Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1177/10597123211031016
C. Lenay
The aim of this article is to offer a new approach of perception regarding the position of a distant object. It is also a tribute to John Stewart who accompanied the first stages of this research. Having already examined the difficulties surrounding questions of the perception of exteriority within the framework of enactive approaches, we will proceed in two stages. The first stage will consist of an attempt to explain distal perception in terms of individual sensorimotor invariants. This poses the problem but fails to solve it. The second stage will propose a new pathway to account for spatial perception; a pathway that does not deny the initial intuitions of the autopoietic enactive approaches, but one which radically changes the conception of cognition by considering, from the perceptual stage, the need to take into account interindividual interactions. The protocol of an original experimental study will characterize this new approach considering the perceptual experience of objects at a distance, in exteriority, in a space of possibilities without parting from the domain of interaction. To do this, we have to work at the limits of the perceptual crossing, that is, at the moment when the perceptual reciprocity between different subjects begins to disappear.
{"title":"Perceiving at a distance: enaction, exteriority and possibility – a tribute to John Stewart","authors":"C. Lenay","doi":"10.1177/10597123211031016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211031016","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to offer a new approach of perception regarding the position of a distant object. It is also a tribute to John Stewart who accompanied the first stages of this research. Having already examined the difficulties surrounding questions of the perception of exteriority within the framework of enactive approaches, we will proceed in two stages. The first stage will consist of an attempt to explain distal perception in terms of individual sensorimotor invariants. This poses the problem but fails to solve it. The second stage will propose a new pathway to account for spatial perception; a pathway that does not deny the initial intuitions of the autopoietic enactive approaches, but one which radically changes the conception of cognition by considering, from the perceptual stage, the need to take into account interindividual interactions. The protocol of an original experimental study will characterize this new approach considering the perceptual experience of objects at a distance, in exteriority, in a space of possibilities without parting from the domain of interaction. To do this, we have to work at the limits of the perceptual crossing, that is, at the moment when the perceptual reciprocity between different subjects begins to disappear.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"29 1","pages":"485 - 503"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211031016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48780012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-29DOI: 10.1177/10597123211030694
Vincenzo Raimondi
Genetic reductionism is increasingly seen as a severely limited approach to understanding living systems. The Neo-Darwinian explanatory framework tends to overlook the role of the organism for an understanding of development and evolution. In the current fast-changing theoretical landscape, the autopoietic approach provides conceptual distinctions and tools that may contribute to building an alternative framework. In this article, I examine the implications of the theories of autopoiesis and natural drift for an organism-centered view of evolution. By shifting the attention from genes to ontogenetic organism-niche configurations and their transformations over generations, this approach presents a compelling perspective on the role of organismal behavior in guiding phylogenetic drift.
{"title":"Autopoiesis and evolution: the role of organisms in natural drift","authors":"Vincenzo Raimondi","doi":"10.1177/10597123211030694","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211030694","url":null,"abstract":"Genetic reductionism is increasingly seen as a severely limited approach to understanding living systems. The Neo-Darwinian explanatory framework tends to overlook the role of the organism for an understanding of development and evolution. In the current fast-changing theoretical landscape, the autopoietic approach provides conceptual distinctions and tools that may contribute to building an alternative framework. In this article, I examine the implications of the theories of autopoiesis and natural drift for an organism-centered view of evolution. By shifting the attention from genes to ontogenetic organism-niche configurations and their transformations over generations, this approach presents a compelling perspective on the role of organismal behavior in guiding phylogenetic drift.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"29 1","pages":"511 - 522"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211030694","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42586731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1177/10597123211017550
Jonas D. Rockbach, Maren Bennewitz
Human–swarm interaction is a frontier in the realms of swarm robotics and human-factors engineering. However, no holistic theory has been explicitly formulated that can inform how humans and robot swarms should interact through an interface while considering real-world demands, the relative capabilities of the components, as well as the desired joint-system behaviours. In this article, we apply a holistic perspective that we refer to as joint human–swarm loops, that is, a cybernetic system made of human, swarm and interface. We argue that a solution for human–swarm interaction should make the joint human–swarm loop an intelligent system that balances between centralized and decentralized control. The swarm-amplified human is suggested as a possible design that combines perspectives from swarm robotics, human-factors engineering and theoretical neuroscience to produce such a joint human–swarm loop. Essentially, it states that the robot swarm should be integrated into the human’s low-level nervous system function. This requires modelling both the robot swarm and the biological nervous system as self-organizing systems. We discuss multiple design implications that follow from the swarm-amplified human, including a computational experiment that shows how the robot swarm itself can be a self-organizing interface based on minimal computational logic.
{"title":"The design of self-organizing human–swarm intelligence","authors":"Jonas D. Rockbach, Maren Bennewitz","doi":"10.1177/10597123211017550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211017550","url":null,"abstract":"Human–swarm interaction is a frontier in the realms of swarm robotics and human-factors engineering. However, no holistic theory has been explicitly formulated that can inform how humans and robot swarms should interact through an interface while considering real-world demands, the relative capabilities of the components, as well as the desired joint-system behaviours. In this article, we apply a holistic perspective that we refer to as joint human–swarm loops, that is, a cybernetic system made of human, swarm and interface. We argue that a solution for human–swarm interaction should make the joint human–swarm loop an intelligent system that balances between centralized and decentralized control. The swarm-amplified human is suggested as a possible design that combines perspectives from swarm robotics, human-factors engineering and theoretical neuroscience to produce such a joint human–swarm loop. Essentially, it states that the robot swarm should be integrated into the human’s low-level nervous system function. This requires modelling both the robot swarm and the biological nervous system as self-organizing systems. We discuss multiple design implications that follow from the swarm-amplified human, including a computational experiment that shows how the robot swarm itself can be a self-organizing interface based on minimal computational logic.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"30 1","pages":"361 - 386"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211017550","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48056539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-18DOI: 10.1177/10597123211024008
Shahab Parvinpour, M. Balali, M. Shafizadeh, Fatemeh Samimi Pazhuh, M. Duncan, D. Broom
The purpose of this study was to examine the variability and coordination of postural adaptations in normal weight children and those with overweight in running and hopping. Fifty-six boys between 7 and 10 years were classified into groups as overweight (n = 33) or normal-weight (n = 23). They performed two trials of running and hopping over a 20-m straight line distance. Accelerometers were attached on the trunk and head for collecting body movements in different directions from 15 strides. Postural variability and coordination were calculated by multiscale entropy and cross approximate entropy for the running and hopping trials, separately. Findings highlight overweight boys had significantly higher trunk-head coordination in mediolateral direction than normal-weight boys (0.72 vs. 0.68). The hopping movement pattern had highest variability (9.88 vs. 8.77) and trunk–head coordination (0.61 vs. 0.67) than running. Excess body mass demands additional postural adaptations to compensate for reducing the risk of losing balance laterally in boys with overweight.
{"title":"Locomotion postural variability and coordination in boys with overweight","authors":"Shahab Parvinpour, M. Balali, M. Shafizadeh, Fatemeh Samimi Pazhuh, M. Duncan, D. Broom","doi":"10.1177/10597123211024008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211024008","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this study was to examine the variability and coordination of postural adaptations in normal weight children and those with overweight in running and hopping. Fifty-six boys between 7 and 10 years were classified into groups as overweight (n = 33) or normal-weight (n = 23). They performed two trials of running and hopping over a 20-m straight line distance. Accelerometers were attached on the trunk and head for collecting body movements in different directions from 15 strides. Postural variability and coordination were calculated by multiscale entropy and cross approximate entropy for the running and hopping trials, separately. Findings highlight overweight boys had significantly higher trunk-head coordination in mediolateral direction than normal-weight boys (0.72 vs. 0.68). The hopping movement pattern had highest variability (9.88 vs. 8.77) and trunk–head coordination (0.61 vs. 0.67) than running. Excess body mass demands additional postural adaptations to compensate for reducing the risk of losing balance laterally in boys with overweight.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"30 1","pages":"409 - 416"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211024008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41925799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-10DOI: 10.1177/10597123211020782
Giovanni Rolla, Jeferson Diello Huffermann
We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies. We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them to show an important point of convergence, namely, that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasize the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto and Myin’s Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements.
{"title":"Converging enactivisms: radical enactivism meets linguistic bodies","authors":"Giovanni Rolla, Jeferson Diello Huffermann","doi":"10.1177/10597123211020782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211020782","url":null,"abstract":"We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies. We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them to show an important point of convergence, namely, that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasize the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto and Myin’s Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"30 1","pages":"345 - 359"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211020782","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41591264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-10DOI: 10.1177/10597123211053071
I. Palacios-García, Francisco J. Parada
All life on earth is intrinsically linked. At the very foundation of every evolutionary interaction are microorganisms, integral components in the composition of both organisms and ecosystems. The available data and this perspective on the order of life challenge the traditional conception of monogenetic biological individuals, suggesting living beings are actually composite multi-species complexes: holobionts. In the present article, we introduce our perspective on the concept of the holobiont mind, a biogenic conception of cognition compatible with the 4E approach and the holobiont theory. We furthermore expand on the idea of the mind as the emerging product of multi-genomic morphology of a composite animal-agent, in ever-changing interaction with its ecological niche. We thus briefly review recent evidence on the brain–gut–microbiome axis and the Microbiome of the Built Environment in order to provide a bridge between the Holobiont Mind and the 4E approach to Cognition, two complementary lines of evidence that have not been linked before, opening novel venues for research with direct impact on health and disease.
{"title":"The holobiont mind: A bridge between 4E cognition and the microbiome","authors":"I. Palacios-García, Francisco J. Parada","doi":"10.1177/10597123211053071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211053071","url":null,"abstract":"All life on earth is intrinsically linked. At the very foundation of every evolutionary interaction are microorganisms, integral components in the composition of both organisms and ecosystems. The available data and this perspective on the order of life challenge the traditional conception of monogenetic biological individuals, suggesting living beings are actually composite multi-species complexes: holobionts. In the present article, we introduce our perspective on the concept of the holobiont mind, a biogenic conception of cognition compatible with the 4E approach and the holobiont theory. We furthermore expand on the idea of the mind as the emerging product of multi-genomic morphology of a composite animal-agent, in ever-changing interaction with its ecological niche. We thus briefly review recent evidence on the brain–gut–microbiome axis and the Microbiome of the Built Environment in order to provide a bridge between the Holobiont Mind and the 4E approach to Cognition, two complementary lines of evidence that have not been linked before, opening novel venues for research with direct impact on health and disease.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"487 - 496"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43091692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-04DOI: 10.1177/10597123211019793
U. Corrêa, Fabian Alberto Romero Clavijo, Marcos Antônio Mattos dos Reis, G. Tani
This article considers human motor skills based on the concept of the hierarchical organisation of living systems. This concept considers apparently opposite phenomena (e.g. consistency-variability) as complementary and as contemplated in the same structure. The hierarchy in open systems is characterised by three main relativities: (a) whole and parts, (b) control and (c) variability. From a hierarchical standpoint, motor skills phenomena are structured under two levels: macro (responsible for the consistency and configuration of patterns) and micro (responsible for variability and, consequently, the flexibility of patterns). Study findings make it possible to understand how adaptations in the soccer, futsal, swimming, golf, coincident timing and graphic motor skills take place by altering the microstructure (parameterisation) or reorganising the macrostructure (self-organisation). The distinction between these two modes of adaptation allows us to consider the increase of complexity in the motor skills phenomena as a basic feature of living systems.
{"title":"The study of motor skills under a view of hierarchical organisation of open system","authors":"U. Corrêa, Fabian Alberto Romero Clavijo, Marcos Antônio Mattos dos Reis, G. Tani","doi":"10.1177/10597123211019793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211019793","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers human motor skills based on the concept of the hierarchical organisation of living systems. This concept considers apparently opposite phenomena (e.g. consistency-variability) as complementary and as contemplated in the same structure. The hierarchy in open systems is characterised by three main relativities: (a) whole and parts, (b) control and (c) variability. From a hierarchical standpoint, motor skills phenomena are structured under two levels: macro (responsible for the consistency and configuration of patterns) and micro (responsible for variability and, consequently, the flexibility of patterns). Study findings make it possible to understand how adaptations in the soccer, futsal, swimming, golf, coincident timing and graphic motor skills take place by altering the microstructure (parameterisation) or reorganising the macrostructure (self-organisation). The distinction between these two modes of adaptation allows us to consider the increase of complexity in the motor skills phenomena as a basic feature of living systems.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"30 1","pages":"473 - 484"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211019793","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43148966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-01DOI: 10.1177/1059712320918678
T. van Es
The free energy principle (FEP) is an information-theoretic approach to living systems. FEP characterizes life by living systems’ resistance to the second law of thermodynamics: living systems do not randomly visit the possible states, but actively work to remain within a set of viable states. In FEP, this is modelled mathematically. Yet, the status of these models is typically unclear: are these models employed by organisms or strictly scientific tools of understanding? In this article, I argue for an instrumentalist take on models in FEP. I shall argue that models used as instruments for knowledge by scientists and models as implemented by organisms to navigate the world are being conflated, which leads to erroneous conclusions. I further argue that a realist position is unwarranted. First, it overgenerates models and thus trivializes the notion of modelling. Second, even when the mathematical mechanisms described by FEP are implemented in an organism, they do not constitute a model. They are covariational, not representational in nature, and precede the social practices that have shaped our scientific modelling practice. I finally argue that the above arguments do not affect the instrumentalist position. An instrumentalist approach can further add to conceptual clarity in the FEP literature.
{"title":"Living models or life modelled? On the use of models in the free energy principle","authors":"T. van Es","doi":"10.1177/1059712320918678","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/1059712320918678","url":null,"abstract":"The free energy principle (FEP) is an information-theoretic approach to living systems. FEP characterizes life by living systems’ resistance to the second law of thermodynamics: living systems do not randomly visit the possible states, but actively work to remain within a set of viable states. In FEP, this is modelled mathematically. Yet, the status of these models is typically unclear: are these models employed by organisms or strictly scientific tools of understanding? In this article, I argue for an instrumentalist take on models in FEP. I shall argue that models used as instruments for knowledge by scientists and models as implemented by organisms to navigate the world are being conflated, which leads to erroneous conclusions. I further argue that a realist position is unwarranted. First, it overgenerates models and thus trivializes the notion of modelling. Second, even when the mathematical mechanisms described by FEP are implemented in an organism, they do not constitute a model. They are covariational, not representational in nature, and precede the social practices that have shaped our scientific modelling practice. I finally argue that the above arguments do not affect the instrumentalist position. An instrumentalist approach can further add to conceptual clarity in the FEP literature.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"23 1","pages":"315 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74424902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-28DOI: 10.1177/10597123211017337
Zachariah A. Neemeh
Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.
{"title":"Smooth coping: an embodied, Heideggerian approach to dual-process theory","authors":"Zachariah A. Neemeh","doi":"10.1177/10597123211017337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211017337","url":null,"abstract":"Dual-process theories divide cognition into two kinds of processes: Type 1 processes that are autonomous and do not use working memory, and Type 2 processes that are decoupled from the immediate situation and use working memory. Often, Type 1 processes are also fast, high capacity, parallel, nonconscious, biased, contextualized, and associative, while Type 2 processes are typically slow, low capacity, serial, conscious, normative, abstract, and rule-based. This article argues for an embodied dual-process theory based on the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. According to Heidegger, the basis of human agents’ encounters with the world is in a prereflective, pragmatically engaged disposition marked by readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit), sometimes equated with “smooth coping.” Examples of smooth coping include walking, throwing a ball, and other embodied actions that do not require reflective thought. I argue that smooth coping primarily consists of Type 1 processes. The Heideggerian dual-process model yields distinctly different hypotheses from Hubert Dreyfus’ model of smooth coping, and I will critically engage with Dreyfus’ work.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"30 1","pages":"329 - 344"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/10597123211017337","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42611673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-03DOI: 10.1177/10597123221130235
C. Witzel, Annika Lübbert, J. O'regan, S. Hanneton, F. Schumann
This study investigated the potential for the development of novel perceptual experiences through sustained training with a sensory augmentation device. We developed (1) a new geomagnetic sensory augmentation device, the NaviEar, and (2) a battery of tests for automaticity in the use of the device. The NaviEar translates head direction toward north into continuous sound according to a “wind coding” principle. To facilitate automatization of use, its design is informed by considerations of the embodiment of spatial orientation and multi-sensory integration, and it uses a sensory coding scheme derived from means for auditory perception of wind direction that is common in sailing because it is easy to understand and use. The test battery assesses different effects of automaticity (interference, rigidity of responses, and dynamic integration) assuming that automaticity is a necessary criterion to show the emergence of perceptual feel, that is, an augmented experience with perceptual phenomenal quality. We measured performance in simple training tasks, administered the tests for automaticity, and assessed subjective reports through a questionnaire. Results suggest that the NaviEar is easy and comfortable to use and has a potential for applications in real-world situations. Despite high usability, however, a 5-day training with the NaviEar did not reach levels of automaticity that are indicative of perceptual feel. We propose that the test battery for automaticity may be used as a benchmark test for iterative research on perceptual experiences in sensory augmentation and sensory substitution.
{"title":"Can perception be extended to a “feel of north”? Tests of automaticity with the NaviEar","authors":"C. Witzel, Annika Lübbert, J. O'regan, S. Hanneton, F. Schumann","doi":"10.1177/10597123221130235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221130235","url":null,"abstract":"This study investigated the potential for the development of novel perceptual experiences through sustained training with a sensory augmentation device. We developed (1) a new geomagnetic sensory augmentation device, the NaviEar, and (2) a battery of tests for automaticity in the use of the device. The NaviEar translates head direction toward north into continuous sound according to a “wind coding” principle. To facilitate automatization of use, its design is informed by considerations of the embodiment of spatial orientation and multi-sensory integration, and it uses a sensory coding scheme derived from means for auditory perception of wind direction that is common in sailing because it is easy to understand and use. The test battery assesses different effects of automaticity (interference, rigidity of responses, and dynamic integration) assuming that automaticity is a necessary criterion to show the emergence of perceptual feel, that is, an augmented experience with perceptual phenomenal quality. We measured performance in simple training tasks, administered the tests for automaticity, and assessed subjective reports through a questionnaire. Results suggest that the NaviEar is easy and comfortable to use and has a potential for applications in real-world situations. Despite high usability, however, a 5-day training with the NaviEar did not reach levels of automaticity that are indicative of perceptual feel. We propose that the test battery for automaticity may be used as a benchmark test for iterative research on perceptual experiences in sensory augmentation and sensory substitution.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"239 - 264"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2021-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44193217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}