Pub Date : 2020-10-08DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1826171
Klaus Dingwerth, Simon Pistor
ABSTRACT This paper provides an introduction to the book symposium on Julian Culp’s Democratic Education in a Globalized World. In this paper we introduce the themes and core claims of Culp’s book, sketch the contributions made by authors of this symposium, and highlight the plausibility of the book’s significance for debates in political philosophy, philosophy of education, educational public policy, as well as for the practice of political education. The issue includes three critical essays by Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein, and Michael Geiss as well as a response to the critics by Culp.
{"title":"Teach your children well: introduction to the book symposium on Julian Culp’s democratic education in a globalized world","authors":"Klaus Dingwerth, Simon Pistor","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1826171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1826171","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper provides an introduction to the book symposium on Julian Culp’s Democratic Education in a Globalized World. In this paper we introduce the themes and core claims of Culp’s book, sketch the contributions made by authors of this symposium, and highlight the plausibility of the book’s significance for debates in political philosophy, philosophy of education, educational public policy, as well as for the practice of political education. The issue includes three critical essays by Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein, and Michael Geiss as well as a response to the critics by Culp.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73595190","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-08DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1816016
M. Geiss
ABSTRACT In the following I would like to expose Julian Culp’s normative argumentation to some empirical considerations. My commentary focuses on one of the central premises of the book: Culp assumes that education can make a decisive contribution to solving the current challenges in plural and globalized societies. He states that recent political philosophy has unacceptably neglected the issue of education. But the book’s aim is not the theoretical determination of education itself. Rather, Culp is concerned with the question of giving education the right normative foundation to solve the social, ecological and democratic challenges the globalized world is currently facing. I don’t think that one can or should discuss and analyse education without normative considerations. Educational thinking cannot do without a normative foundation and it is helpful and necessary to reflect upon them philosophically. This is the central concern of the book, and there is nothing to be added to it by historians or educational researchers. But a purely normative approach runs the risk of repeating many of the problems inherent in educational thinking. I think that even a normative approach would gain a lot from taking the empirical and historical boundaries of its subject more seriously than Culp does. Therefore, most of my remarks are about the relationship between normative theory and historical realities.
{"title":"What can be achieved through education at all? A response to Julian Culp","authors":"M. Geiss","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1816016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1816016","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the following I would like to expose Julian Culp’s normative argumentation to some empirical considerations. My commentary focuses on one of the central premises of the book: Culp assumes that education can make a decisive contribution to solving the current challenges in plural and globalized societies. He states that recent political philosophy has unacceptably neglected the issue of education. But the book’s aim is not the theoretical determination of education itself. Rather, Culp is concerned with the question of giving education the right normative foundation to solve the social, ecological and democratic challenges the globalized world is currently facing. I don’t think that one can or should discuss and analyse education without normative considerations. Educational thinking cannot do without a normative foundation and it is helpful and necessary to reflect upon them philosophically. This is the central concern of the book, and there is nothing to be added to it by historians or educational researchers. But a purely normative approach runs the risk of repeating many of the problems inherent in educational thinking. I think that even a normative approach would gain a lot from taking the empirical and historical boundaries of its subject more seriously than Culp does. Therefore, most of my remarks are about the relationship between normative theory and historical realities.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83627676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1761192
M. Egan
ABSTRACT It is often argued that states do not have any special obligations towards economic migrants, and that skills-based selection of migrants is morally unproblematic. In this paper, I argue that even if one does not endorse special obligations towards economic migrants, there are good reasons to be critical of skills-based selection due to its effect on the citizens in the country they are migrating to. I introduce the issue of the impact of migrant selection on domestic populations by considering Blake’s arguments against racial selection in immigration. He argues that racial selection is wrong because ‘[…] making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial preference domestically as well’. In this paper, I consider whether a similar case can be made against selecting migrants based on their marketable skills. I begin with a short overview of skills-based selection and some of the normative arguments put forward in favour of it, before considering Blake’s argument. Thereafter, I show how Blake’s example of race differs significantly from selection based on skills, in part due to the nature of identification with race and skills. However, I argue that the effects of skills-based selection on domestic population also need to be considered in any normative argument proposing such migration regulations. These effects include changes in our evaluations of equality and citizenship, negative impact on the social bases of self-respect, as well as specific disadvantages for segments of society and a negative effect on social mobility.
{"title":"Statements on race and class: the fairness of skills-based immigration criteria","authors":"M. Egan","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1761192","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1761192","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is often argued that states do not have any special obligations towards economic migrants, and that skills-based selection of migrants is morally unproblematic. In this paper, I argue that even if one does not endorse special obligations towards economic migrants, there are good reasons to be critical of skills-based selection due to its effect on the citizens in the country they are migrating to. I introduce the issue of the impact of migrant selection on domestic populations by considering Blake’s arguments against racial selection in immigration. He argues that racial selection is wrong because ‘[…] making a statement of racial preference in immigration necessarily makes a statement of racial preference domestically as well’. In this paper, I consider whether a similar case can be made against selecting migrants based on their marketable skills. I begin with a short overview of skills-based selection and some of the normative arguments put forward in favour of it, before considering Blake’s argument. Thereafter, I show how Blake’s example of race differs significantly from selection based on skills, in part due to the nature of identification with race and skills. However, I argue that the effects of skills-based selection on domestic population also need to be considered in any normative argument proposing such migration regulations. These effects include changes in our evaluations of equality and citizenship, negative impact on the social bases of self-respect, as well as specific disadvantages for segments of society and a negative effect on social mobility.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74725050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-28DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1756562
T. Govier, David Boutland
ABSTRACT The forces of ISIS (the so-called Islamic State) have lost most of the territory they held in Syria and Iraq, and the anti-ISIS forces are inclined to declare victory. On the presumption that we are in a context of aftermath to this struggle, that aftermath will itself be characterized by serious difficulties. A crucial problem in this context is that of returning foreign fighters. It is estimated that some 5600 persons left western countries to join the ISIS forces. Many of these men and women have been killed or imprisoned. Some will remain abroad to continue violent activities in alliance with ISIS or other jihadist forces. And some will seek to return home to the country they left. Regarding these people, referred to here as returnees, important issues of ethics and policy arise. These issues are likely to be disturbing and polarizing, with the result that some governments hold back from discussing them. Thinking that dodging the issues is a mistake, we explore some of them here, first setting the context in which they arise and then describing the central ethical dilemmas, which the tension between efforts to protect public safety and concern for the rights of suspected persons.
{"title":"Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters","authors":"T. Govier, David Boutland","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1756562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1756562","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The forces of ISIS (the so-called Islamic State) have lost most of the territory they held in Syria and Iraq, and the anti-ISIS forces are inclined to declare victory. On the presumption that we are in a context of aftermath to this struggle, that aftermath will itself be characterized by serious difficulties. A crucial problem in this context is that of returning foreign fighters. It is estimated that some 5600 persons left western countries to join the ISIS forces. Many of these men and women have been killed or imprisoned. Some will remain abroad to continue violent activities in alliance with ISIS or other jihadist forces. And some will seek to return home to the country they left. Regarding these people, referred to here as returnees, important issues of ethics and policy arise. These issues are likely to be disturbing and polarizing, with the result that some governments hold back from discussing them. Thinking that dodging the issues is a mistake, we explore some of them here, first setting the context in which they arise and then describing the central ethical dilemmas, which the tension between efforts to protect public safety and concern for the rights of suspected persons.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73633490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735015
A. Vitikainen
ABSTRACT This article discusses the case of refugees who are LGBT, and the possible grounds for using LGBT status as a basis for prioritizing LGBT persons in refugee admissions. I argue that those states most willing and able to protect LGBT persons against a variety of (also) non-asylum-grounding injustices have strong moral reasons to admit and prioritize refugees with LGBT status over non-LGBT refugees in refugee admissions. These states – typically, Western liberal democracies – are uniquely positioned to provide effective protection for refugees who are LGBT, owing to the failures of other, also refugee receiving, states to do so. The case for prioritizing refugees with LGBT status is built upon two interrelated factors. First, on the specific vulnerability of LGBT persons to a variety of (also) non-asylum-grounding injustices, and second, on the relatively low number of countries that are both willing and able to protect LGBT persons against such injustices.
{"title":"LGBT rights and refugees: a case for prioritizing LGBT status in refugee admissions","authors":"A. Vitikainen","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1735015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735015","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article discusses the case of refugees who are LGBT, and the possible grounds for using LGBT status as a basis for prioritizing LGBT persons in refugee admissions. I argue that those states most willing and able to protect LGBT persons against a variety of (also) non-asylum-grounding injustices have strong moral reasons to admit and prioritize refugees with LGBT status over non-LGBT refugees in refugee admissions. These states – typically, Western liberal democracies – are uniquely positioned to provide effective protection for refugees who are LGBT, owing to the failures of other, also refugee receiving, states to do so. The case for prioritizing refugees with LGBT status is built upon two interrelated factors. First, on the specific vulnerability of LGBT persons to a variety of (also) non-asylum-grounding injustices, and second, on the relatively low number of countries that are both willing and able to protect LGBT persons against such injustices.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78224612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735013
S. Parekh
ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that we should not frame the debate over whether or not we have duties to help refugees in terms of duties of rescue. This way of framing the issue, where Western states are depicted as rescuing refugees from harms unconnected to them, does not adequately represent the reality experienced by refugees in the 21 st century. I suggest that we need a framework that includes the secondary harms experienced by refugees as they try to seek refuge in camps, urban spaces and via asylum. These secondary harms constitute serious violations of human rights and prevent refugees from accessing the minimum conditions of human dignity. As a result, the rescue metaphor is inappropriate and, perhaps more importantly, prevents us from having a proper debate about the obligations of states in general, and Western states in particular, to refugees.
{"title":"Reframing the refugee crisis: from rescue to interconnection","authors":"S. Parekh","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1735013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735013","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper I argue that we should not frame the debate over whether or not we have duties to help refugees in terms of duties of rescue. This way of framing the issue, where Western states are depicted as rescuing refugees from harms unconnected to them, does not adequately represent the reality experienced by refugees in the 21 st century. I suggest that we need a framework that includes the secondary harms experienced by refugees as they try to seek refuge in camps, urban spaces and via asylum. These secondary harms constitute serious violations of human rights and prevent refugees from accessing the minimum conditions of human dignity. As a result, the rescue metaphor is inappropriate and, perhaps more importantly, prevents us from having a proper debate about the obligations of states in general, and Western states in particular, to refugees.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76827350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735018
M. Cherem
ABSTRACT This article argues that there is no general ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question of whether states may permissibly use group-based criteria to permanently resettle refugees from certain contexts. Indeed, I argue that this question only makes sense with respect to a range of narrowly circumscribed scenarios. And, even though it may appear that states have wide discretion with respect to refugees in these scenarios, the way that these scenarios have arisen and continue to be maintained casts doubt upon even this limited conclusion Nevertheless, consulting both the history and practice of international refugee law can help us understand why some particular forms of group-based prioritizations are foreclosed. Such attention to practice based details also sensitizes us to the solution structure (and historic interest constellation) behind refugee law, as well as those institutional tweaks and patches that could actually stand a chance of making a marked difference.
{"title":"May states select among refugees?","authors":"M. Cherem","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1735018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735018","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that there is no general ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question of whether states may permissibly use group-based criteria to permanently resettle refugees from certain contexts. Indeed, I argue that this question only makes sense with respect to a range of narrowly circumscribed scenarios. And, even though it may appear that states have wide discretion with respect to refugees in these scenarios, the way that these scenarios have arisen and continue to be maintained casts doubt upon even this limited conclusion Nevertheless, consulting both the history and practice of international refugee law can help us understand why some particular forms of group-based prioritizations are foreclosed. Such attention to practice based details also sensitizes us to the solution structure (and historic interest constellation) behind refugee law, as well as those institutional tweaks and patches that could actually stand a chance of making a marked difference.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89335619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735016
Zsolt Kapelner
ABSTRACT In this paper I defend the view that the democratic legitimacy of refugee admission policies requires the democratic inclusion of asylum seekers. I argue that this includes not only granting them formal participation rights, but also ensuring that they have a sufficient level of participatory capabilities to exercise these rights. This leads to the specific problem of asylum seekers with vulnerable minority backgrounds. Their participatory capabilities may be hindered by social injustice stemming from their state of origin which the receiving state, one might argue, has no duty to redress. Redressing inequalities that stem from social injustice in other states may be thought of as being beyond the limits of refuge, and therefore unreasonable to demand from receiving states. I propose a defence of what I call the Inclusion Thesis against this objection based on the idea that the democratic inclusion of asylum seekers is necessary for making sure that they can enjoy their basic right to have a say. Receiving states do not generally have a duty to rectify unjust inequalities among asylum seekers that stem from their states of origin. However, when this is necessary for making sure that they can enjoy their basic rights, they may be required to do so. Therefore, since receiving states have a duty to ensure that asylum seekers with vulnerable minority backgrounds can enjoy their basic right to have a say, they also have a duty to make sure that their participatory capabilities are equalized.
{"title":"Vulnerable minorities and democratic legitimacy in refugee admission","authors":"Zsolt Kapelner","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1735016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735016","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper I defend the view that the democratic legitimacy of refugee admission policies requires the democratic inclusion of asylum seekers. I argue that this includes not only granting them formal participation rights, but also ensuring that they have a sufficient level of participatory capabilities to exercise these rights. This leads to the specific problem of asylum seekers with vulnerable minority backgrounds. Their participatory capabilities may be hindered by social injustice stemming from their state of origin which the receiving state, one might argue, has no duty to redress. Redressing inequalities that stem from social injustice in other states may be thought of as being beyond the limits of refuge, and therefore unreasonable to demand from receiving states. I propose a defence of what I call the Inclusion Thesis against this objection based on the idea that the democratic inclusion of asylum seekers is necessary for making sure that they can enjoy their basic right to have a say. Receiving states do not generally have a duty to rectify unjust inequalities among asylum seekers that stem from their states of origin. However, when this is necessary for making sure that they can enjoy their basic rights, they may be required to do so. Therefore, since receiving states have a duty to ensure that asylum seekers with vulnerable minority backgrounds can enjoy their basic right to have a say, they also have a duty to make sure that their participatory capabilities are equalized.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80647964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735017
S. Fine
ABSTRACT Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, but in practice many people seek asylum and do not find it. Where asylum is in short supply, it may seem obvious and reasonable for philosophers to ask whether we can identify principles for prioritizing the asylum claims of some over those of others. In this paper I consider what kind of question this is, and whether it is one that philosophers are in a good position to address. I argue that philosophers have a number of powerful reasons to approach it with serious caution, and even to avoid it altogether. I outline some potential pitfalls of answering it, including the risk of normalizing violations of the principle of non-refoulement.
{"title":"Refugees and the limits of political philosophy","authors":"S. Fine","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1735017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735017","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution, but in practice many people seek asylum and do not find it. Where asylum is in short supply, it may seem obvious and reasonable for philosophers to ask whether we can identify principles for prioritizing the asylum claims of some over those of others. In this paper I consider what kind of question this is, and whether it is one that philosophers are in a good position to address. I argue that philosophers have a number of powerful reasons to approach it with serious caution, and even to avoid it altogether. I outline some potential pitfalls of answering it, including the risk of normalizing violations of the principle of non-refoulement.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76150312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1735014
K. Lippert‐Rasmussen, Sune Lægaard
ABSTRACT In many contexts, states have a duty to take special measures to protect minorities. Does this duty include prioritizing minority over majority refugees? To answer this question, we first show that a vulnerability-focused notion of ‘minorities’ is preferable to a numerical one. Given the vulnerability-focused notion, there is a presumption in favour of prioritizing minority over majority refugees. However, this presumption is sometimes defeated. We identify five conditions under which this is the case. In fact, surprisingly, under special circumstances, states should prioritize certain majority over certain minority refugees.
{"title":"Refugees and minorities: some conceptual and normative issues","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen, Sune Lægaard","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1735014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1735014","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In many contexts, states have a duty to take special measures to protect minorities. Does this duty include prioritizing minority over majority refugees? To answer this question, we first show that a vulnerability-focused notion of ‘minorities’ is preferable to a numerical one. Given the vulnerability-focused notion, there is a presumption in favour of prioritizing minority over majority refugees. However, this presumption is sometimes defeated. We identify five conditions under which this is the case. In fact, surprisingly, under special circumstances, states should prioritize certain majority over certain minority refugees.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77245219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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