Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2016.1127031
Rebecca Ward, E. Schneider
ABSTRACT This article presents a novel application of an inspection game to find optimally efficient nuclear safeguard strategies. It describes a methodology that allocates resources at and across nuclear fuel cycle facilities for a cost-constrained inspectorate seeking to detect a state-facilitated diversion or misuse. The methodology couples a simultaneous-play game theoretic solver with a probabilistic model for simulating state violation scenarios at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The simulation model features a suite of defender options based on current International Atomic Energy Agency practices and an analogous menu of attacker proliferation pathway options. The simulation informs the game theoretic solver by calculating the detection probability for a given inspector-proliferator strategy pair. To generate a scenario payoff, it weights the detection probability by the quantity and quality of material obtained. Using a modified fictitious play algorithm, the game iteratively calls the simulation model until Nash equilibrium is reached and outputs the optimal inspection and proliferation strategies. The value the attacker places on material quantity and quality is varied to generate results representative of states with different capabilities and goals. Sample model results are shown to illustrate the sensitivity of defender and attacker strategy to attacker characteristics.
{"title":"A Game Theoretic Approach to Nuclear Safeguards Selection and Optimization","authors":"Rebecca Ward, E. Schneider","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2016.1127031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2016.1127031","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article presents a novel application of an inspection game to find optimally efficient nuclear safeguard strategies. It describes a methodology that allocates resources at and across nuclear fuel cycle facilities for a cost-constrained inspectorate seeking to detect a state-facilitated diversion or misuse. The methodology couples a simultaneous-play game theoretic solver with a probabilistic model for simulating state violation scenarios at a gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The simulation model features a suite of defender options based on current International Atomic Energy Agency practices and an analogous menu of attacker proliferation pathway options. The simulation informs the game theoretic solver by calculating the detection probability for a given inspector-proliferator strategy pair. To generate a scenario payoff, it weights the detection probability by the quantity and quality of material obtained. Using a modified fictitious play algorithm, the game iteratively calls the simulation model until Nash equilibrium is reached and outputs the optimal inspection and proliferation strategies. The value the attacker places on material quantity and quality is varied to generate results representative of states with different capabilities and goals. Sample model results are shown to illustrate the sensitivity of defender and attacker strategy to attacker characteristics.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"19 1","pages":"21 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77724974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2016.1127040
O. Prilutsky, F. V. von Hippel
{"title":"Memoriam: Stanislav Nikolaevich Rodionov (1929–2014)","authors":"O. Prilutsky, F. V. von Hippel","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2016.1127040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2016.1127040","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"18 1","pages":"63 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82362346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-01-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2016.1127036
Ting Wang
ABSTRACT Concerns about the threat that space debris pose to satellites are expected to increase as the number of mostly non-maneuverable microsatellites in low-Earth orbit grows. International guidelines developed to mitigate the risk from space debris are frequently not followed, however, and may not be able to cope with the dramatic growth expected in the number of satellites. Moreover, the current legal framework is unable to determine who is liable for losses in an on-orbital collision. A space surveillance data-sharing committee is proposed to solve this liability problem. Under the proposed liability rules, satellite operators would be liable for the debris they create and insurance companies would cover such a risk, creating a new financial incentive for operators to adopt space debris mitigation guidelines.
{"title":"A Liability and Insurance Regime for Space Debris Mitigation","authors":"Ting Wang","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2016.1127036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2016.1127036","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Concerns about the threat that space debris pose to satellites are expected to increase as the number of mostly non-maneuverable microsatellites in low-Earth orbit grows. International guidelines developed to mitigate the risk from space debris are frequently not followed, however, and may not be able to cope with the dramatic growth expected in the number of satellites. Moreover, the current legal framework is unable to determine who is liable for losses in an on-orbital collision. A space surveillance data-sharing committee is proposed to solve this liability problem. Under the proposed liability rules, satellite operators would be liable for the debris they create and insurance companies would cover such a risk, creating a new financial incentive for operators to adopt space debris mitigation guidelines.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"51 1","pages":"22 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2016-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89503471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-12-16DOI: 10.1017/s0007680519001521
Terence Chong
Even before the invention of nuclear weapons, there was concern they would be enormously and indiscriminately destructive to civilian populations. In their pathbreaking secret memorandum to the British government in early 1940, “On the Construction of a Super-bomb, based on a Nuclear Chain Reaction in Uranium” which helped lay the basis for the nuclear weapons program in the UK and later the United States Manhattan Project, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls noted that “some part of the energy set free by the bomb goes to produce radioactive substances, and these will emit very powerful and dangerous radiations... . Some of this radioactivity will be carried along with the wind and will spread the contamination; several miles downwind this may kill people... . Owing to the spreading of radioactive substances with the wind, the bomb could probably not be used without killing large numbers of civilians, and this may make it unsuitable as a weapon for use by this country.” During the Cold War, it was well understood that any nuclear attack aimed at destroying an adversary’s nuclear or conventional forces could result in very large numbers of civilian casualties in the targeted country, perhaps regionally, and possibly even globally for a large enough attack with high-yield weapons. This remains true today. In the opening article of the issue, “Radioactive Fallout and Potential Fatalities from Nuclear Attacks on China’s New Missile Silo Fields,” S ebastien Philippe and Ivan Stepanov present an analysis of the consequences of a nuclear attack on three relatively remote areas where China is believed to be constructing hundreds of silos for deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles. The authors model a possible attack on these silos, assuming that to achieve an acceptable kill probability the attacker uses two warheads against a silo and detonates them very close to the ground (which is consistent with public information about U.S. nuclear war plans). The analysis models the significant radioactive fallout from these near-surface nuclear explosions, using advanced atmospheric particle transport software and weather data to evaluate the dispersion of the fallout and population exposure in cities at long distances. Estimates of casualties depend on the specifics of the scenario, but as the authors demonstrate, an attack on the alleged silo fields in China is likely to result in tens of millions of unintended but to be expected civilian deaths from acute radiation sickness. The authors note “Many more would suffer from long-term effects of radiation exposure and die prematurely.” They suggest that such dire humanitarian outcomes should compel policymakers to revisit decisions about siting and attacking missile silo fields. The second article in the issue, “Simulating the Passive Neutron and Gamma Signatures of Containerized Nuclear Warheads for Disarmament Verification,” deals with a completely different side of nuclear weapons. Svenja Sonder, Carina Prunt
甚至在核武器发明之前，就有人担心核武器会对平民造成巨大的、不分青红皂白的破坏。1940年初，奥托·弗里施和鲁道夫·佩尔斯向英国政府提交了一份开创性的秘密备忘录，“基于铀的核链式反应建造超级炸弹”，这为英国的核武器计划和后来的美国曼哈顿计划奠定了基础，奥托·弗里施和鲁道夫·佩尔斯指出，“炸弹释放的一部分能量产生了放射性物质，这些物质会释放出非常强大和危险的辐射... .其中一些放射性物质会随风飘散，使污染扩散;顺风几英里处可能会有人丧命... .由于放射性物质随风扩散，使用这种炸弹可能会造成大量平民死亡，这可能使它不适合作为一种武器被我国使用。”在冷战期间，众所周知，任何旨在摧毁对手核力量或常规力量的核攻击都可能导致目标国家的大量平民伤亡，也许是区域性的，甚至可能是全球范围内的高当量武器的大规模攻击。今天仍然如此。在这期杂志的开篇文章《中国新导弹发射井遭受核攻击的放射性沉降物和潜在死亡》中，S·埃巴斯提恩·菲利普和伊万·斯特帕诺夫对三个相对偏远地区遭受核攻击的后果进行了分析，据信中国正在这些地区建造数百个用于部署洲际弹道导弹的发射井。作者模拟了对这些发射井的可能攻击，假设为了达到可接受的杀伤概率，攻击者使用两枚弹头对一个发射井并在离地面很近的地方引爆它们(这与美国核战争计划的公开信息一致)。该分析模拟了这些近地表核爆炸产生的重要放射性沉降物，使用先进的大气粒子传输软件和天气数据来评估沉降物的扩散和城市中长距离的人口暴露。对伤亡人数的估计取决于具体情况，但正如作者所证明的那样，对中国所谓的发射井场的攻击可能会导致数千万意外但意料之中的平民死于急性辐射病。作者指出:“更多的人将遭受辐射暴露的长期影响，并过早死亡。”他们认为，这种可怕的人道主义后果应该迫使决策者重新考虑导弹发射井的选址和攻击决策。这期的第二篇文章“模拟集装箱核弹头的被动中子和伽马特征用于裁军核查”，涉及核武器的一个完全不同的方面。Svenja Sonder, Carina Prunte, Yannick Fischer, Manuel Kreutle, Jan Scheunemann和Gerald Kirchner讨论了检测封闭容器中钚基武器存在的方法。该分析使用Geant 4代码的数值模拟来考虑简化裂变武器和两级热核弹头的情况，以及废料容器中少量钚的不同假设
{"title":"Editors’ Note","authors":"Terence Chong","doi":"10.1017/s0007680519001521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007680519001521","url":null,"abstract":"Even before the invention of nuclear weapons, there was concern they would be enormously and indiscriminately destructive to civilian populations. In their pathbreaking secret memorandum to the British government in early 1940, “On the Construction of a Super-bomb, based on a Nuclear Chain Reaction in Uranium” which helped lay the basis for the nuclear weapons program in the UK and later the United States Manhattan Project, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls noted that “some part of the energy set free by the bomb goes to produce radioactive substances, and these will emit very powerful and dangerous radiations... . Some of this radioactivity will be carried along with the wind and will spread the contamination; several miles downwind this may kill people... . Owing to the spreading of radioactive substances with the wind, the bomb could probably not be used without killing large numbers of civilians, and this may make it unsuitable as a weapon for use by this country.” During the Cold War, it was well understood that any nuclear attack aimed at destroying an adversary’s nuclear or conventional forces could result in very large numbers of civilian casualties in the targeted country, perhaps regionally, and possibly even globally for a large enough attack with high-yield weapons. This remains true today. In the opening article of the issue, “Radioactive Fallout and Potential Fatalities from Nuclear Attacks on China’s New Missile Silo Fields,” S ebastien Philippe and Ivan Stepanov present an analysis of the consequences of a nuclear attack on three relatively remote areas where China is believed to be constructing hundreds of silos for deploying intercontinental ballistic missiles. The authors model a possible attack on these silos, assuming that to achieve an acceptable kill probability the attacker uses two warheads against a silo and detonates them very close to the ground (which is consistent with public information about U.S. nuclear war plans). The analysis models the significant radioactive fallout from these near-surface nuclear explosions, using advanced atmospheric particle transport software and weather data to evaluate the dispersion of the fallout and population exposure in cities at long distances. Estimates of casualties depend on the specifics of the scenario, but as the authors demonstrate, an attack on the alleged silo fields in China is likely to result in tens of millions of unintended but to be expected civilian deaths from acute radiation sickness. The authors note “Many more would suffer from long-term effects of radiation exposure and die prematurely.” They suggest that such dire humanitarian outcomes should compel policymakers to revisit decisions about siting and attacking missile silo fields. The second article in the issue, “Simulating the Passive Neutron and Gamma Signatures of Containerized Nuclear Warheads for Disarmament Verification,” deals with a completely different side of nuclear weapons. Svenja Sonder, Carina Prunt","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"54 1","pages":"1 - 2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84495105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2015.1087242
J. Acton
The United States, Russia and China are developing hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. A simple model of their trajectory is developed by assuming that the vehicle does not oscillate during the transition to equilibrium gliding. This model is used to analyze U.S. Department of Defense data on test flights for the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2. This glider's lift-to-drag ratio—a key performance parameter—is estimated to be 2.6. The model is also used to calculate the tactical warning time that a boost-glide attack would afford an adversary. Other aspects of boost-glide weapons’ military effectiveness are explored. Approximate calculations suggest that, compared to existing non-nuclear weapons, boost-glide weapons could penetrate more deeply but would be less effective at destroying silos. The distance at which a boost-glide weapon armed with a particle dispersion warhead could destroy a mobile missile is also calculated; it is expected to be significantly larger than for an explosive warhead.
{"title":"Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons","authors":"J. Acton","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2015.1087242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1087242","url":null,"abstract":"The United States, Russia and China are developing hypersonic boost-glide vehicles. A simple model of their trajectory is developed by assuming that the vehicle does not oscillate during the transition to equilibrium gliding. This model is used to analyze U.S. Department of Defense data on test flights for the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2. This glider's lift-to-drag ratio—a key performance parameter—is estimated to be 2.6. The model is also used to calculate the tactical warning time that a boost-glide attack would afford an adversary. Other aspects of boost-glide weapons’ military effectiveness are explored. Approximate calculations suggest that, compared to existing non-nuclear weapons, boost-glide weapons could penetrate more deeply but would be less effective at destroying silos. The distance at which a boost-glide weapon armed with a particle dispersion warhead could destroy a mobile missile is also calculated; it is expected to be significantly larger than for an explosive warhead.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"43 1","pages":"191 - 219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82516148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2015.1082301
Hui Zhang
New public information allows a fresh estimate of China's current and under-construction uranium enrichment capacity. This paper uses open source information and commercial satellite imagery to identify and offer estimates of the capacity of China's 10 operating enrichment facilities, located at 4 sites, using centrifuge technology most likely based on adapting Russian technology. The total currently operating civilian centrifuge enrichment capacity is estimated to be about 4.5 million separative work units/year (SWU/year), with additional capacity estimated to be about 2 million SWU/year under construction. Also China could have an enrichment capacity of around 0.6 million SWU/year for non-weapon military uses (i.e., naval fuel) or dual use. These estimates are much larger than previous public estimates of China's total enrichment capacity. Further expansion of enrichment capacity may be likely since China will require about 9 million SWU/year by 2020 to meet the enriched uranium fuel needs for its planned nuclear power reactor capacity of 58 gigawatts-electric (GWe) by 2020 under its policy of self-sufficiency in the supply of enrichment services.
{"title":"China's Uranium Enrichment Complex","authors":"Hui Zhang","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2015.1082301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1082301","url":null,"abstract":"New public information allows a fresh estimate of China's current and under-construction uranium enrichment capacity. This paper uses open source information and commercial satellite imagery to identify and offer estimates of the capacity of China's 10 operating enrichment facilities, located at 4 sites, using centrifuge technology most likely based on adapting Russian technology. The total currently operating civilian centrifuge enrichment capacity is estimated to be about 4.5 million separative work units/year (SWU/year), with additional capacity estimated to be about 2 million SWU/year under construction. Also China could have an enrichment capacity of around 0.6 million SWU/year for non-weapon military uses (i.e., naval fuel) or dual use. These estimates are much larger than previous public estimates of China's total enrichment capacity. Further expansion of enrichment capacity may be likely since China will require about 9 million SWU/year by 2020 to meet the enriched uranium fuel needs for its planned nuclear power reactor capacity of 58 gigawatts-electric (GWe) by 2020 under its policy of self-sufficiency in the supply of enrichment services.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"73 1","pages":"171 - 190"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86017130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2015.1087221
Jie Yan, A. Glaser
Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. Confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components is at the center of the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. This paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.
{"title":"Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems","authors":"Jie Yan, A. Glaser","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2015.1087221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1087221","url":null,"abstract":"Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. Confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components is at the center of the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. This paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"186 1","pages":"157 - 170"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77011521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2015.1088734
David Wright
“Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” by James M. Acton (this issue), analyzes the portion of the flight of the U.S. HTV-2 hypersonic glide vehicle after it has been boosted to high speed and begins to reenter the atmosphere.1 To understand more about the HTV-2 test flights that took place in 2010 and 2011, this research note discusses the powered portion of the booster’s flight based on simulations from launch through reentry into the atmosphere at about 100 km altitude—the so-called “pierce point.” This corresponds to Acton’s segments 1 and 2 of the trajectory: boost and exo-atmospheric phases. This analysis is based on descriptions of the launch vehicle used in the HTV-2 tests, the splashdown points of the booster stages and faring, and the reported speed and altitude of the HTV-2 at the pierce point. Two test routes were planned for the HTV-2, both starting at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and ending near Kwajalein Atoll some 7,800 km away. The glide portion of trajectory A stretched essentially straight from the launch to impact point, while trajectory B headed west and then maneuvered during its glide to arc south toward the impact point (see Figure 3 of Acton). While tests were only conducted on trajectory A before the program ended, DARPA released the intended parameters for both trajectories, given in Table 1.
{"title":"Research Note to Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons by James M. Acton: Analysis of the Boost Phase of the HTV-2 Hypersonic Glider Tests","authors":"David Wright","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2015.1088734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1088734","url":null,"abstract":"“Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” by James M. Acton (this issue), analyzes the portion of the flight of the U.S. HTV-2 hypersonic glide vehicle after it has been boosted to high speed and begins to reenter the atmosphere.1 To understand more about the HTV-2 test flights that took place in 2010 and 2011, this research note discusses the powered portion of the booster’s flight based on simulations from launch through reentry into the atmosphere at about 100 km altitude—the so-called “pierce point.” This corresponds to Acton’s segments 1 and 2 of the trajectory: boost and exo-atmospheric phases. This analysis is based on descriptions of the launch vehicle used in the HTV-2 tests, the splashdown points of the booster stages and faring, and the reported speed and altitude of the HTV-2 at the pierce point. Two test routes were planned for the HTV-2, both starting at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and ending near Kwajalein Atoll some 7,800 km away. The glide portion of trajectory A stretched essentially straight from the launch to impact point, while trajectory B headed west and then maneuvered during its glide to arc south toward the impact point (see Figure 3 of Acton). While tests were only conducted on trajectory A before the program ended, DARPA released the intended parameters for both trajectories, given in Table 1.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"220 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87800751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-09-02DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2015.1088737
{"title":"Science and Global Security","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2015.1088737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1088737","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"95 3 1","pages":"\">ebi - ebi"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83342175","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2015-05-04DOI: 10.1080/08929882.2015.1037123
Seth A. Hoedl, W. Derek Updegraff
This article examines the current capability of accelerator technology, which is rapidly improving, to produce medical isotopes. A detailed analysis of 12 medical isotopes that are in active diagnostic and therapeutic use and typically made in nuclear reactors shows that accelerator-based technologies, such as linear accelerators, cyclotrons, and spallation neutron sources, could meet medical demand for these isotopes, without the use of enriched uranium and with low proliferation risk. The feasibility of accelerator-based production of an additional 70 isotopes that have a potential medical use is also discussed. A simple estimate suggests that accelerators can produce isotopes at a cost comparable to reactors. This article includes four case studies that illustrate the recent choices that emerging market countries have made when expanding domestic medical isotope production. Technical, commercial, and regulatory steps for commercialization are also described. The article concludes with policy suggestions that would increase the adoption of accelerator-based medical isotope production.
{"title":"The Production of Medical Isotopes without Nuclear Reactors or Uranium Enrichment","authors":"Seth A. Hoedl, W. Derek Updegraff","doi":"10.1080/08929882.2015.1037123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1037123","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the current capability of accelerator technology, which is rapidly improving, to produce medical isotopes. A detailed analysis of 12 medical isotopes that are in active diagnostic and therapeutic use and typically made in nuclear reactors shows that accelerator-based technologies, such as linear accelerators, cyclotrons, and spallation neutron sources, could meet medical demand for these isotopes, without the use of enriched uranium and with low proliferation risk. The feasibility of accelerator-based production of an additional 70 isotopes that have a potential medical use is also discussed. A simple estimate suggests that accelerators can produce isotopes at a cost comparable to reactors. This article includes four case studies that illustrate the recent choices that emerging market countries have made when expanding domestic medical isotope production. Technical, commercial, and regulatory steps for commercialization are also described. The article concludes with policy suggestions that would increase the adoption of accelerator-based medical isotope production.","PeriodicalId":55952,"journal":{"name":"Science & Global Security","volume":"4 1","pages":"121 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2015-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87980420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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