsumes very different notions, which depend on how the molecule and its components are conceived, and each of which brings its own difficulties. In particular, we will focus on how the molecule and its structure are devised from a classical view and from a quantum–mechanical view, and will discuss the different problems related with molecular structure that arise in each case.

The increasing interplay of science and technology is often portrayed with an air of inevitability, but few studies explicitly discuss the source and nature of their interaction. Based on Polanyi’s thoughts on science, technology and personal research activity, in this paper, we consider the relationship between the (relative) divergence of science and the (relative) convergence of technology, and use it to analyse the interaction between science and technology. In particular, we consider the inter-confinement between science and technology that can be attributed to the interaction between the divergence of science and the convergence of technology. This science-technology nexus might have its impact on achieving technology-science progress.

Since the early days of humankind, people have been asking questions about Nature of two kinds: why did that happen? And how can that be used? In a broad sense, science was born that day. We show indeed that science has two complementary and interdependent souls that aim, respectively, to how to understand and how to control Nature. Through a broad historical analysis, this essay aims to (1) give an account of the development of science as an oscillation and an interplay between its two intrinsic natures, (2) demonstrate that this happened already in ancient times starting from the 6th century BC, and (3) the fact that in different periods one of the two natures was largely favored over the other is a consequence of science being a cultural product of the different social-historical contexts.

The paper examines the semiotic and cognitive status of interactive exhibits at science centers, taking the Copernicus Science Center in Warsaw (CSC) as an example. Such science centers support bottom-up interactions, encouraging visitors to spontaneously explore the exhibits in various ways. We analyze one distinctive way of interaction, when young visitors ignore an exhibit’s instruction and use it as if it were a kind of a toy or machine to play with (this is particularly common with exhibits that are unfamiliar “open-ended objects”). Drawing on cognitive semiotics we describe this particular way of interacting with exhibits as the reality mode of experience, in which the user ignores an intended exhibit’s representational function. We consider whether such interactive objects can be framed as cognitive artifacts, given that standard conceptualizations of artifacts emphasize their representational function. How can we convincingly describe the process by which the cognitive function of an exhibit experienced in reality mode is constituted? In this paper we apply concept of ecological cognitive artifact and the idea of the enactive signification to these questions. We argue that exhibits experienced in reality mode do indeed perform cognitive functions, even in the absence of a representational relation. Our investigation provides insights into the cognitive functions of exhibits and contributes to the conceptualization of non-representational cognitive artifacts.