{"title":"Presumed dangerous: California's selective policy of forcibly medicating state prisoners with antipsychotic drugs.","authors":"David E Gross","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"35 ","pages":"483-517"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2002-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"26332088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we review evidence about the development of the Chinese capital markets over a crucial period in world market history, and place that development in the context of world financial markets at the time. Despite fundamental differences between China today and China 100 years ago, it is still important to consider the dangers of an imbalance between domestic and international investor markets, and the mismatch between domestic and foreign expectations about investor protection. The lessons of the last century suggest that China today should consider opening Chinese investor access to foreign capital markets in order to equilibrate the level of diversification between foreign and domestic investors. In addition, protection of domestic corporate investor rights is at least as important as protecting foreign investor rights. This paper is available in English at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=289139
{"title":"China and the World Financial Markets 1870-1930: Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization (Chinese Version)","authors":"W. Goetzmann, A. Ukhov, Ning Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.289143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.289143","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we review evidence about the development of the Chinese capital markets over a crucial period in world market history, and place that development in the context of world financial markets at the time. Despite fundamental differences between China today and China 100 years ago, it is still important to consider the dangers of an imbalance between domestic and international investor markets, and the mismatch between domestic and foreign expectations about investor protection. The lessons of the last century suggest that China today should consider opening Chinese investor access to foreign capital markets in order to equilibrate the level of diversification between foreign and domestic investors. In addition, protection of domestic corporate investor rights is at least as important as protecting foreign investor rights. This paper is available in English at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=289139","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"249 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91519402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Agency problems beset firms and prompt opportunistic behavior by employees. Opportunistic behavior redistributes value, whereas cooperative behavior creates value. Firm-specific fairness norms typically promote the firm’s efficiency by increasing cooperation and decreasing opportunism. Firm-specific fairness norms best promote efficiency when supported by reputation effects and when the firm’s agents internalize the norms. People who internalize norms acquire good character. We will develop the concept of “good agent character,” by which we mean agent character that serves the firm’s profitability by embodying the firm’s fairness norms. Good agent character conveys an advantage to superiors and subordinates in forming cooperative relations with other people who can read character.
{"title":"Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms","authors":"R. Cooter, M. Eisenberg","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.268990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.268990","url":null,"abstract":"Agency problems beset firms and prompt opportunistic behavior by employees. Opportunistic behavior redistributes value, whereas cooperative behavior creates value. Firm-specific fairness norms typically promote the firm’s efficiency by increasing cooperation and decreasing opportunism. Firm-specific fairness norms best promote efficiency when supported by reputation effects and when the firm’s agents internalize the norms. People who internalize norms acquire good character. We will develop the concept of “good agent character,” by which we mean agent character that serves the firm’s profitability by embodying the firm’s fairness norms. Good agent character conveys an advantage to superiors and subordinates in forming cooperative relations with other people who can read character.","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"60 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84539478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article provides a framework for the analysis of the potential effects of the recent AOL/Time Warner merger on the markets forbroadband Internet access and broadband Internet content. We consider two anticompetitive strategies that a vertically integrated firm such as AOL Time Warner, offering both broadband transport and portal services, could in theory profitably pursue. First, an integrated provider could engage in conduit discrimination?insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting its distribution of affiliated content and services over rival platforms. Second, an integrated provider could engage in content discrimination?insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content. After examining the competitive conditions in the broadband portal and transport markets, we evaluate the post-merger incentives of AOL Time Warner to engage in either or both forms of discrimination.
{"title":"Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study of the Aol/Time Warner Merger","authors":"D. Rubinfeld, Hal J. Singer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.269124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269124","url":null,"abstract":"This Article provides a framework for the analysis of the potential effects of the recent AOL/Time Warner merger on the markets forbroadband Internet access and broadband Internet content. We consider two anticompetitive strategies that a vertically integrated firm such as AOL Time Warner, offering both broadband transport and portal services, could in theory profitably pursue. First, an integrated provider could engage in conduit discrimination?insulating its own conduit from competition by limiting its distribution of affiliated content and services over rival platforms. Second, an integrated provider could engage in content discrimination?insulating its own affiliated content from competition by blocking or degrading the quality of outside content. After examining the competitive conditions in the broadband portal and transport markets, we evaluate the post-merger incentives of AOL Time Warner to engage in either or both forms of discrimination.","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"193 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91542201","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patents, patients, and public policy: an incomplete intersection at 35 U.S.C. Section 287(c).","authors":"C M Ho","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"33 3","pages":"601-75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25780679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contemporary corporate scholarship generally assumes that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is getting managers and directors to act as loyal agents for shareholders. We take issue with this approach and argue that the unique legal rules governing publicly-held corporations are instead designed primarily to address a different problem - the "team production" problem - that arises when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a nonseparable output. In such situations team members may find it difficult or impossible to draft explicit contracts distributing the output of their joint efforts, and, as an alternative, might prefer to give up control over their enterprise to an independent third party charged with representing the team's interests and allocating rewards among team members. Thus we argue that the essential economic function of the public corporation is not to address principal-agent problems, but to provide a vehicle through which shareholders, creditors, executives, rank-and-file employees, and other potential corporate "stakeholders" who may invest firm-specific resources can, for their own benefit, jointly relinquish control over those resources to a board of directors. This alternative to the principal-agent approach offers to explain a variety of pivotal doctrines in corporate law that have proven difficult to explain using agency theory, including: the requirement that a public corporation be managed by a board of directors rather than by shareholders directly; the meaning and function of a corporation's "legal personality" and the rules of derivative suit procedure; the substantive structure of directors' fiduciary duties, including the application of the business judgment rule in the takeover context; and the highly-limited nature of shareholders' voting rights. The team production model also carries important normative implications for legal and popular debates over corporate governance, because it suggests that maximizing shareholder wealth should not be the principal goal of corporate law. Rather, directors of public corporations should seek to maximize the joint welfare of all the firm's stakeholders - including shareholders, managers, employees, and possibly other groups such as creditors or the local community - who contribute firm-specific resources to corporate production.
{"title":"A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law","authors":"Margaret M. Blair, Lynn A. Stout","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.425500","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.425500","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary corporate scholarship generally assumes that the central economic problem addressed by corporation law is getting managers and directors to act as loyal agents for shareholders. We take issue with this approach and argue that the unique legal rules governing publicly-held corporations are instead designed primarily to address a different problem - the \"team production\" problem - that arises when a number of individuals must invest firm-specific resources to produce a nonseparable output. In such situations team members may find it difficult or impossible to draft explicit contracts distributing the output of their joint efforts, and, as an alternative, might prefer to give up control over their enterprise to an independent third party charged with representing the team's interests and allocating rewards among team members. Thus we argue that the essential economic function of the public corporation is not to address principal-agent problems, but to provide a vehicle through which shareholders, creditors, executives, rank-and-file employees, and other potential corporate \"stakeholders\" who may invest firm-specific resources can, for their own benefit, jointly relinquish control over those resources to a board of directors. This alternative to the principal-agent approach offers to explain a variety of pivotal doctrines in corporate law that have proven difficult to explain using agency theory, including: the requirement that a public corporation be managed by a board of directors rather than by shareholders directly; the meaning and function of a corporation's \"legal personality\" and the rules of derivative suit procedure; the substantive structure of directors' fiduciary duties, including the application of the business judgment rule in the takeover context; and the highly-limited nature of shareholders' voting rights. The team production model also carries important normative implications for legal and popular debates over corporate governance, because it suggests that maximizing shareholder wealth should not be the principal goal of corporate law. Rather, directors of public corporations should seek to maximize the joint welfare of all the firm's stakeholders - including shareholders, managers, employees, and possibly other groups such as creditors or the local community - who contribute firm-specific resources to corporate production.","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"69 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88957675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Because the Internet provides an infrastructure where the marginal costs of distributing digitized information goods is close to zero, it will tend to drive market prices for information goods toward zero. At the same time, by providing “cheap exit” from localized information regulatory regimes, the Internet may promote competition among jurisdictions in producing information regulation. These markets for information products and for information regulation are linked, so that inefficiencies in one will alter the competitive trade - offs in the other. Both forms of competition may be characterized as races to externalize, in which the benefits of competition are potentially dissipated by jurisdictional spillovers. This will necessitate changes in the international regime for copyright and similar information regulation, which will increasingly tend toward a coordinated but potentially inefficient standard.
{"title":"Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy","authors":"D. Burk","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2037909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2037909","url":null,"abstract":"Because the Internet provides an infrastructure where the marginal costs of distributing digitized information goods is close to zero, it will tend to drive market prices for information goods toward zero. At the same time, by providing “cheap exit” from localized information regulatory regimes, the Internet may promote competition among jurisdictions in producing information regulation. These markets for information products and for information regulation are linked, so that inefficiencies in one will alter the competitive trade - offs in the other. Both forms of competition may be characterized as races to externalize, in which the benefits of competition are potentially dissipated by jurisdictional spillovers. This will necessitate changes in the international regime for copyright and similar information regulation, which will increasingly tend toward a coordinated but potentially inefficient standard.","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90520094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article proposes a market-based alternative to our current unpopular regime for financing federal election campaigns. Under the proposal, each voter receives vouchers for federal elections to contribute either to candidates directly or to interest groups; with limited exceptions, only funds from the voucher system could be spent to support or oppose candidates for elected federal offices. Using public choice theory, Professor Hasen argues that the voucher plan would promote an egalitarian political market in which each person has roughly equal political capital regardless of preexisting disparities in wealth, education, or organizational ability. After demonstrating that the current campaign finance regime favors wealthy and well-organized interests at the expense of the poor and those with diffuse interests, the author identifies four distinct benefits of the voucher proposal. First, the voucher proposal minimizes the role of wealth in the political process and facilitates the organization of those individuals who currently lack political capital. Second, the proposal is likely to promote a stable transition to a more egalitarian political order and a more chaotic, though fairer, legislative process. Third, the voucher proposal's market orientation registers the intensity of voter preferences well. Finally, the proposal has a realistic chance of being enacted and of passing constitutional muster. The author concludes by demonstrating the superiority of the voucher plan under the four criteria to non-voucher public financing of Congressional campaigns, proportional representation, and group-based political solutions
{"title":"Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers","authors":"Richard L. Hasen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1961263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961263","url":null,"abstract":"This Article proposes a market-based alternative to our current unpopular regime for financing federal election campaigns. Under the proposal, each voter receives vouchers for federal elections to contribute either to candidates directly or to interest groups; with limited exceptions, only funds from the voucher system could be spent to support or oppose candidates for elected federal offices. Using public choice theory, Professor Hasen argues that the voucher plan would promote an egalitarian political market in which each person has roughly equal political capital regardless of preexisting disparities in wealth, education, or organizational ability. After demonstrating that the current campaign finance regime favors wealthy and well-organized interests at the expense of the poor and those with diffuse interests, the author identifies four distinct benefits of the voucher proposal. First, the voucher proposal minimizes the role of wealth in the political process and facilitates the organization of those individuals who currently lack political capital. Second, the proposal is likely to promote a stable transition to a more egalitarian political order and a more chaotic, though fairer, legislative process. Third, the voucher proposal's market orientation registers the intensity of voter preferences well. Finally, the proposal has a realistic chance of being enacted and of passing constitutional muster. The author concludes by demonstrating the superiority of the voucher plan under the four criteria to non-voucher public financing of Congressional campaigns, proportional representation, and group-based political solutions","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"87 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1996-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77862728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ethical problems for physicians raised by AIDS and HIV infection: conflicting legal obligations of confidentiality and disclosure.","authors":"B A McDonald","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":" ","pages":"557-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"26273302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The recent emergence and rapid growth of biotechnology as a commercial industry has raised serious questions concerning the role of patent law as the industry's dominant form of intellectual property protection. Several commentators, drawing on an analogy to computer software protection, have suggested copyright law as an alternative method of protecting recombinant DNA innovation. This article reviews these arguments in light of recent court decisions and scholarly commentary concerning copyright of computer software.The article argues that copyright law is not sacrosanct, but rather represents a particular scope of proprietary interests that may be used to accommodate the needs of new technologies such as biotechnology. The article asserts, however, that the decision to apply copyright protection to such a technology should be based on policy rather than on analogy. The article reviews the basic characteristics ofboth the science of molecular biology and of the biotechnology industry, and, by contrasting these characteristics to those of the software industry, concludes that, as a matter of policy, copyright is not the most appropriate form of intellectual property protection for biotechnology.
{"title":"Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences","authors":"D. Burk","doi":"10.31235/osf.io/v28w6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/v28w6","url":null,"abstract":"The recent emergence and rapid growth of biotechnology as a commercial industry has raised serious questions concerning the role of patent law as the industry's dominant form of intellectual property protection. Several commentators, drawing on an analogy to computer software protection, have suggested copyright law as an alternative method of protecting recombinant DNA innovation. This article reviews these arguments in light of recent court decisions and scholarly commentary concerning copyright of computer software.The article argues that copyright law is not sacrosanct, but rather represents a particular scope of proprietary interests that may be used to accommodate the needs of new technologies such as biotechnology. The article asserts, however, that the decision to apply copyright protection to such a technology should be based on policy rather than on analogy. The article reviews the basic characteristics ofboth the science of molecular biology and of the biotechnology industry, and, by contrasting these characteristics to those of the software industry, concludes that, as a matter of policy, copyright is not the most appropriate form of intellectual property protection for biotechnology.","PeriodicalId":83406,"journal":{"name":"University of California, Davis law review","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89193817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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