Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2021.1951000
Thomas Spence, A. Ahmad
Abstract Interest in nuclear power has grown in some Middle Eastern states despite poor economics, seismic activity, and attacks on nuclear facilities in the region. This article assesses risks from cesium-137 release and dispersal from spent nuclear fuel fires at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates and Bushehr in Iran to public health, the water supply, and the food security of major Persian Gulf cities. Doha, Dammam, Al-Hofuf, and Manama are most at risk of receiving 1.5 MBq/m2 for a spent fuel fire at Barakah, while a spent fuel fire at Bushehr could affect Shiraz, Ahvaz, Basrah, and Kuwait City, albeit at lower probabilities. Absent a decision to end nuclear power in the region, options for reducing the potential risks of spent fuel fires on Persian Gulf populations include the timely transfer of spent fuel from pools into safer dry cask storage, multilateral disaster-response planning, and a commitment not to attack nuclear facilities.
{"title":"Risks to Persian Gulf Cities from Spent Fuel Fires at the Barakah and Bushehr Nuclear Power Plants","authors":"Thomas Spence, A. Ahmad","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2021.1951000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2021.1951000","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Interest in nuclear power has grown in some Middle Eastern states despite poor economics, seismic activity, and attacks on nuclear facilities in the region. This article assesses risks from cesium-137 release and dispersal from spent nuclear fuel fires at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates and Bushehr in Iran to public health, the water supply, and the food security of major Persian Gulf cities. Doha, Dammam, Al-Hofuf, and Manama are most at risk of receiving 1.5 MBq/m2 for a spent fuel fire at Barakah, while a spent fuel fire at Bushehr could affect Shiraz, Ahvaz, Basrah, and Kuwait City, albeit at lower probabilities. Absent a decision to end nuclear power in the region, options for reducing the potential risks of spent fuel fires on Persian Gulf populations include the timely transfer of spent fuel from pools into safer dry cask storage, multilateral disaster-response planning, and a commitment not to attack nuclear facilities.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"48 1","pages":"67 - 89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82264761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-04DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2021.1988325
A. Glaser, Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin
Abstract Since the early 1960s, Israel has used the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert for unsafeguarded plutonium production. Estimates of cumulative plutonium production have been very uncertain, however, because the power level of the reactor is unknown, and there is a lack of detail about the reactor design. This analysis presents new estimates of historic plutonium production in Israel based on neutronics calculations for the Dimona reactor. As of December 2020, we estimate that the cumulative production of plutonium is 830 ± 100 kg. Israel continues to operate the Dimona reactor today, possibly to offset the decay of its stock of tritium. For these reasons, the production of tritium and the possible production of enriched uranium are also briefly discussed. Calculations suggest that the reactor could make on the order of 50–60 grams of tritium and support an arsenal of about one hundred advanced nuclear weapons. The paper also includes a critical review of the 1986 testimony by the Dimona technician and whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu, which provided much of the basis for public discussion of the reactor’s power and operation.
{"title":"Plutonium and Tritium Production in Israel’s Dimona Reactor, 1964–2020","authors":"A. Glaser, Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2021.1988325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2021.1988325","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the early 1960s, Israel has used the Dimona reactor in the Negev Desert for unsafeguarded plutonium production. Estimates of cumulative plutonium production have been very uncertain, however, because the power level of the reactor is unknown, and there is a lack of detail about the reactor design. This analysis presents new estimates of historic plutonium production in Israel based on neutronics calculations for the Dimona reactor. As of December 2020, we estimate that the cumulative production of plutonium is 830 ± 100 kg. Israel continues to operate the Dimona reactor today, possibly to offset the decay of its stock of tritium. For these reasons, the production of tritium and the possible production of enriched uranium are also briefly discussed. Calculations suggest that the reactor could make on the order of 50–60 grams of tritium and support an arsenal of about one hundred advanced nuclear weapons. The paper also includes a critical review of the 1986 testimony by the Dimona technician and whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu, which provided much of the basis for public discussion of the reactor’s power and operation.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"336 1","pages":"90 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78042355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-09DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2022.2111757
Sébastien Philippe, S. Schoenberger, N. Ahmed
Abstract Between 1966 and 1974, France conducted 41 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in French Polynesia, exposing local populations to radioactive fallout. Under French law, individuals who were present at the time and later developed certain radiogenic cancers are eligible for compensation from the government—unless it is proven that they could not have received effective doses greater than 1 mSv in any given year. Using new information available from recently declassified documents, as well as atmospheric transport modeling of radioactive fallout, this article shows that upper-bound government estimates of effective doses received by the public have been underestimated by factors of 2 to 10. As a result, approximately 110,000 people, representing 90% of the French Polynesian population at the time, could have received doses greater than 1 mSv per year. Integrating updated dose estimates into the claim adjudication process would enlarge the pool of eligible claimants by a factor of 10.
{"title":"Radiation Exposures and Compensation of Victims of French Atmospheric Nuclear Tests in Polynesia","authors":"Sébastien Philippe, S. Schoenberger, N. Ahmed","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2022.2111757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2022.2111757","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Between 1966 and 1974, France conducted 41 atmospheric nuclear weapon tests in French Polynesia, exposing local populations to radioactive fallout. Under French law, individuals who were present at the time and later developed certain radiogenic cancers are eligible for compensation from the government—unless it is proven that they could not have received effective doses greater than 1 mSv in any given year. Using new information available from recently declassified documents, as well as atmospheric transport modeling of radioactive fallout, this article shows that upper-bound government estimates of effective doses received by the public have been underestimated by factors of 2 to 10. As a result, approximately 110,000 people, representing 90% of the French Polynesian population at the time, could have received doses greater than 1 mSv per year. Integrating updated dose estimates into the claim adjudication process would enlarge the pool of eligible claimants by a factor of 10.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"30 1","pages":"62 - 94"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77929605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2021.1926159
A. Axelsson, Jennifer Schofield, Daniel Sunhede, Nicholas J. Thompson, Ian Laurie, Katarina Wilhelmsen, Benjamin Carter
Abstract Effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is an endeavor for which a solution is widely sought, but also one which poses numerous challenges, such as protection of information and safety and security of warheads and components. Some or all of these challenges could be influenced by the nature of the hosting dismantlement facility. We have developed a systems engineering approach for use in assessing this aspect of the dismantlement verification problem. We have used the methodology to evaluate which of four broad classes of facilities would be most favorable for verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads: a nuclear warhead facility engaged in active stockpile work, a nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work, a converted industrial facility, and a purpose-designed dedicated dismantlement facility. The analysis is based on the level of challenge involved in implementing verified dismantlement, with respect to five key areas: Verification, Confidentiality, Safety, Security, and Compatibility with the overall nuclear warhead reductions regime. Using our method we find the option of the existing nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work to be most favorable. On initial consideration, a dedicated dismantlement facility turns out to be the least favorable. This outcome is related to Compatibility and depends on the importance of making a dedicated dismantlement facility available in the same time frame as an existing nuclear warhead facility. If this criterion is relaxed, the dedicated dismantlement facility instead becomes the most favorable option. Verification, Confidentiality and Security have less impact on the overall outcome.
{"title":"Verified Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement: An Analysis and Methodology for Facility Assessment","authors":"A. Axelsson, Jennifer Schofield, Daniel Sunhede, Nicholas J. Thompson, Ian Laurie, Katarina Wilhelmsen, Benjamin Carter","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2021.1926159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2021.1926159","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is an endeavor for which a solution is widely sought, but also one which poses numerous challenges, such as protection of information and safety and security of warheads and components. Some or all of these challenges could be influenced by the nature of the hosting dismantlement facility. We have developed a systems engineering approach for use in assessing this aspect of the dismantlement verification problem. We have used the methodology to evaluate which of four broad classes of facilities would be most favorable for verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads: a nuclear warhead facility engaged in active stockpile work, a nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work, a converted industrial facility, and a purpose-designed dedicated dismantlement facility. The analysis is based on the level of challenge involved in implementing verified dismantlement, with respect to five key areas: Verification, Confidentiality, Safety, Security, and Compatibility with the overall nuclear warhead reductions regime. Using our method we find the option of the existing nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work to be most favorable. On initial consideration, a dedicated dismantlement facility turns out to be the least favorable. This outcome is related to Compatibility and depends on the importance of making a dedicated dismantlement facility available in the same time frame as an existing nuclear warhead facility. If this criterion is relaxed, the dedicated dismantlement facility instead becomes the most favorable option. Verification, Confidentiality and Security have less impact on the overall outcome.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"29 1","pages":"17 - 63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87189801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2021.1894810
Robert Hughes
Abstract Verification inspections that support nuclear weapon arms control treaties can require photographs to be taken as part of the inspection evidence. In a nuclear weapon facility, the host would generally want to review images before they are released to the inspector to prevent the accidental release of sensitive information. Currently, giving the host sole custody of the images for review severely impacts the confidence of the inspector that the images are genuine and unmodified. This paper outlines how simple cryptographic methods can be employed to allow the host sole custody for review while maintaining the inspector’s confidence in the veracity of the images. The concept is then expanded to propose and illustrate the capability for the host to redact a portion of an image while still allowing the inspector to verify that the remainder of the image is genuine. The ability to allow a host to have sole custody of images for review, and even redaction, without affecting inspector confidence in the veracity of the images they receive would contribute to improved processes for nuclear weapon verification in future arms control treaties.
{"title":"Review and Redaction-Tolerant Image Verification Using Cryptographic Methods","authors":"Robert Hughes","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2021.1894810","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2021.1894810","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Verification inspections that support nuclear weapon arms control treaties can require photographs to be taken as part of the inspection evidence. In a nuclear weapon facility, the host would generally want to review images before they are released to the inspector to prevent the accidental release of sensitive information. Currently, giving the host sole custody of the images for review severely impacts the confidence of the inspector that the images are genuine and unmodified. This paper outlines how simple cryptographic methods can be employed to allow the host sole custody for review while maintaining the inspector’s confidence in the veracity of the images. The concept is then expanded to propose and illustrate the capability for the host to redact a portion of an image while still allowing the inspector to verify that the remainder of the image is genuine. The ability to allow a host to have sole custody of images for review, and even redaction, without affecting inspector confidence in the veracity of the images they receive would contribute to improved processes for nuclear weapon verification in future arms control treaties.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"3 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89273855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2020.1864945
C. Tracy, David Wright
Abstract The United States, Russia, and China are developing an array of hypersonic weapons—maneuverable vehicles that carry warheads through the atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound. Proponents claim that these weapons outperform existing missiles in terms of delivery time and evasion of early warning systems. Here, we report computational modeling of hypersonic boost-glide missile flight which shows that these weapons travel intercontinental distances more slowly than comparable ballistic missiles flying depressed trajectories, and that they remain visible to existing space-based sensors for the majority of flight. Fundamental physical limitations imposed by low-altitude atmospheric flight render hypersonic missiles an evolutionary—not revolutionary—development relative to established ballistic missile technologies. Misperceptions of hypersonic weapon performance have arisen from social processes by which the organizations developing these weapons construct erroneous technical facts favoring continued investment. The modeling reported here provides a basis for rigorous, quantitative analysis of hypersonic weapon performance.
{"title":"Modeling the Performance of Hypersonic Boost-Glide Missiles","authors":"C. Tracy, David Wright","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2020.1864945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2020.1864945","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States, Russia, and China are developing an array of hypersonic weapons—maneuverable vehicles that carry warheads through the atmosphere at more than five times the speed of sound. Proponents claim that these weapons outperform existing missiles in terms of delivery time and evasion of early warning systems. Here, we report computational modeling of hypersonic boost-glide missile flight which shows that these weapons travel intercontinental distances more slowly than comparable ballistic missiles flying depressed trajectories, and that they remain visible to existing space-based sensors for the majority of flight. Fundamental physical limitations imposed by low-altitude atmospheric flight render hypersonic missiles an evolutionary—not revolutionary—development relative to established ballistic missile technologies. Misperceptions of hypersonic weapon performance have arisen from social processes by which the organizations developing these weapons construct erroneous technical facts favoring continued investment. The modeling reported here provides a basis for rigorous, quantitative analysis of hypersonic weapon performance.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"12 1","pages":"135 - 170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77953698","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2020.1869474
F. V. von Hippel, Masafumi Takubo
Abstract With the end of the Cold War, Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom declared an end to their production of plutonium for weapons and Russia and the United States declared large quantities excess to their future weapon requirements. The disposal of these excess stocks has stalled, however, and during the next two decades, the relatively small stocks of weapons plutonium in India, North Korea, Pakistan and possibly also China could increase significantly. Meanwhile, despite the failed commercialization of plutonium breeder reactors, the separation of civilian but weapon-usable plutonium from power-reactor fuel continues in France, India, Japan, Russia, and has begun in China. The global stock of separated civilian plutonium now exceeds that of weapons plutonium and could increase further during the next two decades.
{"title":"Global Stocks of Separated Plutonium – Stalled on the Path to Elimination","authors":"F. V. von Hippel, Masafumi Takubo","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2020.1869474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2020.1869474","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract With the end of the Cold War, Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom declared an end to their production of plutonium for weapons and Russia and the United States declared large quantities excess to their future weapon requirements. The disposal of these excess stocks has stalled, however, and during the next two decades, the relatively small stocks of weapons plutonium in India, North Korea, Pakistan and possibly also China could increase significantly. Meanwhile, despite the failed commercialization of plutonium breeder reactors, the separation of civilian but weapon-usable plutonium from power-reactor fuel continues in France, India, Japan, Russia, and has begun in China. The global stock of separated civilian plutonium now exceeds that of weapons plutonium and could increase further during the next two decades.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"38 1","pages":"171 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86179131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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