Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science最新文献

Because international travel is now more frequent and convenient, communicable diseases that occur in one region can be transmitted to another area within a few hours. For this reason, many efforts have been undertaken in Taiwan to establish a comprehensive border quarantine system to protect against imported diseases that may threaten the health of the population. According to the International Health Regulations (2005), decades of development strategies for border quarantine have covered not only routine practices and specific measures for handling a pandemic but also have drawn attention to the development of core capacities at designated points of entry. However, as a result of the rapidly increasing number of points of entry, changes in transportation patterns, and the emergence of diseases, current border quarantine practice is being challenged to maintain human resources and the efficacy of entry screening. It is therefore critical to reexamine border quarantine strategies that will fit future needs and national conditions. This article reviews the current border health practices in Taiwan and discusses 5 key challenges to be further considered and improved. The findings can serve as a guide for further policy reform in Taiwan and other countries.

The Global Health Security Agenda's objectives contain components that could help health departments address emerging public health challenges that threaten the population. As part of the agenda, partner countries with advanced public health systems will support the development of infrastructure in stakeholder health departments. To facilitate this process and augment local programs, state and local health departments may want to include concepts of health security in their public health preparedness offices in order to simultaneously build capacity. Health security programs developed by public health departments should complete projects that are closely aligned with the objectives outlined in the global agenda and that facilitate the completion of current preparedness grant requirements. This article identifies objectives and proposes tactical local projects that run parallel to the 9 primary objectives of the Global Health Security Agenda. Executing concurrent projects at the international and local levels in preparedness offices will accelerate the completion of these objectives and help prevent disease epidemics, detect health threats, and respond to public health emergencies. Additionally, future funding tied or related to health security may become more accessible to state and local health departments that have achieved these objectives.

The Early Alerting and Reporting (EAR) project, launched in 2008, is aimed at improving global early alerting and risk assessment and evaluating the feasibility and opportunity of integrating the analysis of biological, chemical, radionuclear (CBRN), and pandemic influenza threats. At a time when no international collaborations existed in the field of event-based surveillance, EAR's innovative approach involved both epidemic intelligence experts and internet-based biosurveillance system providers in the framework of an international collaboration called the Global Health Security Initiative, which involved the ministries of health of the G7 countries and Mexico, the World Health Organization, and the European Commission. The EAR project pooled data from 7 major internet-based biosurveillance systems onto a common portal that was progressively optimized for biological threat detection under the guidance of epidemic intelligence experts from public health institutions in Canada, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The group became the first end users of the EAR portal, constituting a network of analysts working with a common standard operating procedure and risk assessment tools on a rotation basis to constantly screen and assess public information on the web for events that could suggest an intentional release of biological agents. Following the first 2-year pilot phase, the EAR project was tested in its capacity to monitor biological threats, proving that its working model was feasible and demonstrating the high commitment of the countries and international institutions involved. During the testing period, analysts using the EAR platform did not miss intentional events of a biological nature and did not issue false alarms. Through the findings of this initial assessment, this article provides insights into how the field of epidemic intelligence can advance through an international network and, more specifically, how it was further developed in the EAR project.