This article challenges the ontological assumptions of European Union (EU) theory that rest on the primacy of ‘states’. It also refutes the narrative of peace which is celebrated in scholarship and EU self-representation. It looks at early EU integration through the postcolonial lens and argues that both EU self-image and EU theory do not consider colonialism and empire and have silenced the violence committed outside Europe. Hence, they have produced a historically inaccurate and conceptually misleading account of early European integration. The post-colonial reading of the EU brings history back to the story of Europe to advance a revisionist account of theories of early European integration. The examination of arrangements laid out in Europe’s capitals – from Berlin in 1885 to Paris in 1919 to Rome in 1957 – reveals continuity of goals, motivations, and technologies of domination, rather than Europe’s ‘new beginnings’. The article demonstrates that the legal order established by the Treaty of Rome institutionalized the colonialism of EU members at the new supra-national level. It subordinated foreign people and economies to the interests of European capital, legitimized control of resources, camouflaged the old civilizing mission under a new guise of development, and reproduced and maintained the colonial racialized relationship of inequality and dependence. Ultimately, Rome infused the new European project with imperial, violent, hierarchical, and racial characteristics that remain unacknowledged by the EU theory. European integration, Imperial order, Statehood, Peace, Colonialism
{"title":"The Myth of Peace and Statehood in European Integration Theory: The Imperial Legal Order of the Rome Treaty","authors":"E. Polonska-Kimunguyi","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023010","url":null,"abstract":"This article challenges the ontological assumptions of European Union (EU) theory that rest on the primacy of ‘states’. It also refutes the narrative of peace which is celebrated in scholarship and EU self-representation. It looks at early EU integration through the postcolonial lens and argues that both EU self-image and EU theory do not consider colonialism and empire and have silenced the violence committed outside Europe. Hence, they have produced a historically inaccurate and conceptually misleading account of early European integration. The post-colonial reading of the EU brings history back to the story of Europe to advance a revisionist account of theories of early European integration. The examination of arrangements laid out in Europe’s capitals – from Berlin in 1885 to Paris in 1919 to Rome in 1957 – reveals continuity of goals, motivations, and technologies of domination, rather than Europe’s ‘new beginnings’. The article demonstrates that the legal order established by the Treaty of Rome institutionalized the colonialism of EU members at the new supra-national level. It subordinated foreign people and economies to the interests of European capital, legitimized control of resources, camouflaged the old civilizing mission under a new guise of development, and reproduced and maintained the colonial racialized relationship of inequality and dependence. Ultimately, Rome infused the new European project with imperial, violent, hierarchical, and racial characteristics that remain unacknowledged by the EU theory.\u0000European integration, Imperial order, Statehood, Peace, Colonialism","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44073838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion and gross violations of human rights in Ukraine, the EU has adopted no less than ten sanctions packages in the first year alone. Yet none of the targetted persons and entities were blacklisted under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR). This relatively new thematic sanctions tool, which is also known as the ‘EU’s Magnitsky Act’, aims precisely at targeting the most serious of human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including genocide and crimes against humanity, the proof of which has —literally— been piling up in Ukraine. This raises the question whether the GHRSR is fit for purpose. EU sanctions; Russia; Ukraine; genocide; crimes against humanity; human rights
{"title":"Editorial: The EU’s Magnitsky Act: Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?","authors":"S. Blockmans","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023006","url":null,"abstract":"In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion and gross violations of human rights in Ukraine, the EU has adopted no less than ten sanctions packages in the first year alone. Yet none of the targetted persons and entities were blacklisted under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR). This relatively new thematic sanctions tool, which is also known as the ‘EU’s Magnitsky Act’, aims precisely at targeting the most serious of human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including genocide and crimes against humanity, the proof of which has —literally— been piling up in Ukraine. This raises the question whether the GHRSR is fit for purpose.\u0000EU sanctions; Russia; Ukraine; genocide; crimes against humanity; human rights","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49660565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has long troubled the European Union’s (EU’s) neighbourhood. As a latecomer to the region, the EU played no role in the conflict in the 1990s. The subsequent establishment of bilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, including a closer engagement through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) did not herald any significant changes in this respect. The bilateral relations with both countries advanced despite the military build-up, hostile rhetoric and periodic fighting. When another war erupted in September 2020, the EU was strikingly absent from the international scene in stark contrast to its rhetoric and pledges of the last two decades. Meanwhile, the Russian-brokered ceasefire did not resolve the conflict and led to further aggression demanding a more hands-on approach by the EU. In a welcome development, the EU undertook various efforts to engage the parties in a continuous dialogue for resolving the outstanding issues. In this context, the article argues for a more enhanced role of the EU in resolving this conflict based on a principled position in line with EU values and respect for international law. Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia, Azerbaijan, EU, European Neighbourhood Policy, OSCE Minsk Group
{"title":"The EU and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: The Forty-Four-Day War and Its Aftermath","authors":"N. Ghazaryan","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023004","url":null,"abstract":"The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has long troubled the European Union’s (EU’s) neighbourhood. As a latecomer to the region, the EU played no role in the conflict in the 1990s. The subsequent establishment of bilateral relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, including a closer engagement through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) did not herald any significant changes in this respect. The bilateral relations with both countries advanced despite the military build-up, hostile rhetoric and periodic fighting. When another war erupted in September 2020, the EU was strikingly absent from the international scene in stark contrast to its rhetoric and pledges of the last two decades. Meanwhile, the Russian-brokered ceasefire did not resolve the conflict and led to further aggression demanding a more hands-on approach by the EU. In a welcome development, the EU undertook various efforts to engage the parties in a continuous dialogue for resolving the outstanding issues. In this context, the article argues for a more enhanced role of the EU in resolving this conflict based on a principled position in line with EU values and respect for international law.\u0000Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia, Azerbaijan, EU, European Neighbourhood Policy, OSCE Minsk Group","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46938371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article seeks to address the question of how membership in the European Union (EU) affects the foreign policy positions of its Member States. Most of the existing research has focused on single case studies and relied on qualitative methods, encountering difficulties in providing a systematic and consistent general picture about the causal effect of membership. Instead, this study adopts a comprehensive and quantitative approach. Drawing from constructivist theory in International Relations, it clarifies a general theoretical framework for Foreign Policy Europeanization. It then employs national speeches at the United Nations General Debate to construct two measures of similarity with the EU’s positions and norms in international affairs. Applying these to a difference-in-differences approach, it finds substantial evidence that, after several years of membership, countries gradually converge towards the positions and norms of the Union. It is argued that these overall findings are consistent with a socialization effect, but not with material cost-benefit calculations. Europeanization, Foreign Policy, European Union, United Nations General Debate, Socialization, Constructivism, Difference-in-differences, Quantitative Text Analysis
{"title":"Quantifying Foreign Policy Europeanization: A Comprehensive Approach","authors":"Giacomo Borsetti","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023005","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to address the question of how membership in the European Union (EU) affects the foreign policy positions of its Member States. Most of the existing research has focused on single case studies and relied on qualitative methods, encountering difficulties in providing a systematic and consistent general picture about the causal effect of membership. Instead, this study adopts a comprehensive and quantitative approach. Drawing from constructivist theory in International Relations, it clarifies a general theoretical framework for Foreign Policy Europeanization. It then employs national speeches at the United Nations General Debate to construct two measures of similarity with the EU’s positions and norms in international affairs. Applying these to a difference-in-differences approach, it finds substantial evidence that, after several years of membership, countries gradually converge towards the positions and norms of the Union. It is argued that these overall findings are consistent with a socialization effect, but not with material cost-benefit calculations.\u0000Europeanization, Foreign Policy, European Union, United Nations General Debate, Socialization, Constructivism, Difference-in-differences, Quantitative Text Analysis","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46875374","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses Case C-161/20 Commission v. Council (International Maritime Organization (IMO)), in which the Court of Justice of the EU upheld a Council Decision endorsing a submission to the IMO by the Presidency of the Council on behalf of the European Commission and the Member States (MSs), and not on behalf of the EU. With this case, the Court contributes to the debate on the EU’s external representation, particularly in the context of an international organization to which all the MSs, but not the EU, are parties and which regulates issues falling within EU competences. Combining an EU external relations law and a public international law perspective, this article assesses the Court’s reliance on and interpretation of international law and explores the boundaries carved by EU and international law for the participation of the EU as a separate entity in the IMO. It also seeks to discern how this case fits within the Court’s established ‘gatekeeping’ mechanisms in determining the effects of international law in the EU legal order and whether it signals an emerging, more flexible engagement with international law. International Maritime Organization, European Union, international organizations, Court of Justice of the EU, competences, international law, external representation
{"title":"The EU’s Representation in International Organizations: Case C-161/20 Commission v. Council (International Maritime Organization)","authors":"Athena Herodotou, Ioanna Hadjiyianni","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023003","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses Case C-161/20 Commission v. Council (International Maritime Organization (IMO)), in which the Court of Justice of the EU upheld a Council Decision endorsing a submission to the IMO by the Presidency of the Council on behalf of the European Commission and the Member States (MSs), and not on behalf of the EU. With this case, the Court contributes to the debate on the EU’s external representation, particularly in the context of an international organization to which all the MSs, but not the EU, are parties and which regulates issues falling within EU competences. Combining an EU external relations law and a public international law perspective, this article assesses the Court’s reliance on and interpretation of international law and explores the boundaries carved by EU and international law for the participation of the EU as a separate entity in the IMO. It also seeks to discern how this case fits within the Court’s established ‘gatekeeping’ mechanisms in determining the effects of international law in the EU legal order and whether it signals an emerging, more flexible engagement with international law.\u0000International Maritime Organization, European Union, international organizations, Court of Justice of the EU, competences, international law, external representation","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42016725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Orbie, Anissa Bougrea, Antonio Salvador M. Alcazar III, Szilvia Nagy, Á. Oleart, Jonalyn C. Paz, Rahel W. Sebhatu, Tiffany G. Williams, I. Wodzka
Josep Borrell’s infamous 13 October 2022 speech, where he described the European Union (EU) in terms of a ‘garden’ versus the ‘jungle’ outside, has received an unprecedented amount of scrutiny. Yet the metaphor used by the HighRepresentative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President in charge of ‘a stronger Europe in the world’was not new, nor was its underlying logic a surprise. Various analysts have pointed out the colonial tropes in European policymakers’ discourses over the past decades. In an influential essay that came out in 2000, Sir Robert Cooper, who would later also become an advisor to the Council of the EU, the European External Action Service, and the European Commission, pitched the ‘postmodern’ EU where the rule of law is reigning versus ‘premodern’ states where the ‘law of the jungle’ prevails. This illustrates how mainstream EU political discourse has been, and remains, highly colonial in the way in which relations between the EU and its presumed ‘others’ in world politics are conceived. More notable is the intensity of the debate and condemnation that Borrell’s speech has generated within policy and scholarly circles. This reflects a growing realization that the EU should be more modest about its so-called civilizational achievements and acknowledge the long and dark shadow of its colonial past. Against the background of clear challenges to (western) European dominance in the world system, critical observers are ardently questioning Europe’s alleged moral and sociopolitical superiority. Issues of racism within Europe have been increasingly discussed in the wake of ‘Black Lives Matter’ protests. Recent research has revealed
{"title":"Editorial: Decolonizing Rather than Decentring ‘Europe’","authors":"J. Orbie, Anissa Bougrea, Antonio Salvador M. Alcazar III, Szilvia Nagy, Á. Oleart, Jonalyn C. Paz, Rahel W. Sebhatu, Tiffany G. Williams, I. Wodzka","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023001","url":null,"abstract":"Josep Borrell’s infamous 13 October 2022 speech, where he described the European Union (EU) in terms of a ‘garden’ versus the ‘jungle’ outside, has received an unprecedented amount of scrutiny. Yet the metaphor used by the HighRepresentative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Vice-President in charge of ‘a stronger Europe in the world’was not new, nor was its underlying logic a surprise. Various analysts have pointed out the colonial tropes in European policymakers’ discourses over the past decades. In an influential essay that came out in 2000, Sir Robert Cooper, who would later also become an advisor to the Council of the EU, the European External Action Service, and the European Commission, pitched the ‘postmodern’ EU where the rule of law is reigning versus ‘premodern’ states where the ‘law of the jungle’ prevails. This illustrates how mainstream EU political discourse has been, and remains, highly colonial in the way in which relations between the EU and its presumed ‘others’ in world politics are conceived. More notable is the intensity of the debate and condemnation that Borrell’s speech has generated within policy and scholarly circles. This reflects a growing realization that the EU should be more modest about its so-called civilizational achievements and acknowledge the long and dark shadow of its colonial past. Against the background of clear challenges to (western) European dominance in the world system, critical observers are ardently questioning Europe’s alleged moral and sociopolitical superiority. Issues of racism within Europe have been increasingly discussed in the wake of ‘Black Lives Matter’ protests. Recent research has revealed","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47821093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EU restrictive measures, often referred to as ‘sanctions’, have become an increasingly used instrument of EU autonomous foreign policy. For some restrictive measures, however, the EU cannot act alone. In order to adopt them, the Council must rely on information transmitted by third states’ authorities and decisions taken by them at domestic level. This has been the case, in particular, of EU restrictive measures adopted in connection with misappropriations of state funds. The Council’s use of such evidence has been somewhat controversial and has led to numerous legal debates before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). To what extent was the Council free to rely on the evidence provided by these third states’ authorities? How to ensure that the fundamental rights of the targeted persons and entities were complied with in the process? Faced with these questions in its particularly abundant case law, the CJEU has progressively raised the threshold of validity for these sanctions. It has done so up to a point at which, in the authors’ opinion, the sanctions can no longer reach such threshold in practice. This article addresses the evolutions and implications of the CJEU case law on a legal aspect that is of crucial importance for the EU’s sanctions practice. Restrictive measures – Third States evidence – Misappropriations of State funds – Terrorism – Judicial review – Fundamental Rights – Ukraine – Tunisia – Egypt
{"title":"EU Restrictive Measures and Third Countries’ Evidence","authors":"Celia Challet, Dorin-Ciprian Grumaz","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023002","url":null,"abstract":"EU restrictive measures, often referred to as ‘sanctions’, have become an increasingly used instrument of EU autonomous foreign policy. For some restrictive measures, however, the EU cannot act alone. In order to adopt them, the Council must rely on information transmitted by third states’ authorities and decisions taken by them at domestic level. This has been the case, in particular, of EU restrictive measures adopted in connection with misappropriations of state funds. The Council’s use of such evidence has been somewhat controversial and has led to numerous legal debates before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). To what extent was the Council free to rely on the evidence provided by these third states’ authorities? How to ensure that the fundamental rights of the targeted persons and entities were complied with in the process? Faced with these questions in its particularly abundant case law, the CJEU has progressively raised the threshold of validity for these sanctions. It has done so up to a point at which, in the authors’ opinion, the sanctions can no longer reach such threshold in practice. This article addresses the evolutions and implications of the CJEU case law on a legal aspect that is of crucial importance for the EU’s sanctions practice.\u0000Restrictive measures – Third States evidence – Misappropriations of State funds – Terrorism – Judicial review – Fundamental Rights – Ukraine – Tunisia – Egypt","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42868103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Defence Fund (EDF) has been interpreted by a number of scholars as a step beyond intergovernmental cooperation and towards the introduction of supranationalism in defence policy. We suggest that past developments in space policy can be a guide for developments in the defence area given the functional dependencies between the two fields and their institutional similarities. Based on this, we believe that the Commission will be unable to convert its new authority over the EDF into actual influence over use of force. On the contrary, the EDF may signal that European defence industrial policy is increasingly motivated by civilian and predominantly commercial considerations, dissociated from the operational objectives of national defence policies. Like the EDF, the European Union’s (EU’s) space programmes involve the supranational financing of militarily relevant capabilities. We argue that Member States have accepted supranationalism in space policy insofar as the Commission was able to civilianize matters of industrial governance and keep them separate from the conduct of military operations. We show that the EU implemented civilian programmes in areas that were otherwise driven by national militaries. In instances where civilianization was impossible, Member States’ security interests are preserved through intergovernmental modes of decision-making, even within purportedly ‘community’-driven processes. Member States have also retained significant control over future developments by exploiting a web of overlapping institutions and hazy task allocation. spillover, neofunctionalism, space policy, European Defence Fund, defence industry, industrial policy
{"title":"Lessons from EU Space Programmes for Collective Defence","authors":"Ediz Topcuoğlu, S. Bora","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022030","url":null,"abstract":"The European Defence Fund (EDF) has been interpreted by a number of scholars as a step beyond intergovernmental cooperation and towards the introduction of supranationalism in defence policy. We suggest that past developments in space policy can be a guide for developments in the defence area given the functional dependencies between the two fields and their institutional similarities. Based on this, we believe that the Commission will be unable to convert its new authority over the EDF into actual influence over use of force. On the contrary, the EDF may signal that European defence industrial policy is increasingly motivated by civilian and predominantly commercial considerations, dissociated from the operational objectives of national defence policies. Like the EDF, the European Union’s (EU’s) space programmes involve the supranational financing of militarily relevant capabilities. We argue that Member States have accepted supranationalism in space policy insofar as the Commission was able to civilianize matters of industrial governance and keep them separate from the conduct of military operations. We show that the EU implemented civilian programmes in areas that were otherwise driven by national militaries. In instances where civilianization was impossible, Member States’ security interests are preserved through intergovernmental modes of decision-making, even within purportedly ‘community’-driven processes. Member States have also retained significant control over future developments by exploiting a web of overlapping institutions and hazy task allocation.\u0000spillover, neofunctionalism, space policy, European Defence Fund, defence industry, industrial policy","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44091156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens of thousands of additionalUS troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, as was the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts.While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths.Once key issues of financial equity and military deterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out for themselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and at the same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large. Transatlantic relations, foreign and security policy, burdensharing, strategic autonomy, financial equity, deterrence, nuclear weapons
{"title":"Beyond Burdensharing and European Strategic Autonomy: Rebuilding Transatlantic Security After the Ukraine War","authors":"K. Engelbrekt","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022028","url":null,"abstract":"The war in Ukraine unleashed in early 2022 may temporarily obscure the long-term trend that the United States is shrinking its military footprint in and around Europe, as the defence posture of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Central Europe suddenly was bolstered by tens of thousands of additionalUS troops. For as long as the war drags on, certainly, these reinforcements will stay in place. But if, and when, the war ends or shifts to attrition warfare stretching out for years, as was the case after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea, one can easily envisage changes in how European governments manage security and defence issues among themselves and in relation to their North American counterparts.While the debate on transatlantic security so far has played out in two distinct modes, either focusing on the economic side of burdensharing or projecting a vision of European strategic autonomy, there is a need for a more sober understanding of the future division of labour, one that would be grounded in the right blend of economics and deterrence. The main suggestion of this article is that stakeholders on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean ‘split the difference’ and strike a new grand bargain on the basis of their respective strengths.Once key issues of financial equity and military deterrence have been adequately addressed, European governments will still have their work cut out for themselves. They must elaborate solutions to specific challenges at the sub-strategic theatre level and at the same time navigate the complexities of optimizing defence reforms, aligning regional force designs and rendering foreign policy compatible with the strategic priorities of the European Union (EU) and Europe at large.\u0000Transatlantic relations, foreign and security policy, burdensharing, strategic autonomy, financial equity, deterrence, nuclear weapons","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46091235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is common to criticize the State of Israel for its lack of strategy. This is true with respect to its foreign relations, and with specific reference to her relations with the EU. This criticism was reinforced during the five terms of Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership (1996–1999 and 2009–2021). Commentators expressed strong criticism of his leadership, blaming him for shaping and implementing Israel’s foreign relations in a non-strategic, incoherent, and inconsistent manner. This article provides an alternative perspective, arguing that during his five terms Netanyahu and his governments adopted and pursued a calculated and coherent policy towards the EU, which was aimed at mitigating EU intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and at dismissing any manifestation of EU political criticism towards Israel. The article analyses his policy towards the EU and the main instruments adopted in order to promote it, through the prism of scholarship pertaining to speech-acts and Euroscepticism. Foreign relations, Speech-acts, Euroscepticism, EU-Israel relations, Benjamin Netanyahu
{"title":"Article: EU-Israel Relations: Netanyahu’s Legacy","authors":"G. Harpaz","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022034","url":null,"abstract":"It is common to criticize the State of Israel for its lack of strategy. This is true with respect to its foreign relations, and with specific reference to her relations with the EU. This criticism was reinforced during the five terms of Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership (1996–1999 and 2009–2021). Commentators expressed strong criticism of his leadership, blaming him for shaping and implementing Israel’s foreign relations in a non-strategic, incoherent, and inconsistent manner. This article provides an alternative perspective, arguing that during his five terms Netanyahu and his governments adopted and pursued a calculated and coherent policy towards the EU, which was aimed at mitigating EU intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and at dismissing any manifestation of EU political criticism towards Israel. The article analyses his policy towards the EU and the main instruments adopted in order to promote it, through the prism of scholarship pertaining to speech-acts and Euroscepticism.\u0000Foreign relations, Speech-acts, Euroscepticism, EU-Israel relations, Benjamin Netanyahu","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48044474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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