Bioethics最新文献

The COVID-19 pandemic created healthcare backlogs of routine primary and preventive care, elective procedures, dental care, and mental healthcare appointments across the world. So far, governments are responding by enacting pandemic recovery policies that expand their healthcare sector activity, without much, if any, consideration of its effects on the environmental crisis that is (among other things) worsening human health and health equity. This study argues that, as a matter of health and social justice, governments have an ethical responsibility to equitably reduce the backlog with minimal environmental damage. To do so, a first key action is to give priority to policy options that minimise negative human impacts on the environment. Yet these policies alone will not be sufficient to address the backlog, particularly in relation to elective procedures. The study therefore contends that a second key action for governments is to enact the policy options that are best able to equitably reduce the remainder of the backlog, while accelerating the transition to sustainable health care in ways that are best able to reduce the specific environmental costs of those policy options. It concludes by considering whether limits apply to governments' ethical responsibilities that ultimately mean accelerating the transition to sustainable health care is not required when addressing the backlog.

The term slow code refers to an intentional reduction in the pace or intensity of resuscitative efforts during a medical emergency. This can be understood as an intermediate level between full code (full resuscitation efforts) and no code (no resuscitation efforts) and serves as a symbolic gesture when intervention is considered medically futile. While some previous research acknowledges the slow code as an integral part of clinical practice, many ethicists have condemned the practice as dishonest and causing unnecessary pain for the patient. As the public's views on this issue have been largely absent from the discussion to date, two vignette experiments were performed to investigate their perceptions. The findings indicate that laypersons believe that slow codes are commonplace and often prefer them over a no code. While a full code was perceived as the standard approach and rated most ethical and least punishable, the present results do not support the widespread assumption that laypersons generally oppose slow codes, and this finding should inform ethical discussion and clinical practice.

Current clinical research lacks diversity in those that participate. This lack of diversity is concerning given its importance for successful drug development. The frequency and severity of many diseases, along with the pharmacological properties of therapies, can display significant differences based on patient diversity. A clinical trial population that is more reflective of these differences will help researchers better understand the therapeutic profile of the treatment and provide generalizable knowledge to the medical community. The advent of decentralized clinical trial designs is meant to help address this lack of diversity by using portable digital health technologies and virtual interactions to enhance clinical trial access and broaden participation. By leveraging these technologies, trial conduct can occur at locations other than traditional research sites. This shift in trial location may help address some of the logistical, educational, engagement, and trust barriers that have historically prevented enrollment of diverse populations. However, these types of trials still have limitations. Ethical concerns around justice, equity, and diversity will still exist with decentralized clinical trials, which could be mediated using clinical research vehicles. When utilized, this modality may enhance the scientific design and conduct of clinical trials and better follow these ethical principles. These enhancements and improved ethical direction could be accomplished through increasing community involvement, improving health literacy, supporting more diverse trial sites, creating community-based research footholds, fostering connections with researchers, limiting technical challenges, and preventing data security issues.

Opponents of legalised assisted dying often assert that palliative care is worse in countries where assisted dying has been legalised, and imply that legalised assisted dying makes palliative care worse. This study considers five versions of this claim: that it is difficulty to access expert palliative care in countries where assisted dying has been legalised, that those countries rank low in their quality of end-of-life care; that legalising assisted dying doesn't expand patient choice in respect of palliative care; that growth in palliative care services has stalled in countries where assisted dying has been legalised; and that legalised assisted dying impedes the growth of palliative care or causes it to decline. In each case, it concludes that neither argumentation nor evidence supports these claims.

In 1975, The New England Journal of Medicine published James Rachels' article 'Active and Passive Euthanasia'. The argumentative method that Rachels introduced, the Bare Difference Argument (also known as the Contrast Strategy), became one of the most widely used tools in ethical reasoning. The argument, however, fails to show active euthanasia being morally permissible. It fails because Rachels takes the intuitions from the case where letting die is morally impermissible and applies the intuitions to cases where letting die is morally permissible. While it is possible to create thought-experiments that are more analogous to euthanasia, in this respect, than Rachels' cases, they too are disanalogous to euthanasia with some of the relevant features. Creating the perfect analogy, however, would be a mistake too. Such a case would be too analogous; people would simply be divided on what kind of moral intuitions they would have. The problem thus highlights a methodological limit in philosophical bioethics and raises questions related to the roles of philosophical ethicists in the context of assisted dying.

Emerging evidence that intrauterine exposures to environmental stressors can 'programme' epigenetic modifications in offspring, leading to long-lasting health risks, has generated debate about whether prospective mothers have a specific 'epigenetic' moral responsibility. However, to date, proposals for maternal epigenetic responsibility have failed to grapple adequately with the uncertainty of scientific evidence, and specifically, whether the causal basis for intrauterine epigenetic effects is sufficiently established to ground claims of moral responsibility. Causality is widely considered a necessary condition for the attribution of moral responsibility. In this paper, we show that much foetal programming science in humans has yet to establish a causal epigenetic connection between intrauterine exposures and subsequent offspring health impacts. This research struggles to establish that the relationship between such exposures and offspring health risks is in fact causal, neither has it been able to evince the causal significance of exposures during pregnancy to such outcomes. We argue that these two challenges to establishing causality in foetal programming research seriously undercut the idea that prospective mothers may have a moral responsibility to ensure the epigenetics of their offspring.

With the continued expansion and commercialisation of fertility treatments, the selection and matching of donors have become more sophisticated and technologised. As part of this landscape, new form of genetic screening: 'expanded carrier screening' (ECS) is being offered as a technique to avoid the risk of donors passing on genetic conditions to future offspring. Allowing donors to be tested for hundreds of genetic conditions simultaneously, ECS marks a considerable departure from traditional 'family history' models of screening, which rely on an individual's knowledge of family health. There is growing evidence of a drive towards the use of ECS within the fertility sector, and a growing number of clinics are offering it for a fee, as part of an egg or sperm donation cycle or as an add-on to IVF treatment. In this article, we use methods of critical reflection to synthesise data from two studies to explore how ECS is being used to avoid genetic risk in IVF treatment using donor gametes. We suggest that ECS is a new form of repro-genetic selection-a selective reproductive technology-with specific and important implications for donors, recipients and clinicians and with the potential to reconfigure the scope and application of gamete donation. We examine these implications and conclude that the existing policy blind spot relating to this development in fertility treatment practice needs to be urgently addressed.