Pub Date : 2022-05-23DOI: 10.1177/10597123221094360
M. McGann
This commentary addresses the course-of-experience method in the context of calls for improved theorising in psychological science, and in particular the prospect of applying distinctive means of analysis to examine patterns and variance both between people and across contexts. Psychology can benefit by the development of both theories of principle (formal accounts of the structure of phenomena) and constructive theories (formal accounts of the mechanics of phenomena). The course-of-experience method can provide a useful step toward the development of both. Resonances with other work grounded in naturalistic observation identify potential questions that remain as to how the course-of-experience method can address questions about the relationship between individual and collective aspects of experience, but the technique represents a significant boon to the future development of valid cognitive science.
{"title":"Connecting with the subject of our science: Course-of-experience research supports valid theory building in cognitive science","authors":"M. McGann","doi":"10.1177/10597123221094360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221094360","url":null,"abstract":"This commentary addresses the course-of-experience method in the context of calls for improved theorising in psychological science, and in particular the prospect of applying distinctive means of analysis to examine patterns and variance both between people and across contexts. Psychology can benefit by the development of both theories of principle (formal accounts of the structure of phenomena) and constructive theories (formal accounts of the mechanics of phenomena). The course-of-experience method can provide a useful step toward the development of both. Resonances with other work grounded in naturalistic observation identify potential questions that remain as to how the course-of-experience method can address questions about the relationship between individual and collective aspects of experience, but the technique represents a significant boon to the future development of valid cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"137 - 141"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42053014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-20DOI: 10.1177/10597123221093101
María Isabel Gaete
The tension between reflection and experience has been highlighted by Buddhism as the origin of human suffering, described as an undercurrent and constant feelings of restlessness, grasping, anxiety, and dissatisfaction or disease. This universal suffering experience called Dukkha refers to the failure to find a Self in reflection or the frustrated desire or craving to have or to be something. For Buddhism, not only the desired object is illusory, but so is the desiring self. Further, Varela et al. (1993) integrate these ideas into the development of cognitive sciences and the understanding of human experience from an embodied and selfless mind perspective. The present article attempts to apply the Buddhist notion of suffering or Dukkha along with Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s contributions to the understanding of the embodied sense of Self that characterizes symptoms of Depression. The expression of the self-grasping suffering experiences and the tension between reflection and experience for depressive patients will be discussed from an enacted and embodied perspective. Further, new research ideas along with possible new psychotherapeutic approaches are discussed.
{"title":"Suffering and sense of self: The tension between reflection and experience—The case of depression","authors":"María Isabel Gaete","doi":"10.1177/10597123221093101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221093101","url":null,"abstract":"The tension between reflection and experience has been highlighted by Buddhism as the origin of human suffering, described as an undercurrent and constant feelings of restlessness, grasping, anxiety, and dissatisfaction or disease. This universal suffering experience called Dukkha refers to the failure to find a Self in reflection or the frustrated desire or craving to have or to be something. For Buddhism, not only the desired object is illusory, but so is the desiring self. Further, Varela et al. (1993) integrate these ideas into the development of cognitive sciences and the understanding of human experience from an embodied and selfless mind perspective. The present article attempts to apply the Buddhist notion of suffering or Dukkha along with Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s contributions to the understanding of the embodied sense of Self that characterizes symptoms of Depression. The expression of the self-grasping suffering experiences and the tension between reflection and experience for depressive patients will be discussed from an enacted and embodied perspective. Further, new research ideas along with possible new psychotherapeutic approaches are discussed.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"467 - 486"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47737917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-20DOI: 10.1177/10597123221098002
Nicolás Alessandroni, L. Malafouris
The target article provides valuable reflections regarding the study of cognition-in-the-world and proposes a methodology that could help researchers unravel the structure and temporal unfolding of lived experience. In this commentary, we discuss the authors' commitment to the enactive notion of sense-making as the activity of an autonomous system that brings forth a meaningful world to maintain its self-constituted identity. From Material Engagement Theory, we hold that defending such a notion leads to unnecessary ontological asymmetries that obscure the fundamental role of materiality for cognition. On the one hand, we argue that the relationship of close intertwinement and co-constitution that unites organism and environment makes it untenable to characterise cognition as being driven by individuals. In our view, cognition arises from the dynamic encounter between brains, bodies and culture. On the other hand, we suggest that organism and environment should not be seen as separate ontological categories that come to interact with each other but as two terms of a transactional process of continuous becoming. Consistently, we propose to consider meaning as emerging from the in-between space that material engagement creates rather than from the activity of an organism.
{"title":"Blurring ontological boundaries: The transactional nature of material engagement","authors":"Nicolás Alessandroni, L. Malafouris","doi":"10.1177/10597123221098002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221098002","url":null,"abstract":"The target article provides valuable reflections regarding the study of cognition-in-the-world and proposes a methodology that could help researchers unravel the structure and temporal unfolding of lived experience. In this commentary, we discuss the authors' commitment to the enactive notion of sense-making as the activity of an autonomous system that brings forth a meaningful world to maintain its self-constituted identity. From Material Engagement Theory, we hold that defending such a notion leads to unnecessary ontological asymmetries that obscure the fundamental role of materiality for cognition. On the one hand, we argue that the relationship of close intertwinement and co-constitution that unites organism and environment makes it untenable to characterise cognition as being driven by individuals. In our view, cognition arises from the dynamic encounter between brains, bodies and culture. On the other hand, we suggest that organism and environment should not be seen as separate ontological categories that come to interact with each other but as two terms of a transactional process of continuous becoming. Consistently, we propose to consider meaning as emerging from the in-between space that material engagement creates rather than from the activity of an organism.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"127 - 131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43850380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-20DOI: 10.1177/10597123221094356
Simon Høffding
The Course-of-Experience presents an interesting method for working with others’ experience, drawing on Micro-phenomenology (MP), Enactivism, and Peircean semiotics. It addresses possible applications to cognitive science, answering to a call about how to reliably integrate phenomenological data and experimental methods. I applaud the ambitious framework presented in the target paper, and hope that Poizat and colleagues in response or in later work will address three potential shortcoming: (1) How does the framework fare in comparison to similar methods. (2) Why is Peircean semiotics necessary for the framework? 3) Does it need to copy what seems to be epistemological and metaphysical infelicities concerning pre-reflective experience directly from MP?
{"title":"“What’s done is done, the bullet’s left the gun”: Questions on the Application, Origin, and Metaphysics of the «Course-of-Experience Framework»","authors":"Simon Høffding","doi":"10.1177/10597123221094356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221094356","url":null,"abstract":"The Course-of-Experience presents an interesting method for working with others’ experience, drawing on Micro-phenomenology (MP), Enactivism, and Peircean semiotics. It addresses possible applications to cognitive science, answering to a call about how to reliably integrate phenomenological data and experimental methods. I applaud the ambitious framework presented in the target paper, and hope that Poizat and colleagues in response or in later work will address three potential shortcoming: (1) How does the framework fare in comparison to similar methods. (2) Why is Peircean semiotics necessary for the framework? 3) Does it need to copy what seems to be epistemological and metaphysical infelicities concerning pre-reflective experience directly from MP?","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"133 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48828665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-10DOI: 10.1177/10597123221097451
Rodrigo Sosa
Learning is a major determinant of behavioral change for some organisms through their lifecycles. From an associative perspective, learning is assumed to occur whenever organisms experience particular statistical regularities in their environment; specifically, meaningful outcomes that follow certain cues or actions chiefly contribute to behavioral change. However, numerous empirical reports reveal that not all cue–outcome and action–outcome combinations are learned equally well, a phenomenon that is termed belongingness. Those reports are valuable as descriptive-level knowledge, but beg further considerations, like what is the origin, adaptive value of, and underlying mechanisms associated with the predisposition to couple particular events. Contrary to what is often assumed, the mere observation of learning predispositions says little as to whether they arise from genetics, are constrained by hardwired neural circuitries, or have been ecologically advantageous in an evolutionary timescale. The present paper aims to present a number of notions from different research fields outside the hard core of associative learning and, in so doing, provides elements for careful study and conceptualization of this issue. Thereafter, these notions are pooled to understand behavioral variation in a wide array of phenomena, thus, bringing a more informed approach to the nature versus nurture debate.
{"title":"Beyond belongingness: Rethinking innate behavioral predispositions, learning constraints, and cognitive capacities","authors":"Rodrigo Sosa","doi":"10.1177/10597123221097451","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221097451","url":null,"abstract":"Learning is a major determinant of behavioral change for some organisms through their lifecycles. From an associative perspective, learning is assumed to occur whenever organisms experience particular statistical regularities in their environment; specifically, meaningful outcomes that follow certain cues or actions chiefly contribute to behavioral change. However, numerous empirical reports reveal that not all cue–outcome and action–outcome combinations are learned equally well, a phenomenon that is termed belongingness. Those reports are valuable as descriptive-level knowledge, but beg further considerations, like what is the origin, adaptive value of, and underlying mechanisms associated with the predisposition to couple particular events. Contrary to what is often assumed, the mere observation of learning predispositions says little as to whether they arise from genetics, are constrained by hardwired neural circuitries, or have been ecologically advantageous in an evolutionary timescale. The present paper aims to present a number of notions from different research fields outside the hard core of associative learning and, in so doing, provides elements for careful study and conceptualization of this issue. Thereafter, these notions are pooled to understand behavioral variation in a wide array of phenomena, thus, bringing a more informed approach to the nature versus nurture debate.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41944503","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-27DOI: 10.1177/10597123211072613
Aitana Grasso-Cladera, Stefanella Costa-Cordella, Alejandra Rossi, Nikolas F Fuchs, Francisco J Parada
Cognitive dynamics are multimodal, and they need to integrate real-time feedback to be adaptive and appropriate. However, cognition research still relies on mostly unimodal paradigms using simple motor tasks in laboratory-based static situations. This paper addresses this limitation by presenting the Mobile Brain/Body Imaging approach based on the Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enactive perspective, which complements traditional laboratory work while also facilitating ecologically valid applications. First, we briefly review Mobile Brain/Body Imaging technologies used to obtain functional and structural images of the Brain/Body System during natural cognition. Specifically: mobile cognitive electrophysiology, mobile functional neurovascular dynamics, and mobile behavioral measurements. Second, we review the development of Mobile Brain/Body Imaging/4E in Chile. Finally, we discuss challenges and opportunities. We conclude that although this new epistemic/methodological approach is promising, there is a need for greater portability, robust equipment, and data-analysis tools that can integrate signals from the brain/body-in-the-world system. Future experimental designs need to re-consider their underlying logic and increase their ecological validity by perhaps-modifying the physical spaces in which experiments are conducted.
{"title":"Mobile Brain/Body Imaging: Challenges and opportunities for the implementation of research programs based on the 4E perspective to cognition","authors":"Aitana Grasso-Cladera, Stefanella Costa-Cordella, Alejandra Rossi, Nikolas F Fuchs, Francisco J Parada","doi":"10.1177/10597123211072613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211072613","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Cognitive dynamics are multimodal, and they need to integrate real-time feedback to be adaptive and appropriate. However, cognition research still relies on mostly unimodal paradigms using simple motor tasks in laboratory-based static situations. This paper addresses this limitation by presenting the Mobile Brain/Body Imaging approach based on the Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enactive perspective, which complements traditional laboratory work while also facilitating ecologically valid applications. First, we briefly review Mobile Brain/Body Imaging technologies used to obtain functional and structural images of the Brain/Body System during natural cognition. Specifically: mobile cognitive electrophysiology, mobile functional neurovascular dynamics, and mobile behavioral measurements. Second, we review the development of Mobile Brain/Body Imaging/4E in Chile. Finally, we discuss challenges and opportunities. We conclude that although this new epistemic/methodological approach is promising, there is a need for greater portability, robust equipment, and data-analysis tools that can integrate signals from the brain/body-in-the-world system. Future experimental designs need to re-consider their underlying logic and increase their ecological validity by perhaps-modifying the physical spaces in which experiments are conducted.</p>","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-17DOI: 10.1177/10597123221084739
C. Valenzuela-Moguillansky, E. Demšar
In recent decades, empirical study of experience has been installed as a relevant and necessary element in researching cognitive phenomena. However, its incorporation into cognitive science has been largely done by following an objectivist frame of reference, without reconsidering the practices and standards involved in the process of research and the interpretation and validation of the results. This has given rise to a number of issues that reveal inconsistencies in the understanding and treatment of some crucial aspects of first-person research. In this article, we will outline a research direction aiming at contributing to the establishment of a framework for the study of experience that addresses these inconsistencies. Specifically, we will identify some challenges facing the study of experience—in particular those linked to the understanding of memory, expression and description, and intersubjectivity in exploring experience—and propose to reframe them under the epistemological framework of the enactive approach. Moreover, we will explore the prospect of gaining insight into theoretical and methodological strategies for dealing with these issues by extending our vision beyond the field of cognitive science to its neighboring fields, focusing in particular on the field of somatic practices.
{"title":"Toward a science of experience: Outlining some challenges and future directions","authors":"C. Valenzuela-Moguillansky, E. Demšar","doi":"10.1177/10597123221084739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221084739","url":null,"abstract":"In recent decades, empirical study of experience has been installed as a relevant and necessary element in researching cognitive phenomena. However, its incorporation into cognitive science has been largely done by following an objectivist frame of reference, without reconsidering the practices and standards involved in the process of research and the interpretation and validation of the results. This has given rise to a number of issues that reveal inconsistencies in the understanding and treatment of some crucial aspects of first-person research. In this article, we will outline a research direction aiming at contributing to the establishment of a framework for the study of experience that addresses these inconsistencies. Specifically, we will identify some challenges facing the study of experience—in particular those linked to the understanding of memory, expression and description, and intersubjectivity in exploring experience—and propose to reframe them under the epistemological framework of the enactive approach. Moreover, we will explore the prospect of gaining insight into theoretical and methodological strategies for dealing with these issues by extending our vision beyond the field of cognitive science to its neighboring fields, focusing in particular on the field of somatic practices.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"449 - 466"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48947081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-15DOI: 10.1177/10597123211072352
G. Poizat, Simon Flandin, J. Theureau
The article presents the course-of-experience framework and how it contributes to studying cognition in practice. The aim is twofold: (a) to argue for a phenomenologically and semiotically inspired enactivist approach to practice and cognition in practice and (b) to describe research methods that provide rigorous first-person data in relation to practice—in other words, a view “from within” of practice. Practice is considered to be a relevant unit of analysis for studying cognition-in-the-world and is defined as enacted, lived, situated, embodied, and enculturated. Practice is not viewed as a “context for” but as “constitutive” of the cognitive process itself. This article describes (a) the epistemological foundation and general assumptions of the course-of-experience framework, (b) the associated way of looking at pre-reflective self-consciousness and its relation to practice, (c) the analytical hypothesis derived from Peirce’s semeiotic, and (d) some methodological considerations related to data collection, data processing, and analysis. In the concluding section, we outline the added value of the course-of-experience framework for cognitive science, and we indicate possible directions for further research.
{"title":"A micro-phenomenological and semiotic approach to cognition in practice: a path toward an integrative approach to studying cognition-in-the-world and from within","authors":"G. Poizat, Simon Flandin, J. Theureau","doi":"10.1177/10597123211072352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123211072352","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the course-of-experience framework and how it contributes to studying cognition in practice. The aim is twofold: (a) to argue for a phenomenologically and semiotically inspired enactivist approach to practice and cognition in practice and (b) to describe research methods that provide rigorous first-person data in relation to practice—in other words, a view “from within” of practice. Practice is considered to be a relevant unit of analysis for studying cognition-in-the-world and is defined as enacted, lived, situated, embodied, and enculturated. Practice is not viewed as a “context for” but as “constitutive” of the cognitive process itself. This article describes (a) the epistemological foundation and general assumptions of the course-of-experience framework, (b) the associated way of looking at pre-reflective self-consciousness and its relation to practice, (c) the analytical hypothesis derived from Peirce’s semeiotic, and (d) some methodological considerations related to data collection, data processing, and analysis. In the concluding section, we outline the added value of the course-of-experience framework for cognitive science, and we indicate possible directions for further research.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"109 - 125"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42156941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-12DOI: 10.1177/10597123221080193
R. Lanfranco, A. Canales-Johnson, B. Lucero, Esteban Vargas, V. Noreika
The contents of consciousness are complex and dynamic and are embedded in perception and cognition. The study of consciousness and subjective experience has been central to philosophy for centuries. However, despite its relevance for understanding cognition and behaviour, the empirical study of consciousness is relatively new, embroiled by the seemingly opposing subjective and objective sources of data. Francisco Varela (1946–2001) pioneered the empirical study of consciousness by developing novel, naturalised and rich approaches in a non-reductive and comprehensive manner. In this article, we review the main conceptual distinctions and philosophical challenges of consciousness research and highlight the main contributions of Varela and his associates: the development of neurophenomenology as a methodological framework that builds a bridge between subjective and objective sources of data and the discovery of gamma-band phase synchronisation as a neural marker of perceptual awareness. Finally, we describe the work of Varela on time consciousness, his philosophical approach and the implementation of his neurophenomenological framework for its study by integrating subjective reports with neural measures.
{"title":"Towards a view from within: The contribution of Francisco Varela to the study of consciousness","authors":"R. Lanfranco, A. Canales-Johnson, B. Lucero, Esteban Vargas, V. Noreika","doi":"10.1177/10597123221080193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221080193","url":null,"abstract":"The contents of consciousness are complex and dynamic and are embedded in perception and cognition. The study of consciousness and subjective experience has been central to philosophy for centuries. However, despite its relevance for understanding cognition and behaviour, the empirical study of consciousness is relatively new, embroiled by the seemingly opposing subjective and objective sources of data. Francisco Varela (1946–2001) pioneered the empirical study of consciousness by developing novel, naturalised and rich approaches in a non-reductive and comprehensive manner. In this article, we review the main conceptual distinctions and philosophical challenges of consciousness research and highlight the main contributions of Varela and his associates: the development of neurophenomenology as a methodological framework that builds a bridge between subjective and objective sources of data and the discovery of gamma-band phase synchronisation as a neural marker of perceptual awareness. Finally, we describe the work of Varela on time consciousness, his philosophical approach and the implementation of his neurophenomenological framework for its study by integrating subjective reports with neural measures.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":"31 1","pages":"405 - 422"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42077660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1177/10597123221076876
Bert H. Hodges
This article offers an exploration of agency and its place in the natural order, one marked by meaning and value. Three examples of agency at different scales—human, bacterial, and thermodynamic—are presented, which reveal insights into the nature of agency itself, while also illustrating the range of phenomena that theoretical accounts need to address. Three approaches to agency are then explored, an enactive approach and two ecological accounts, Reed’s “effort after meaning and value” and ecological values-realizing theory. These approaches are compared from the perspective of ecological values-realizing theory, noting differences and similarities between them. The article is intended to be exploratory, so that the contributions of each of the three accounts can be appreciated, while posing sharp questions and challenges from an ecological values-realizing perspective. Claims considered include: Agency is characteristic of the ecosystem in its entirety, not only in its organismic components. A defining aspect of agency is the possibility of acting in ways that increase freedom and other values. Values function as ecosystem defining constraints. Agency requires hope and responsibility, going beyond goal-achievement toward increasing the integrity of the ecosystem. Agency is marked by interdependence and self-criticism more than autonomy. Living systems create and increase instability.
{"title":"Values define agency: Ecological and enactive perspectives reconsidered","authors":"Bert H. Hodges","doi":"10.1177/10597123221076876","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10597123221076876","url":null,"abstract":"This article offers an exploration of agency and its place in the natural order, one marked by meaning and value. Three examples of agency at different scales—human, bacterial, and thermodynamic—are presented, which reveal insights into the nature of agency itself, while also illustrating the range of phenomena that theoretical accounts need to address. Three approaches to agency are then explored, an enactive approach and two ecological accounts, Reed’s “effort after meaning and value” and ecological values-realizing theory. These approaches are compared from the perspective of ecological values-realizing theory, noting differences and similarities between them. The article is intended to be exploratory, so that the contributions of each of the three accounts can be appreciated, while posing sharp questions and challenges from an ecological values-realizing perspective. Claims considered include: Agency is characteristic of the ecosystem in its entirety, not only in its organismic components. A defining aspect of agency is the possibility of acting in ways that increase freedom and other values. Values function as ecosystem defining constraints. Agency requires hope and responsibility, going beyond goal-achievement toward increasing the integrity of the ecosystem. Agency is marked by interdependence and self-criticism more than autonomy. Living systems create and increase instability.","PeriodicalId":55552,"journal":{"name":"Adaptive Behavior","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43146897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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