Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565601
K. Lippert‐Rasmussen
ABSTRACT Barry and Øverland reject Singer’s assistance principle as being too demanding and offer a positive defence of a less demanding one. In this article, I critically scrutinize their arguments. My main claim is that they fail to show that their own principle of assistance is superior to more demanding ones such as Singer’s.
{"title":"Barry and Øverland on Singer and assistance-based duties","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565601","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565601","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Barry and Øverland reject Singer’s assistance principle as being too demanding and offer a positive defence of a less demanding one. In this article, I critically scrutinize their arguments. My main claim is that they fail to show that their own principle of assistance is superior to more demanding ones such as Singer’s.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77467205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565608
Bashshar Haydar
ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Barry and Øverland did not succeed in providing an answer to Singer’s challenge. I start by arguing against their claim, that the case on which Singer relies on in order to generate a highly demanding assistance requirement, has a special feature that limits its applicability to other situations. Second, I argue against Barry and Øverland’s attempt to undermine any highly demanding principle of assistance on the basis of the failure of others to share the burden of assistance. While the above does not show that Singer’s highly demanding assistance principles are vindicated, it does show, however, that more needs to be done, than what Barry and Øverland have offered, in order to meet Singer’s challenge.
{"title":"Barry and Øverland’s defence of a moderate principle of assistance","authors":"Bashshar Haydar","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565608","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper, I argue that Barry and Øverland did not succeed in providing an answer to Singer’s challenge. I start by arguing against their claim, that the case on which Singer relies on in order to generate a highly demanding assistance requirement, has a special feature that limits its applicability to other situations. Second, I argue against Barry and Øverland’s attempt to undermine any highly demanding principle of assistance on the basis of the failure of others to share the burden of assistance. While the above does not show that Singer’s highly demanding assistance principles are vindicated, it does show, however, that more needs to be done, than what Barry and Øverland have offered, in order to meet Singer’s challenge.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78247490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565611
H. Lawford-Smith
ABSTRACT According to Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2016), there are multiple ways “the affluent” might be morally responsible for the situation the global poor are in, including having failed to assist them on a single occasion or on multiple occasions; by enabling harm to them; by ‘giving rise to cost’ for them; by making it costly for the poor to escape their own suffering; by exploiting them; by overdetermining harm to them. But what exactly is this group, “the affluent”, who Barry and Øverland present as being capable of doing all these things? In this paper I present three possible conceptions of ‘the affluent’, and argue that they all create problems for the conclusions the authors want to reach.
根据Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland(2016)的研究，“富人”可能会以多种方式对全球穷人所处的状况承担道德责任，包括在一次或多次未能帮助他们;使他们受到伤害;给他们“增加成本”;通过让穷人付出高昂的代价来摆脱自己的痛苦;利用他们;通过过度确定对他们的伤害。但是Barry和Øverland所呈现的这个“富人”群体到底是什么?在本文中，我提出了“富人”的三种可能的概念，并认为它们都给作者想要得出的结论带来了问题。
{"title":"Are ‘the affluent’ responsible for global poverty?","authors":"H. Lawford-Smith","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565611","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT According to Christian Barry & Gerhard Øverland (2016), there are multiple ways “the affluent” might be morally responsible for the situation the global poor are in, including having failed to assist them on a single occasion or on multiple occasions; by enabling harm to them; by ‘giving rise to cost’ for them; by making it costly for the poor to escape their own suffering; by exploiting them; by overdetermining harm to them. But what exactly is this group, “the affluent”, who Barry and Øverland present as being capable of doing all these things? In this paper I present three possible conceptions of ‘the affluent’, and argue that they all create problems for the conclusions the authors want to reach.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77663944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606
L. Valentini
ABSTRACT Millions of people in our world are in need of assistance: from the global poor, to refugees, from the victims of natural disasters, to those of violent crimes. What are our responsibilities towards them? Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland’s answer is plausible and straightforward: we have enforceable duties to assist others in need whenever we can do so ‘at relatively moderate cost to ourselves, and others’. Barry and Øverland defend this answer on the ground that it best fits our intuitions in a variety of hypothetical rescue scenarios. I argue that, although Barry and Øverland’s view is intuitively appealing, appeal to intuitive cases is insufficient to vindicate it satisfactorily. Intuitive cases alone do not allow us to establish: (i) what costs count as moderate and (ii) whether assistance-based responsibilities are, in fact, enforceable. These considerations suggest that Barry and Øverland’s defence of their preferred answer to the assistance question may be incomplete.
{"title":"Arguing for assistance-based responsibilities: are intuitions enough?","authors":"L. Valentini","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565606","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Millions of people in our world are in need of assistance: from the global poor, to refugees, from the victims of natural disasters, to those of violent crimes. What are our responsibilities towards them? Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland’s answer is plausible and straightforward: we have enforceable duties to assist others in need whenever we can do so ‘at relatively moderate cost to ourselves, and others’. Barry and Øverland defend this answer on the ground that it best fits our intuitions in a variety of hypothetical rescue scenarios. I argue that, although Barry and Øverland’s view is intuitively appealing, appeal to intuitive cases is insufficient to vindicate it satisfactorily. Intuitive cases alone do not allow us to establish: (i) what costs count as moderate and (ii) whether assistance-based responsibilities are, in fact, enforceable. These considerations suggest that Barry and Øverland’s defence of their preferred answer to the assistance question may be incomplete.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89538757","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565610
Siba Harb, R. Leland
ABSTRACT In Responding to Global Poverty, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland argue that, while exploitation is morally problematic, responsibilities not to exploit are characteristically less stringent than responsibilities not to harm. They even suggest that exploiters’ responsibilities to assist the exploited may be weaker than the responsibilities of culpable bystanders who are able to help the poor but fail to do so We think Barry and Øverland underestimate the prospects of the exploitation argument. In our paper, we suggest that exploitation can plausibly be understood as a kind of harm. If exploitation harms, then it requires special justification and can generate stringent responsibilities not to exploit that have a different ground than those generated by morally culpable failures to assist. This suggests an important way to rehabilitate arguments for poverty relief on the basis of a duty not to harm, and that there is more interesting territory to explore than Barry and Øverland’s arguments suggest.
{"title":"Exploiting disadvantage as causing harm","authors":"Siba Harb, R. Leland","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565610","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Responding to Global Poverty, Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland argue that, while exploitation is morally problematic, responsibilities not to exploit are characteristically less stringent than responsibilities not to harm. They even suggest that exploiters’ responsibilities to assist the exploited may be weaker than the responsibilities of culpable bystanders who are able to help the poor but fail to do so We think Barry and Øverland underestimate the prospects of the exploitation argument. In our paper, we suggest that exploitation can plausibly be understood as a kind of harm. If exploitation harms, then it requires special justification and can generate stringent responsibilities not to exploit that have a different ground than those generated by morally culpable failures to assist. This suggests an important way to rehabilitate arguments for poverty relief on the basis of a duty not to harm, and that there is more interesting territory to explore than Barry and Øverland’s arguments suggest.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91307738","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565604
Siba Harb, Bashshar Haydar, R. Leland
ABSTRACT This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland’s book ‘Responding to Global Poverty’. The issue includes eight critical essays, a precis of the book and a response to critics by Barry.
{"title":"What do the affluent owe the global poor, an introduction","authors":"Siba Harb, Bashshar Haydar, R. Leland","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565604","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper provides an introduction to the special issue on Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland’s book ‘Responding to Global Poverty’. The issue includes eight critical essays, a precis of the book and a response to critics by Barry.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79974197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2019.1565605
A. G. Polkamp
ABSTRACT In the last chapter of Responding to Global Poverty, Barry and Øverland argue that there are moral reasons against overdetermining harm. They define overdetermining harm as conduct that makes no apparent difference to the occurrence of harm but is of the type that brings about harm when many people engage in it. An individual’s greenhouse gas emissions are a prime example. Barry and Øverland’s proposal is that reasons to refrain from overdetermining conduct exist because of the probability that the agent will become an element of the set of actual conditions that in fact brings about the outcome. This paper aims to show that by focusing on causation-related considerations, Barry and Øverland base their account on the wrong reasons. More specifically, I argue that this focus leads to three difficulties. First, the account is not able to justify overdetermination-based constraints in all overdetermined harm cases. Second, the probability of being in the set may be too easily outweighed by the costs of refraining and the benefits the conduct would bring. Third, the probability of being in the actual set may not be highly morally relevant, given that an individual’s contribution to the harm caused by the set can only be very limited in large-scaled overdetermined harm cases. Barry and Øverland are right in arguing that it is important to undermine scepticism about the wrongness of overdetermining harm. However, a non-causation-based account might be more successful in doing so.
{"title":"Individual contributions to collective harm: how important is causation?","authors":"A. G. Polkamp","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2019.1565605","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2019.1565605","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the last chapter of Responding to Global Poverty, Barry and Øverland argue that there are moral reasons against overdetermining harm. They define overdetermining harm as conduct that makes no apparent difference to the occurrence of harm but is of the type that brings about harm when many people engage in it. An individual’s greenhouse gas emissions are a prime example. Barry and Øverland’s proposal is that reasons to refrain from overdetermining conduct exist because of the probability that the agent will become an element of the set of actual conditions that in fact brings about the outcome. This paper aims to show that by focusing on causation-related considerations, Barry and Øverland base their account on the wrong reasons. More specifically, I argue that this focus leads to three difficulties. First, the account is not able to justify overdetermination-based constraints in all overdetermined harm cases. Second, the probability of being in the set may be too easily outweighed by the costs of refraining and the benefits the conduct would bring. Third, the probability of being in the actual set may not be highly morally relevant, given that an individual’s contribution to the harm caused by the set can only be very limited in large-scaled overdetermined harm cases. Barry and Øverland are right in arguing that it is important to undermine scepticism about the wrongness of overdetermining harm. However, a non-causation-based account might be more successful in doing so.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86744257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-26DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2018.1498700
Marc de Wilde
ABSTRACT This article analyzes and compares the institutionalist theories of law developed by Santi Romano and Carl Schmitt. In the early 1930s, Schmitt referred to Romano to explain his own conversion to an institutionalist jurisprudence, which he preferred to call ‘concrete order thinking’. Both Romano and Schmitt criticized the normativist approach to law characteristic of legal positivism. Instead, they developed an institutionalist approach that regarded legal norms as secondary phenomena, pointing at the importance of the underlying institutional order, which shaped and informed these norms. More particularly, both Romano and Schmitt believed that the crisis of the modern state could only be overcome by recognizing the juristic character of non-state institutions and their legal orders. However, unlike Romano, Schmitt used ‘concrete order thinking’ to advocate an ideological reinterpretation of law: he thus presented the National-Socialist Führerprinzip as a ‘great example’ of ‘concrete order thinking’ and called upon German judges to reinterpret the so-called ‘general clauses’ in statutes in line with the National-Socialist ideology. While Schmitt developed ‘concrete order thinking’ into a theoretical justification of the totalitarian state, Romano emphasized the neutral and descriptive character of his institutionalist theory. Unlike Schmitt, he concluded that non-state institutions and their legal orders could never be completely incorporated into the state, but continued to exist and develop in its shadows.
{"title":"The dark side of institutionalism: Carl Schmitt reading Santi Romano","authors":"Marc de Wilde","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2018.1498700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2018.1498700","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article analyzes and compares the institutionalist theories of law developed by Santi Romano and Carl Schmitt. In the early 1930s, Schmitt referred to Romano to explain his own conversion to an institutionalist jurisprudence, which he preferred to call ‘concrete order thinking’. Both Romano and Schmitt criticized the normativist approach to law characteristic of legal positivism. Instead, they developed an institutionalist approach that regarded legal norms as secondary phenomena, pointing at the importance of the underlying institutional order, which shaped and informed these norms. More particularly, both Romano and Schmitt believed that the crisis of the modern state could only be overcome by recognizing the juristic character of non-state institutions and their legal orders. However, unlike Romano, Schmitt used ‘concrete order thinking’ to advocate an ideological reinterpretation of law: he thus presented the National-Socialist Führerprinzip as a ‘great example’ of ‘concrete order thinking’ and called upon German judges to reinterpret the so-called ‘general clauses’ in statutes in line with the National-Socialist ideology. While Schmitt developed ‘concrete order thinking’ into a theoretical justification of the totalitarian state, Romano emphasized the neutral and descriptive character of his institutionalist theory. Unlike Schmitt, he concluded that non-state institutions and their legal orders could never be completely incorporated into the state, but continued to exist and develop in its shadows.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2018-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78069596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-24DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2018.1498696
P. Marshall
ABSTRACT This article critically analyses and discards two democratically justified cases for the disenfranchisement of prisoners. These cases are offered in relatively recent published works by Peter Ramsay and Claudio López-Guerra, which – unlike other approaches – take the democratic challenge to disenfranchisement very seriously. Their arguments are based on a diagnostic of the conditions of imprisonment, which concludes that prisoners’ electoral participation is problematic for democracy because it endangers electoral integrity. This article argues against their positions and suggests that for prisoners to be treated as democratic citizens they must be recognized as electors and given an opportunity to vote. Firstly, it will be affirmed that prisoners cannot be made responsible for the conditions of their imprisonment and that prisons must adequately meet democratic requirements. It will also be affirmed that, if these requirements were fulfilled, the conditions of prisoners in a democratic prison would not be sufficiently different, in relevant aspects, from the conditions of other enfranchised people. Secondly, it will be asserted that, at least at to some extent, their arguments underestimate the possibilities of prison reform and electoral regulation to overcome the democratic problems of coercion and manipulation, which they target as two main problems of enfranchisement.
{"title":"Voting from prison: against the democratic case for disenfranchisement","authors":"P. Marshall","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2018.1498696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2018.1498696","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article critically analyses and discards two democratically justified cases for the disenfranchisement of prisoners. These cases are offered in relatively recent published works by Peter Ramsay and Claudio López-Guerra, which – unlike other approaches – take the democratic challenge to disenfranchisement very seriously. Their arguments are based on a diagnostic of the conditions of imprisonment, which concludes that prisoners’ electoral participation is problematic for democracy because it endangers electoral integrity. This article argues against their positions and suggests that for prisoners to be treated as democratic citizens they must be recognized as electors and given an opportunity to vote. Firstly, it will be affirmed that prisoners cannot be made responsible for the conditions of their imprisonment and that prisons must adequately meet democratic requirements. It will also be affirmed that, if these requirements were fulfilled, the conditions of prisoners in a democratic prison would not be sufficiently different, in relevant aspects, from the conditions of other enfranchised people. Secondly, it will be asserted that, at least at to some extent, their arguments underestimate the possibilities of prison reform and electoral regulation to overcome the democratic problems of coercion and manipulation, which they target as two main problems of enfranchisement.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2018-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78031499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-24DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2018.1498699
Mariano Croce
ABSTRACT This essay foregrounds the relevance of Italian jurist Santi Romano’s theorizing to today’s political and legal debates on the relation between state and non-state laws. As Romano’s classic book L’ordinamento giuridico (1917–1918) has finally been translated into English, the Anglophone readership can take stock of one of the most enlightening contributions to institutional thinking in the last centuries. Romano put forward a theory of legal institutionalism that has legal pluralism as a basic corollary and contended that the legal order is naturally equipped to temper and overcome conflicts between bodies of law. The present contribution argues that this approach unravels the riddles of recent multiculturalist paradigms and provides invaluable insights on the way the state could and should manage the conflicts between competing normative orders that lay claims to legislative and jurisdictional autonomy.
{"title":"Whither the state? On Santi Romano’s The legal order","authors":"Mariano Croce","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2018.1498699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2018.1498699","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay foregrounds the relevance of Italian jurist Santi Romano’s theorizing to today’s political and legal debates on the relation between state and non-state laws. As Romano’s classic book L’ordinamento giuridico (1917–1918) has finally been translated into English, the Anglophone readership can take stock of one of the most enlightening contributions to institutional thinking in the last centuries. Romano put forward a theory of legal institutionalism that has legal pluralism as a basic corollary and contended that the legal order is naturally equipped to temper and overcome conflicts between bodies of law. The present contribution argues that this approach unravels the riddles of recent multiculturalist paradigms and provides invaluable insights on the way the state could and should manage the conflicts between competing normative orders that lay claims to legislative and jurisdictional autonomy.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2018-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72805657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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