The introduction of over half a dozen unilateral European Union (EU) trade policy instruments in the past few years seems to represent a major shift to the EU’s previous focus on bilateral and multilateral avenues. This article investigates the origins of the recent unilateralization of EU trade policy and the main characteristics of the new instruments. What are the new instruments’ goals and why does the EU introduce them now? We identify six key determinants of this trend: the rise of state interventions, increasing sustainability ambitions, a more adverse geopolitical context, the paralysis of the multilateral trading system, the resistance to bilateral trade agreements and changing preferences within key Member States. The instruments can be divided in three clusters focused on competitiveness, sustainability, and security. They share to a larger or lesser degree five key features: reciprocity, deterrence, built-in engagement, extension of internal policies, and the pursuit of international public goods. Our analysis points at a unilateral turn with EU characteristics, offering a framework for studying trade unilateralization in comparative perspective. EU, Trade Policy, Unilateralization, Geopoliticization, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, Sustainability
{"title":"The Unilateral Turn in EU Trade Policy? The Origins and Characteristics of the EU’s New Trade Instruments","authors":"H. Kalimo, Ferdi De Ville, Simon Happersberger","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023012","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction of over half a dozen unilateral European Union (EU) trade policy instruments in the past few years seems to represent a major shift to the EU’s previous focus on bilateral and multilateral avenues. This article investigates the origins of the recent unilateralization of EU trade policy and the main characteristics of the new instruments. What are the new instruments’ goals and why does the EU introduce them now? We identify six key determinants of this trend: the rise of state interventions, increasing sustainability ambitions, a more adverse geopolitical context, the paralysis of the multilateral trading system, the resistance to bilateral trade agreements and changing preferences within key Member States. The instruments can be divided in three clusters focused on competitiveness, sustainability, and security. They share to a larger or lesser degree five key features: reciprocity, deterrence, built-in engagement, extension of internal policies, and the pursuit of international public goods. Our analysis points at a unilateral turn with EU characteristics, offering a framework for studying trade unilateralization in comparative perspective.\u0000EU, Trade Policy, Unilateralization, Geopoliticization, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, Sustainability","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49275946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU’s investment screening mechanism (ISM) has been a prime example of the unilateral turn in EU trade and investment policy and of a broader global trend of a rise in ISMs. Being a champion of market liberalization and open investment regimes, however, for the EU to introduce a regulatory barrier to cross-border capital flows is particularly remarkable. This contribution argues that conceptually, ISMs may be understood as exposing a problem of trust in international relations (IR) and that a greatly consequential, if not decisive, underlying factor affecting both the introduction and usage of the EU ISM has been the level of trust between the EU and the People’s Republic of China. The introduction of the EU ISM is a symptom of mistrust in EU-China relations in its legislative form, and a test of trust in its individual decisions at Member State (MS) level. Discussing the above, the article aims to fulfil two objectives. First, it demonstrates how the concept of trust can illustrate the genesis and later the functioning of the EU ISM. Secondly, it explores what legal tools may be adopted to either rebuild trust or to render trust inessential by curtailing the security vulnerabilities which require it. EU External Affairs, China, Foreign Investment, FDI, Investment Screening, National Security, Trust
{"title":"Thinking Past Naivete: Investment Screening by the EU as a Problem of (Mis)trust in International Relations","authors":"M. Misra","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023016","url":null,"abstract":"The EU’s investment screening mechanism (ISM) has been a prime example of the unilateral turn in EU trade and investment policy and of a broader global trend of a rise in ISMs. Being a champion of market liberalization and open investment regimes, however, for the EU to introduce a regulatory barrier to cross-border capital flows is particularly remarkable. This contribution argues that conceptually, ISMs may be understood as exposing a problem of trust in international relations (IR) and that a greatly consequential, if not decisive, underlying factor affecting both the introduction and usage of the EU ISM has been the level of trust between the EU and the People’s Republic of China. The introduction of the EU ISM is a symptom of mistrust in EU-China relations in its legislative form, and a test of trust in its individual decisions at Member State (MS) level. Discussing the above, the article aims to fulfil two objectives. First, it demonstrates how the concept of trust can illustrate the genesis and later the functioning of the EU ISM. Secondly, it explores what legal tools may be adopted to either rebuild trust or to render trust inessential by curtailing the security vulnerabilities which require it.\u0000EU External Affairs, China, Foreign Investment, FDI, Investment Screening, National Security, Trust","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46247095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At their inception in the early 1990s, conditionality clauses were introduced in the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) as an instrument for the protection and promotion of labour standards and human rights in the Global South. Conditionality in the GSP as an instrument of development and trade policy was conceived as separate from foreign policy tools in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Notwithstanding the very limited suspension practice, previous research highlighted indications of political contamination in withdrawal decisions. This article explores the question as to whether GSP withdrawals are becoming more similar to CFSP sanctions. Relying primarily on policy documents and legislation, the article discusses the evolution of GSP conditionality from its origins to present, including the proposal for a new Regulation governing the GSP tabled by the Commission in July 2021 and currently under consideration. With this aim in mind, it first outlines the evolution of the design of withdrawal mechanisms, taking issue with the changing focus of the GSP conditionality, which has expanded considerably while withdrawal practice remains marginal. Following that, the implications of the identified trend(s) for the European Union (EU) are teased out. Economic sanctions, GSP, EU trade policy, labour standards, human rights, CFSP
{"title":"Are EU GSP Withdrawals and CFSP Sanctions Becoming More Alike?","authors":"C. Portela","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023013","url":null,"abstract":"At their inception in the early 1990s, conditionality clauses were introduced in the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) as an instrument for the protection and promotion of labour standards and human rights in the Global South. Conditionality in the GSP as an instrument of development and trade policy was conceived as separate from foreign policy tools in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Notwithstanding the very limited suspension practice, previous research highlighted indications of political contamination in withdrawal decisions. This article explores the question as to whether GSP withdrawals are becoming more similar to CFSP sanctions. Relying primarily on policy documents and legislation, the article discusses the evolution of GSP conditionality from its origins to present, including the proposal for a new Regulation governing the GSP tabled by the Commission in July 2021 and currently under consideration. With this aim in mind, it first outlines the evolution of the design of withdrawal mechanisms, taking issue with the changing focus of the GSP conditionality, which has expanded considerably while withdrawal practice remains marginal. Following that, the implications of the identified trend(s) for the European Union (EU) are teased out.\u0000Economic sanctions, GSP, EU trade policy, labour standards, human rights, CFSP","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45197333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As part of the European Commission’s Open Strategic Autonomy agenda, the European Union has reformed its unilateral trade and investment policy toolbox. Existing instruments have been updated (e.g., Trade Defence Instruments, the Enforcement Regulation) and new instruments have been adopted (e.g., the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument). These developments are significant: taken together, they herald a unilateral turn in the EU’s trade and investment policy. This special issue explores aspects of this unilateral turn. It combines a bird’s-eye perspective with studies of specific instruments; it brings together political science and legal methodologies; and it looks at the unilateral turn from the inside-out and from the outside-in. The special issue scratches the surface of what we consider to be a seismic change in the EU’s trade and investment policy. We hope it will trigger further debate and scholarly analysis of this important topic. In this introduction, we set the scene and introduce the six articles that are part of this special issue. unilateral turn, unilateralism, EU trade and investment policy, security, sustainability, level playing field, geopolitics, geopoliticization, economic coercion, restrictive measures, common commercial policy
{"title":"The Unilateral Turn in EU Trade and Investment Policy","authors":"T. Verellen, A. Hofer","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023011","url":null,"abstract":"As part of the European Commission’s Open Strategic Autonomy agenda, the European Union has reformed its unilateral trade and investment policy toolbox. Existing instruments have been updated (e.g., Trade Defence Instruments, the Enforcement Regulation) and new instruments have been adopted (e.g., the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, the Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument). These developments are significant: taken together, they herald a unilateral turn in the EU’s trade and investment policy. This special issue explores aspects of this unilateral turn. It combines a bird’s-eye perspective with studies of specific instruments; it brings together political science and legal methodologies; and it looks at the unilateral turn from the inside-out and from the outside-in. The special issue scratches the surface of what we consider to be a seismic change in the EU’s trade and investment policy. We hope it will trigger further debate and scholarly analysis of this important topic. In this introduction, we set the scene and introduce the six articles that are part of this special issue.\u0000unilateral turn, unilateralism, EU trade and investment policy, security, sustainability, level playing field, geopolitics, geopoliticization, economic coercion, restrictive measures, common commercial policy","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45417508","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EU public procurement law provides different options for preventing geopolitically undesirable dependency on third country suppliers in critical infrastructure. Their effectiveness solely depends, however, on the willingness of national authorities to use those. Recently, the EU therefore adopted the International Procurement Instrument (IPI) Regulation, within the sphere of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), to condition the access to public contracts for third country entities on reciprocity. This article explores the security dimension of this issue. After generally considering the role of sovereignty as a limit to international trade, the article specifies the security risks which may arise in a public procurement context and sets out the legal options for Member States to address those. The article then discusses how security intrinsically shapes CCP instruments and how the new regulation could indicate a shift in the EU’s role, from facilitating legal options for Member States, towards the Commission itself restricting the market access for certain third countries. Although such bans ought to be based on a lack of reciprocity rather than security, in times of weaponized dependencies the security dimension is undeniable. When considering interdependence as a stabilizing force in international relations, reciprocity itself has in fact become a security objective. EU law, Public Procurement, National Security, Critical Infrastructure, Common Commercial Policy, International Procurement Instrument, Economic Interdependence, Sovereignty, World Trade Organization, Government Procurement Agreement
{"title":"Reciprocity as Security: Reconsidering Third Country Access to European Critical Infrastructure Procurement","authors":"Nathan Meershoek","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023017","url":null,"abstract":"EU public procurement law provides different options for preventing geopolitically undesirable dependency on third country suppliers in critical infrastructure. Their effectiveness solely depends, however, on the willingness of national authorities to use those. Recently, the EU therefore adopted the International Procurement Instrument (IPI) Regulation, within the sphere of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), to condition the access to public contracts for third country entities on reciprocity. This article explores the security dimension of this issue. After generally considering the role of sovereignty as a limit to international trade, the article specifies the security risks which may arise in a public procurement context and sets out the legal options for Member States to address those. The article then discusses how security intrinsically shapes CCP instruments and how the new regulation could indicate a shift in the EU’s role, from facilitating legal options for Member States, towards the Commission itself restricting the market access for certain third countries. Although such bans ought to be based on a lack of reciprocity rather than security, in times of weaponized dependencies the security dimension is undeniable. When considering interdependence as a stabilizing force in international relations, reciprocity itself has in fact become a security objective.\u0000EU law, Public Procurement, National Security, Critical Infrastructure, Common Commercial Policy, International Procurement Instrument, Economic Interdependence, Sovereignty, World Trade Organization, Government Procurement Agreement","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45051164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
EU Regulation 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, FSR) is a unilateral tool designed to fill a perceived regulatory gap in the existing EU and WTO rules on foreign subsidies. After a description of the new Regulation, this paper demonstrates that the FSR follows in the footsteps of a long European tradition of scepticism towards EU Member State subsidization in the internal market, but that it also arises in a context where the EU’s approach to subsidization as a tool in international trade has been more ambiguous, combining initiatives to fight government subsidies (the ‘defensive’ approach) with examples of the active use and promotion of subsidization (the ‘offensive’ approach). The paper subsequently aims to forecast how the FSR’s implementation will be affected by contextual factors, such as the perceived crisis of globalization and the crisis of the WTO, and the resurgence of industrial policy in the United States (e.g., the US Inflation Reduction Act) and in the EU itself (where various recent initiatives facilitate the granting of subsidies), as well as by factors internal to the Regulation, such as its dependence on policy choices and certain practical challenges to its application. FSR, subsidies, state aid, competition, international trade, industrial policy, WTO
{"title":"The Foreign Subsidies Regulation: Calling Foul While Upping the Ante?","authors":"J. Blockx, P. Mattiolo","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023014","url":null,"abstract":"EU Regulation 2022/2560 on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, FSR) is a unilateral tool designed to fill a perceived regulatory gap in the existing EU and WTO rules on foreign subsidies. After a description of the new Regulation, this paper demonstrates that the FSR follows in the footsteps of a long European tradition of scepticism towards EU Member State subsidization in the internal market, but that it also arises in a context where the EU’s approach to subsidization as a tool in international trade has been more ambiguous, combining initiatives to fight government subsidies (the ‘defensive’ approach) with examples of the active use and promotion of subsidization (the ‘offensive’ approach). The paper subsequently aims to forecast how the FSR’s implementation will be affected by contextual factors, such as the perceived crisis of globalization and the crisis of the WTO, and the resurgence of industrial policy in the United States (e.g., the US Inflation Reduction Act) and in the EU itself (where various recent initiatives facilitate the granting of subsidies), as well as by factors internal to the Regulation, such as its dependence on policy choices and certain practical challenges to its application.\u0000FSR, subsidies, state aid, competition, international trade, industrial policy, WTO","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42148628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ‘unilateral turn’ in EU trade and investment policy is also reflected in the EU’s adoption of restrictive measures or sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. EU sanctions do not only target the Russian government but also Russian individuals and companies with investments in the EU. They can also indirectly affect the economic activities of other foreign investors running businesses in the territory of Member States. This raises unexplored questions about the interaction between EU sanctions and certain disciplines of international economic law, such as international investment protection law. Member States have undertaken obligations under international investment agreements (IIAs) signed with Russia and other states in respect of investments made in their territory by Russian and non-Russian investors. This article examines whether, and if so to what extent, the EU’s unilateral turn in the form of sanctions can fall within the scope of international investment law. It shows that this policy can trigger claims against Member States under a different set of IIAs. This article also examines potential defences that Member States can invoke against investment treaty claims resulting from the implementation of sanctions. Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine conflict, international law, international investment agreements, ISDS, nationality, third-party countermeasures, essential security interests
{"title":"The Legality of EU Sanctions Under International Investment Agreements","authors":"Javier García Olmedo","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023015","url":null,"abstract":"The ‘unilateral turn’ in EU trade and investment policy is also reflected in the EU’s adoption of restrictive measures or sanctions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. EU sanctions do not only target the Russian government but also Russian individuals and companies with investments in the EU. They can also indirectly affect the economic activities of other foreign investors running businesses in the territory of Member States. This raises unexplored questions about the interaction between EU sanctions and certain disciplines of international economic law, such as international investment protection law. Member States have undertaken obligations under international investment agreements (IIAs) signed with Russia and other states in respect of investments made in their territory by Russian and non-Russian investors. This article examines whether, and if so to what extent, the EU’s unilateral turn in the form of sanctions can fall within the scope of international investment law. It shows that this policy can trigger claims against Member States under a different set of IIAs. This article also examines potential defences that Member States can invoke against investment treaty claims resulting from the implementation of sanctions.\u0000Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine conflict, international law, international investment agreements, ISDS, nationality, third-party countermeasures, essential security interests","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45911077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When in the early 2000s, the European Union prepared to take in a host of Central and Eastern European countries, some policy observers were quick to assert that the newcomers, given their staunch Atlanticism, would increase the US political clout in the EU’s corridors of power. Sceptics, on the other hand, pushed back by contending that with the deepening of the EU integration process, the foreign and security policies of Central-Eastern Europe would eventually align closer with Brussels. This article, using Lithuania as a case study, seeks to reflect on how these competing hypotheses have panned out in practice. The analysis concludes that Lithuania, despite being institutionally anchored in the EU, has sought to retain its special relations with Washington, thus occasionally causing some disruption to the EU’s consensus. Stated differently, it has exhibited the behaviour of a super atlanticist. Lithuania, the United States, the EU, Alliances, Super Atlanticism
{"title":"Super Atlanticist in the EU? Vilnius Between Washington and Brussels","authors":"Andris Banka","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023009","url":null,"abstract":"When in the early 2000s, the European Union prepared to take in a host of Central and Eastern European countries, some policy observers were quick to assert that the newcomers, given their staunch Atlanticism, would increase the US political clout in the EU’s corridors of power. Sceptics, on the other hand, pushed back by contending that with the deepening of the EU integration process, the foreign and security policies of Central-Eastern Europe would eventually align closer with Brussels. This article, using Lithuania as a case study, seeks to reflect on how these competing hypotheses have panned out in practice. The analysis concludes that Lithuania, despite being institutionally anchored in the EU, has sought to retain its special relations with Washington, thus occasionally causing some disruption to the EU’s consensus. Stated differently, it has exhibited the behaviour of a super atlanticist.\u0000Lithuania, the United States, the EU, Alliances, Super Atlanticism","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48894879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current shifts in the post-Cold War international order are bringing the attention to notions of great power competition, demonstrating once again the geopolitical significance of Europe and Asia for global politics. This article applies concepts from the classical geopolitical thinking of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman as an ‘optic tool’ for analysing current global events and for considering the European Union’s (EU’s) strategic direction in light of the interests of the United States, Russia, and China in Europe’s wider region. With the American post-Cold War global preponderance steadily waning and the rising challenges from the east in the face of Russia and China, the EU finds itself in a position that requires the redefinition of its geopolitical identity and strategic pursuit of its own interests. A look through the classical geopolitical concepts of the Heartland and the Rimland reveals that the EU is an extraordinary player in geopolitics as it has the potential to determine (1) access to the Eurasian Heartland via its influence over Eastern Europe and (2) control of the maritime Rimland by virtue of its geography, alliances, and its potential participation in Beijing’s New Silk Road initiative. These findings are discussed by considering the EU’s potential foreign policy directions vis-à-vis the US, Russia, and China. European Union, United States, Russia, China, Eurasia, Geopolitical theory, Foreign policy, Grand strategy, Strategic Autonomy
{"title":"The EU at a Strategic Crossroads: A Geopolitical Player in Great Power Games?","authors":"Iren Marinova","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023007","url":null,"abstract":"The current shifts in the post-Cold War international order are bringing the attention to notions of great power competition, demonstrating once again the geopolitical significance of Europe and Asia for global politics. This article applies concepts from the classical geopolitical thinking of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman as an ‘optic tool’ for analysing current global events and for considering the European Union’s (EU’s) strategic direction in light of the interests of the United States, Russia, and China in Europe’s wider region. With the American post-Cold War global preponderance steadily waning and the rising challenges from the east in the face of Russia and China, the EU finds itself in a position that requires the redefinition of its geopolitical identity and strategic pursuit of its own interests. A look through the classical geopolitical concepts of the Heartland and the Rimland reveals that the EU is an extraordinary player in geopolitics as it has the potential to determine (1) access to the Eurasian Heartland via its influence over Eastern Europe and (2) control of the maritime Rimland by virtue of its geography, alliances, and its potential participation in Beijing’s New Silk Road initiative. These findings are discussed by considering the EU’s potential foreign policy directions vis-à-vis the US, Russia, and China.\u0000European Union, United States, Russia, China, Eurasia, Geopolitical theory, Foreign policy, Grand strategy, Strategic Autonomy","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45699514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
European police officers’ work in the context of multinational police missions is an important component of international peace- and statebuilding. However, so far little is known about the inner life of police work in such missions. Existing research suggests that difficulties arise when police from countries with different policing models participate in the same mission. Focusing on public order policing and drawing on interviews with European police officers working in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions of the European Union, our findings offer a more nuanced picture. Even though distinctly national styles continue to inform public order practices (trends of convergence notwithstanding), European members of multinational missions are not critical of differing approaches per se and even appreciate cross-national variation as it provides a range of options. However, their pragmatism also leads mission members to be critical towards practices they regard as not fitting local conditions in mission areas or as lacking proper planning. European Union, CSDP, police missions, transnational policing, European Foreign and Security Policy, pragmatism, public order, protest policing
{"title":"Do National Differences Hamper CSDP? The Pragmatism of Mission Members","authors":"Cornelius Friesendorf, P. Neubauer","doi":"10.54648/eerr2023008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.54648/eerr2023008","url":null,"abstract":"European police officers’ work in the context of multinational police missions is an important component of international peace- and statebuilding. However, so far little is known about the inner life of police work in such missions. Existing research suggests that difficulties arise when police from countries with different policing models participate in the same mission. Focusing on public order policing and drawing on interviews with European police officers working in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions of the European Union, our findings offer a more nuanced picture. Even though distinctly national styles continue to inform public order practices (trends of convergence notwithstanding), European members of multinational missions are not critical of differing approaches per se and even appreciate cross-national variation as it provides a range of options. However, their pragmatism also leads mission members to be critical towards practices they regard as not fitting local conditions in mission areas or as lacking proper planning.\u0000European Union, CSDP, police missions, transnational policing, European Foreign and Security Policy, pragmatism, public order, protest policing","PeriodicalId":84710,"journal":{"name":"European foreign affairs review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48932749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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