Pub Date : 2018-01-01DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR201815710
J. Cizek
{"title":"Encyklopedismus J. H. Alsteda jako jedna z inspirací Komenského pansofismu","authors":"J. Cizek","doi":"10.5840/STUDNEOAR201815710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/STUDNEOAR201815710","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/STUDNEOAR201815710","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71297646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-29DOI: 10.5840/studneoar201714412
Prokop Sousedík, David Svoboda
{"title":"Je Tomášovo pojetí matematiky instrumentalistické?: Reakce na kritiku L. Nováka","authors":"Prokop Sousedík, David Svoboda","doi":"10.5840/studneoar201714412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar201714412","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/studneoar201714412","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41671592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-16DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171426
P. Kwasniewski
Divine Wisdom, Natural Order, and Human Intervention Leibniz on the Intersection of Theology, Teleology, and Technology In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz addresses how human beings ought to intervene in a preharmonized world and contribute to the unfolding of its goodness. His view exhibits an instructive tension between belief in a providentially fixed natural order, on the one hand, and, on the other, a characteristically early modern belief in a world of infinite possibilities for human actors, that is, developers of technology. Other texts in Leibniz, as well as comparison with Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, helps to reveal the extent to which Leibniz is torn between venerating the ancient tradition of natural philosophy, a purely “contemplative” discipline, and embracing the modern project of mastery of nature, a pragmatic and transformative enterprise.
{"title":"Divine Wisdom, Natural Order, and Human Intervention: Leibniz on the Intersection of Theology, Teleology, and Technology","authors":"P. Kwasniewski","doi":"10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171426","url":null,"abstract":"Divine Wisdom, Natural Order, and Human Intervention Leibniz on the Intersection of Theology, Teleology, and Technology In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz addresses how human beings ought to intervene in a preharmonized world and contribute to the unfolding of its goodness. His view exhibits an instructive tension between belief in a providentially fixed natural order, on the one hand, and, on the other, a characteristically early modern belief in a world of infinite possibilities for human actors, that is, developers of technology. Other texts in Leibniz, as well as comparison with Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, helps to reveal the extent to which Leibniz is torn between venerating the ancient tradition of natural philosophy, a purely “contemplative” discipline, and embracing the modern project of mastery of nature, a pragmatic and transformative enterprise.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44434076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-16DOI: 10.5840/studneoar201714210
Johannes Rudbeckius
{"title":"Concluding Speech of the Collegium Logicum That Was Held in Wittenberg: from 20th October 1608 until 12th January 1609","authors":"Johannes Rudbeckius","doi":"10.5840/studneoar201714210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar201714210","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49090849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-16DOI: 10.5840/studneoar20171428
BenjaminThomas Page
Aquinas has been labelled “the greatest advocate of dispositional modality”, by one contemporary power theorist. This paper’s goal is to critically analyse this claim. Before doing so, however, it first explicates some components of Aquinas’s ontology of powers, putting him in dialogue with contemporary discussions. Next it explicates the two competing views of the modality of powers, dispositional modality and conditional necessity, and proceeds to examine the textual basis as to which of the two Aquinas held. Ultimately the paper finds evidence in favour of the latter. The paper then concludes with a suggestion as to how Aquinas would explain examples given by those who advocate the dispositional modality position. In answer to the title, therefore, the paper argues that thinking of Aquinas as the greatest advocate of dispositional modality is a fiction, and that this award belongs to someone else.
{"title":"Thomas Aquinas, “the Greatest Advocate of Dispositional Modality”: Fact or Fiction?","authors":"BenjaminThomas Page","doi":"10.5840/studneoar20171428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20171428","url":null,"abstract":"Aquinas has been labelled “the greatest advocate of dispositional modality”, by one contemporary power theorist. This paper’s goal is to critically analyse this claim. Before doing so, however, it first explicates some components of Aquinas’s ontology of powers, putting him in dialogue with contemporary discussions. Next it explicates the two competing views of the modality of powers, dispositional modality and conditional necessity, and proceeds to examine the textual basis as to which of the two Aquinas held. Ultimately the paper finds evidence in favour of the latter. The paper then concludes with a suggestion as to how Aquinas would explain examples given by those who advocate the dispositional modality position. In answer to the title, therefore, the paper argues that thinking of Aquinas as the greatest advocate of dispositional modality is a fiction, and that this award belongs to someone else.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49354184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-16DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR201714211
P. Blum
{"title":"Philosophie des Humanismus und der Renaissance (1350–1600)","authors":"P. Blum","doi":"10.5840/STUDNEOAR201714211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/STUDNEOAR201714211","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43020041","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-11-16DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171427
M. Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen
In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of FourCategory Ontology is obliged to resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level.
{"title":"Kind Instantiation and Kind Change: A Problem for Four-Category Ontology","authors":"M. Keinänen, Jani Hakkarainen","doi":"10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171427","url":null,"abstract":"In Lowe’s Four-Category Ontology, instantiation is a basic formal ontological relation between particulars (objects, modes) and their kinds (kinds, attributes). Therefore, instantiation must be considered as a metaphysically necessary relation, which also rules out the metaphysical possibility of kind change. Nevertheless, according to Lowe, objects obtain their identity conditions in a more general level than specific natural kinds, which allows for kind change. There also seems to be actual examples of kind change. The advocate of FourCategory Ontology is obliged to resolve the tension between these mutually incompatible claims. In this article, we argue that the only viable option for the advocate of Four-Category Ontology is to bite the bullet and stick to the necessity of each of the most specific natural kind to the object instantiating it. As a major drawback, the four-category ontologist does not have any credible means to allow for kind change or determination of the identity conditions in a more general level.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47472005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-18DOI: 10.5840/studneoar20171435
David Peroutka
Briefl y in Response to Lukáš Novák’s Libertarian Polemic In response to Novák’s polemic attack I try to remove some misunderstandings and defend compatibilism about free will. My main argument goes thus: Let us take for example two agents who both decide not to kill. The fi rst one makes his choice out of his dilemmatic mental state of incertitude and perplexity. Conversely the second person understands the sense of moral principles so clearly that she makes the right decision with necessity. Since the morality of the second person surpasses that of the fi rst, my point is that the libertarian thinker puts in confl ict morality and freedom: The more a person (the latter agent) is virtuous, the less she is free (for the supposed necessity of her volition is taken to be incompatible with freedom in the libertarian theory). And – on the other hand – the less an agent (the former one) is moral, the more he is free. Indeed, he would be free while the latter unfree if it were true (as the libertarian believes) that freedom entails contingency. This is a peculiar rule of proportion. Compatibilism avoids such a peculiarity.
{"title":"Stručně k Novákově libertariánské polemice","authors":"David Peroutka","doi":"10.5840/studneoar20171435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20171435","url":null,"abstract":"Briefl y in Response to Lukáš Novák’s Libertarian Polemic In response to Novák’s polemic attack I try to remove some misunderstandings and defend compatibilism about free will. My main argument goes thus: Let us take for example two agents who both decide not to kill. The fi rst one makes his choice out of his dilemmatic mental state of incertitude and perplexity. Conversely the second person understands the sense of moral principles so clearly that she makes the right decision with necessity. Since the morality of the second person surpasses that of the fi rst, my point is that the libertarian thinker puts in confl ict morality and freedom: The more a person (the latter agent) is virtuous, the less she is free (for the supposed necessity of her volition is taken to be incompatible with freedom in the libertarian theory). And – on the other hand – the less an agent (the former one) is moral, the more he is free. Indeed, he would be free while the latter unfree if it were true (as the libertarian believes) that freedom entails contingency. This is a peculiar rule of proportion. Compatibilism avoids such a peculiarity.","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/studneoar20171435","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48438929","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-08-11DOI: 10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171413
Miroslav Hanke
{"title":"The Closure Principle for Signification: (An Outline of a Dynamic Version)","authors":"Miroslav Hanke","doi":"10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/STUDNEOAR20171413","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55635,"journal":{"name":"Studia Neoaristotelica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2017-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43655528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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