Foundations of Chemistry最新文献

Molecular structure is one of the dispositional attributes of the molecule and counted as an example of affordances. This attribute has been systematically exploited through the development of theories and practice of organic chemistry. (Ochiai 2023, pp. 141–149) The question to be addressed in this study is whether we can legitimately claim that this type of attribute is real. To answer the question, we first clarify what is worthy of the word ‘reality’ in scientific arguments. Whitehead claims that a physical substance like electron is a bundle of spatial-temporal experience. (Mesle 2008, p. 36) The contention is that we cognize the causal relationships of the physical world through the experience of events. What we cognize as real is not unchanging matter but various kinds of events we experience. Based on this recognition we examine the nature of affordances. Affordances are the context-relative dispositional attributes of {agent-world} complexes. (Harré 2014, pp. 77–91; Harré and Llored 2018, pp. 167–186) The affordance of a knife becomes actualized through our experience of cutting. In this way affordances are concerned with work or the function of something useful. They are materialized as tools. This suggests that affordances are real, and so is molecular structure. Molecular structure is characterized by a certain function which molecules show in organic synthesis. Other dispositional attributes of molecules that become actualized in the context of organic chemistry are also examined. We refer to the physical significance of wavefunctions as well, which we discussed in the previous study. (Ochiai 2023, pp. 359–367) Creating function, we expand a world we cognize as real. This view of the world we name ‘functional realism.’ Our conceptual scheme is supported by Quine’s holism.

In philosophy, the empirical success of a science is often explained by the fact that it has managed to discover some law(s) of nature. This line of thought has not been thoroughly explored with respect to chemistry. The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by showing how we could think about laws in chemistry. Specifically, it briefly presents how laws of nature are understood in philosophy of science. It then discusses two case studies from chemistry—the periodic table and chemical reactions—and explains how general ideas about law-hood can be applied to these cases. Lastly, it presents research questions and philosophical problems that arise by considering chemistry from the perspective of laws. This analysis illustrates that there is value in thinking about laws in chemistry.

The article contrasts the way that laws are regarded by some philosophers of science with the way that they are regarded by scientists and science educators. After a brief review of the Humean and necessitarian views of scienfic laws, I highlight difference between scientists who regard laws as being merely descriptive and philosophers who generally regard them as being explanatory and, in some cases, as being necessary. I also discuss the views of two prominent philosophers of science who deny any role for scienfic laws. I conclude that science educators should be wary of adopng the necessitarian view of scienfic laws.

In this paper we will argue that the identity of the entities that inhabit the nanoworld is a contextual identity. To defend that, we will analyse the so-called “biological” identity and the “synthetic” identity of nanomaterials. From this analysis, we will claim that nano-individuals (entities that show an intermediate nature between individuals and stuff), can be adequately understood from the perspective of a processual ontology. With that, we intend to contribute to the philosophical understanding of the ontology of the nano-domain.

In recent years, the definition of mole, the unit of the amount of substance, has changed to have the base units of the International System defined by “explicit-constant” formulations. The old definition, by referring explicitly to both mass and elementary units, suggests that the mole is a bridge between the macroscopic and microscopic registers. Conversely, the new definition emphasizes the aspect of counting, referred to any kind of elementary unit. Paradoxically, this results in the disappearance of the notion of substance from the very unit of the quantity amount of substance. This change of definition elicited both positive and negative remarks from various authors, in relation to its epistemological, disciplinary, lexical and educational implications. In the present paper, we analyze some of these issues, highlighting the (conflicting) motivations of metrologists and chemists. We argue that the new definition of mole reflects a view of chemistry according to which the microscopic perspective prevails, possibly entailing the loss of reference to the macroscopic register; this could be related with the profound change undergone by the cognitive practices of chemistry along this last century.

Although the electron density can be calculated with the formal resources of quantum mechanics, in physics it does not play the leading role that the quantum state does. In contrast, the concept of electron density is central in quantum chemistry. There is no doubt about how the electron density is computed in terms of the wave function of an atom or molecule. However, when the interpretation of the concept is at stake, there is no general agreement. In this article we will analyze the two main interpretations of the concept of electron density: the Born-style probability density interpretation and the Schrödinger-style charge density interpretation. In particular, we will examine their differences, their relations with quantum mechanics and the consequences that each of them entails from a strictly quantum point of view.