Employing strategic narrative theory, (A. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin & L. Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (Routledge 2013)) the article compares the EU’s and the US’s strategic narratives of their Southern neighbourhoods, forged after the simultaneous migration crises at their Southern borders in 2013-2015. By this comparison, the article tests the claims that the EU and the US have different preferences for (regional) orders and explores the region’s role in their strategic narratives. Exploring three levels in the circulation of the narratives – system, identity and issue – this article concludes that both powers share the idea of desired regional order. At the same time, the place of the ‘region’ in the strategic narratives is different, demonstrating the EU’s deeper engagement in the region and its identity as a regional power. strategic narrative, the EU, the US, ENP, Central America, region-building
{"title":"EU and US Narratives of Order and Disorder in Their Southern Neighbourhoods After the Migration Crises","authors":"Ieva Giedraityte","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022005","url":null,"abstract":"Employing strategic narrative theory, (A. Miskimmon, B. O’Loughlin & L. Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order (Routledge 2013)) the article compares the EU’s and the US’s strategic narratives of their Southern neighbourhoods, forged after the simultaneous migration crises at their Southern borders in 2013-2015. By this comparison, the article tests the claims that the EU and the US have different preferences for (regional) orders and explores the region’s role in their strategic narratives. Exploring three levels in the circulation of the narratives – system, identity and issue – this article concludes that both powers share the idea of desired regional order. At the same time, the place of the ‘region’ in the strategic narratives is different, demonstrating the EU’s deeper engagement in the region and its identity as a regional power.\u0000strategic narrative, the EU, the US, ENP, Central America, region-building","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46897484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article evaluates public perceptions of the European Union (EU) in Montenegro and Serbia as the front running EU membership candidates. It uses a multidisciplinary approach, which comprises a comparative survey data analysis method, the Image Theory and a mind-mapping approach of EU perceptions analysis to study the EU-Western Balkans relations. Public perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans are (re)created and juxtaposed against perceptions of other external actors, notably Russia and China. This has led to the EU’s ‘power of attraction’ being diminished in the Western Balkans. Rival perceptions of China and Russia as ‘less demanding’ partners than the EU, and the slowing down of EU’s enlargement agenda have also contributed to this trend. In order to maximize its own security and counter the growing geopolitical influence by China and Russia in the Western Balkans, the EU would benefit from a more comprehensive study of its own representation and public perceptions in candidate states. By doing so, the EU could improve the knowledge about its soft power, which can in turn increase the effectiveness of its foreign policy programmes globally and democracy promotion in the neighbourhood. European integration, EU public diplomacy, accession, Image Theory, EU-Western Balkans relations, Montenegro, Serbia, EU membership, EU accession, EU foreign policy, soft power
{"title":"Perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans Vis-à-vis Russia and China","authors":"Nina Markovic Khaze","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022006","url":null,"abstract":"This article evaluates public perceptions of the European Union (EU) in Montenegro and Serbia as the front running EU membership candidates. It uses a multidisciplinary approach, which comprises a comparative survey data analysis method, the Image Theory and a mind-mapping approach of EU perceptions analysis to study the EU-Western Balkans relations. Public perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans are (re)created and juxtaposed against perceptions of other external actors, notably Russia and China. This has led to the EU’s ‘power of attraction’ being diminished in the Western Balkans. Rival perceptions of China and Russia as ‘less demanding’ partners than the EU, and the slowing down of EU’s enlargement agenda have also contributed to this trend. In order to maximize its own security and counter the growing geopolitical influence by China and Russia in the Western Balkans, the EU would benefit from a more comprehensive study of its own representation and public perceptions in candidate states. By doing so, the EU could improve the knowledge about its soft power, which can in turn increase the effectiveness of its foreign policy programmes globally and democracy promotion in the neighbourhood.\u0000European integration, EU public diplomacy, accession, Image Theory, EU-Western Balkans relations, Montenegro, Serbia, EU membership, EU accession, EU foreign policy, soft power","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48174962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a political context characterized by democracies with fading partisan identities, political entrepreneurs in the form of radical right parties turned immigration into a powerful subject of issue competition on the basis of a cultural or identity cleavage.1 The literature has illustrated that political parties can respond to this challenge through various strategies (e.g., through ‘accommodation’, ‘adversarial’ and ‘diffusion’ strategies). In this article, we develop an innovative analytical framework to examine strategies of de-politicization in the context of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) in three countries; France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Through this analytical framework, we aim to generate new insights in the dynamics of strategic action through de-politicization, looking at the differentiations between political parties. In the conclusion, we formulate hypotheses for the varying choices in de-politicization strategies, highlighting why some strategies are more prominent in some countries. The application of the analytical framework on rich empirics could serve as a basis for further research on de-politicization strategies in multiple contexts, looking at the factors that explain the variation between political actors.In a political context characterized by democracies with fading partisan identities, political entrepreneurs in the form of radical right parties turned immigration into a powerful subject of issue competition on the basis of a cultural or identity cleavage.1 The literature has illustrated that political parties can respond to this challenge through various strategies (e.g., through ‘accommodation’, ‘adversarial’ and ‘diffusion’ strategies). In this article, we develop an innovative analytical framework to examine strategies of de-politicization in the context of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) in three countries; France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Through this analytical framework, we aim to generate new insights in the dynamics of strategic action through de-politicization, looking at the differentiations between political parties. In the conclusion, we formulate hypotheses for the varying choices in de-politicization strategies, highlighting why some strategies are more prominent in some countries. The application of the analytical framework on rich empirics could serve as a basis for further research on de-politicization strategies in multiple contexts, looking at the factors that explain the variation between political actors.
{"title":"The Global Compact for Migration: A Case of De-Politicization?","authors":"Nathan Lauwers","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022002","url":null,"abstract":"In a political context characterized by democracies with fading partisan identities, political entrepreneurs in the form of radical right parties turned immigration into a powerful subject of issue competition on the basis of a cultural or identity cleavage.1 The literature has illustrated that political parties can respond to this challenge through various strategies (e.g., through ‘accommodation’, ‘adversarial’ and ‘diffusion’ strategies). In this article, we develop an innovative analytical framework to examine strategies of de-politicization in the context of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) in three countries; France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Through this analytical framework, we aim to generate new insights in the dynamics of strategic action through de-politicization, looking at the differentiations between political parties. In the conclusion, we formulate hypotheses for the varying choices in de-politicization strategies, highlighting why some strategies are more prominent in some countries. The application of the analytical framework on rich empirics could serve as a basis for further research on de-politicization strategies in multiple contexts, looking at the factors that explain the variation between political actors.In a political context characterized by democracies with fading partisan identities, political entrepreneurs in the form of radical right parties turned immigration into a powerful subject of issue competition on the basis of a cultural or identity cleavage.1 The literature has illustrated that political parties can respond to this challenge through various strategies (e.g., through ‘accommodation’, ‘adversarial’ and ‘diffusion’ strategies). In this article, we develop an innovative analytical framework to examine strategies of de-politicization in the context of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) in three countries; France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Through this analytical framework, we aim to generate new insights in the dynamics of strategic action through de-politicization, looking at the differentiations between political parties. In the conclusion, we formulate hypotheses for the varying choices in de-politicization strategies, highlighting why some strategies are more prominent in some countries. The application of the analytical framework on rich empirics could serve as a basis for further research on de-politicization strategies in multiple contexts, looking at the factors that explain the variation between political actors.","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44474082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I rely on the recent ‘Palm Oil Wars’ between the EU, Malaysia, and Indonesia to illustrate how the EU’s ‘inflated’ Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is becoming increasingly difficult to manage. The CCP’s expansion in scope, the external effects of internal EU environmental legislation, the increased role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of international agreements, as well as the EU’s constitutional mandate to pursue non-trade values in its external and trade relations has increased the number of issues and players that can affect the negotiation of preferential trade agreements. As a possible solution, I propose that the EU should prioritize its non-trade values and objectives, among which one can mention the protection of human rights, the promotion of democratic values, the rule of law, sustainable development, environmental protection, and investment protection. For higher non-trade values, the EU should follow a principle-based approach, even if the risk is that no agreement will be concluded; for medium-level values, the EU should follow a more concessionary approach and accept certain trade-offs in order to keep concluding trade agreements and remain a credible international partner, whilst lower non-trade values or objectives can be excluded from the negotiations if they risk jeopardizing them. Palm Oil Wars – Common Commercial Policy – EU environmental legislation – nontrade values
{"title":"The ‘Palm Oil Wars’ or How the EU’s ‘Inflated’ Common Commercial Policy Might Need to Prioritize Its Non-trade Values","authors":"Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi","doi":"10.54648/eerr2022003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2022003","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I rely on the recent ‘Palm Oil Wars’ between the EU, Malaysia, and Indonesia to illustrate how the EU’s ‘inflated’ Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is becoming increasingly difficult to manage. The CCP’s expansion in scope, the external effects of internal EU environmental legislation, the increased role of the European Parliament in the conclusion of international agreements, as well as the EU’s constitutional mandate to pursue non-trade values in its external and trade relations has increased the number of issues and players that can affect the negotiation of preferential trade agreements. As a possible solution, I propose that the EU should prioritize its non-trade values and objectives, among which one can mention the protection of human rights, the promotion of democratic values, the rule of law, sustainable development, environmental protection, and investment protection. For higher non-trade values, the EU should follow a principle-based approach, even if the risk is that no agreement will be concluded; for medium-level values, the EU should follow a more concessionary approach and accept certain trade-offs in order to keep concluding trade agreements and remain a credible international partner, whilst lower non-trade values or objectives can be excluded from the negotiations if they risk jeopardizing them.\u0000Palm Oil Wars – Common Commercial Policy – EU environmental legislation – nontrade values","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48574436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
About four months ahead of the global climate summit in Glasgow, the European Commission revealed the details of its controversial proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). If adopted by the European Parliament and Council, the proposed CBAM would make the EU the first jurisdiction worldwide to extend its domestic carbon price to emissions that are produced outside its borders but are embedded into its imports of carbon-intensive commodities. While aligning with the EU’s long-standing ambition to play a leadership role in the global battle against climate change, this novel regulatory initiative raises a number of critical legal and policy questions – i.e., would it be effective, legal and ‘fair’?
{"title":"EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Key Issues Going Forward","authors":"Gracia Marín Durán","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021039","url":null,"abstract":"About four months ahead of the global climate summit in Glasgow, the European Commission revealed the details of its controversial proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). If adopted by the European Parliament and Council, the proposed CBAM would make the EU the first jurisdiction worldwide to extend its domestic carbon price to emissions that are produced outside its borders but are embedded into its imports of carbon-intensive commodities. While aligning with the EU’s long-standing ambition to play a leadership role in the global battle against climate change, this novel regulatory initiative raises a number of critical legal and policy questions – i.e., would it be effective, legal and ‘fair’?","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45401455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
On 4 July 2019, the EU formally requested the Panel of Experts to be convened under Article 13.15 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The gist of the dispute revolved around Korea’s compliance with its labour rights obligations under the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapter of the FTA. The Panel of Experts gave its decision on 20 January 2021, making several recommendations for Korea to amend its domestic legislation. As a result of the EU-Korea labour dispute, Korea ratified three International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions and made amendments to its Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act (TULRAA). While the dispute has yielded some successful results for the EU, this article examines shortcomings of the EU’s approach to promoting labour rights in its relations with Korea, and remaining challenges as regards Korea’s obligations under the TSD Chapter. European Union, external relations, labour rights, EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Trade and Sustainable Development, labour dispute, Panel of Experts, freedom of association, forced labour
{"title":"The EU-Korea Labour Dispute: A Critical Analysis of the EU’s Approach","authors":"Ji sun Han","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021041","url":null,"abstract":"On 4 July 2019, the EU formally requested the Panel of Experts to be convened under Article 13.15 of the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The gist of the dispute revolved around Korea’s compliance with its labour rights obligations under the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapter of the FTA. The Panel of Experts gave its decision on 20 January 2021, making several recommendations for Korea to amend its domestic legislation. As a result of the EU-Korea labour dispute, Korea ratified three International Labour Organisation (ILO) Conventions and made amendments to its Trade Union and Labour Relations Adjustment Act (TULRAA). While the dispute has yielded some successful results for the EU, this article examines shortcomings of the EU’s approach to promoting labour rights in its relations with Korea, and remaining challenges as regards Korea’s obligations under the TSD Chapter.\u0000European Union, external relations, labour rights, EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Trade and Sustainable Development, labour dispute, Panel of Experts, freedom of association, forced labour","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46148526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European Union (EU) has continuously extended its presence in the post-communist neighbourhood through the offer of membership and/or closer political and economic association. Meanwhile, the growing competition among various powers in the region brings a potential of new divisions in Europe, as Ukraine’s crisis demonstrates. Furthermore, while the presence of such powers as the United States (US) or Russia is somewhat traditional for the region, China’s growing economic engagement with post-communist states reveals its potential to become an equally important actor. This article examines this potential of China on the examples of Poland and Ukraine, as both countries share geographic and historical similarities but differ in their Europeanization progress. We believe that this convergence with the EU may affect the way Ukraine and Poland perceive and accordingly engage with China and test this hypothesis within the neoclassical realist framework. We find that the perceptions of China in the two countries affect the intensity of their engagement with China, especially when the EU is concerned. Moreover, the effectiveness of the relationship-building with China, in line with neoclassical realism, depends on the extent to which their political decisions are guided by strategic considerations as opposed to perceptions of international affairs. This is true for the dynamics of China’s relations with the two countries not only in the long run but also in light of the most recent developments in the international arena. perceptions, China, the EU, Poland, Ukraine, Russia
{"title":"In the ‘Shadow’ of the EU: Perceptions of China and Strategic Considerations in Poland and Ukraine","authors":"Iana Sabatovych, Xiwen Wang","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021046","url":null,"abstract":"The European Union (EU) has continuously extended its presence in the post-communist neighbourhood through the offer of membership and/or closer political and economic association. Meanwhile, the growing competition among various powers in the region brings a potential of new divisions in Europe, as Ukraine’s crisis demonstrates. Furthermore, while the presence of such powers as the United States (US) or Russia is somewhat traditional for the region, China’s growing economic engagement with post-communist states reveals its potential to become an equally important actor. This article examines this potential of China on the examples of Poland and Ukraine, as both countries share geographic and historical similarities but differ in their Europeanization progress. We believe that this convergence with the EU may affect the way Ukraine and Poland perceive and accordingly engage with China and test this hypothesis within the neoclassical realist framework. We find that the perceptions of China in the two countries affect the intensity of their engagement with China, especially when the EU is concerned. Moreover, the effectiveness of the relationship-building with China, in line with neoclassical realism, depends on the extent to which their political decisions are guided by strategic considerations as opposed to perceptions of international affairs. This is true for the dynamics of China’s relations with the two countries not only in the long run but also in light of the most recent developments in the international arena.\u0000perceptions, China, the EU, Poland, Ukraine, Russia","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46494209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article draws on the argument that systematic consideration of the perceptions held at the level of foreign policy-makers can enrich the understanding of Self-Other identity interactions. This research examines the evolution of the discursive dialogue between the EU’s self-portrayals as an actor in the shared neighbourhood and as an actor in the Ukrainian crisis and its external perceptions in Russia. In focus are the EU’s and Russia’s political narratives formulated and communicated from 2003 to 2015. The analysis shows a leading trend of Russia challenging the EU’s predominantly self-ingratiating images thus refusing to sediment the EU’s self-proclaimed identity as a distinctive actor. In turn, the EU’s inattention to its ‘mirror’ images has led to the self-reinforcing cycle of reciprocal mis – and non-recognition of Russia as the constitutive Other in the EU identity formation. These patterns have contributed to the escalation in the discursive clashes between the two actors during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. the EU, Russia, external perceptions, discourse
{"title":"Russia’s Perceptions of the European Union as an Actor in the Shared Neighbourhood Before and During the Ukraine Conflict","authors":"I. Khayrizamanova","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021044","url":null,"abstract":"This article draws on the argument that systematic consideration of the perceptions held at the level of foreign policy-makers can enrich the understanding of Self-Other identity interactions. This research examines the evolution of the discursive dialogue between the EU’s self-portrayals as an actor in the shared neighbourhood and as an actor in the Ukrainian crisis and its external perceptions in Russia. In focus are the EU’s and Russia’s political narratives formulated and communicated from 2003 to 2015. The analysis shows a leading trend of Russia challenging the EU’s predominantly self-ingratiating images thus refusing to sediment the EU’s self-proclaimed identity as a distinctive actor. In turn, the EU’s inattention to its ‘mirror’ images has led to the self-reinforcing cycle of reciprocal mis – and non-recognition of Russia as the constitutive Other in the EU identity formation. These patterns have contributed to the escalation in the discursive clashes between the two actors during the Russia-Ukraine conflict.\u0000the EU, Russia, external perceptions, discourse","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43718789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the perceptions that young people in Ukraine have of the European Union (EU) and the Baltic States. Based on a qualitatively rich data set from surveys carried out with students across four regions of Ukraine – Kyiv, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv – the paper draws on International Relations (IR) image theory to analyse the cognitive, normative, and emotive elements of youth perceptions of the national Self of Ukraine and the important Others of the EU and the Baltic States. Several key findings emerge from the study: (1) youth in Ukraine have broadly positive attitudes towards the EU and the Baltic States; (2) young people in Ukraine report greater familiarity with EU affairs than those of the Baltic States; but (3) attitudes to the EU are predominantly cognitive while (4) attitudes to the Baltic States are predominantly emotive; and finally (5) youth in Ukraine perceive the EU and Baltic state Other in normatively positive terms but the national Self in normatively negative terms. Our findings underline the centrality of the emotive aspect of IR image theory in public perception research and in processes of political socialization. This study therefore makes an important contribution to theoretical literatures on IR image as well as providing a timely empirical analysis with direct relevance to EU external relations diplomacy and the development of EU neighbourhood policy. European Union, Ukraine, Baltic States, International Relations, Image Theory, Mental Mapping, Public Perception Research
{"title":"Youth Perceptions of the EU and the Baltic States in Ukraine: Emotive Attitudes and Images","authors":"N. Chaban, L. Whitten","doi":"10.54648/eerr2021045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2021045","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the perceptions that young people in Ukraine have of the European Union (EU) and the Baltic States. Based on a qualitatively rich data set from surveys carried out with students across four regions of Ukraine – Kyiv, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk and Kharkiv – the paper draws on International Relations (IR) image theory to analyse the cognitive, normative, and emotive elements of youth perceptions of the national Self of Ukraine and the important Others of the EU and the Baltic States. Several key findings emerge from the study: (1) youth in Ukraine have broadly positive attitudes towards the EU and the Baltic States; (2) young people in Ukraine report greater familiarity with EU affairs than those of the Baltic States; but (3) attitudes to the EU are predominantly cognitive while (4) attitudes to the Baltic States are predominantly emotive; and finally (5) youth in Ukraine perceive the EU and Baltic state Other in normatively positive terms but the national Self in normatively negative terms.\u0000Our findings underline the centrality of the emotive aspect of IR image theory in public perception research and in processes of political socialization. This study therefore makes an important contribution to theoretical literatures on IR image as well as providing a timely empirical analysis with direct relevance to EU external relations diplomacy and the development of EU neighbourhood policy.\u0000European Union, Ukraine, Baltic States, International Relations, Image Theory, Mental Mapping, Public Perception Research","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44534318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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