Pub Date : 2022-04-03DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2022.2081398
Borja Niño Arnaiz
ABSTRACT Some proponents of global justice question that opening borders is an effective strategy to alleviate global poverty and reduce inequalities between countries. This article goes a step further and asks whether an open borders policy is compatible with the objectives of global distributive justice. The latter, it will be argued, entails the ordering of needs, the assignment of priorities and the preference or subordination of some interests over others. In other words, global justice requires the establishment of conditions and restrictions on mobility. On the contrary, open borders claim an unrestricted and unconditional (not unqualified) freedom of movement, limited only by public health considerations, serious threats to national security or democratic institutions, but not by an aspiration for maximizing global redistributive utility. The main point is that not only would freedom of movement be instrumentalized, losing its presumptive moral force, but ultimately open borders as a remedy of global justice are an oxymoron. The article concludes with an alternative defence of freedom of international movement.
{"title":"Should we open borders? Yes, but not in the name of global justice","authors":"Borja Niño Arnaiz","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2022.2081398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2022.2081398","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some proponents of global justice question that opening borders is an effective strategy to alleviate global poverty and reduce inequalities between countries. This article goes a step further and asks whether an open borders policy is compatible with the objectives of global distributive justice. The latter, it will be argued, entails the ordering of needs, the assignment of priorities and the preference or subordination of some interests over others. In other words, global justice requires the establishment of conditions and restrictions on mobility. On the contrary, open borders claim an unrestricted and unconditional (not unqualified) freedom of movement, limited only by public health considerations, serious threats to national security or democratic institutions, but not by an aspiration for maximizing global redistributive utility. The main point is that not only would freedom of movement be instrumentalized, losing its presumptive moral force, but ultimately open borders as a remedy of global justice are an oxymoron. The article concludes with an alternative defence of freedom of international movement.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"162 1","pages":"55 - 68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88056906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2022.2031588
D. Sharp
ABSTRACT In ‘Are Citizenship Tests Necessarily Illiberal?’, Michael Blake argues that difficult citizenship tests are not necessarily illiberal, so long as they test for the right things. In this paper, I argue that Blake’s attempt to square citizenship tests with liberalism fails. Blake underestimates the burdens citizenship tests impose on immigrants, ignoring in particular the egalitarian claims immigrants have on equal social membership. Moreover, Blake’s positive justification of citizenship tests – that they help justify immigrants’ coercive voting power – both neglects the fact that such tests are coercively imposed on immigrants and that the citizenship test Blake envisions does little to help ensure immigrants’ votes are legitimate. Citizenship tests thus aren’t, even in principle, a way of protecting citizens from unjustified coercive power. They are, even under favourable circumstances, an illiberal way of obstructing immigrants’ quest for social equality.
{"title":"Why citizenship tests are necessarily illiberal: a reply to Blake","authors":"D. Sharp","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2022.2031588","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2022.2031588","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In ‘Are Citizenship Tests Necessarily Illiberal?’, Michael Blake argues that difficult citizenship tests are not necessarily illiberal, so long as they test for the right things. In this paper, I argue that Blake’s attempt to square citizenship tests with liberalism fails. Blake underestimates the burdens citizenship tests impose on immigrants, ignoring in particular the egalitarian claims immigrants have on equal social membership. Moreover, Blake’s positive justification of citizenship tests – that they help justify immigrants’ coercive voting power – both neglects the fact that such tests are coercively imposed on immigrants and that the citizenship test Blake envisions does little to help ensure immigrants’ votes are legitimate. Citizenship tests thus aren’t, even in principle, a way of protecting citizens from unjustified coercive power. They are, even under favourable circumstances, an illiberal way of obstructing immigrants’ quest for social equality.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77514007","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2022.2031589
M. Blake
ABSTRACT I have argued that citizenship tests are not, in principle, unjust, were they to accurately test the acquisition of those particular aspects of local history and vocabulary necessary for participation in the local political community. Daniel Sharp disagrees, and argues that such tests are always unjust; they impose unjustifiable burdens against all and only migrants seeking admission to political citizenship. In this paper, I defend the possibility of a just test. I argue, first, that the burden on prospective citizens is not an undue or unjust one, were we to have some reason available to us by which that burden might be justified; and, second, that some such reason is available, given the relevance of local knowledge to political discourse – a relevance acknowledged in both current law and in theories of public reason.
{"title":"In defense of citizenship testing: a reply to Daniel Sharp","authors":"M. Blake","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2022.2031589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2022.2031589","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I have argued that citizenship tests are not, in principle, unjust, were they to accurately test the acquisition of those particular aspects of local history and vocabulary necessary for participation in the local political community. Daniel Sharp disagrees, and argues that such tests are always unjust; they impose unjustifiable burdens against all and only migrants seeking admission to political citizenship. In this paper, I defend the possibility of a just test. I argue, first, that the burden on prospective citizens is not an undue or unjust one, were we to have some reason available to us by which that burden might be justified; and, second, that some such reason is available, given the relevance of local knowledge to political discourse – a relevance acknowledged in both current law and in theories of public reason.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80853536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2022.2030093
David V. Axelsen
ABSTRACT The world has evolved from being international to being global. Increasingly, global issues like climate change, migration, pandemics, trade, big data, and terrorism spill over borders drawn centuries ago as if they were no longer there. In this globalized world, however, people are still born and educated as citizens of particular nation states. Indeed, education is still used as one of the state's main tools for shaping citizen virtues and commitments. Political philosophers have acknowledged both the increasingly global nature of contemporary political problems and the power of education to shape citizens but have failed to recognize how the two are interconnected. In his book, Democratic Education in a Globalized World: A Normative Theory, Julian Culp seeks to rectify this double-sided failure by building a theory of and framework for educating people for democratic citizenship in a world of border-crossing issues. I outline how he seeks to overcome this problem, set out an analytical framework with which to engage with his account, and note some significant worries that arise from this analysis. In particular, I focus on a specific blindness from which Culp's account suffers, which makes it unable to detect wrongs that arise when the state fails to commit to fundamental normative principles.
{"title":"When the state doesn’t commit: a review essay of Julian Culp’s Democratic Education in a Globalized World","authors":"David V. Axelsen","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2022.2030093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2022.2030093","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The world has evolved from being international to being global. Increasingly, global issues like climate change, migration, pandemics, trade, big data, and terrorism spill over borders drawn centuries ago as if they were no longer there. In this globalized world, however, people are still born and educated as citizens of particular nation states. Indeed, education is still used as one of the state's main tools for shaping citizen virtues and commitments. Political philosophers have acknowledged both the increasingly global nature of contemporary political problems and the power of education to shape citizens but have failed to recognize how the two are interconnected. In his book, Democratic Education in a Globalized World: A Normative Theory, Julian Culp seeks to rectify this double-sided failure by building a theory of and framework for educating people for democratic citizenship in a world of border-crossing issues. I outline how he seeks to overcome this problem, set out an analytical framework with which to engage with his account, and note some significant worries that arise from this analysis. In particular, I focus on a specific blindness from which Culp's account suffers, which makes it unable to detect wrongs that arise when the state fails to commit to fundamental normative principles.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84100229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2021.1991138
Charles Jones
ABSTRACT In this paper I respond to the central claims presented in Samuel Moyn’s influential book, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Moyn argues that human rights have the following features: they are powerless to combat growing material inequality; they share key characteristics with neoliberalism; they make only minimalist or sufficientarian demands and therefore are not enough to achieve the equality demanded by justice. He suggests, in particular, that Henry Shue’s Basic Rights exemplifies these features. My response argues that Moyn does not accurately present the core conceptual and normative characteristics of human rights, nor does he succeed in implicating Shue’s conception in his critique. I suggest that Moyn’s own ideas about global justice are incompletely developed, including his views about the scope, content, and distributive principles that should guide an account of global justice. Finally, I argue that, even though human rights are only part of an account of global justice, nonetheless they do provide reasons to limit socioeconomic inequality. This point is exemplified by the claim that a human right to democracy requires limits on material inequality in order to prevent power hierarchy. In short, I agree with Moyn that human rights are not enough by themselves to achieve global justice, but I reject his multi-pronged critique of human rights, specifically his claim that they imply no constraints on socioeconomic inequality.
{"title":"Are human rights enough? On human rights and inequality","authors":"Charles Jones","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2021.1991138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1991138","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper I respond to the central claims presented in Samuel Moyn’s influential book, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World. Moyn argues that human rights have the following features: they are powerless to combat growing material inequality; they share key characteristics with neoliberalism; they make only minimalist or sufficientarian demands and therefore are not enough to achieve the equality demanded by justice. He suggests, in particular, that Henry Shue’s Basic Rights exemplifies these features. My response argues that Moyn does not accurately present the core conceptual and normative characteristics of human rights, nor does he succeed in implicating Shue’s conception in his critique. I suggest that Moyn’s own ideas about global justice are incompletely developed, including his views about the scope, content, and distributive principles that should guide an account of global justice. Finally, I argue that, even though human rights are only part of an account of global justice, nonetheless they do provide reasons to limit socioeconomic inequality. This point is exemplified by the claim that a human right to democracy requires limits on material inequality in order to prevent power hierarchy. In short, I agree with Moyn that human rights are not enough by themselves to achieve global justice, but I reject his multi-pronged critique of human rights, specifically his claim that they imply no constraints on socioeconomic inequality.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88649238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2021.1993646
Michael Bennett
ABSTRACT This article argues that capital flight of real investment presents governments with a quadrilemma. First, governments can tailor their policies to attract investors – but this is incompatible with a whole range of alternative policy choices. Second, they can simply accept capital flight – but this is incompatible with a robust capital stock and tax base. Third, they can harmonize its taxes and regulations with other states – but this is incompatible with international independence. Fourth, they can impose capital controls – but this is incompatible with international capital mobility. These incompatibilities make up four different goals, the value of which are described. Strategies may be mixed, but the pursuit of any three goals must always come at the expense of the fourth.
{"title":"The capital flight quadrilemma: Democratic trade-offs and international investment","authors":"Michael Bennett","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2021.1993646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1993646","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that capital flight of real investment presents governments with a quadrilemma. First, governments can tailor their policies to attract investors – but this is incompatible with a whole range of alternative policy choices. Second, they can simply accept capital flight – but this is incompatible with a robust capital stock and tax base. Third, they can harmonize its taxes and regulations with other states – but this is incompatible with international independence. Fourth, they can impose capital controls – but this is incompatible with international capital mobility. These incompatibilities make up four different goals, the value of which are described. Strategies may be mixed, but the pursuit of any three goals must always come at the expense of the fourth.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73282274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2021.1999579
T. Crnko, Nebojša Zelič
ABSTRACT This paper brings together the discussions on international resource trade and immigration. Following Wenar’s analysis of the resource curse, the aim is to challenge the conventional view on immigration that asserts the right of states to have discretionary control over these policies. The paper shows that more liberal immigration is required as an additional remedial policy to persons harmed in unjust trade. The right to self-determination and territorial rights, which are used as the basis for the exclusion of immigrants, are in the context of this analysis constrained by both attentiveness to harm and the charge of inconsistency. Both rights, which are protected domestically, are violated by the unjust ‘might makes right’ trade rule in the international context, causing harm to people in resource exporting countries. This inconsistency presents a challenge to the moral plausibility of the conventional view in the context of the resource trade.
{"title":"The resource curse and duties to immigrants","authors":"T. Crnko, Nebojša Zelič","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2021.1999579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1999579","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper brings together the discussions on international resource trade and immigration. Following Wenar’s analysis of the resource curse, the aim is to challenge the conventional view on immigration that asserts the right of states to have discretionary control over these policies. The paper shows that more liberal immigration is required as an additional remedial policy to persons harmed in unjust trade. The right to self-determination and territorial rights, which are used as the basis for the exclusion of immigrants, are in the context of this analysis constrained by both attentiveness to harm and the charge of inconsistency. Both rights, which are protected domestically, are violated by the unjust ‘might makes right’ trade rule in the international context, causing harm to people in resource exporting countries. This inconsistency presents a challenge to the moral plausibility of the conventional view in the context of the resource trade.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85788735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2021.1958509
E. Pils
ABSTRACT Autocratic control of civil society, including academia, can be extended to democratic societies and institutions in ways that pose threats to liberal-democratic values, such as academic freedom, for example through mechanisms and practices that lead to academic self-censorship. Engaging critically with the literature on ‘sharp power’ and ‘authoritarian influencing’ addressing this phenomenon, this paper argues that democratic actors who, without sharing the repressive goals of autocracies, contribute to their success in settings of international collaboration and exchange can become structurally complicit with such wrongs. Recognizing the risk of complicity is a necessary first step towards addressing the political responsibilities resulting from it.
{"title":"Complicity in democratic engagement with autocratic systems","authors":"E. Pils","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2021.1958509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1958509","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Autocratic control of civil society, including academia, can be extended to democratic societies and institutions in ways that pose threats to liberal-democratic values, such as academic freedom, for example through mechanisms and practices that lead to academic self-censorship. Engaging critically with the literature on ‘sharp power’ and ‘authoritarian influencing’ addressing this phenomenon, this paper argues that democratic actors who, without sharing the repressive goals of autocracies, contribute to their success in settings of international collaboration and exchange can become structurally complicit with such wrongs. Recognizing the risk of complicity is a necessary first step towards addressing the political responsibilities resulting from it.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"82 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77599305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2021.1958508
Alexandru Volacu, Vlad Terteleac
ABSTRACT In this article we aim to assess how the negative effects of brain drain can be mitigated in a fair way. We particularly focus on the policies of extraterritorial taxation and temporary compulsory service for highly skilled migrants in developing countries, which are most thoroughly defended by Gillian Brock. We argue that while Brock is right in pressing for policies seeking to combat the damaging effects of brain drain, she fails to properly characterize the complex strands of disadvantage that run through this phenomenon, placing an unfair redistributive burden on highly skilled migrants. By contrast, we maintain that any fair distribution of such burdens can only flow from a comprehensive account of existing comparative disadvantages, without regard for migratory status. The resulting policy implications are that a considerable part of the tax burden required for mitigating brain drain should be borne by citizens of developed countries, and that compulsory service in developing countries should be rejected.
{"title":"Mitigating the costs of departure. Brain drain, disadvantage and fair burden-sharing","authors":"Alexandru Volacu, Vlad Terteleac","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2021.1958508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1958508","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article we aim to assess how the negative effects of brain drain can be mitigated in a fair way. We particularly focus on the policies of extraterritorial taxation and temporary compulsory service for highly skilled migrants in developing countries, which are most thoroughly defended by Gillian Brock. We argue that while Brock is right in pressing for policies seeking to combat the damaging effects of brain drain, she fails to properly characterize the complex strands of disadvantage that run through this phenomenon, placing an unfair redistributive burden on highly skilled migrants. By contrast, we maintain that any fair distribution of such burdens can only flow from a comprehensive account of existing comparative disadvantages, without regard for migratory status. The resulting policy implications are that a considerable part of the tax burden required for mitigating brain drain should be borne by citizens of developed countries, and that compulsory service in developing countries should be rejected.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"31 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89316355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-03DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2021.1926086
Desiree Lim
In Justice for People on the Move, Gillian Brock helpfully proposes a number of internal and contribution requirements, central to human rights practice, that must constrain states’ exclusion of non-citizens. On her account, failing to meet these requirements would undermine states’ claim to legitimacy. In particular, Brock persuasively shows that the USA’ travel ban on non-citizens from Muslim-majority countries violates the legitimacy constraint. Building on Brock’s framework, I analyse two other types of travel bans. In response to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the US first imposed travel bans on travellers from China and Europe to prevent further transmission of the virus. More recently, the US has issued a proclamation that suspends the entry of any immigrants who purportedly risk harming the US labour market in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. Would both these travel bans meet Brock’s internal and contribution requirements for state legitimacy? I discuss these questions in my response to Brock’s book, which proceeds in this order. I begin in Section 2 by recapping the legitimacy constraints that Brock places on states’ right to exclude non-citizens: specifically, what she calls the ‘internal’ and ‘contribution’ requirements, which focus on states’ role in upholding a robust regime of human rights protections (2020: 34). I then explain Brock’s criticism of the USA’s infamous ‘Muslim ban’, which she performs through the lens of these legitimacy constraints. Next, in Section 3, I expand on two different travel bans that have been imposed in the name of the COVID-19 pandemic and their implications for global migration: bans on travellers from certain geographic regions (which now includes US citizens themselves), and bans on migration on the basis that it will pose a threat to local workers in the period of economic recovery. In Section 4, using Brock’s framework, I evaluate their ethical permissibility. There, I argue that regional travel bans are not only justifiable, but necessary from the perspective of legitimacy, with certain caveats. On the other hand, while travel bans on the basis of ‘economic threat’ might be permissible in theory, the US’s application has been deeply unjust in practice. I conclude in Section 5.
{"title":"Travel bans and COVID-19","authors":"Desiree Lim","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2021.1926086","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1926086","url":null,"abstract":"In Justice for People on the Move, Gillian Brock helpfully proposes a number of internal and contribution requirements, central to human rights practice, that must constrain states’ exclusion of non-citizens. On her account, failing to meet these requirements would undermine states’ claim to legitimacy. In particular, Brock persuasively shows that the USA’ travel ban on non-citizens from Muslim-majority countries violates the legitimacy constraint. Building on Brock’s framework, I analyse two other types of travel bans. In response to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic, the US first imposed travel bans on travellers from China and Europe to prevent further transmission of the virus. More recently, the US has issued a proclamation that suspends the entry of any immigrants who purportedly risk harming the US labour market in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. Would both these travel bans meet Brock’s internal and contribution requirements for state legitimacy? I discuss these questions in my response to Brock’s book, which proceeds in this order. I begin in Section 2 by recapping the legitimacy constraints that Brock places on states’ right to exclude non-citizens: specifically, what she calls the ‘internal’ and ‘contribution’ requirements, which focus on states’ role in upholding a robust regime of human rights protections (2020: 34). I then explain Brock’s criticism of the USA’s infamous ‘Muslim ban’, which she performs through the lens of these legitimacy constraints. Next, in Section 3, I expand on two different travel bans that have been imposed in the name of the COVID-19 pandemic and their implications for global migration: bans on travellers from certain geographic regions (which now includes US citizens themselves), and bans on migration on the basis that it will pose a threat to local workers in the period of economic recovery. In Section 4, using Brock’s framework, I evaluate their ethical permissibility. There, I argue that regional travel bans are not only justifiable, but necessary from the perspective of legitimacy, with certain caveats. On the other hand, while travel bans on the basis of ‘economic threat’ might be permissible in theory, the US’s application has been deeply unjust in practice. I conclude in Section 5.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":"296 1","pages":"55 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79631667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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