Pub Date : 2013-03-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.189
Samuel Kessler
It seems almost commonplace now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, to bemoan the crisis facing public higher education in America. (1) Funding at the federal and state levels - sometimes in decline, sometimes on the rise - feels more tenuous than ever. (2) To entice new students, colleges and universities have been creating and revamping majors, expanding study-abroad programs and internship options, and opening new recreational and research facilities, all while increasing tuition at rates well above inflation. (3) And we have recently been witness to a disturbing set of public shamings as schools disclose a culture of statistical inflation in pursuit of higher rankings in U.S. News and World Report (Perez-Pena and Slotnik 2012). The 2008 fiscal crisis and the fraught relationship between Congress and the White House have only added urgency to this already agitated discussion. Many reasons can explain the anxiety about the future of public higher education. This paper addresses one cause that is often unmentioned. It is my worry that millions of Americans who regard religion as central to their lives may have become disenchanted with and disenfranchised by public higher education. For one example among many, Liberty University in Virginia, founded by the Baptist preacher Jerry Falwell in 1971, has doubled its student body twice since 2007 alone. It now educates more than 60,000 students each semester - far more than even some of the largest public universities (Anderson 2013). Religious Americans who attend or send their children to parochial schools of higher education do not see their moral or political views reflected in or valued by public academia, which is often seen as dominated by left-of-center voices. (4) I believe that this sense of disenfranchisement leads religious Americans to send more and more of their children to private denominationally-affiliated colleges and seminaries instead of public universities. (5) This essay is organized into two major parts. To provide an overview of the crisis facing American higher education, I begin by discussing two representative texts, The University in Ruins by Bill Readings and The Marketplace of Ideas by Louis Menand. These books describe different sets of problems and propose divergent (though complementary) kinds of solutions. The essay then takes up a vision of the university presented in the 1790s by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and compares his view with recent writings by the contemporary social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. I conclude by using these texts to suggest how public higher education could better accommodate religious Americans. Bill Readings and the University of Economics Two books on public education, one by the late literary scholar Bill Readings and the other by the cultural historian Louis Menand, present broad critiques of the contemporary public university. In a way, these two authors create a tension with each other. For Readings, the universit
如今,在21世纪的第二个十年,哀叹美国公立高等教育面临的危机似乎已经司空见惯。联邦和州一级的资金——有时在减少,有时在增加——感觉比以往任何时候都脆弱。为了吸引新生,学院和大学一直在创建和改造专业,扩大海外留学项目和实习选择,开设新的娱乐和研究设施,与此同时,学费的涨幅远高于通货膨胀率。(3)我们最近目睹了一系列令人不安的公开羞辱,因为学校为了在《美国新闻与世界报道》中获得更高的排名,披露了一种统计膨胀的文化(Perez-Pena And Slotnik, 2012)。2008年的财政危机,以及国会和白宫之间令人担忧的关系,只会给这个本已紧张的讨论增加紧迫性。许多原因可以解释对公立高等教育未来的焦虑。本文讨论了一个经常被忽视的原因。我担心的是,数百万将宗教视为生活中心的美国人可能已经对公立高等教育不再抱有幻想,并被剥夺了权利。弗吉尼亚州的利伯蒂大学(Liberty University)就是这样一个例子。该大学由浸信会传教士杰里·福尔韦尔(Jerry Falwell)于1971年创立,仅2007年以来,学生人数就翻了两倍。它现在每学期教育超过6万名学生,远远超过一些最大的公立大学(Anderson 2013)。参加或送子女去教会学校接受高等教育的信教美国人认为,他们的道德或政治观点没有反映在公共学术界或受到公共学术界的重视,而公共学术界通常被视为由中间偏左的声音主导。(4)我相信,这种被剥夺公民权的感觉,导致美国信教的人把越来越多的孩子送到隶属于宗教的私立学院和神学院,而不是公立大学。这篇文章分为两个主要部分。为了概述美国高等教育面临的危机,我首先讨论两个具有代表性的文本,比尔·瑞丁斯的《废墟中的大学》和路易斯·梅南德的《思想市场》。这些书描述了不同的问题,并提出了不同的(尽管是互补的)解决方案。接着,这篇文章采用了德国哲学家伊曼努尔•康德(Immanuel Kant)在18世纪90年代提出的大学愿景,并将他的观点与当代社会心理学家乔纳森•海特(Jonathan Haidt)最近的著作进行了比较。最后,我用这些文本来建议公立高等教育如何更好地容纳信教的美国人。两本关于公共教育的书,一本由已故文学学者比尔·雷丁斯撰写,另一本由文化历史学家路易斯·曼南德撰写,对当代公立大学进行了广泛的批评。在某种程度上,这两位作者之间产生了一种紧张关系。在《读本》中,大学的主要功能是培养和认证资本主义工人;对Menand来说,大学在结构上是不合时宜的,与当代生活的需求脱节。看一下这两本书,就可以大致了解警报的主要话语。它还指出了“道德”、“上帝”、“国家”和“真理”(美国信教人士常用的比喻)等词往往被排除在关于公立高等教育状况和未来的辩论之外的原因。雷丁的主要论点是,到20世纪的最后十年,大学已经从一个传递他所谓的“文化”的机构转变为一个促进他所谓的“卓越”的机构。雷丁所说的“文化”指的是一种民族国家精神,一种对大学建立和成熟的政治和地理实体的成就——包括历史、文学和艺术——的叙述。...
{"title":"Religion and the Public University","authors":"Samuel Kessler","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.189","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.189","url":null,"abstract":"It seems almost commonplace now, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, to bemoan the crisis facing public higher education in America. (1) Funding at the federal and state levels - sometimes in decline, sometimes on the rise - feels more tenuous than ever. (2) To entice new students, colleges and universities have been creating and revamping majors, expanding study-abroad programs and internship options, and opening new recreational and research facilities, all while increasing tuition at rates well above inflation. (3) And we have recently been witness to a disturbing set of public shamings as schools disclose a culture of statistical inflation in pursuit of higher rankings in U.S. News and World Report (Perez-Pena and Slotnik 2012). The 2008 fiscal crisis and the fraught relationship between Congress and the White House have only added urgency to this already agitated discussion. Many reasons can explain the anxiety about the future of public higher education. This paper addresses one cause that is often unmentioned. It is my worry that millions of Americans who regard religion as central to their lives may have become disenchanted with and disenfranchised by public higher education. For one example among many, Liberty University in Virginia, founded by the Baptist preacher Jerry Falwell in 1971, has doubled its student body twice since 2007 alone. It now educates more than 60,000 students each semester - far more than even some of the largest public universities (Anderson 2013). Religious Americans who attend or send their children to parochial schools of higher education do not see their moral or political views reflected in or valued by public academia, which is often seen as dominated by left-of-center voices. (4) I believe that this sense of disenfranchisement leads religious Americans to send more and more of their children to private denominationally-affiliated colleges and seminaries instead of public universities. (5) This essay is organized into two major parts. To provide an overview of the crisis facing American higher education, I begin by discussing two representative texts, The University in Ruins by Bill Readings and The Marketplace of Ideas by Louis Menand. These books describe different sets of problems and propose divergent (though complementary) kinds of solutions. The essay then takes up a vision of the university presented in the 1790s by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and compares his view with recent writings by the contemporary social psychologist Jonathan Haidt. I conclude by using these texts to suggest how public higher education could better accommodate religious Americans. Bill Readings and the University of Economics Two books on public education, one by the late literary scholar Bill Readings and the other by the cultural historian Louis Menand, present broad critiques of the contemporary public university. In a way, these two authors create a tension with each other. For Readings, the universit","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"19-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-03-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.190
A. Light
Parties to the U.N. climate negotiations are now engaged in a three-year process to produce a new comprehensive global climate agreement. This agreement should attempt to satisfy competing demands from developed and developing countries for an equitable assignment of responsibilities for mitigating greenhouse gases. It should also be sensitive to national regulatory and legal circumstances. Unfortunately, the current basis for U.S. regulation of greenhouse gases is at odds with some approaches other nations take to the equitable reduction of emissions. This difference may make it difficult for the U.S. both to embrace a global treaty and to preserve its ability to cut its own emissions.
{"title":"An Equity Hurdle in International Climate Negotiations","authors":"A. Light","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.190","url":null,"abstract":"Parties to the U.N. climate negotiations are now engaged in a three-year process to produce a new comprehensive global climate agreement. This agreement should attempt to satisfy competing demands from developed and developing countries for an equitable assignment of responsibilities for mitigating greenhouse gases. It should also be sensitive to national regulatory and legal circumstances. Unfortunately, the current basis for U.S. regulation of greenhouse gases is at odds with some approaches other nations take to the equitable reduction of emissions. This difference may make it difficult for the U.S. both to embrace a global treaty and to preserve its ability to cut its own emissions.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"28-35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-03-22DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.188
Robert K. Fullinwider
"Does the Election Make You Want to Be Sedated?" So read a late October headline. What was the irritant calling for sedation? The "caustic" attack ads the 2012 political season delivered in spades. With the presidential election still four weeks away, Las Vegas television stations were featuring 10,000 political commercials a week. And Las Vegas ranked only tenth on the list of adsaturated markets. None of these political ads limned detailed plans for our country's future. Apart from the few that presented a candidate's fuzzy "vision" for future prosperity and freedom, the rest sliced and diced opponents, leaving an observant visitor from Mars to conclude that the only people who run for office in the United States are mountebanks, schemers, time-servers, liars, fakers, traitors, quacks, and crooks. Every opinion poll shows that the public heartily dislikes political attack ads; and baleful commentators ceaselessly lament the damage to democracy done by the steady diet of bile that campaigns feed the electorate. Yet many of those who create the ads take a different view. "Negative ads not only work, they give voters better information than positive ads," declared one political consultant a few years back. Affirmed another: "competitive, comparative, compelling ads ... provide voters with the mothers' milk of political decision-making: information." This sentiment is widely shared in the consulting profession. Are voters perhaps disgruntled with what in fact is good for them? That's what one political scientist believes. John Geer, in his 2006 book, In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns, set out to establish empirically whether negative ads hurt or helped the electoral process. He restricted his investigation to 795 television ads run in presidential races from 1960 to 2000, copies of which are readily accessible in a couple of repositories. After coding these ads for content and type, Geer concluded that * Negative ads have always outpaced positive ads by ratios ranging from 3 to 1 in 1984 to 20 to 1 in 2000. The average is about 8 to 1. * There is a clear upward trend in negativity since 1960. * Negative ads, contrary to received wisdom, enhance the democratic process by creating a more information-rich environment. The last of these conclusions is the most interesting and provocative. How did Geer arrive at it? His argument involved several stages. First, Geer postulated an "asymmetry" between positive and negative ads. "[F]or the negative ad to be effective, the sponsor ... must marshal more evidence" [than the sponsor of a positive ad]. "[W]hen politicians present negative messages, they need to provide evidence to make them credible." Geer then tested this postulate against the data. He examined the 795 ads to see if they included evidence. Geer's findings supported his postulate: "In every year under study, negative ads were much more likely to provide clear evidence to support their point than positive ads." Second
“选举让你想要镇静剂吗?”十月底的一个标题是这样写的。镇静的刺激是什么?这种“刻薄”的攻击无疑为2012年的政治季打了广告。距离总统大选还有四个星期,拉斯维加斯的电视台每周播放1万条政治广告。拉斯维加斯在饱和市场名单上仅排在第十位。这些政治广告都没有为我们国家的未来制定详细的计划。除了少数人提出了候选人对未来繁荣和自由的模糊“愿景”之外,其余的人都对对手进行了切分,让一个观察敏锐的火星访客得出结论:在美国竞选公职的人只有骗子、阴谋家、时间服务者、骗子、骗子、骗子和骗子。每一项民意调查都显示,公众非常不喜欢政治攻击广告;恶毒的评论员不断地哀叹,竞选活动给选民提供的源源不断的愤怒对民主造成了损害。然而,许多制作广告的人却有不同的看法。几年前,一位政治顾问宣称:“负面广告不仅有效,而且比正面广告能为选民提供更好的信息。”另一个人肯定地说:“竞争的、比较的、引人注目的广告……为选民提供政治决策的母乳:信息。”这种观点在咨询行业得到了广泛认同。选民们是否对实际上对他们有利的事情感到不满?这是一位政治学家的观点。约翰·吉尔(John Geer)在2006年出版的《为消极辩护:总统竞选中的攻击性广告》(in Defense of negative: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns)一书中,着手从经验上确定消极广告对选举过程是有害还是有益。他将调查范围限制在了从1960年到2000年的795个总统竞选电视广告上,这些广告的副本很容易在几个资料库中找到。在对这些广告的内容和类型进行编码后,Geer得出结论:*负面广告与正面广告的比例一直在上升,从1984年的3:1到2000年的20:1不等。平均比率约为8比1。*自1960年以来,消极情绪有明显的上升趋势。*负面广告,与公认的智慧相反,通过创造一个更丰富的信息环境来促进民主进程。最后一个结论是最有趣和最具挑衅性的。吉尔是如何得出这个结论的?他的论证包括几个阶段。首先,吉尔假设正面和负面广告之间存在“不对称”。“要想让负面广告有效,赞助商……必须拿出更多的证据”[比正面广告的赞助商]。“当政客们发出负面信息时,他们需要提供证据,让这些信息可信。”吉尔随后用数据验证了这一假设。他检查了795个广告,看它们是否包含证据。吉尔的发现支持了他的假设:“在研究的每一年里,负面广告比正面广告更有可能提供明确的证据来支持他们的观点。”第二,吉尔发现攻击性广告更可能是关于问题而不是个性。他研究的负面广告有三分之一是针对反对派候选人的性格,三分之二是针对他们的政策立场。“[N]消极的吸引力在本质上更倾向于定位....负面广告为选民提供政府行为选择的可能性几乎是正面广告的两倍。”最后,Geer展示了一些脚手架。他赞同西方政治理论中的一个标准主题,断言“(思想上的)进步是批评的产物”。350多年前,约翰弥尔顿....在《航空出版自由》中认为,最好是“让真理和谬误纠缠……在自由开放的交流中。“[…约翰·斯图亚特·密尔……大约200年后,他们甚至进一步认为,如果一种观点受到批评,它就会获得合法性和可信度。...
{"title":"Are Negatives Positive","authors":"Robert K. Fullinwider","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.188","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.188","url":null,"abstract":"\"Does the Election Make You Want to Be Sedated?\" So read a late October headline. What was the irritant calling for sedation? The \"caustic\" attack ads the 2012 political season delivered in spades. With the presidential election still four weeks away, Las Vegas television stations were featuring 10,000 political commercials a week. And Las Vegas ranked only tenth on the list of adsaturated markets. None of these political ads limned detailed plans for our country's future. Apart from the few that presented a candidate's fuzzy \"vision\" for future prosperity and freedom, the rest sliced and diced opponents, leaving an observant visitor from Mars to conclude that the only people who run for office in the United States are mountebanks, schemers, time-servers, liars, fakers, traitors, quacks, and crooks. Every opinion poll shows that the public heartily dislikes political attack ads; and baleful commentators ceaselessly lament the damage to democracy done by the steady diet of bile that campaigns feed the electorate. Yet many of those who create the ads take a different view. \"Negative ads not only work, they give voters better information than positive ads,\" declared one political consultant a few years back. Affirmed another: \"competitive, comparative, compelling ads ... provide voters with the mothers' milk of political decision-making: information.\" This sentiment is widely shared in the consulting profession. Are voters perhaps disgruntled with what in fact is good for them? That's what one political scientist believes. John Geer, in his 2006 book, In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns, set out to establish empirically whether negative ads hurt or helped the electoral process. He restricted his investigation to 795 television ads run in presidential races from 1960 to 2000, copies of which are readily accessible in a couple of repositories. After coding these ads for content and type, Geer concluded that * Negative ads have always outpaced positive ads by ratios ranging from 3 to 1 in 1984 to 20 to 1 in 2000. The average is about 8 to 1. * There is a clear upward trend in negativity since 1960. * Negative ads, contrary to received wisdom, enhance the democratic process by creating a more information-rich environment. The last of these conclusions is the most interesting and provocative. How did Geer arrive at it? His argument involved several stages. First, Geer postulated an \"asymmetry\" between positive and negative ads. \"[F]or the negative ad to be effective, the sponsor ... must marshal more evidence\" [than the sponsor of a positive ad]. \"[W]hen politicians present negative messages, they need to provide evidence to make them credible.\" Geer then tested this postulate against the data. He examined the 795 ads to see if they included evidence. Geer's findings supported his postulate: \"In every year under study, negative ads were much more likely to provide clear evidence to support their point than positive ads.\" Second","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"13-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-03-22DOI: 10.13021/G8pppq.312013.187
M. Fornerino
Almost as Often as the Earth Turns The story I am about to tell should have taken place during medieval times, but instead, it takes place in the twenty-first century. Perhaps it could best be described as a Latino version of a tale about a knight-errant and his damsel, a tragic fairy-tale-in-the-making that has as its protagonists an undocumented Mexican couple - a man and a woman who ventured to an unknown land, like so many others, looking for work and the promise of a better future. I was a witness to this story before I became its narrator, and as such, I was struck by the ties that reach out across history, repeating the same tales again and again. The lovers and travelers, then and now, searching for hope and facing great obstacles, and even violence, along the way. This much is enough to tie us to the past, to tie fiction to reality. But there is more. For one of the most remarkable and surprising things that I discovered was that the modern caballero I knew, like the medieval cavalier I could only imagine, was utterly sure that the world is flat. I discovered this fact while walking along Main Street in a small town somewhere in the American Midwest. I was making my way back to my office with our "hero" and his doncella (from now on, "Pedro" and "Isabel"), talking to them about their hometown. (1) It was a time during which that city found itself at the center of international news due to a high intensity earthquake that had just hit, causing major damage and loss of life. "It's amazing how quickly we learn of events happening in places so far away these days," I commented, "but I suppose that's the nature of technology: news travels around the globe in no time." To my surprise, Pedro reacted with confusion and disbelief - not to the claim that news travels quickly, but to the claim that it travels "around a globe." Isabel proceeded to explain to an incredulous Pedro that the world was, indeed, round. She enunciated the word "round," or redondo in Spanish, in such a beautiful and musical way that there was no doubt what she meant to convey, how she meant to insist on the idea of the roundness of the world. I also felt compelled to add that the Earth turned on its axis and, further, revolved around the sun. The cosmos is about curves and ellipses, never about flat surfaces and straight lines. Pedro listened for a while, looking at us condescendingly, apparently feeling sorry for us. After all, we were women, and by definition we were not capable of knowing more than he did. The conversation continued for a while, with stories of Columbus and Copernicus, explorers and scientists, discoveries and celebrations; but Pedro remained silent, unconvinced, and always smiling as if to indicate his disdain. I changed the topic and kept walking, sensing that we were not going to change Pedro's mind in the first round. We made our way through the summer air, and I thought of the seasons. I thought of the beauty of the way it all unfolds, spinning and
{"title":"The Woman Who Fell in Love with the Man Who Thought the World Was Flat Public Policy, Identity, and the Challenge of Reconceptualizing Domestic Violence in the Latino Community","authors":"M. Fornerino","doi":"10.13021/G8pppq.312013.187","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8pppq.312013.187","url":null,"abstract":"Almost as Often as the Earth Turns The story I am about to tell should have taken place during medieval times, but instead, it takes place in the twenty-first century. Perhaps it could best be described as a Latino version of a tale about a knight-errant and his damsel, a tragic fairy-tale-in-the-making that has as its protagonists an undocumented Mexican couple - a man and a woman who ventured to an unknown land, like so many others, looking for work and the promise of a better future. I was a witness to this story before I became its narrator, and as such, I was struck by the ties that reach out across history, repeating the same tales again and again. The lovers and travelers, then and now, searching for hope and facing great obstacles, and even violence, along the way. This much is enough to tie us to the past, to tie fiction to reality. But there is more. For one of the most remarkable and surprising things that I discovered was that the modern caballero I knew, like the medieval cavalier I could only imagine, was utterly sure that the world is flat. I discovered this fact while walking along Main Street in a small town somewhere in the American Midwest. I was making my way back to my office with our \"hero\" and his doncella (from now on, \"Pedro\" and \"Isabel\"), talking to them about their hometown. (1) It was a time during which that city found itself at the center of international news due to a high intensity earthquake that had just hit, causing major damage and loss of life. \"It's amazing how quickly we learn of events happening in places so far away these days,\" I commented, \"but I suppose that's the nature of technology: news travels around the globe in no time.\" To my surprise, Pedro reacted with confusion and disbelief - not to the claim that news travels quickly, but to the claim that it travels \"around a globe.\" Isabel proceeded to explain to an incredulous Pedro that the world was, indeed, round. She enunciated the word \"round,\" or redondo in Spanish, in such a beautiful and musical way that there was no doubt what she meant to convey, how she meant to insist on the idea of the roundness of the world. I also felt compelled to add that the Earth turned on its axis and, further, revolved around the sun. The cosmos is about curves and ellipses, never about flat surfaces and straight lines. Pedro listened for a while, looking at us condescendingly, apparently feeling sorry for us. After all, we were women, and by definition we were not capable of knowing more than he did. The conversation continued for a while, with stories of Columbus and Copernicus, explorers and scientists, discoveries and celebrations; but Pedro remained silent, unconvinced, and always smiling as if to indicate his disdain. I changed the topic and kept walking, sensing that we were not going to change Pedro's mind in the first round. We made our way through the summer air, and I thought of the seasons. I thought of the beauty of the way it all unfolds, spinning and ","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"31 1","pages":"2"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2013-01-01DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.312013.464
D. Lévine, J. Lichtenberg, R. Nelson, M. Sagoff
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Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.90
D. Maclean
Is “human being” a moral concept? I believe it is, which makes me a speciesist. Speciesism violates a moral principle of equality. Peter Singer defines it as “a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” He compares it to racism. My goal in this essay is to defend a speciesist attitude or outlook on morality.
{"title":"Is “Human Being” a Moral Concept?","authors":"D. Maclean","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.90","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.90","url":null,"abstract":"Is “human being” a moral concept? I believe it is, which makes me a speciesist. Speciesism violates a moral principle of equality. Peter Singer defines it as “a prejudice or attitude of bias toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” He compares it to racism. My goal in this essay is to defend a speciesist attitude or outlook on morality.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"16-20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66669045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.101
J. Segal
Common sense would suggest that the acquisition of precision-guided munitions should make it easier to avoid collateral damage in war. But U.S. military theorists have drawn the opposite conclusion: namely, that the more precise the weapon, the more permissive the standard for targeting should be. Henry Shue explains why this has happenedand why it is factually mistaken and morally misguided.
{"title":"Targeting Civilian Infrastructure with Smart Bombs: The New Permissiveness","authors":"J. Segal","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.101","url":null,"abstract":"Common sense would suggest that the acquisition of precision-guided munitions should make it easier to avoid collateral damage in war. But U.S. military theorists have drawn the opposite conclusion: namely, that the more precise the weapon, the more permissive the standard for targeting should be. Henry Shue explains why this has happenedand why it is factually mistaken and morally misguided.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"2-7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43888378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.91
P. Levine, A. Higgins‐D'alessandro
Those who study and evaluate civic education programs are often reticent about their values or unsure how to defend them. Peter Levine and Ann Higgins-DAlessandro offer a range of philosophical resources for thinking about the values that society should hold and how it should try to transmit these values through civic education to future generations.
{"title":"The Philosophical Foundations of Civic Education","authors":"P. Levine, A. Higgins‐D'alessandro","doi":"10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.91","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.91","url":null,"abstract":"Those who study and evaluate civic education programs are often reticent about their values or unsure how to defend them. Peter Levine and Ann Higgins-DAlessandro offer a range of philosophical resources for thinking about the values that society should hold and how it should try to transmit these values through civic education to future generations.","PeriodicalId":82464,"journal":{"name":"Report from the Institute for Philosophy & Public Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"21-27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66668700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.89
M. Sagoff
A New Yorker cartoon illustrates the intergenerational aspect of climate change. It shows an Eskimo mother, father, and young child as they wave a tearful farewell to an old man, presumably a grandparent, whom they have placed on an ice floe. The family itself stands on a floating piece of ice. Which generation is responsible for the plight of which? I want to argue that the intergenerational aspect of climate change makes economic reasoning about it more problematic than one might think. Economic analysis depends on the idea of trade or exchange. It is hard to see, therefore, how it applies to our relations to people in the further future. We cannot bargain with them or they with us. Since they do not yet exist, they cannot have property rights. If ability to pay is a prerequisite of willingness to pay (WTP), moreover, then future generations cannot be willing--because they are not able--to pay us anything. We have exhausted all possible "benefits of trade" with them. I shall argue that the passivity of future generations--their inability to exercise market or political power--makes economic analysis irrelevant not just to justifying the goals of climate policy but also to designing instruments to achieve those goals. Economists often recommend that an international authority "cap" global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but allow firms to trade "allowances" under that cap. I shall argue that such a regime cannot succeed because generations in the further future, who are its principal beneficiaries, are in no position to defend it. Trading in GHG "allowances," as I shall argue, is more likely to reflect beliefs about the likelihood of enforcement--bets placed on election returns, for example--than to reveal the marginal cost of "sustainable" production or "clean" energy technology. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] A perfectly efficient or competitive market cannot respond to the need of future generations for a stable climate because future generations play no role as market actors. An efficient policy therefore cannot be a sustainable policy. This is an argument against efficiency, not against sustainability. That economic theory fails in this way suggests we must rely on other reasons and rationales to justify a response to the threat of climate change. Climate Change Is Not a Collective Action Problem According to Paul G. Harris, "Climate change is a collective action problem par excellence." One can see the appeal of this analysis. In 1965, Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action showed that when each individual acts on self-interest, for example, to "free-ride" on the more socially motivated action of others, public goods will not be produced. Olson defines a "group" as "a number of individuals with a common interest." Olson wrote, "Unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not ac
《纽约客》的一幅漫画说明了气候变化的代际方面。画中,爱斯基摩人的母亲、父亲和年幼的孩子含泪向一位老人挥手告别,这位老人可能是他们的祖父母,他们把老人放在一块浮冰上。这家人站在一块浮冰上。哪一代人应该为哪一代人的困境负责?我想说的是,气候变化的代际性使得对它的经济推理比人们想象的更有问题。经济分析依赖于贸易或交换的概念。因此,我们很难看到,这将如何适用于未来的两国人民关系。我们不能和他们讨价还价,他们也不能和我们讨价还价。因为他们还不存在,他们不可能拥有产权。此外,如果支付能力是支付意愿(WTP)的先决条件,那么后代就不可能愿意——因为他们没有能力——支付给我们任何东西。我们已经用尽了所有可能的“贸易利益”。我认为,后代的被动性——他们无法行使市场或政治权力——使得经济分析不仅对证明气候政策目标的合理性无关紧要,而且对设计实现这些目标的工具也无关紧要。经济学家经常建议国际权威机构“限制”全球温室气体(GHG)排放,但允许企业在这一上限下进行“配额”交易。我认为,这种制度不可能成功,因为未来的几代人,作为其主要受益者,没有能力为其辩护。我将指出,温室气体“配额”交易更有可能反映出对执行可能性的信念——比如对选举结果的押注——而不是揭示“可持续”生产或“清洁”能源技术的边际成本。一个完全有效或竞争的市场不能满足子孙后代对稳定气候的需求,因为子孙后代不扮演市场参与者的角色。因此,有效的政策不可能是可持续的政策。这是一个反对效率的论点,而不是反对可持续性的论点。经济理论在这方面的失败表明,我们必须依靠其他理由和理由来证明应对气候变化威胁的合理性。根据Paul G. Harris的说法,“气候变化是一个集体行动的问题。”我们可以看到这种分析的吸引力。1965年,Mancur Olson在《集体行动的逻辑》(The Logic of Collective Action)中指出,当每个个体都按照自身利益行事时,例如,“搭便车”他人更具社会动机的行动,就不会产生公共产品。奥尔森将“团体”定义为“一群有共同兴趣的人”。奥尔森写道:“除非一个群体中的个人数量很少,或者除非有强制或其他特殊手段使个人按照他们的共同利益行事,理性的、自利的个人不会为实现他们的共同利益或群体利益而行动。”然而,稍加反思就会发现,“公地悲剧”或对集体行动问题的分析并不适合气候变化的挑战。在典型的集体行动问题中,例如在“囚徒困境”博弈中管理开放的公共资源或防止叛逃,如果所有人都合作,每个人都会受益;如果每个人都以自己的个人利益为目的,所有人都会失败。然而,在气候变化的情况下,有一个群体,即今天和下一代的人,将做出重大牺牲,例如,放弃消费廉价的化石燃料。一个完全不同的群体,我们可以称之为“后代”,将从中受益。解决集体行动问题所必需的强制被互惠利益所证明,也就是说,每个人通过限制他人的自由而获得的收益大于他或她接受同样的限制而失去的收益。…
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Pub Date : 2010-05-24DOI: 10.13021/G8PPPQ.302010.100
D. Luban
This essay, a version of the 2010 Tabor Lecture at Valparaiso Law School, examines issues about the role of a prosecutor in the adversary system through the lens of the following question: Should a prosecutor throw a case to avoid keeping men who he thinks are innocent in prison? This issue came to prominence in 2008, when Daniel Bibb, a New York City prosecutor, told newspaper reporters that he had done so in connection with a 1991 murder conviction that he had been assigned to reinvestigate after new evidence emerged that the wrong men had been convicted and were serving lengthy sentences. Bibb’s superiors required him (over his protests) to defend the convictions in a hearing to determine if the men should be retried. He had exhaustively reinvestigated the case, including interviews with reluctant witnesses who it seemed unlikely that anyone but Bibb could get to testify. This essay delves into the facts of the case and includes interview material with Daniel Bibb. It defends Bibb’s conduct, and argues that rather than facing professional discipline (as some ethics experts suggested), Bibb deserves praise. The essay uses the episode to examine the meaning of familiar adage that prosecutors must seek justice, not victory; the question of whether a subordinate lawyer in an organization must defer to the judgment of his or her superiors; and the role of conscience in legal ethics.
本文改编自2010年瓦尔帕莱索法学院(Valparaiso Law School)的塔博尔讲座(Tabor Lecture),通过以下问题审视了检察官在对抗制中所扮演的角色:检察官是否应该放弃一个案件,以避免将他认为无辜的人关进监狱?这个问题在2008年变得引人注目,当时纽约市检察官丹尼尔·比布(Daniel Bibb)对报纸记者说,他这么做是与1991年的一起谋杀案有关,当时有新证据表明,错误的人被判有罪,正在服刑很长时间,于是他被指派重新调查这起谋杀案。比布的上级要求他(不顾他的抗议)在听证会上为定罪辩护,以决定这些人是否应该重审。他详尽地重新调查了这个案子,包括采访了一些不情愿的证人,这些证人似乎除了比布以外,谁也不可能出庭作证。这篇文章深入研究了案件的事实,包括对丹尼尔·比布的采访材料。它为比布的行为辩护,并认为比布应该受到表扬,而不是像一些道德专家建议的那样面临专业纪律处分。这篇文章利用这一情节来检验一句熟悉的格言的含义:检察官必须寻求正义,而不是胜利;一个组织中的下级律师是否必须服从其上级的判断;以及良心在法律伦理中的作用。
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