Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415796
Magna Carta
130 The Second World War, which bore witness to innumerable violations of the most basic, natural rights of humankind, resulted in the death ofmillions ofpeople, and left in its wake the bitter memory of the Holocaust and devastation. It created a universal awareness of the need for world peace and harmony. As a result, the United Nations Organisation was born based on respect for the rights ofpeoples and nations to self-determination and independence, the need to protect global peace, to condemn war and aggression and promote the peaceful solution of conflicts.
{"title":"East Timor's magna carta","authors":"Magna Carta","doi":"10.1080/14672715.2000.10415796","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415796","url":null,"abstract":"130 The Second World War, which bore witness to innumerable violations of the most basic, natural rights of humankind, resulted in the death ofmillions ofpeople, and left in its wake the bitter memory of the Holocaust and devastation. It created a universal awareness of the need for world peace and harmony. As a result, the United Nations Organisation was born based on respect for the rights ofpeoples and nations to self-determination and independence, the need to protect global peace, to condemn war and aggression and promote the peaceful solution of conflicts.","PeriodicalId":84339,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars","volume":"32 1","pages":"130 - 132"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415796","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59813091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415777
S. Heaney
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415778
G. Robinson
Abstract Written by a historian who served with the UN's Political Affairs Office in East Timor during the turbulent months in mid 1999, this article provides an insider's view on the terror of the militia violence but goes beyond that to explain why many of those who worked with the UN mission were less worried about the militia than about being party to a failed and perhaps shameful process—failed for the people of East Timor and shameful for the United Nations. The article offers intimate details on the internal decision-making process at the United Nations concerning the “popular consultation” and the introduction of a peacekeeping force, and then about whether or not to evacuate UN personnel and their East Timorese associates as the violence escalated. The author concludes that the UN effort was not the “fiasco” that some feared it would be. On the contrary, the Unamet mission managed to avoid the pitfalls of other UN interventions (in Rwanda, for example) and go on to establish some important precedents that will allow the United Nations to work more effectively in the years ahead.
{"title":"With unamet in East Timor: A historian's personal view","authors":"G. Robinson","doi":"10.1080/14672715.2000.10415778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415778","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Written by a historian who served with the UN's Political Affairs Office in East Timor during the turbulent months in mid 1999, this article provides an insider's view on the terror of the militia violence but goes beyond that to explain why many of those who worked with the UN mission were less worried about the militia than about being party to a failed and perhaps shameful process—failed for the people of East Timor and shameful for the United Nations. The article offers intimate details on the internal decision-making process at the United Nations concerning the “popular consultation” and the introduction of a peacekeeping force, and then about whether or not to evacuate UN personnel and their East Timorese associates as the violence escalated. The author concludes that the UN effort was not the “fiasco” that some feared it would be. On the contrary, the Unamet mission managed to avoid the pitfalls of other UN interventions (in Rwanda, for example) and go on to establish some important precedents that will allow the United Nations to work more effectively in the years ahead.","PeriodicalId":84339,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars","volume":"32 1","pages":"23 - 26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415778","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59812205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415789
T. Shiraishi
Abstract Written in the period between the June 1999 general election and the October runoff election that saw Abdurrahman Wahid claim the presidency of Indonesia, this article describes “a new phase in Indonesian politics” that has given rise to widely shared hopes within Indonesia and abroad that political stability will be restored, politics routinized, and the economy return to the growth path. The author explains why the chances that Indonesia will actually progress in this manner are slim. The article begins by describing the political process that governed the June elections that resulted in Megawati Sukarnoputri winning 153 seats in the Parliament (33.7 percent of the vote). Next the author forecasts how the October election would likely turn out. The relevance and importance of the situations in East Timor and Aceh figure importantly in the author's assessment of the long-term prospects for political and economic recovery in Indonesia.
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415793
A. McIntyre
Abstract Megawati Sukarnoputri, like Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma and Sheikh Hasina Wajed of Bangladesh, is the daughter of a “founding father” of her country who has sought political power in order to redeem his legacy. Her ability to interpret this legacy flexibly (enabling her to adjust to changed circumstances) and to symbolize not only her father but, by her silent suffering at the hands of the authoritarian government of President Suharto, purity and decency as well, largely explains her political success. She stood for Parliament in 1987 and 1992 as a member of the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) and became leader of this party in 1993 despite government hostility toward her. Her failure in 1995 to repudiate a nomination for the presidency concentrated the wrath of Suharto upon her. In June and July 1996, he engineered her removal from the PDI leadership and was behind an attack on her party headquarters by government thugs in which at least five party members died. Suharto was obliged to resign from office in May 1998, and a parliamentary election was held in June 1999. Megawati's party obtained the largest proportion of the vote: 34 percent, followed by Golkar with 22 percent, and the National Awakening Party of her almost-blind friend, Abdurrahman Wahid with 12 percent. However, her silences, which had been so eloquent in the Suharto period when it was dangerous to speak out, became a distinct political liability in Indonesia's emerging talk shop of democracy. Consequently, she was unable to convert her strong parliamentary result into a successful presidential bid, and was out-maneuvered for the top office by Wahid himself showing a scant regard for his erstwhile democratic principles. Rioting by Megawati's supporters convinced him of the wisdom of having her as his deputy. Consequently, he worked hard (and successfully) to secure her victory in the vice-presidential ballot. “We make a perfect team,” he commented later. “I can't see and she can't talk.”
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415795
Amnesty International
Abstract The following accounts from East Timorese refugees—presented in a combination of verbatim testimony and shorter and longer narratives—represent a small selection of the testimonies gathered by Amnesty International in interviews conducted in Darwin, Australia, in September 1999.
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415776
Arnold S. Kohen
Abstract Exploring the background behind the recent upheaval in East Timor, this article tries to place Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and the Roman Catholic Church in their proper historical relationship with the territory's movement for independence and the population more generally. The article shows that East Timor's Catholic Church, dating from the colonial period, had a significant presence in the territory. The brutal Indonesian invasion of 1975 and the subsequent military occupation posed a great challenge to the Church and many of the clergy, who worked to defend the people of East Timor from attack. In doing so, they transformed their institution into a crucial nongovernmental entity with high international standing. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Bishop Belo in 1996 dealt a great blow to Jakarta's ambitions in East Timor. Over the years, Indonesian authorities had tried to utilize the Church to support their territorial claims to East Timor. Despite a long campaign of pressure and intimidation aimed at both the Church in East Timor as well as of the Vatican, the Indonesian regime was stymied in its efforts. The recent violent attacks orchestrated by the Indonesian military, in which the Church and its clergy were prime targets, can be seen, at least in part, as acts of revenge and an expression of the frustration and rage of an Indonesian military regime that could not accept that its campaign to subdue East Timor had failed.
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415783
R. Falk
Abstract This article summarizes the ordeal of East Timor since 1975 by primary reference to international law and the evolving notion of international criminality. From such a perspective, it regards the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor to be a flagrant example of international aggression comparable to that of Iraq against Kuwait. The central question is raised as to why the United Nations did so much to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty in 1991 and so little on behalf of East Timor in the more than two decades since 1975. In its essence, East Timor's struggle for independence involved a most difficult transition from its status as a Portuguese colony. The Indonesian annexation of East Timor disrupted the process of decolonization, but did not alter its essential character. Unresolved at this point is the question about whether the atrocities inflicted on the people of East Timor in 1999 will be sufficient cause for any further action by the United Nations. The earlier period of Indonesian criminality, associated with the events of 1975, seems unlikely to be scrutinized with a view to establishing a criminal tribunal even as pressure builds to convene a tribunal to consider charges against surviving members of the Khmer Rouge considered responsible for the massive genocide in Cambodia that occurred at roughly the same time. If victimization is measured by the proportion of the population, then the events in East Timor appear as serious as those in Cambodia, and as deserving of legal scrutiny.
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415791
Gerry van Klinken
Abstract The violence military-backed militias perpetrated on the East Timorese in 1999 illustrates the fundamental character of the Indonesian state: it is not merely non-democratic but also highly centralized. Both these characteristics were imprinted on the state by its late nineteenth century colonial origins. Efforts to both democratize and decentralize the state during the post-independence 1950s were undone by key state elites led by the military under Suharto. However, the separation of East Timor from Indonesia indicates a victory for the local that may well become a trend around Indonesia. While East Timor never legally belonged to the Indonesian state, its independence movement was driven by grievances that are shared by many other communities throughout Indonesia's periphery. Central state elites view these local movements in terms of “breakdown,” but at the local level they are seen as hopeful alternatives. It is not necessary to romanticize all local movements—elements of them are xenophobic, violent, and corrupt. But these elements are usually balanced by responsible and non-violent groups inspired by the search for a state that serves more human ends.
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Pub Date : 2000-06-01DOI: 10.1080/14672715.2000.10415794
R. Tanter, M. Selden, S. Shalom
Abstract The long struggle for East Timorese independence, the 500-year funu, has been won. The last battle is not yet over, and the painful residues of colonialism and war will scar East Timorese society and culture for many years to come, but for the people of East Timor, the taste of freedom is in the air. By way of conclusion, it may be worthwhile to survey the most important obstacles likely to face East Timor in its trajectory from Indonesian colony to United Nations temporary protectorate to full independence, and to consider some of the choices for the transition era.
{"title":"East Timor faces the future","authors":"R. Tanter, M. Selden, S. Shalom","doi":"10.1080/14672715.2000.10415794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415794","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The long struggle for East Timorese independence, the 500-year funu, has been won. The last battle is not yet over, and the painful residues of colonialism and war will scar East Timorese society and culture for many years to come, but for the people of East Timor, the taste of freedom is in the air. By way of conclusion, it may be worthwhile to survey the most important obstacles likely to face East Timor in its trajectory from Indonesian colony to United Nations temporary protectorate to full independence, and to consider some of the choices for the transition era.","PeriodicalId":84339,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars","volume":"32 1","pages":"113 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14672715.2000.10415794","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59812800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}