Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science最新文献

Several quick tests for identifying botulinum toxins (BoNTs) are commercially available, but generally these tests have not been evaluated by independent laboratories. This study presents data on the evaluation of a number of commercial tests and demonstrates the use of cosmetic preparations of BoNT A and B as positive controls. For reference we used an in-house ELISA procedure. The cosmetic toxins, Botox(®) and Neurobloc(®), were found to be useful-that is, they had a sufficiently high toxin content to be used in test evaluation studies. Some commercial kits based on columns (ABICAP(®)) or lateral flow technology were tested for their detection limits. The ABICAP column system was found to be a useful alternative to an in-house ELISA method. In general, the lateral flow-based test systems evaluated here were not able to detect BoNT, and a large proportion of the tests showed construction failures. In conclusion, this study showed that cosmetic BoNT products have enough toxin content to be used as convenient and accessible means of testing commercially available quick tests. The lateral flow tests used in this study were not satisfactory, while the ABICAP system was found to be a good alternative to an ELISA.

Ricin, a heterodimeric toxin that is present in the seeds of the Ricinus communis plant, is the biothreat agent most frequently encountered by law enforcement agencies in the United States. Even in untrained hands, the easily obtainable seeds can yield a highly toxic product that has been used in various types of threats, including "white-powder" letters. Although the vast majority of these threats are hoaxes, an impediment to accurate hazard assessments by first responders is the unreliability of rapid detection assays for ricin, such as lateral flow assays (LFAs). One of the complicating factors associated with LFAs is the incorporation of antibodies of poor specificity that cross-react with near-neighbors or with plant lectins that are capable of nonspecifically cross-linking the capture and detector antibodies. Because of the compelling and critical need to promote the interests of public safety and public health, the Department of Homeland Security conducted a comprehensive laboratory evaluation study of a commercial LFA for the rapid detection of ricin. This study was conducted using comprehensive inclusivity and exclusivity panels of ricin and near-neighbor plant materials, along with panels of lectins and "white-powders," to determine the specificity, sensitivity, limits of detection, dynamic range, and repeatability of the assay for the specific intended use of evaluating suspicious white powders and environmental samples in the field.

Bacillus anthracis, the etiological agent of anthrax, a zoonosis relatively common throughout the world, can be used as an agent of bioterrorism. In naturally occurring outbreaks and in criminal release of this pathogen, a fast and accurate diagnosis is crucial to an effective response. Microbiological forensics and epidemiologic investigations increasingly rely on molecular markers, such as polymorphisms in DNA sequence, to obtain reliable information regarding the identification or source of a suspicious strain. Over the past decade, significant research efforts have been undertaken to develop genotyping methods with increased power to differentiate B. anthracis strains. A growing number of DNA signatures have been identified and used to survey B. anthracis diversity in nature, leading to rapid advances in our understanding of the global population of this pathogen. This article provides an overview of the different phylogenetic subgroups distributed across the world, with a particular focus on Europe. Updated information on the anthrax situation in Europe is reported. A brief description of some of the work in progress in the work package 5.1 of the AniBioThreat project is also presented, including (1) the development of a robust typing tool based on a suspension array technology and multiplexed single nucleotide polymorphisms scoring and (2) the typing of a collection of DNA from European isolates exchanged between the partners of the project. The know-how acquired will contribute to improving the EU's ability to react rapidly when the identity and real origin of a strain need to be established.

The national security strategy is the Dutch government's instrument for multihazard risk management and is intended to contribute to the prevention of societal disruption as a consequence of a (future) disaster or crisis in the Netherlands. It considers the likelihood that a certain incident will occur, the impact if it should occur, and what can be done to prevent the occurrence and/or reduce the impact. In other words, "which threats is the Netherlands faced with, how serious are they, and what can be done to mitigate the consequences?" By annually assessing the likelihood and impact of different scenarios, the government is able to continually improve its overview of risks and to determine priorities regarding the allocation of resources for the prevention of, preparation for, and response to threats. At the start of the annual cycle of the implementation of the national security strategy, possible scenarios are identified. These scenarios are then drawn up and assessed by the Network of Analysts for National Security, resulting in the national risk assessment (NRA). On the basis of this risk assessment, a capabilities analysis is performed. This capabilities analysis assesses whether the country (government, private sector, and civilians) has sufficient capabilities (people, material, knowledge, skills, and procedures) at its disposal to adequately deal with the threat, and it considers which capabilities should be strengthened or developed. Finally, a report is prepared for the council of ministers. On the basis of this report, the cabinet decides which capabilities will be strengthened.

Preparedness for the decontamination of affected environments, premises, facilities, and products is one prerequisite for an immediate response to an animal disease outbreak. Various information sources provide recommendations on how to proceed in an outbreak situation to eliminate biological contaminants and to stop the spread of the disease. In order to facilitate the identification of the right decontamination strategy, we present an overview of relevant references for a collection of pathogenic agents. The choice of pathogens is based on a survey of lists containing highly pathogenic agents and/or biological agents considered to be potential vehicles for deliberate contamination of food, feed, or farm animals. European legislation and guidelines from national and international institutions were screened to find decontamination protocols for each of the agents. Identified recommendations were evaluated with regard to their area of application, which could be facilities and equipment, wastes, food, and other animal products. The requirements of a disinfectant for large-scale incidents were gathered, and important characteristics (eg, inactivating spectrum, temperature range, toxicity to environment) of the main recommended disinfectants were summarized to assist in the choice of a suitable and efficient approach in a crisis situation induced by a specific high-risk animal or zoonotic pathogen. The literature search revealed numerous relevant recommendations but also legal gaps for certain diseases, such as Q fever or brucellosis, and legal difficulties for the use of recommended disinfectants. A lack of information about effective disinfectants was identified for some agents.

Compared to routine diagnostics, screening for pathogens in outbreak situations, with or without intentional release, poses demands on the detection technology to not only indicate the presence of already known causative agents but also novel and unexpected pathogens. The metagenomic approach to detecting viral pathogens, using unbiased high-throughput sequencing (HTS), is a well-established methodology with a broad detection range and wide applicability on different sample matrices. To prepare a sample for HTS, the common presequencing steps include homogenization, enrichment, separation (eg, magnetic separation), and amplification. In this initial study, we explored the benefits and drawbacks of preprocessing by sequence-independent, single-primer amplification (SISPA) of nucleic acids by applying the methodology to artificial samples. More specifically, a synthetic metagenome was divided into 2 samples, 1 unamplified and 1 diluted, and amplified by SISPA. Subsequently, both samples were sequenced using the Ion Torrent Personal Genome Machine (PGM), and the resulting datasets were analyzed by using bioinformatics, short read mapping, de novo assembly, BLAST-based taxonomic classification, and visualization. The results indicate that even though SISPA introduces a strong amplification bias, which makes it unsuitable for whole-genome sequencing, it is still useful for detecting and identifying viruses.

Avian influenza virus (AIV) and Newcastle disease virus (NDV) infect various avian species including domestic poultry. Clinical manifestations vary from subclinical or mild to severe multiorgan systemic disease with a near 100% mortality rate. Severe disease is caused by highly virulent specific virus strains, termed highly pathogenic AIV and velogenic NDV. Recent controversial influenza H5 adaptation studies in ferrets have highlighted the importance of preparedness against AIV as a bioterrorism agent. Furthermore, NDV also has zoonotic potential, although symptoms in humans are mild and self-limiting for naturally occurring viruses. Thus, both of these viruses pose a direct biothreat to domestic poultry but also indirectly to humans via zoonotic transmission. For diagnosis and rapid containment of disease, it is crucial to differentiate highly pathogenic AIVs and NDVs from frequently occurring low pathogenic variants. Recently, we developed a novel strategy for pathotyping of AIV and NDV that we review here. The method should be ideal for rapid testing and surveillance in food safety, for wild bird monitoring, and for combating acts of bioterrorism.

Recent data implicate Salmonella enterica serovar Typhi as a causative pathogen of the Plague of Athens during the Peloponnesian War (430-426 bc). According to Thucydides, the sudden outbreak of the disease may link to poisoning of the water reservoirs by the Spartans. The siege of a city was aimed at exhausting the supplies of a population, which often led to the outbreak and spread of epidemics. Poisoning of the water reservoirs of a besieged city as an act of bioterrorism would probably shorten the necessary time for such conditions to appear.

In the field of diagnostic microbiology, rapid molecular methods are critically important for detecting pathogens. With rapid and accurate detection, preventive measures can be put in place early, thereby preventing loss of life and further spread of a disease. From a preparedness perspective, early detection and response are important in order to minimize the consequences. During the past 2 decades, advances in next-generation sequencing (NGS) technology have changed the playing field of molecular methods. Today, it is within reach to completely sequence the total microbiological content of a clinical sample, creating a metagenome, in a single week of laboratory work. As new technologies emerge, their dissemination and capacity building must be facilitated, and criteria for use, as well as guidelines on how to report results, must be established. This article focuses on the use of metagenomics, from sample collection to data analysis and to some extent NGS, for the detection of pathogens, the integration of the technique in outbreak response systems, and the risk-based evaluation of sample processing in routine diagnostics labs. The article covers recent advances in the field, current debate, gaps in research, and future directions. Examples of metagenomic detection, as well as possible applications of the methods, are described in various biopreparedness outbreak scenarios.

Laboratory response networks (LRNs) have been established for security reasons in several countries including the Netherlands, France, and Sweden. LRNs function in these countries as a preparedness measure for a coordinated diagnostic response capability in case of a bioterrorism incident or other biocrimes. Generally, these LRNs are organized on a national level. The EU project AniBioThreat has identified the need for an integrated European LRN to strengthen preparedness against animal bioterrorism. One task of the AniBioThreat project is to suggest a plan to implement laboratory biorisk management CWA 15793:2011 (CWA 15793), a management system built on the principle of continual improvement through the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. The implementation of CWA 15793 can facilitate trust and credibility in a future European LRN and is an assurance that the work done at the laboratories is performed in a structured way with continuous improvements. As a first step, a gap analysis was performed to establish the current compliance status of biosafety and laboratory biosecurity management with CWA 15793 in 5 AniBioThreat partner institutes in France (ANSES), the Netherlands (CVI and RIVM), and Sweden (SMI and SVA). All 5 partners are national and/or international laboratory reference institutes in the field of public or animal health and possess high-containment laboratories and animal facilities. The gap analysis showed that the participating institutes already have robust biorisk management programs in place, but several gaps were identified that need to be addressed. Despite differences between the participating institutes in their compliance status, these variations are not significant. Biorisk management exercises also have been identified as a useful tool to control compliance status and thereby implementation of CWA 15793. An exercise concerning an insider threat and loss of a biological agent was performed at SVA in the AniBioThreat project to evaluate implementation of the contingency plans and as an activity in the implementation process of CWA 15793. The outcome of the exercise was perceived as very useful, and improvements to enhance biorisk preparedness were identified. Gap analyses and exercises are important, useful activities to facilitate implementation of CWA 15793. The PDCA cycle will enforce a structured way to work, with continual improvements concerning biorisk management activities. Based on the activities in the AniBioThreat project, the following requirements are suggested to promote implementation: support from the top management of the organizations, knowledge about CWA 15793, a compliance audit checklist and gap analysis, training and exercises, networking in LRNs and other networks, and interinstitutional audits. Implementation of CWA 15793 at each institute would strengthen the European animal bioterrorism response capabilities by establishing a well-prepared LRN.