Pub Date : 2014-01-01DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.322014.557
Idil Boran
As countries are negotiating a new global climate agreement, this paper explores options for a mechanism on loss and damage. A highly intuitive formula is that of implementing a system of compensation based on historical accountability for past emissions. The paper highlights the shortcomings of this approach. It advances, instead, a risk-sharing approach within an adaptation framework. The central idea is to include – within the architecture of international cooperation – insurance-like policy mechanisms, extending safety nets to communities vulnerable to climate-related impacts. The merit of this approach is that it captures an important conception of justice, while responding to the challenges of multilateral decisionmaking. Its distinguishing feature is a convergence of considerations of justice with those of efficiency and durability.
{"title":"Risk-Sharing: A Normative Framework for International Climate Negotiations","authors":"Idil Boran","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.322014.557","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.322014.557","url":null,"abstract":"As countries are negotiating a new global climate agreement, this paper explores options for a mechanism on loss and damage. A highly intuitive formula is that of implementing a system of compensation based on historical accountability for past emissions. The paper highlights the shortcomings of this approach. It advances, instead, a risk-sharing approach within an adaptation framework. The central idea is to include – within the architecture of international cooperation – insurance-like policy mechanisms, extending safety nets to communities vulnerable to climate-related impacts. The merit of this approach is that it captures an important conception of justice, while responding to the challenges of multilateral decisionmaking. Its distinguishing feature is a convergence of considerations of justice with those of efficiency and durability.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"4-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66670609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-10-11DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.131
K. Oakley, D. O’Brien, David Lee
Although much of the debate in UK policy circles has been on the definition and measurement of well-being, there have been as yet relatively few attempts to apply a well-being lens to specific policy areas. One partial exception has been cultural policy. In 2010 the Culture and Sport Evidence Programme (CASE) reported on a three-year research project into the drivers and impacts of participation in sports and cultural activity. CASE was a major programme within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the UK's ministry of culture. A key strand of the programme was to understand and assess the benefits of cultural engagement. The project assessed in terms of subjective well-being the value to the individual of participation in sports and engagement in cultural activity (CASE 2010, 5). In a policy area often criticized for its lack of investment in research and evidence-gathering, the size of the programme alone--[pounds sterling]1.8m for an effort that brought together all the main cultural policy organizations in the UK--could be taken as a sign that the "well-being agenda" held out some promise for cultural policy-makers. Indeed, it could be argued that cultural activities, with their associations of conviviality, "flow-like" engagement (Csikszentmihalyi 1992), and attention to questions of both meaning and belonging, offer fertile ground for policy engagement with well-being. Yet despite the rather startling finding that a visit to the cinema once a week had an income compensation value of [pounds sterling]9,000 per household per year (CASE 2010), developing a well-being-inflected cultural policy is proving quite problematic. Although debates about culture and the good life are of ancient lineage, our concern is with the UK policy regime of the last fifteen years or so, first under the New Labour government (1997-2010) and later under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. This corresponds with the growth of well-being as a policy discourse, both in the UK and internationally. Given that, we use the term "well-being" as is commonly done in policy circles to refer to a combination of subjective well-being with more eudemonic measures, although we recognize that these definitions are both contested and confused. Although we understand "culture" in a broad sense to include the arts (visual and performing arts, music, literature, and so on), the media (film, TV, radio, videogames, and other social media), heritage (museums, built and natural heritage), and sport, the focus of this paper will be largely on "cultural policy" as it concerns the arts and heritage. The link between participation in sports and well-being is reasonably well-demonstrated (Scully et al. 1998; Chatzisarantis and Hagger 2007), whereas media use is more often associated with debates about its role as a source of ill-being and a variety of moral panics (Kraut et al. 1998). Media policy-makers may legitimately wish to stress the well-being benefits of media part
尽管英国政策圈的大部分争论都是关于幸福的定义和衡量，但迄今为止，将幸福的视角应用于具体政策领域的尝试相对较少。文化政策是一个部分例外。2010年，文化和体育证据方案(CASE)报告了一项为期三年的研究项目，研究参与体育和文化活动的驱动因素和影响。CASE是英国文化部文化、媒体和体育部(DCMS)的一个主要项目。该计划的一个关键部分是理解和评估文化参与的好处。该项目从主观幸福感的角度评估了参与体育和文化活动对个人的价值(CASE 2010, 5)。在一个经常因缺乏研究和证据收集投资而受到批评的政策领域，单是这个项目的规模——180万英镑，汇集了英国所有主要的文化政策组织——就可以被视为“福祉议程”为文化政策制定者带来了一些希望的迹象。事实上，可以说，文化活动与欢乐、“流动式”参与(Csikszentmihalyi, 1992)以及对意义和归属问题的关注有关，为政策与福祉的接触提供了肥沃的土壤。然而，尽管有一个相当惊人的发现，即每周去一次电影院，每户家庭每年的收入补偿价值为9000英镑(CASE 2010)，但制定一项受福祉影响的文化政策被证明是相当有问题的。虽然关于文化和美好生活的争论由来已久，但我们关注的是过去15年左右英国的政策体制，首先是新工党政府(1997-2010)，后来是保守党-自由民主党联合政府。这与福祉作为一种政策话语的增长相对应，无论是在英国还是在国际上。考虑到这一点，我们使用“幸福”一词，就像政策界通常做的那样，指的是主观幸福与更幸福的措施的结合，尽管我们认识到这些定义既有争议又令人困惑。虽然我们从广义上理解“文化”包括艺术(视觉和表演艺术、音乐、文学等)、媒体(电影、电视、广播、电子游戏和其他社交媒体)、遗产(博物馆、建筑和自然遗产)和体育，但本文的重点将主要放在“文化政策”上，因为它涉及艺术和遗产。参与体育运动与幸福感之间的联系得到了很好的证明(Scully et al. 1998;Chatzisarantis和Hagger 2007)，而媒体的使用更多地与关于其作为疾病和各种道德恐慌来源的角色的辩论有关(Kraut et al. 1998)。媒体决策者可能有理由希望强调媒体参与带来的福祉，就电影而言，他们有时也会这样做(DCMS 2012)，但他们通常是对媒体使用往往有害的建议采取的后防行动，特别是对儿童(Livingstone和Haddon 2009)。然而，在艺术领域，争取合法性的斗争，以及因此而要求公共支出的呼声，通常更为强烈，而且为了宣传目的而使用工具主义论点的情况也更为充分。因此，艺术和遗产一直是受福祉影响的政策话语的焦点。直到最近，在英国，文化政策与幸福观念的接触主要有两种:鼓励艺术和创造性活动作为教育的一部分，以及使用艺术疗法作为治疗各种疾病的方法。后一种形式可能有着最悠久的历史:从精神分裂症和其他形式的精神病患者的视觉表达的治疗益处，到将艺术作为一种治疗抑郁症、焦虑症和其他精神疾病的形式(Staricoff 2004;Heenan 2006)。…
{"title":"Happy now?: Well-being and cultural policy","authors":"K. Oakley, D. O’Brien, David Lee","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.131","url":null,"abstract":"Although much of the debate in UK policy circles has been on the definition and measurement of well-being, there have been as yet relatively few attempts to apply a well-being lens to specific policy areas. One partial exception has been cultural policy. In 2010 the Culture and Sport Evidence Programme (CASE) reported on a three-year research project into the drivers and impacts of participation in sports and cultural activity. CASE was a major programme within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the UK's ministry of culture. A key strand of the programme was to understand and assess the benefits of cultural engagement. The project assessed in terms of subjective well-being the value to the individual of participation in sports and engagement in cultural activity (CASE 2010, 5). In a policy area often criticized for its lack of investment in research and evidence-gathering, the size of the programme alone--[pounds sterling]1.8m for an effort that brought together all the main cultural policy organizations in the UK--could be taken as a sign that the \"well-being agenda\" held out some promise for cultural policy-makers. Indeed, it could be argued that cultural activities, with their associations of conviviality, \"flow-like\" engagement (Csikszentmihalyi 1992), and attention to questions of both meaning and belonging, offer fertile ground for policy engagement with well-being. Yet despite the rather startling finding that a visit to the cinema once a week had an income compensation value of [pounds sterling]9,000 per household per year (CASE 2010), developing a well-being-inflected cultural policy is proving quite problematic. Although debates about culture and the good life are of ancient lineage, our concern is with the UK policy regime of the last fifteen years or so, first under the New Labour government (1997-2010) and later under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition. This corresponds with the growth of well-being as a policy discourse, both in the UK and internationally. Given that, we use the term \"well-being\" as is commonly done in policy circles to refer to a combination of subjective well-being with more eudemonic measures, although we recognize that these definitions are both contested and confused. Although we understand \"culture\" in a broad sense to include the arts (visual and performing arts, music, literature, and so on), the media (film, TV, radio, videogames, and other social media), heritage (museums, built and natural heritage), and sport, the focus of this paper will be largely on \"cultural policy\" as it concerns the arts and heritage. The link between participation in sports and well-being is reasonably well-demonstrated (Scully et al. 1998; Chatzisarantis and Hagger 2007), whereas media use is more often associated with debates about its role as a source of ill-being and a variety of moral panics (Kraut et al. 1998). Media policy-makers may legitimately wish to stress the well-being benefits of media part","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"18-26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-10-11DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.130
Tim E. Taylor
When we talk about well-being we often also talk about what is "good for" a person. The fact that we use the term "good" suggests that there is a kind of value here. Philosophers tend to call this "prudential value" to distinguish it from value of other kinds, such as aesthetic value or moral value. Surprisingly little attention is given in the philosophical literature to the relationship between prudential value and well-being. Often, they are simply regarded as synonyms (in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example [Crisp 2008]). In this paper I shall argue that it is useful to make a distinction between these two separate, but closely related, notions and that a recognition of this distinction, and an increased focus upon prudential value in certain circumstances, would be beneficial in the context of public policy. The Distinction When we say that a person has a high level of well-being, we tend to mean that his life is going well for him overall. In some cases a judgment about well-being may concern a person's whole life, but it is more usual to talk about somebody's well-being at a particular time. Sometimes we talk about specific kinds of well-being, such as psychological or social well-being. In these cases we are concerned with how well a person's life is going in a particular respect, rather than on the whole. Nevertheless, a judgment about someone's level of psychological or social well-being is still a judgment about how well his life is going overall in that respect. By contrast, when we talk about prudential value, we do not necessarily make any overall evaluation of a person's life. We may, of course, talk about the prudential value of a person's life itself--whether it is a good life for that person. But lives are by no means the only things that we evaluate in this way. We talk about all sorts of things, including objects, people, events, and states of affairs as being good or bad for people. When we talk about something's being good for a person, we mean that this thing makes, or tends to make, that person's life go better for her. But making such a judgment does not imply any judgment about how well her life is going overall. Indeed, the judgment that something is good for some person is entirely consistent with a judgment that the person's life is going badly overall. Thus, for example, when a condemned man eats his favorite meal on the eve of his execution, it is plausible that in some small way his enjoyment of the meal is good for him: it makes his life go a little bit better for him than it would have gone otherwise. Nevertheless, this is consistent with the fact that overall his life is going very badly indeed. We might say that the meal has positive prudential value for him, but that his level of well-being is very low. We can sum up the distinction by saying that well-being is what someone has if her life is going well for her; whereas something has prudential value for someone if it contributes to making her
{"title":"Well-being and Prudential Value","authors":"Tim E. Taylor","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.130","url":null,"abstract":"When we talk about well-being we often also talk about what is \"good for\" a person. The fact that we use the term \"good\" suggests that there is a kind of value here. Philosophers tend to call this \"prudential value\" to distinguish it from value of other kinds, such as aesthetic value or moral value. Surprisingly little attention is given in the philosophical literature to the relationship between prudential value and well-being. Often, they are simply regarded as synonyms (in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for example [Crisp 2008]). In this paper I shall argue that it is useful to make a distinction between these two separate, but closely related, notions and that a recognition of this distinction, and an increased focus upon prudential value in certain circumstances, would be beneficial in the context of public policy. The Distinction When we say that a person has a high level of well-being, we tend to mean that his life is going well for him overall. In some cases a judgment about well-being may concern a person's whole life, but it is more usual to talk about somebody's well-being at a particular time. Sometimes we talk about specific kinds of well-being, such as psychological or social well-being. In these cases we are concerned with how well a person's life is going in a particular respect, rather than on the whole. Nevertheless, a judgment about someone's level of psychological or social well-being is still a judgment about how well his life is going overall in that respect. By contrast, when we talk about prudential value, we do not necessarily make any overall evaluation of a person's life. We may, of course, talk about the prudential value of a person's life itself--whether it is a good life for that person. But lives are by no means the only things that we evaluate in this way. We talk about all sorts of things, including objects, people, events, and states of affairs as being good or bad for people. When we talk about something's being good for a person, we mean that this thing makes, or tends to make, that person's life go better for her. But making such a judgment does not imply any judgment about how well her life is going overall. Indeed, the judgment that something is good for some person is entirely consistent with a judgment that the person's life is going badly overall. Thus, for example, when a condemned man eats his favorite meal on the eve of his execution, it is plausible that in some small way his enjoyment of the meal is good for him: it makes his life go a little bit better for him than it would have gone otherwise. Nevertheless, this is consistent with the fact that overall his life is going very badly indeed. We might say that the meal has positive prudential value for him, but that his level of well-being is very low. We can sum up the distinction by saying that well-being is what someone has if her life is going well for her; whereas something has prudential value for someone if it contributes to making her","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"10-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-10-11DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.212
T. Vis̆ak, J. Balcombe
In this paper we will argue that generality is a virtue of Haybron’s account of welfare. Indeed, reflecting on the applicability of his theory to nonhuman animals will give us a better understanding of its applicability to humans. We will first focus on self-fulfillment and suggest an interpretation of Haybron’s account according to which the self-fulfillment of an individual consists in the fulfillment of the aspects of the self that are applicable to that particular individual. This makes Haybron’s account of welfare applicable to all sentient beings. Then we will focus on sub-personal nature-fulfillment and argue that the same interpretation leads to the conclusion that Haybron’s account of welfare recognizes even nonsentient beings as welfare subjects. We suggest a way of avoiding this latter conclusion.
{"title":"The Applicability of the Self-fulfillment Account of Welfare to Nonhuman Animals, Babies, and Mentally Disabled Humans","authors":"T. Vis̆ak, J. Balcombe","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.212","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we will argue that generality is a virtue of Haybron’s account of welfare. Indeed, reflecting on the applicability of his theory to nonhuman animals will give us a better understanding of its applicability to humans. We will first focus on self-fulfillment and suggest an interpretation of Haybron’s account according to which the self-fulfillment of an individual consists in the fulfillment of the aspects of the self that are applicable to that particular individual. This makes Haybron’s account of welfare applicable to all sentient beings. Then we will focus on sub-personal nature-fulfillment and argue that the same interpretation leads to the conclusion that Haybron’s account of welfare recognizes even nonsentient beings as welfare subjects. We suggest a way of avoiding this latter conclusion.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"27-34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-10-11DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.133
M. Qizilbash
The capability approach was first developed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture "Equality of What?" (Sen 1980). Canonical statements of the approach were published in the 1980s (for example, Sen 1985). Slightly modified statements were subsequently published in the early 1990s (for example, Sen 1993), with more "mature" versions published in Sen's Development as Freedom and The Idea of Justice (Sen 1999; 2009). Over the years, variations of the approach have emerged. In particular, Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, which is distinguished by a different title--the "capabilities approach"--has emerged as a distinct view in moral and political theory. The capability approach is often seen as advancing a distinct view of human well-being. But at the same time it also supports Sen's claims that welfare is not the exclusive object of value in moral evaluation and that freedom has a value independent of welfare. The freedom to live a life we value and have reason to value--or the opportunity we have to lead a valuable or good life--is, very roughly, our capability. Those interested in alternative views of well-being or of the good life will ask: does this approach provide a distinctive account of what makes a life go well or better, or of human flourishing? If it does, does this view of the good life provide any new insights into public policies and about what governments and others should, or should not, promote? I argue in this paper that even if Sen does not advance a substantive view of the good life in developing his capability perspective, his theoretical commitments lead him to quite specific policy views. These strongly contrast with those adopted by one contemporary utilitarian: Richard Layard. Although Sen's views about policy typically overlap with those of others--like Nussbaum--who favor a version of the capability perspective, sometimes variations of the approach can diverge in their policy applications because of theoretical differences. The Capability Perspective The capability perspective emerged from an engagement with a variety of different theoretical approaches within philosophy and welfare economics. In both areas it started from a critical attitude to specific notions of welfare in utilitarian thinking, those that see welfare or "utility" in terms of the satisfaction of desires, pleasure, or happiness. In each case, the approach suggests that the metric of "utility" might be distorted in some way. The overworked indentured servant and the undernourished peasant may cut their desires, learn to find pleasure in small mercies, or learn to be happy with their lot. Nonetheless, they suffer from significant deprivations and may be short on opportunities to live lives that are valuable. This "adaptation" (or "small mercies") objection to "utility"-based analysis suggests that we should be concerned, in evaluating the quality of people's lives, with the opportunities they have and with what they are able to do or be. And it caut
{"title":"On Capability and the Good Life: Theoretical Debates and their Practical Implications","authors":"M. Qizilbash","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.133","url":null,"abstract":"The capability approach was first developed by Amartya Sen in his Tanner Lecture \"Equality of What?\" (Sen 1980). Canonical statements of the approach were published in the 1980s (for example, Sen 1985). Slightly modified statements were subsequently published in the early 1990s (for example, Sen 1993), with more \"mature\" versions published in Sen's Development as Freedom and The Idea of Justice (Sen 1999; 2009). Over the years, variations of the approach have emerged. In particular, Martha Nussbaum's version of the approach, which is distinguished by a different title--the \"capabilities approach\"--has emerged as a distinct view in moral and political theory. The capability approach is often seen as advancing a distinct view of human well-being. But at the same time it also supports Sen's claims that welfare is not the exclusive object of value in moral evaluation and that freedom has a value independent of welfare. The freedom to live a life we value and have reason to value--or the opportunity we have to lead a valuable or good life--is, very roughly, our capability. Those interested in alternative views of well-being or of the good life will ask: does this approach provide a distinctive account of what makes a life go well or better, or of human flourishing? If it does, does this view of the good life provide any new insights into public policies and about what governments and others should, or should not, promote? I argue in this paper that even if Sen does not advance a substantive view of the good life in developing his capability perspective, his theoretical commitments lead him to quite specific policy views. These strongly contrast with those adopted by one contemporary utilitarian: Richard Layard. Although Sen's views about policy typically overlap with those of others--like Nussbaum--who favor a version of the capability perspective, sometimes variations of the approach can diverge in their policy applications because of theoretical differences. The Capability Perspective The capability perspective emerged from an engagement with a variety of different theoretical approaches within philosophy and welfare economics. In both areas it started from a critical attitude to specific notions of welfare in utilitarian thinking, those that see welfare or \"utility\" in terms of the satisfaction of desires, pleasure, or happiness. In each case, the approach suggests that the metric of \"utility\" might be distorted in some way. The overworked indentured servant and the undernourished peasant may cut their desires, learn to find pleasure in small mercies, or learn to be happy with their lot. Nonetheless, they suffer from significant deprivations and may be short on opportunities to live lives that are valuable. This \"adaptation\" (or \"small mercies\") objection to \"utility\"-based analysis suggests that we should be concerned, in evaluating the quality of people's lives, with the opportunities they have and with what they are able to do or be. And it caut","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"32 1","pages":"35-42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-09-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.459
D. Lévine
Those who are economically well off may admit that global poverty is a great evil that demands significant action on their part but also believe that morality -- duty or obligation -- cannot reasonably require them to make great sacrifices. We may resolve this tension if we think less in terms of the duties of individuals to the word's poor and more in terms of collective action; that is, in terms of the institutions, policies, and practices that make it easier for the wealthy to help the poor and more likely that the poor will receive the help they need.
{"title":"On the Morality of Peacekeeping Among Active Civilians","authors":"D. Lévine","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.459","url":null,"abstract":"Those who are economically well off may admit that global poverty is a great evil that demands significant action on their part but also believe that morality -- duty or obligation -- cannot reasonably require them to make great sacrifices. We may resolve this tension if we think less in terms of the duties of individuals to the word's poor and more in terms of collective action; that is, in terms of the institutions, policies, and practices that make it easier for the wealthy to help the poor and more likely that the poor will receive the help they need.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"2-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-09-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.452
J. Lichtenberg
Those who are economically well off may admit that global poverty is a great evil that demands significant action on their part but also believe that morality -- duty or obligation -- cannot reasonably require them to make great sacrifices. We may resolve this tension if we think less in terms of the duties of individuals to the word's poor and more in terms of collective action; that is, in terms of the institutions, policies, and practices that make it easier for the wealthy to help the poor and more likely that the poor will receive the help they need.
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Pub Date : 2013-09-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.453
R. Nelson
Economists in the United States are strongly divided between those who advocate free markets and those who defend politically inspired regulations and policies. Almost all economists, whatever their political views, however, have traditionally agreed that the extension of free market principles internationally is desirable, that is, global free trade. To understand why there is there much greater agreement among economists about free trade in the international arena, we have to explore the religious, social, and cultural assumptions that lead them to believe that whether or not free trade serves the interests of any one country at a particular time, it leads -- sometimes ruthlessly -- the betterment of humanity worldwide.
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Pub Date : 2013-09-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.462
M. Sagoff
Clinical studies that run over the Internet, if they are not supported or regulated by a federal agency, are generally not covered by the Common Rule, which protects (among other things) the privacy and confidentiality of information obtained from the human subjects of research. Instead, Internet-leveraged clinical studies improvise a variety of their own protocols to protect research subjects from "informational risk." These protocols generally put less emphasis on the analysis of big data and more emphasis on the history of particular cases. The protocols chosen to manage informational risk might then reflect and reinforce assumptions about the philosophy of science and about the progress of medicine.
{"title":"ELSI and the Philosophy of Science","authors":"M. Sagoff","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.462","url":null,"abstract":"Clinical studies that run over the Internet, if they are not supported or regulated by a federal agency, are generally not covered by the Common Rule, which protects (among other things) the privacy and confidentiality of information obtained from the human subjects of research. Instead, Internet-leveraged clinical studies improvise a variety of their own protocols to protect research subjects from \"informational risk.\" These protocols generally put less emphasis on the analysis of big data and more emphasis on the history of particular cases. The protocols chosen to manage informational risk might then reflect and reinforce assumptions about the philosophy of science and about the progress of medicine.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"27-35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-08-26DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.135
Sam Wren-Lewis
The use of well-being research in assessing and creating public policy is gaining popularity. The UK's Office of National Statistics has developed its National Well-being Index to do exactly that, and several other nations have followed suit. This sway in political will, however, can make the use of well-being research in public policy seem less controversial than it is. Much of the rhetoric around the move toward well-being measures in evaluating policy has centered either on the idea that well-being is what "ultimately matters" or that it is at least "something we all care about." In this essay, I will argue that such claims are illegitimate from the perspective of political liberalism. The former kind of claim is illegitimate insofar as liberal societies should not base policy on comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines that many reasonable citizens may not accept. The latter kind of claim is illegitimate insofar as some people care significantly more than others about well-being or the ingredients of well-being. Thus, the use of well-being research to evaluate public policy cannot be justified on either of these grounds. Does this mean that there are no justifiable grounds for well-being-based policy? Not necessarily. In this essay, I explore the possibility that the psychological aspects of well-being can be viewed as a "primary good." That is, the preservation and promotion of well-being can be justified as instrumentally valuable for most people. Well-being is instrumentally valuable for most people regardless of their particular intrinsic values. In John Rawls's terms, well-being can be viewed as an all-purpose good that people are assumed to want whatever their plans. The reason for this is that the psychological aspects of well-being, the kinds of things subjective well-being research typically measures, tend to be cognitively and motivationally necessary for agency. Without being able to appreciate one's life emotionally and cognitively, one cannot sufficiently pursue one's own conception of the good. Thus, well-being tends to be necessary for leading a good life regardless of one's conception of in what a good life consists. Even if it is the case, however, that well-being can be viewed as a primary good in this way, it is not necessarily the case that the state should promote it as a matter of justice. The state should promote only primary goods that share certain important features. First, a given primary good must be distributable and objectively comparable if the state is to promote it in a just manner. In addition, the state must be in the best position to promote a given primary good. That is, the primary good must require institutional support: public policies related to its existence and continuation. Moreover, the primary good must be non-fungible. That is, it must not be commonly obtainable through substitutes--things other than the goods and services provided by the state. I will argue that the psychologic
福祉研究在评估和制定公共政策方面的应用越来越受欢迎。英国国家统计局(Office of National Statistics)为此制定了国民幸福指数(National Well-being Index)，其他几个国家也纷纷效仿。然而，这种政治意愿的摇摆可以使福祉研究在公共政策中的应用看起来没有那么有争议。围绕在政策评估中采用幸福指标的说法，要么集中在幸福是“最终重要的”，要么至少是“我们都关心的东西”这一观点上。在本文中，我将从政治自由主义的角度论证这些主张是不合法的。前一种主张是不合理的，因为自由社会不应该把政策建立在许多理性公民可能不接受的全面的宗教、道德或哲学教义之上。后一种说法是不合理的，因为有些人比其他人更关心幸福或幸福的成分。因此，利用福祉研究来评估公共政策，在上述任何一个理由上都是不合理的。这是否意味着基于福祉的政策没有正当理由?不一定。在这篇文章中，我探讨了幸福感的心理方面可以被视为“主要利益”的可能性。也就是说，对大多数人来说，维护和促进幸福是有价值的。幸福对大多数人来说是有工具价值的，不管他们的内在价值如何。用约翰·罗尔斯的话说，幸福可以被看作是一种万能的好东西，人们被假设无论他们有什么计划都想要它。原因在于，幸福感的心理方面，即主观幸福感研究通常衡量的东西，往往是行为在认知和动机上所必需的。一个人如果不能从情感上和认知上欣赏自己的生活，就无法充分追求自己对美好的理解。因此，幸福往往是过上美好生活的必要条件，而不管一个人对美好生活的概念是什么。然而，即使是这样，幸福可以被视为一种主要的好，也不一定是国家应该把它作为一种正义的问题来促进。国家应该只促进具有某些重要特征的初级产品。首先，如果国家要以公正的方式促进一种特定的初级商品，它必须是可分配的和客观上可比较的。此外，国家必须处于促进特定初级商品的最佳位置。也就是说，首要利益必须需要体制支持:与它的存在和延续有关的公共政策。此外，首要商品必须是不可替代的。也就是说，它不能通过替代品——除了国家提供的商品和服务之外的东西——普遍获得。我认为幸福的心理方面都有这些特征。因此，根据政治自由主义，政府可以合法地提供必要的社会产品，以维护和促进心理方面的福祉。然而，最后我要提醒大家一句。公共政策应该在多大程度上促进福祉并不明显。也许只有幸福的基本心理方面才是能动性所必需的。事实上，也许只有不存在疾病的心理方面(如慢性抑郁症)才是一件主要的好事。这可能会对政府为维护和促进福祉而制定的政策产生影响。关于福祉研究在公共政策中的应用的许多讨论都集中在(a)福祉研究的一般有效性或特定含义，或(b)福祉和相关概念(如幸福，生活满意度，生活质量等)的价值。．．．
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