Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1837493
G. Badano, Alasia Nuti
ABSTRACT This paper introduces the symposium on Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s book Political Self-Deception. After having explained the contribution of the book to debates in democratic theory and having highlighted its main arguments, the paper provides an overview of the different contributions to the symposium. The contributions range from philosophy, political theory and history and, thus, show the interdisciplinary interest of the book and critically engage with its various aspects.
{"title":"Pathologies of democratic deliberation: introduction to the symposium on A.E. Galeotti’s Political Self-Deception","authors":"G. Badano, Alasia Nuti","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1837493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837493","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper introduces the symposium on Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s book Political Self-Deception. After having explained the contribution of the book to debates in democratic theory and having highlighted its main arguments, the paper provides an overview of the different contributions to the symposium. The contributions range from philosophy, political theory and history and, thus, show the interdisciplinary interest of the book and critically engage with its various aspects.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75159127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1850044
Shaul Mitelpunkt
ABSTRACT A contribution to the roundtable on Anna Galeotti’s book. This review examines the utility of taking a prophylactic approach to the study of the history of U.S. military interventions.
{"title":"Self-deception, war, and the quest for the appropriate prophylactic","authors":"Shaul Mitelpunkt","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1850044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1850044","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A contribution to the roundtable on Anna Galeotti’s book. This review examines the utility of taking a prophylactic approach to the study of the history of U.S. military interventions.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16544951.2020.1850044","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72414196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1837468
Alfred Moore
ABSTRACT What can one say to the self-deceived? And – perhaps more importantly – who can say it? The attribution of self-deception depends heavily on the criteria for what is thought to be beyond dispute. For Galeotti, misperception of reality is a product of psychological and emotional pressure resulting in ‘emotionally overloaded wishes’, and her solution thus involves the construction of what an ‘impartial’ and ‘dispassionate’ observer would conclude when presented with the same evidence. Drawing on her examples of foreign policy decision-making, I discuss two objections. First, I ask whether being ‘dispassionate’ is enough get one off the hook from the sorts of value judgements that must be made in assessing evidence in complex situations. Second, I address the role of disagreement and dissent, and suggest that what is required are not actors with a lack of emotionally overloaded wishes, but actors with different goals and wishes. Thus, while Galeotti emphasizes solutions drawing on ideals of impartiality, we might more productively look for solutions that engage multiple forms of partiality.
{"title":"Reality check: can impartial umpires solve the problem of political self-deception?","authors":"Alfred Moore","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1837468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837468","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What can one say to the self-deceived? And – perhaps more importantly – who can say it? The attribution of self-deception depends heavily on the criteria for what is thought to be beyond dispute. For Galeotti, misperception of reality is a product of psychological and emotional pressure resulting in ‘emotionally overloaded wishes’, and her solution thus involves the construction of what an ‘impartial’ and ‘dispassionate’ observer would conclude when presented with the same evidence. Drawing on her examples of foreign policy decision-making, I discuss two objections. First, I ask whether being ‘dispassionate’ is enough get one off the hook from the sorts of value judgements that must be made in assessing evidence in complex situations. Second, I address the role of disagreement and dissent, and suggest that what is required are not actors with a lack of emotionally overloaded wishes, but actors with different goals and wishes. Thus, while Galeotti emphasizes solutions drawing on ideals of impartiality, we might more productively look for solutions that engage multiple forms of partiality.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837468","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72545491","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1846947
A. Galeotti
ABSTRACT The article replies to the five comments to Political Self-Deception, from the more philosophical and epistemic remarks to the more political and historical ones. In the end, it summarizes the main points of the book as suggested by the discussion with the five comments.
{"title":"Political Self-Deception revisited: reply to comments","authors":"A. Galeotti","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1846947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1846947","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article replies to the five comments to Political Self-Deception, from the more philosophical and epistemic remarks to the more political and historical ones. In the end, it summarizes the main points of the book as suggested by the discussion with the five comments.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77477647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1837467
L. Erez
ABSTRACT In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti considers (and rebuts) two ‘realist’ objections. Galeotti’s realist argues that there is no need for the overly complex concept of self-deception, since self-serving lies and manipulation are descriptively and normatively sufficient; and that in any case, deception in democratic politics is sometimes justifiable. In response, Galeotti offers explanatory, moral, and normative reasons why self-deception is a helpful concept in international politics: it helps us better understand the political reality of deception, and guides us in how to avoid or mitigate it. In this comment, I wish to revisit the realist objections, and to provide a more nuanced and more robust version of them. In doing so, I raise questions about the relationship between self-deception and the failure of political judgement, about the moral evaluation of deception in democratic politics, and about the normative implications of Galeotti’s analysis for political responsibility and for prophylactic measures.
{"title":"What is political about political self-deception?","authors":"L. Erez","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1837467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1837467","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti considers (and rebuts) two ‘realist’ objections. Galeotti’s realist argues that there is no need for the overly complex concept of self-deception, since self-serving lies and manipulation are descriptively and normatively sufficient; and that in any case, deception in democratic politics is sometimes justifiable. In response, Galeotti offers explanatory, moral, and normative reasons why self-deception is a helpful concept in international politics: it helps us better understand the political reality of deception, and guides us in how to avoid or mitigate it. In this comment, I wish to revisit the realist objections, and to provide a more nuanced and more robust version of them. In doing so, I raise questions about the relationship between self-deception and the failure of political judgement, about the moral evaluation of deception in democratic politics, and about the normative implications of Galeotti’s analysis for political responsibility and for prophylactic measures.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74249599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1837483
Alice Baderin
ABSTRACT In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti carves out valuable space for the analysis of behaviour on the part of political leaders that lies between straightforward deception and honest mistakes. In these comments I consider whether the concept of self-deception can travel from the political to the academic arena, to illuminate problems in how political theorists treat empirical data in the course of their normative work. Drawing on examples from the literature on the social bases of self-respect, I show that political theorists too are vulnerable to the motivationally biased treatment of data. I suggest that this problem can helpfully be located on the same broad terrain Galeotti outlines, between lying and mistakes. I also identify some potential analogues, for the academic sphere, of Galeotti's proposed remedies for political SD. The paper goes on to reflect on how Galeotti herself employs empirical evidence in developing her account of self-deception. In particular, I challenge the empirical basis of her assumption that political self-deception is significantly more predictable, and therefore preventable, than political lying. My discussion seeks to show that, in addition to its intended contribution to the study of political deception, Political Self-Deception offers a valuable perspective on recent debates about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. However, approaching the book from this methodological angle reveals, in turn, some weaknesses in the empirical foundations of one of Galeotti's own key normative claims.
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Pub Date : 2020-12-04DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1853921
N. Manson
ABSTRACT Galeotti argues that we can gain a better understanding of political decision making by drawing upon the notion of self-deception and offers a rich articulation of what self-deception is, and how and why it exerts influence upon political decision making, especially in high-stakes contexts where the decision seems to be counter to rationality. But such contexts are also explicable from a different perspective, with different theoretical resources. In recent years the field of ‘virtue epistemology’ has discussed a wide range of epistemic vices – traits of character, and cognitive strategies, that stand in the way of gaining knowledge. This raises questions about how an explanation of political decision making in terms of self-deception relates to an explanation in terms of epistemic vice. Because the notion of epistemic vice applies to self-deception and to other cognitive deficiencies, it is argued that the broader notion of epistemic vice might be explanatorily richer, and more useful.
{"title":"Political self-deception and epistemic vice","authors":"N. Manson","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1853921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1853921","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Galeotti argues that we can gain a better understanding of political decision making by drawing upon the notion of self-deception and offers a rich articulation of what self-deception is, and how and why it exerts influence upon political decision making, especially in high-stakes contexts where the decision seems to be counter to rationality. But such contexts are also explicable from a different perspective, with different theoretical resources. In recent years the field of ‘virtue epistemology’ has discussed a wide range of epistemic vices – traits of character, and cognitive strategies, that stand in the way of gaining knowledge. This raises questions about how an explanation of political decision making in terms of self-deception relates to an explanation in terms of epistemic vice. Because the notion of epistemic vice applies to self-deception and to other cognitive deficiencies, it is argued that the broader notion of epistemic vice might be explanatorily richer, and more useful.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75728359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-08DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1816001
Martin Beckstein
ABSTRACT To assess the merits and demerits of the content of Culp’s educational programme, the paper does three things: First, it discusses whether Culp’s defence against conceivable objections manages to effectively dispel the charge of cosmopolitan arrogance. Second, it spells out one implication of epistemic modesty, which Culp considers a core competence to be imparted by citizenship education. Third, it reflects upon the tricky task of motivating individuals to comply with the demands of justice. Taken together, the paper argues that Culp’s case is impressively strong but nevertheless tends to suffer from a rationalist constriction. It does not leave sufficient room for tradition in private life and public reasoning. This rationalist constriction is problematic from a normative philosophical, and especially a practice-oriented viewpoint.
{"title":"Cosmopolitan arrogance, epistemic modesty and the motivational prerequisites for solidarity","authors":"Martin Beckstein","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1816001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1816001","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT To assess the merits and demerits of the content of Culp’s educational programme, the paper does three things: First, it discusses whether Culp’s defence against conceivable objections manages to effectively dispel the charge of cosmopolitan arrogance. Second, it spells out one implication of epistemic modesty, which Culp considers a core competence to be imparted by citizenship education. Third, it reflects upon the tricky task of motivating individuals to comply with the demands of justice. Taken together, the paper argues that Culp’s case is impressively strong but nevertheless tends to suffer from a rationalist constriction. It does not leave sufficient room for tradition in private life and public reasoning. This rationalist constriction is problematic from a normative philosophical, and especially a practice-oriented viewpoint.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79830960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-08DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1821531
Julian Culp
ABSTRACT In Democratic Education in a Globalized World (Routledge, 2019) I defend a discourse theory of global justice as the appropriate normative 1 1 I would like to thank the guest editors of the book symposium, Klaus Dingwerth and Simon Pistor, as well as David Tresilian and Sharman Levinson for valuable exchanges on this article. ground for conceiving educational justice and citizenship education under conditions of economic and political globalization. In addition, I articulate democratic conceptions of global educational justice and citizenship education that recognize a moral-political right to democratically adequate education and call for the creation of transnational democratic consciousness. Based on these conceptions I spell out school practices such as historically informed, cross-cultural learning within socially diverse settings that would contribute to realizing these conceptions. In this article I reply to liberal perfectionist, communitarian-conservative and empiricist-historical critiques of Democratic Education in a Globalized World from Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein and Michael Geiss, respectively. I emphasize the feasibility of injustice-reducing educational practices, I explain how a discourse theory of justice accommodates considerations of both the good and the right, and I justify why the grim record of past educational experience does not render pointless the pursuit of progressive aims through education.
{"title":"A vindication of transnational democratic education – replies to Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein and Michael Geiss","authors":"Julian Culp","doi":"10.1080/16544951.2020.1821531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1821531","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Democratic Education in a Globalized World (Routledge, 2019) I defend a discourse theory of global justice as the appropriate normative 1 1 I would like to thank the guest editors of the book symposium, Klaus Dingwerth and Simon Pistor, as well as David Tresilian and Sharman Levinson for valuable exchanges on this article. ground for conceiving educational justice and citizenship education under conditions of economic and political globalization. In addition, I articulate democratic conceptions of global educational justice and citizenship education that recognize a moral-political right to democratically adequate education and call for the creation of transnational democratic consciousness. Based on these conceptions I spell out school practices such as historically informed, cross-cultural learning within socially diverse settings that would contribute to realizing these conceptions. In this article I reply to liberal perfectionist, communitarian-conservative and empiricist-historical critiques of Democratic Education in a Globalized World from Michael Festl, Martin Beckstein and Michael Geiss, respectively. I emphasize the feasibility of injustice-reducing educational practices, I explain how a discourse theory of justice accommodates considerations of both the good and the right, and I justify why the grim record of past educational experience does not render pointless the pursuit of progressive aims through education.","PeriodicalId":55964,"journal":{"name":"Ethics & Global Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81785368","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-08DOI: 10.1080/16544951.2020.1816015
Michael G. Festl
ABSTRACT This article engages with Julian Culp’s Democratic Education in a Globalized World from the perspective of political philosophy in a global world. The focus is on liberalism. From this angle, Culp’s book entails three important claims. The first is that a right to basic education on the global level exists, i.e. a right to education for everybody independent of one’s nation state. The second claim is that the implementation of this right is not a task for each nation state alone but of world society as a whole. This implies that countries that are able to provide more than basic education to its citizens have a duty to redistribute part of their excess resources to help poor countries secure basic education for their citizens. Culp’s third claim, relevant to the liberal project, is on the kind of education that is supposed to go global. This education should be free-standing, that is, based on political as opposed to perfectionist arguments. This contribution agrees with the first claim, is sceptical regarding the second one, and disagrees with the third one.
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