This paper presents an Ethics Framework for MAiD (Medical Assistance in Dying) to support the integration of evidence-informed, values-based, inclusive and transparent ethical decision-making into everyday MAiD practice. As with other areas of clinical practice, ethical decision-making is an intrinsic part of MAiD. While clinicians connected to academic medical centers or large hospitals may have access to the expertise of an ethicist, those working independently, or in community-based, rural or remote settings may wrestle with ethical issues alone. Without a process to guide ethical reflection and analysis, clinicians navigating complex MAiD cases risk moral distress and uncertainty, and may inadvertently make decisions that are biased, narrow or ill-informed. The proposed Ethics Framework for MAiD includes a description of core values and principles relevant to the delivery of MAiD and a process guide to support the application of values and principles to cases. Use of the framework is illustrated through a simplified complex MAiD case. This Ethics Framework for MAiD is applicable to both clinical patient cases and organizational ethics issues, and adaptable to any jurisdiction and any legal or practice context. It may also be used by ethicists when conducting formal ethics case consultations involving MAiD. The goal of the paper is to empower MAiD assessors, providers, health professionals, program managers and ethicists to address ethical issues arising in everyday practice through the introduction of a pragmatic ethics framework specifically tailored to assisted dying.
{"title":"An Ethics Framework for Medical Assistance in Dying: Supporting Ethical Decision-Making in the Practice of MAiD.","authors":"Andrea N Frolic, Tim Holland","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70037","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper presents an Ethics Framework for MAiD (Medical Assistance in Dying) to support the integration of evidence-informed, values-based, inclusive and transparent ethical decision-making into everyday MAiD practice. As with other areas of clinical practice, ethical decision-making is an intrinsic part of MAiD. While clinicians connected to academic medical centers or large hospitals may have access to the expertise of an ethicist, those working independently, or in community-based, rural or remote settings may wrestle with ethical issues alone. Without a process to guide ethical reflection and analysis, clinicians navigating complex MAiD cases risk moral distress and uncertainty, and may inadvertently make decisions that are biased, narrow or ill-informed. The proposed Ethics Framework for MAiD includes a description of core values and principles relevant to the delivery of MAiD and a process guide to support the application of values and principles to cases. Use of the framework is illustrated through a simplified complex MAiD case. This Ethics Framework for MAiD is applicable to both clinical patient cases and organizational ethics issues, and adaptable to any jurisdiction and any legal or practice context. It may also be used by ethicists when conducting formal ethics case consultations involving MAiD. The goal of the paper is to empower MAiD assessors, providers, health professionals, program managers and ethicists to address ethical issues arising in everyday practice through the introduction of a pragmatic ethics framework specifically tailored to assisted dying.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145350179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, the healthcare infrastructure within Gaza has been dismantled. While international humanitarian law mandates distinction between lawful targets (combatants and military objectives) and non-lawful targets (civilians and civilian objects), and acknowledging the inherent complexities of applying this principle in conflicts involving non-state actors like Hamas operating within civilian areas, numerous reports indicate that Israel's actions have resulted in significant and foreseeable consequences for the Gazan civilian population. Due to these substantial and foreseeable harms, which have led to a long-term humanitarian crisis, we argue that the Israeli government bears a moral responsibility to help mitigate the long-term humanitarian crisis, which, at a minimum, requires helping to rebuild the healthcare infrastructure to its status quo ante bellum.
{"title":"Israel's Post-War Healthcare Obligations.","authors":"Daniel J Hurst, Christopher A Bobier","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70041","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, the healthcare infrastructure within Gaza has been dismantled. While international humanitarian law mandates distinction between lawful targets (combatants and military objectives) and non-lawful targets (civilians and civilian objects), and acknowledging the inherent complexities of applying this principle in conflicts involving non-state actors like Hamas operating within civilian areas, numerous reports indicate that Israel's actions have resulted in significant and foreseeable consequences for the Gazan civilian population. Due to these substantial and foreseeable harms, which have led to a long-term humanitarian crisis, we argue that the Israeli government bears a moral responsibility to help mitigate the long-term humanitarian crisis, which, at a minimum, requires helping to rebuild the healthcare infrastructure to its status quo ante bellum.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145350154","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A minority of countries around the world have taken steps to legalize the practice of physician-assisted suicide and/or euthanasia (PAS/E). Proponents frame PAS/E as a means to enhance patient autonomy, reduce suffering, alleviate the burden of illness, and respect patient dignity. Critics of PAS/E, on the other hand, assert that it reflects a distortion of autonomy, mistakes the source of patient suffering, and dangerously affirms to people that their dignity and worth are contingent on not requiring burdensome caregiving. This has the potential to create uncertainty for how clinicians and institutions should provide ethical guidance to patients on morally controversial matters such as PAS/E. Although ethicists have a duty to explain the range of ethical arguments, they also have an obligation to reinforce ethical boundaries and provide decisive guidance when an intervention is irreconcilable with the practice of medicine. In their clinical role, ethicists can explain why PAS/E is not a healing act and why it violates the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. This article outlines three roles for clinical ethicists to provide education, consultation, and develop policies designed to respond to patient suffering in a manner that preserves the integrity of medicine.
{"title":"Three Roles for Clinical Ethicists to Provide Clarity and Guidance on Physician-Assisted Suicide/Euthanasia.","authors":"Katherine Drabiak","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.70038","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A minority of countries around the world have taken steps to legalize the practice of physician-assisted suicide and/or euthanasia (PAS/E). Proponents frame PAS/E as a means to enhance patient autonomy, reduce suffering, alleviate the burden of illness, and respect patient dignity. Critics of PAS/E, on the other hand, assert that it reflects a distortion of autonomy, mistakes the source of patient suffering, and dangerously affirms to people that their dignity and worth are contingent on not requiring burdensome caregiving. This has the potential to create uncertainty for how clinicians and institutions should provide ethical guidance to patients on morally controversial matters such as PAS/E. Although ethicists have a duty to explain the range of ethical arguments, they also have an obligation to reinforce ethical boundaries and provide decisive guidance when an intervention is irreconcilable with the practice of medicine. In their clinical role, ethicists can explain why PAS/E is not a healing act and why it violates the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence. This article outlines three roles for clinical ethicists to provide education, consultation, and develop policies designed to respond to patient suffering in a manner that preserves the integrity of medicine.</p>","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145304588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>For various reasons I have been doing a lot of hospital visiting lately and it has offered an opportunity to observe the care that is provided by obviously overworked health care professionals, who are routinely faced with challenging situations in conditions that inevitably involve scarcity of resources.</p><p>One incident that I witnessed concerned an apparently frail elderly person whose dentures had been lost in the hospital. The person's daughter was understandably annoyed by this and was offered an opportunity to claim for monetary compensation. While this may be the best that could be offered under the circumstances, it does not address the immediate needs of the patient, as obtaining new dentures may be difficult in this case. At the very least, it would take some time.</p><p>Thinking about this from a bioethical point of view, some might invoke a principle of dignity and argue that to leave a patient without his dentures infringes such a principle, although this obviously was not done deliberately. There are other ways of looking at it, however. With frail elderly patients, considerable focus is naturally placed on capacity to make decisions, and there is a surrounding legal framework to establish what counts as such capacity or the lack of it. There is another, natural, sense of capacity, however, concerning ability to function physically. Without one's dentures the capacity to take in nutrition is clearly compromised.</p><p>This thought leads to consideration of the class of ‘add-ons’ that might have similar importance. Artificial body parts and mobility aids should be considered. Spectacles and hearing aids are obvious examples that spring to mind. Another possible candidate is a watch. While younger generations might rely on their mobile phones for telling the time, for their seniors this might not be the case, and when eyesight is failing, seeing a clock on the wall might be challenging. Knowing what the time is, however, may be important to a patient in maintaining a sense of normality.</p><p>Hospitals cannot be expected to take responsibility for the possessions of their patients. The suggestion being put forward here, however, is that there should be some systems in place to safeguard those patient possessions that are key to their physical functioning. Obviously there are challenges to be faced, for example when patients have to move between beds or wards to facilitate the best care for themselves or for other patients. It is easy to see how possessions might get lost in the transfer. But some of those possessions, such as those mentioned above, are much more important than others (e.g., books and magazines), in so far as they support physical capacity. Where they do not already exist, there should therefore be a system of specific checks in place for these, just as there are mechanisms for checking that the proper medication has been administered. This is because they are in an important sense an extension of the patient's p
{"title":"Little Things Mean A Lot","authors":"Ruth Chadwick","doi":"10.1111/bioe.70036","DOIUrl":"10.1111/bioe.70036","url":null,"abstract":"<p>For various reasons I have been doing a lot of hospital visiting lately and it has offered an opportunity to observe the care that is provided by obviously overworked health care professionals, who are routinely faced with challenging situations in conditions that inevitably involve scarcity of resources.</p><p>One incident that I witnessed concerned an apparently frail elderly person whose dentures had been lost in the hospital. The person's daughter was understandably annoyed by this and was offered an opportunity to claim for monetary compensation. While this may be the best that could be offered under the circumstances, it does not address the immediate needs of the patient, as obtaining new dentures may be difficult in this case. At the very least, it would take some time.</p><p>Thinking about this from a bioethical point of view, some might invoke a principle of dignity and argue that to leave a patient without his dentures infringes such a principle, although this obviously was not done deliberately. There are other ways of looking at it, however. With frail elderly patients, considerable focus is naturally placed on capacity to make decisions, and there is a surrounding legal framework to establish what counts as such capacity or the lack of it. There is another, natural, sense of capacity, however, concerning ability to function physically. Without one's dentures the capacity to take in nutrition is clearly compromised.</p><p>This thought leads to consideration of the class of ‘add-ons’ that might have similar importance. Artificial body parts and mobility aids should be considered. Spectacles and hearing aids are obvious examples that spring to mind. Another possible candidate is a watch. While younger generations might rely on their mobile phones for telling the time, for their seniors this might not be the case, and when eyesight is failing, seeing a clock on the wall might be challenging. Knowing what the time is, however, may be important to a patient in maintaining a sense of normality.</p><p>Hospitals cannot be expected to take responsibility for the possessions of their patients. The suggestion being put forward here, however, is that there should be some systems in place to safeguard those patient possessions that are key to their physical functioning. Obviously there are challenges to be faced, for example when patients have to move between beds or wards to facilitate the best care for themselves or for other patients. It is easy to see how possessions might get lost in the transfer. But some of those possessions, such as those mentioned above, are much more important than others (e.g., books and magazines), in so far as they support physical capacity. Where they do not already exist, there should therefore be a system of specific checks in place for these, just as there are mechanisms for checking that the proper medication has been administered. This is because they are in an important sense an extension of the patient's p","PeriodicalId":55379,"journal":{"name":"Bioethics","volume":"39 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2025-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/bioe.70036","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145234249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}