Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910246
James M. Edie
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Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910248
D. Savan
{"title":"Spinoza: New Perspectives","authors":"D. Savan","doi":"10.5840/SWJPHIL197910248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SWJPHIL197910248","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83275,"journal":{"name":"The Southwestern journal of philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":"217-221"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87297150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910242
T. Carson
{"title":"Happiness and the Good Life: A Rejoinder to Mele","authors":"T. Carson","doi":"10.5840/SWJPHIL197910242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SWJPHIL197910242","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83275,"journal":{"name":"The Southwestern journal of philosophy","volume":"87 21","pages":"189-192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72375270","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910244
M. Heidegger, T. Sheehan, F. Elliston
{"title":"The Understanding of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being Question","authors":"M. Heidegger, T. Sheehan, F. Elliston","doi":"10.5840/SWJPHIL197910244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SWJPHIL197910244","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83275,"journal":{"name":"The Southwestern journal of philosophy","volume":"27 1","pages":"199-201"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83279297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910235
D. Coleman
{"title":"Is Mathematics for Hume Synthetic a Priori","authors":"D. Coleman","doi":"10.5840/SWJPHIL197910235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/SWJPHIL197910235","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83275,"journal":{"name":"The Southwestern journal of philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"113-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1979-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76376812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910239
M. Sterling
In this article I shall discuss certain alleged consequences of the "cognitive theory" of emotions. This cognitive conception of emotions has been decisively embraced and most extensively dealt with by Robert C. Solomon in his recent book The Passions. Thus in the present paper I shall be thinking primarily of Solomon's discussion of the cognitive theory, and my quotations will be exclusively from The Passions. First I shall indicate what the theory asserts; then I shall call attention to certain consequences that Solomon takes to follow from it; and last I shall discuss these putative consequences, being specifically concerned to say why I believe that such consequences do not really follow from the cognitive theory of emotions. The cognitive theory is offered as an alternative mainly to such influential views as the various behavioristic, physiological, feeling, and bodily-sensation theories of the emotions. It concedes that emotions may be correlated , or invariably associated, with certain kinds of behavior, physiological disturbances, and sensations; however, it denies that such things constitute emotions. Its fundamental contention is that emotions per se are nothing but judgments of a certain sort. Consider the following statement from The Passions :
在这篇文章中，我将讨论情绪“认知理论”的某些所谓后果。罗伯特·c·所罗门(Robert C. Solomon)在他的新书《激情》(The emotions)中明确地接受了这种对情感的认知概念，并对其进行了最广泛的论述。因此，在本文中，我将主要考虑所罗门对认知理论的讨论，我的引文将完全来自《激情》。首先，我要说明这个理论的主张;然后我要提醒大家注意所罗门由此带来的某些后果;最后，我将讨论这些假定的结果，特别要说明为什么我认为这些结果并不能真正从情绪的认知理论中得出。认知理论主要是作为诸如各种情绪的行为主义、生理学、感觉和身体感觉理论等有影响力的观点的替代。它承认情绪可能与某些行为、生理障碍和感觉相关，或者总是相关的;然而，它否认这些东西构成情感。它的基本论点是，情感本身只不过是某种判断。想想《激情》中的下面这段话:
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Pub Date : 1979-07-01DOI: 10.5840/SWJPHIL197910237
Edwin Berk
The causal theory of reference is commonly thought to provide striking support for scientific realism; that is supposed to be one of the stronger points in the theory's favor. But whether it really does so, I think, depends upon what is meant by "scientific realism/' Consider the following definitions of scientific realism. According to Hilary Putnam, realism may be "spelled out" by means of two principles :
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