{"title":"Editorial: Fast and Furious? A Quick Digest of a Plan for the Accelerated Integration of Candidate Countries into the EU","authors":"S. Blockmans","doi":"10.54648/eerr2024001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2024001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"95 1-2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140517010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) – a regulation adopted by the European Union (EU) in July 2023 to boost the production capabilities of the EU defence industry with a view to supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. The article explains the context in which the regulation was adopted, examines its content, and discusses its consequences for EU integration in the field of defence. At the same time, however, it also considers some critical aspects of ASAP, highlighting the limitations of the regulation approved by the European Parliament (EP) and the Council – particularly when compared with the original proposal of the European Commission. As the article argues, the ASAP regulation endeavours to support the capacity of the EU defence industry to live up to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, funding with EU money ammunitions’ production and procurement. At the same time, ASAP also positions the EU to address in a supranational way a more threatening geo-strategic environment. From this point of view, therefore, the ASAP is a step in the direction of establishing a European defence union, seen both as a combination of military capability and industrial capacity. Nevertheless, ASAP falls well short of an EU equivalent of the United States’ Defence Production Act, which suggests that further steps are needed towards the establishment of a real EU defence union. Yet, as the war in Ukraine turns into an ongoing conflict of attrition, the article posits that such a union would be needed – asap. Act in Support of Ammunition Production, European Union, Common Security & Defence Policy, War in Ukraine, Legal bases
{"title":"European Defence Union ASAP: The Act in Support of Ammunition Production and the development of EU defence capabilities in response to the war in Ukraine","authors":"Federico Fabbrini","doi":"10.54648/eerr2024004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2024004","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) – a regulation adopted by the European Union (EU) in July 2023 to boost the production capabilities of the EU defence industry with a view to supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. The article explains the context in which the regulation was adopted, examines its content, and discusses its consequences for EU integration in the field of defence. At the same time, however, it also considers some critical aspects of ASAP, highlighting the limitations of the regulation approved by the European Parliament (EP) and the Council – particularly when compared with the original proposal of the European Commission. As the article argues, the ASAP regulation endeavours to support the capacity of the EU defence industry to live up to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, funding with EU money ammunitions’ production and procurement. At the same time, ASAP also positions the EU to address in a supranational way a more threatening geo-strategic environment. From this point of view, therefore, the ASAP is a step in the direction of establishing a European defence union, seen both as a combination of military capability and industrial capacity. Nevertheless, ASAP falls well short of an EU equivalent of the United States’ Defence Production Act, which suggests that further steps are needed towards the establishment of a real EU defence union. Yet, as the war in Ukraine turns into an ongoing conflict of attrition, the article posits that such a union would be needed – asap.\u0000Act in Support of Ammunition Production, European Union, Common Security & Defence Policy, War in Ukraine, Legal bases","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"6 5","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140522024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article scrutinizes the ex-post constitutional compatibility with the autonomy of the EU legal order of the Investor to State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism established in Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Whereas the compatibility of intra-EU aspects of ECT arbitration is examined primarily in the light of the EU Court of Justice’s (CJEU) Achmea and Komstroy judgments, the compatibility of its extra-EU aspects is examined primarily in the light of its Opinion 1/17. Since those Court decisions are indeed in line with the previous case-law, the article does not need to delve into earlier case-law. Although the issue is analysed from the standpoint of EU law, awards of the arbitral tribunals before which the ECT is invoked have been taken into consideration especially to ascertain whether the CJEU’s concerns for preserving the autonomy of the EU legal order against any possible legal effects of these awards were justified. The article also analyses the principal options to remedy the incompatibility of the ISDS mechanism under the ECT with the autonomy of the EU legal order. Autonomy of the EU Legal Order, Investor to State Dispute Settlement, the Energy Charter Treaty, Intra-EU Arbitration, Extra-EU Arbitration
{"title":"The Compatibility of the ISDS Mechanism under the Energy Charter Treaty With the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order","authors":"M. T. Karayiğit","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023031","url":null,"abstract":"The article scrutinizes the ex-post constitutional compatibility with the autonomy of the EU legal order of the Investor to State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism established in Article 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Whereas the compatibility of intra-EU aspects of ECT arbitration is examined primarily in the light of the EU Court of Justice’s (CJEU) Achmea and Komstroy judgments, the compatibility of its extra-EU aspects is examined primarily in the light of its Opinion 1/17. Since those Court decisions are indeed in line with the previous case-law, the article does not need to delve into earlier case-law. Although the issue is analysed from the standpoint of EU law, awards of the arbitral tribunals before which the ECT is invoked have been taken into consideration especially to ascertain whether the CJEU’s concerns for preserving the autonomy of the EU legal order against any possible legal effects of these awards were justified. The article also analyses the principal options to remedy the incompatibility of the ISDS mechanism under the ECT with the autonomy of the EU legal order.\u0000Autonomy of the EU Legal Order, Investor to State Dispute Settlement, the Energy Charter Treaty, Intra-EU Arbitration, Extra-EU Arbitration","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"25 10","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140518576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
COVID-19 has posed a serious challenge for the European Union (EU) since 2020. The EU has adopted vaccine diplomacy, among other measures, to tackle this global pandemic. The EU also applied the Advance Purchase Agreements (APA) and export control for the COVID-19 vaccine in 2021, and did not fully support a waiver for vaccine and medicine Intellectual Property (IP) in the 2022 WTO negotiation. This paper focuses primarily on the following core issues and questions: What is the concept of vaccine diplomacy? What are the theories, policy decisions, jurisprudence and practices of the EU’s vaccine diplomacy? What is the strategy of the EU for cooperating with the WHO and the Access to Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator (COVAX)?What is the significance, and implications of EU vaccine diplomacy? The EU firmly supports WHO multilateralism and the COVAX framework for vaccine distribution and health cooperation. The EU also actively participates in WHO negotiations for a new health treaty, to respond effectively to future pandemics. This paper also suggests some ways to resolve the problem about how the EU can become a contracting party to the new WHO health treaty. Despite the fact that some policies such as the APA, vaccine export control and IP waiver were criticized by some other countries, the EU’s vaccine diplomacy in the WHO is largely a great success. The EU vaccine diplomacy is expected to increase the EU’s soft power and normative influence in the WHO, and contribute greatly to the health of European citizens, other human beings and a new emerging international health order. APA, COVAX, COVID-19, export control, EU, International Pandemic Treaty, vaccine diplomacy, WHO, WTO waiver
{"title":"The EU’s Vaccine Diplomacy in the WHO","authors":"D. Horng","doi":"10.54648/eerr2024003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2024003","url":null,"abstract":"COVID-19 has posed a serious challenge for the European Union (EU) since 2020. The EU has adopted vaccine diplomacy, among other measures, to tackle this global pandemic. The EU also applied the Advance Purchase Agreements (APA) and export control for the COVID-19 vaccine in 2021, and did not fully support a waiver for vaccine and medicine Intellectual Property (IP) in the 2022 WTO negotiation. This paper focuses primarily on the following core issues and questions: What is the concept of vaccine diplomacy? What are the theories, policy decisions, jurisprudence and practices of the EU’s vaccine diplomacy? What is the strategy of the EU for cooperating with the WHO and the Access to Covid-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator (COVAX)?What is the significance, and implications of EU vaccine diplomacy? The EU firmly supports WHO multilateralism and the COVAX framework for vaccine distribution and health cooperation. The EU also actively participates in WHO negotiations for a new health treaty, to respond effectively to future pandemics. This paper also suggests some ways to resolve the problem about how the EU can become a contracting party to the new WHO health treaty. Despite the fact that some policies such as the APA, vaccine export control and IP waiver were criticized by some other countries, the EU’s vaccine diplomacy in the WHO is largely a great success. The EU vaccine diplomacy is expected to increase the EU’s soft power and normative influence in the WHO, and contribute greatly to the health of European citizens, other human beings and a new emerging international health order. \u0000APA, COVAX, COVID-19, export control, EU, International Pandemic Treaty, vaccine diplomacy, WHO, WTO waiver","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"56 20","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140517646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the European Union’s (EU) relations with the Southern neighbour countries (SNCs) have been reframed in the light of a new élan of democracy promotion. The underlying logic of this approach was to leverage the building and consolidation of democracy and rule of law through enhanced cooperation in terms of more ‘markets, money and mobility’. A sort of mobility-democracy nexus has been assumed by the European Commission as a crucial dimension of the EU’s external relations with SNCs. Within this strategy, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) with SNCs have been identified as a key policy tool for EU democracy promotion. Via original qualitative analysis of European Commission’s documents, MPs, and other migration and mobility agreements that the EU has negotiated with SNCs since 2011, this paper explores how the mobility-democracy nexus has been defined in the Commission’s talks. We critically discuss the effectiveness of this nexus and demonstrate the inefficacy of MPs as a tool to promote democracy by fostering more mobility and regular migration flows. Looking at the content of MPs with three SNCs (Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan) allows to trace the transformation of EU external relations with SNCs from a principled approach into selective issue-oriented cooperation based on more specific and sectorial policy choices. European Union, Southern neighbourhood, EU external policies, post-Arab uprisings, mobility partnerships, democracy promotion, migration, content analysis
{"title":"The Mobility-Democracy Nexus Betrayed: When the European Commission’s Talks Fall Apart in the Mediterranean","authors":"Stefania Panebianco, Giuseppe Cannata","doi":"10.54648/eerr2024002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2024002","url":null,"abstract":"In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the European Union’s (EU) relations with the Southern neighbour countries (SNCs) have been reframed in the light of a new élan of democracy promotion. The underlying logic of this approach was to leverage the building and consolidation of democracy and rule of law through enhanced cooperation in terms of more ‘markets, money and mobility’. A sort of mobility-democracy nexus has been assumed by the European Commission as a crucial dimension of the EU’s external relations with SNCs. Within this strategy, Mobility Partnerships (MPs) with SNCs have been identified as a key policy tool for EU democracy promotion. Via original qualitative analysis of European Commission’s documents, MPs, and other migration and mobility agreements that the EU has negotiated with SNCs since 2011, this paper explores how the mobility-democracy nexus has been defined in the Commission’s talks. We critically discuss the effectiveness of this nexus and demonstrate the inefficacy of MPs as a tool to promote democracy by fostering more mobility and regular migration flows. Looking at the content of MPs with three SNCs (Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan) allows to trace the transformation of EU external relations with SNCs from a principled approach into selective issue-oriented cooperation based on more specific and sectorial policy choices.\u0000European Union, Southern neighbourhood, EU external policies, post-Arab uprisings, mobility partnerships, democracy promotion, migration, content analysis","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"9 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140525592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) adopts restrictive measures – or sanctions – as part of its counterterrorism strategy. These measures restrict the fundamental rights of the natural or legal persons they target and can be challenged in front of the General Court or the European Court of Justice (the CJEU). Drawing from both legal scholarship and security studies, this article refines an analytical framework that enables an original analysis of the case law of the CJEU: we focus on ‘proximity’, an element so far neglected in the analysis of counter-terrorism sanctions. Proximity is the variable measuring the distance between the addressee of a measure from the actual commission of a terrorist act. Such a variable provides the analytical framework through which to test the hypotheses and findings proposed in the last decade by previous studies. Such findings are mostly confirmed by our interdisciplinary analysis, but nuanced. While it is true that sanctions lead to a process of othering and stigmatization, the Court has introduced some meaningful procedural safeguards that contribute to protecting the fundamental rights of individuals, especially in the case of family members of suspected terrorists. Not dissimilarly from what was noted about judicial protection in other sanctions regimes, however, tensions remain in how to ensure effective substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, protection to sanctions addressees. Terrorism, EU restrictive measures, Court of Justice of the European Union, fundamental rights, judicial protection
{"title":"Who is really affected by European Union terrorist sanctions? A Critical Study on ‘Proximity’ in EU Case Law","authors":"L. Lonardo, Veronika Datzer, Shanti Walde","doi":"10.54648/eerr2024005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2024005","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) adopts restrictive measures – or sanctions – as part of its counterterrorism strategy. These measures restrict the fundamental rights of the natural or legal persons they target and can be challenged in front of the General Court or the European Court of Justice (the CJEU).\u0000Drawing from both legal scholarship and security studies, this article refines an analytical framework that enables an original analysis of the case law of the CJEU: we focus on ‘proximity’, an element so far neglected in the analysis of counter-terrorism sanctions. Proximity is the variable measuring the distance between the addressee of a measure from the actual commission of a terrorist act. Such a variable provides the analytical framework through which to test the hypotheses and findings proposed in the last decade by previous studies.\u0000Such findings are mostly confirmed by our interdisciplinary analysis, but nuanced. While it is true that sanctions lead to a process of othering and stigmatization, the Court has introduced some meaningful procedural safeguards that contribute to protecting the fundamental rights of individuals, especially in the case of family members of suspected terrorists. Not dissimilarly from what was noted about judicial protection in other sanctions regimes, however, tensions remain in how to ensure effective substantive, as opposed to merely procedural, protection to sanctions addressees.\u0000Terrorism, EU restrictive measures, Court of Justice of the European Union, fundamental rights, judicial protection","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"29 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140524423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2022, the EU published its Strategic Compass, setting the course for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the coming years. The most eye-catching proposal in the Compass is the creation of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC). The creation of such a multinational force as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toolbox, which may well engage in armed conflicts, is problematic for the attribution of possible violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper describes how the EU may be held accountable for the acts committed by the troops it deploys. Then it will discuss how the differences in the organization of EU operations may affect the opportunities for attribution. Finally, the paper recommends the EU’s CSDP operations to have a command and control structure that is fully integrated as this ensures the highest level of certainty when it comes to the attribution of wrongful acts. European Union, EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, International Humanitarian Law, EU Strategic Compass, multinational operations, accountability, CFSP, peacekeeping, crisis management
{"title":"The EU as a Crisis Manager: Ensuring Accountability Under IHL","authors":"Aron Bosman","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023020","url":null,"abstract":"In 2022, the EU published its Strategic Compass, setting the course for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the coming years. The most eye-catching proposal in the Compass is the creation of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC). The creation of such a multinational force as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toolbox, which may well engage in armed conflicts, is problematic for the attribution of possible violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper describes how the EU may be held accountable for the acts committed by the troops it deploys. Then it will discuss how the differences in the organization of EU operations may affect the opportunities for attribution. Finally, the paper recommends the EU’s CSDP operations to have a command and control structure that is fully integrated as this ensures the highest level of certainty when it comes to the attribution of wrongful acts.\u0000European Union, EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, International Humanitarian Law, EU Strategic Compass, multinational operations, accountability, CFSP, peacekeeping, crisis management","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Relatively little is known about the precise activities of the European External Action Service (EEAS) headquarters in the European Union’s (EU’s) international climate diplomacy, especially since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. This article therefore sketches the evolution of the climate diplomacy activities undertaken by EEAS headquarters between the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015 and COP26 in 2021. Based on a triangulation of official documents and twenty semi-structured interviews, the article finds that although the EEAS headquarters continues to coordinate and mainstream EU climate diplomacy, it has also become more outwardly-involved and entrepreneurial. This entrepreneurship can be explained by the creation within the EEAS of an Ambassador at Large for Climate Diplomacy, the working style of the appointed ambassador, increased resources at EEAS headquarters dedicated to climate diplomacy, and a favourable institutional context within the EU. These findings provide a detailed and updated insight into the involvement of EEAS headquarters within EU climate diplomacy. Accordingly, they improve our understanding of the EU as a climate actor and also demonstrate the importance of individuals in shaping how the EU conducts its climate diplomacy. EEAS, European Union, climate diplomacy, international climate politics
{"title":"A New Kid in Town? The Evolution of the EEAS Headquarters’ Involvement in EU Climate Diplomacy","authors":"Joseph Earsom, Tom Delreux","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023022","url":null,"abstract":"Relatively little is known about the precise activities of the European External Action Service (EEAS) headquarters in the European Union’s (EU’s) international climate diplomacy, especially since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015. This article therefore sketches the evolution of the climate diplomacy activities undertaken by EEAS headquarters between the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in 2015 and COP26 in 2021. Based on a triangulation of official documents and twenty semi-structured interviews, the article finds that although the EEAS headquarters continues to coordinate and mainstream EU climate diplomacy, it has also become more outwardly-involved and entrepreneurial. This entrepreneurship can be explained by the creation within the EEAS of an Ambassador at Large for Climate Diplomacy, the working style of the appointed ambassador, increased resources at EEAS headquarters dedicated to climate diplomacy, and a favourable institutional context within the EU. These findings provide a detailed and updated insight into the involvement of EEAS headquarters within EU climate diplomacy. Accordingly, they improve our understanding of the EU as a climate actor and also demonstrate the importance of individuals in shaping how the EU conducts its climate diplomacy.\u0000EEAS, European Union, climate diplomacy, international climate politics","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European continent has only one micro-state that is not landlocked: the Principality of Monaco. This city-state along the French Riviera is an independent state under international law and is not an EU Member State. Therefore, the law and policy of the EU’s external relations applies, which must cater for the Principality’s peculiar existence because of practical necessity. The EU retains differentiated legal relations with its closest geographical neighbours, and the EU-Monégasque relationship sees several unilateral EU measures taken to account for Monaco, as well as a limited array of international agreements between the parties, including a monetary agreement. These cumulatively make up the legal aspects to their international relations with each other. At first sight, these legal relations appear limited. Yet, as this article establishes, EUMonégasque legal relations have widened and deepened over time, and an association agreement is on the horizon to account for the necessitated intensity of cooperation on a legal footing. Such a development would bring the Principality legally closer to the EU than it ever has been before. European Union, EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, International Humanitarian Law, EU Strategic Compass, multinational operations, accountability, CFSP, peacekeeping, crisis management
{"title":"The Legal Relations of the European Union with the Principality of Monaco","authors":"Graham Butler","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023021","url":null,"abstract":"The European continent has only one micro-state that is not landlocked: the Principality of Monaco. This city-state along the French Riviera is an independent state under international law and is not an EU Member State. Therefore, the law and policy of the EU’s external relations applies, which must cater for the Principality’s peculiar existence because of practical necessity. The EU retains differentiated legal relations with its closest geographical neighbours, and the EU-Monégasque relationship sees several unilateral EU measures taken to account for Monaco, as well as a limited array of international agreements between the parties, including a monetary agreement. These cumulatively make up the legal aspects to their international relations with each other. At first sight, these legal relations appear limited. Yet, as this article establishes, EUMonégasque legal relations have widened and deepened over time, and an association agreement is on the horizon to account for the necessitated intensity of cooperation on a legal footing. Such a development would bring the Principality legally closer to the EU than it ever has been before.\u0000European Union, EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, International Humanitarian Law, EU Strategic Compass, multinational operations, accountability, CFSP, peacekeeping, crisis management","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU’s decision to grant Ukraine and Moldova a candidate country status and the recognition of Georgia’s European perspective in June 2022 has significant effects for both the EU’s enlargement and security and defence policies. So far, ‘hard’ security issues have played little role in the framing of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Association Agreements (AAs) with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Their full integration into EU security and defence arrangements will thus require considerable strategy-making and implementation efforts. This article discusses the extent to which existing external Differentiated Integration (DI) constellations can be seen as ‘building blocks’ for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s prospective full integration into the EU’s security and defence architecture. It is shown that, in legal and practical terms, such DI constellations are conducive to the deepening of these countries’ integration with the EU in the security and defence domain. From the political viewpoint, the focus on DI with the new accession countries may, however, be (mis)used as a substitute for fullscale integration into the EU security and defence architecture. We, nonetheless, suggest several pilot domains that can be used to test the limits of new accession countries’ DI with the Union. EU security and defence policy, EU enlargement policy, accession, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Russia’s war against Ukraine, European Defence Agency, European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation
{"title":"The Eastern Neighbours and EU Security Policy: A Differentiated Integration Perspective","authors":"Maryna Rabinovych","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023019","url":null,"abstract":"The EU’s decision to grant Ukraine and Moldova a candidate country status and the recognition of Georgia’s European perspective in June 2022 has significant effects for both the EU’s enlargement and security and defence policies. So far, ‘hard’ security issues have played little role in the framing of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Association Agreements (AAs) with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Their full integration into EU security and defence arrangements will thus require considerable strategy-making and implementation efforts. This article discusses the extent to which existing external Differentiated Integration (DI) constellations can be seen as ‘building blocks’ for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s prospective full integration into the EU’s security and defence architecture. It is shown that, in legal and practical terms, such DI constellations are conducive to the deepening of these countries’ integration with the EU in the security and defence domain. From the political viewpoint, the focus on DI with the new accession countries may, however, be (mis)used as a substitute for fullscale integration into the EU security and defence architecture. We, nonetheless, suggest several pilot domains that can be used to test the limits of new accession countries’ DI with the Union.\u0000EU security and defence policy, EU enlargement policy, accession, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Russia’s war against Ukraine, European Defence Agency, European Defence Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"161 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135762010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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