Foundations of Science最新文献

Abstract

The question of whether mathematics depends on experience, including experience of the external world, is problematic because, while it is clear that natural sciences depend on experience, it is not clear that mathematics depends on experience. Indeed, several mathematicians and philosophers think that mathematics does not depend on experience, and this is also the view of mainstream philosophy of mathematics. However, this view has had a deleterious effect on the philosophy of mathematics. This article argues that, in fact, the view is not valid. Mathematics depends on experience because experience influences the making of mathematics, indeed much mathematics arises from experience and is evaluated on the basis of experience.

Pictorial representations such as diagrams and figures are widely used in scientific literature for explanatory and descriptive purposes. The intuitive nature of pictorial representations coupled with texts foster a better understanding of the objects of study. Biological mechanisms and processes can be clearly illustrated and grasped in pictures. I argue that pictorial representations describe biological phenomena by telling stories. I elaborate on the role of narrative structures of pictures in the frontier research using a case study in immunology. I articulate that pictures with an inherent narrative structure are crucial in biological sciences.

In this paper we present a paradigmatic example of the use in knowledge management of techniques from other fields, namely mathematical analysis. We also highlight that the Jacobi method presented here takes precedence over the better known Hungarian method. Finally, we signify that the Jacobi method represents the first known or recognized case of serendipity in both knowledge management and operational research. This paper thus demonstrates the intersection between knowledge management, mathematical analysis and operational research and how taking historical perspectives are important for recognising future applications of knowledge management. This results in a better understanding of knowledge management and how it can be applied in the future. It has been shown how knowledge management relates to historical mathematical principles.

In this paper, we examine the issue of the empirical or non-empirical status of philosophical metatheories. In particular, we ask whether a specific type of metatheoretical product, formal reconstructions of scientific theories, can be empirically tested. To answer this, we take Metatheoretical Structuralism as a metatheory and Classical Mechanics as our case studies. We show how classical mechanics can be reconstructed from structuralism. We then present a computer program, called Reconstructor, and show how it can be used to test the adequacy of the reconstruction. Finally, we discuss some philosophical points regarding these tests, namely, the issues of holism, circularity and metatheoretical predictions.

Insofar as disagreement may in principle regard most of (maybe all) facets of information system ontologies’ [ISOs] debate, it may also produce a plurality of views – sometimes inconsistent with each other – on ISOs’ development and design. This paper analyzes a view that makes the recognition of – and provides a theoretical foundation for – such a plurality of views a trademark: perspectivism (on ISOs). The aim is to show what exactly endorsing perspectivism consists of, and how perspectivism differs from different, competing views. Section 2 introduces the main claims of perspectivism, and remarks that perspectivism mainly deals with ISOs’ development and design. As for ISOs’ development, Sect. 3 considers domain’s partition and systematization, by distinguishing perspectivism from realism and relativism. Section 3 also shows that perspectivism implies some sort of variantism on ISOs’ representational primitives, about which perspectivism may not differ from its rivals. As for the ISOs’ design, Sect. 4 points out that despite perspectivism grants the possibility to use any procedural approach, principle, and ontological language, it is not committed to uphold that all those approaches, principles, and languages are legitimate. Finally, Sect. 5 focuses on both perspectivism’s weaknesses and (theoretical) contribution to ISOs’ debate.

I identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist's selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen's original and K. Brad Wray's newer interpretation. In Wray's version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community - viz. scientists' interests, goals, and preferences - explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray's version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change over time. Theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science are however not faddish. They are mostly stable; that is, long-lived and consistent over time. This is because scientists (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to what I will call the testability norm: scientific theories must make falsifiable claims about the external physical world. The testability norm and not psycho-sociology explains the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science. Contra Wray, scientific anti-realists can then maintain that the external physical world (as expressed in the testability norm) explains theory-success.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10699-023-09907-y.

Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it.

We consider consciousness attributed to systems in space-time which can be purely physical without biological background and focus on the mathematical understanding of the phenomenon. It is shown that the set theory based on sets in the foundations of mathematics, when switched to set theory based on ZFC models, is a very promising mathematical tool in explaining the brain/mind complex and the emergence of consciousness in natural and artificial systems. We formalise consciousness-supporting systems in physical space-time, but this is localised in open domains of spatial regions and the result of this process is a family of different ZFC models. Random forcing, as in set theory, corresponds precisely to the random influence on the system of external stimuli, and the principles of reflection of set theory explain the conscious internal reaction of the system. We also develop the conscious Turing machines which have their external ZFC environment and the dynamics is encoded in the random forcing changing models of ZFC in which Turing machines with oracles are formulated. The construction is applied to cooperating families of conscious agents which, due to the reflection principle, can be reduced to the implementation of certain concurrent games with different levels of self-reflection.

In a scenario characterized by unpredictable developments, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, epidemiological models have played a leading part, having been especially widely deployed for forecasting purposes. In this paper, two real-world examples of modeling are examined in support of the proposition that science can convey inconsistent as well as genuinely perspectival representations of the world. Reciprocally inconsistent outcomes are grounded on incompatible assumptions, whereas perspectival outcomes are grounded on compatible assumptions and illuminate different aspects of the same object of interest. In both cases, models should be viewed as expressions of specific assumptions and unconstrained choices on the part of those designing them. The coexistence of a variety of models reflects a primary feature of science, namely its pluralism. It is herein proposed that recent over-exposure to science’s inner workings and disputes such as those pertaining to models, may have led the public to perceive pluralism as a flaw—or more specifically, as disunity or fragmentation, which in turn may have been interpreted as a sign of unreliability. In conclusion, given the inescapability of pluralism, suggestions are offered as to how to counteract distorted perceptions of science, and thereby enhance scientific literacy.

To believe that logic has no history might at first seem peculiar today. But since the early 20th century, this position has been repeatedly conflated with logical monism of Kantian provenance. This logical monism asserts that only one logic is authoritative, thereby rendering all other research in the field marginal and negating the possibility of acknowledging a history of logic. In this paper, I will show how this and many related issues have developed, and that they are founded on only one prominent statement by Kant. I will argue, however, that this statement takes on a very different meaning in a broader context of the history and philosophy of science, and that Kant and his supporters never advocated the logical monism that they are still said to hold today.