Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science最新文献

Computational models describing bacterial kinetics were developed for inhalational anthrax in New Zealand white (NZW) rabbits following inhalation of Ames strain B. anthracis. The data used to parameterize the models included bacterial numbers in the airways, lung tissue, draining lymph nodes, and blood. Initial bacterial numbers were deposited spore dose. The first model was a single exponential ordinary differential equation (ODE) with 3 rate parameters that described mucociliated (physical) clearance, immune clearance (bacterial killing), and bacterial growth. At 36 hours postexposure, the ODE model predicted 1.7×10⁷ bacteria in the rabbit, which agreed well with data from actual experiments (4.0×10⁷ bacteria at 36 hours). Next, building on the single ODE model, a physiological-based biokinetic (PBBK) compartmentalized model was developed in which 1 physiological compartment was the lumen of the airways and the other was the rabbit body (lung tissue, lymph nodes, blood). The 2 compartments were connected with a parameter describing transport of bacteria from the airways into the body. The PBBK model predicted 4.9×10⁷ bacteria in the body at 36 hours, and by 45 hours the model showed all clearance mechanisms were saturated, suggesting the rabbit would quickly succumb to the infection. As with the ODE model, the PBBK model results agreed well with laboratory observations. These data are discussed along with the need for and potential application of the models in risk assessment, drug development, and as a general aid to the experimentalist studying inhalational anthrax.

New construction of biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories in the United States has increased in the past decade to facilitate research on potential bioterrorism agents. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention inspect BSL-3 facilities and review commissioning documentation, but no single agency has oversight over all BSL-3 facilities. This article explores the extent to which standard operating procedures in US BSL-3 facilities vary between laboratories with select agent or non-select agent status. Comparisons are made for the following variables: personnel training, decontamination, personal protective equipment (PPE), medical surveillance, security access, laboratory structure and maintenance, funding, and pest management. Facilities working with select agents had more complex training programs and decontamination procedures than non-select agent facilities. Personnel working in select agent laboratories were likely to use powered air purifying respirators, while non-select agent laboratories primarily used N95 respirators. More rigorous medical surveillance was carried out in select agent workers (although not required by the select agent program) and a higher level of restrictive access to laboratories was found. Most select agent and non-select agent laboratories reported adequate structural integrity in facilities; however, differences were observed in personnel perception of funding for repairs. Pest management was carried out by select agent personnel more frequently than non-select agent personnel. Our findings support the need to promote high quality biosafety training and standard operating procedures in both select agent and non-select agent laboratories to improve occupational health and safety.

Antiviral medications can decrease the severity and duration of influenza, but they are most effective if started within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms. In a severe influenza pandemic, normal channels of obtaining prescriptions and medications could become overwhelmed. To assess public perception of the acceptability and feasibility of alternative strategies for prescribing, distributing, and dispensing antivirals and disseminating information about influenza and its treatment, the Institute of Medicine, with technical assistance from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), convened public engagement events in 3 demographically and geographically diverse communities: Fort Benton, MT; Chattanooga, TN; and Los Angeles, CA. Participants were introduced to the issues associated with pandemic influenza and the challenges of ensuring timely public access to information and medications. They then discussed the advantages and disadvantages of 5 alternative strategies currently being considered by the CDC and its partners. Participants at all 3 venues expressed high levels of acceptance for each of the proposed strategies and contributed useful ideas to support their implementation. This article discusses the key findings from these sessions.

During routine screening in 2011, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) identified 2 persons with elevated radioactivity. CBP, in collaboration with Los Alamos National Laboratory, informed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that these people could have increased radiation exposure as a result of undergoing cardiac Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans several months earlier with rubidium Rb 82 chloride injection from CardioGen-82. We conducted a multistate investigation to assess the potential extent and magnitude of radioactive strontium overexposure among patients who had undergone Rb 82 PET scans. We selected a convenience sample of clinical sites in 4 states and reviewed records to identify eligible study participants, defined as people who had had an Rb 82 PET scan between February and July 2011. All participants received direct radiation screening using a radioisotope identifier able to detect the gamma energy specific for strontium-85 (514 keV) and urine bioassay for excreted radioactive strontium. We referred a subset of participants with direct radiation screening counts above background readings for whole body counting (WBC) using a rank ordering of direct radiation screening. The rank order list, from highest to lowest, was used to contact and offer voluntary enrollment for WBC. Of 308 participants, 292 (95%) had direct radiation screening results indistinguishable from background radiation measurements; 261 of 265 (98%) participants with sufficient urine for analysis had radioactive strontium results below minimum detectable activity. None of the 23 participants who underwent WBC demonstrated elevated strontium activity above levels associated with routine use of the rubidium Rb 82 generator. Among investigation participants, we did not identify evidence of strontium internal contamination above permissible levels. This investigation might serve as a model for future investigations of radioactive internal contamination incidents.

On the morning of June 9, 2009, an explosion occurred at a manufacturing plant in Garner, North Carolina. By the end of the day, 68 injured patients had been evaluated at the 3 Level I trauma centers and 3 community hospitals in the Raleigh/Durham metro area (3 people who were buried in the structural collapse died at the scene). Approximately 300 employees were present at the time of the explosion, when natural gas being vented during the repair of a hot water heater ignited. The concussion from the explosion led to structural failure in multiple locations and breached additional natural gas, electrical, and ammonia lines that ran overhead in the 1-story concrete industrial plant. Intent is the major difference between this type of accident and a terrorist using an incendiary device to terrorize a targeted population. But while this disaster lacked intent, the response, rescue, and outcomes were improved as a result of bioterrorism preparedness. This article discusses how bioterrorism hospital preparedness planning, with an all-hazards approach, became the basis for coordinated burn surge disaster preparedness. This real-world disaster challenged a variety of systems, hospitals, and healthcare providers to work efficiently and effectively to manage multiple survivors. Burn-injured patients served as a focus for this work. We describe the response, rescue, and resuscitation provided by first responders and first receivers as well as efforts made to develop burn care capabilities and surge capacity.

Medicine for Policymakers is a Journal column that provides decision makers with brief explanations of the meaning and implications for biosecurity of clinical issues. The articles describe, for a nonmedical audience, hospital practices, medical challenges, healthcare delivery issues, and other topics of current interest. Readers may submit ideas to the column's editor, Amesh A. Adalja, MD, through the Journal's editorial office at jjfox@upmc.edu .

Responding to outbreaks is one of the most routine yet most important functions of a public health agency. However, some outbreaks are bigger, more visible, or more complex than others, prompting discussion about when an "outbreak" becomes a "public health emergency." When a public health emergency is identified, resources (eg, funding, staff, space) may need to be redirected from core public health programs to contribute to the public health emergency response. The need to sustain critical public health functions while preparing for public health emergency responses raises a series of operational and resource management questions, including when a public health emergency begins and ends, why additional resources are needed, how long an organization should expect staff to be redirected, and how many staff (or what proportion of the agency's staff ) an organization should anticipate will be needed to conduct a public health emergency response. This article addresses these questions from a national perspective by reviewing events for which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention redirected staff from core public health functions to respond to a series of public health emergencies. We defined "public health emergency" in both operational and public health terms and found that on average each emergency response lasted approximately 4 months and used approximately 9.5% of our workforce. We also provide reasons why public health agencies should consider the impact of redirecting resources when preparing for public health emergencies.

Local health departments typically rely on exercises to test preparedness capacity; however, pre-scripted drills often lack the sense of urgency that a real event would engender. No-notice, unscripted exercises that challenge staff to think critically under pressure may provide a mechanism for a more realistic assessment of preparedness capacity. The very active influenza season of 2012-13 presented the Public Health Preparedness Program at the Philadelphia Department of Public Health with the opportunity to conduct an influenza vaccination clinic at a local boarding school. Program leaders used this opportunity to design a no-notice exercise to test the ability of staff to effectively coordinate an emergency field response while simultaneously delivering a real public health intervention. On the day of the exercise, staff members were given 6 hours to plan and execute a vaccination clinic without any guidance from program leaders. Best practices observed during the exercise included: (1) early identification and mitigation of rate-limiting steps, and (2) successful implementation of a previously untested high-throughput vaccination model. Although the primary intent of the exercise was to assess the ability of staff to respond to a no-notice event, this vaccination clinic also functioned as a microcosm of a larger response, revealing several considerations related to vaccine ordering, staff resources, and throughput rates that have broader implications for public health responses to large-scale biological attacks or pandemics.

This article reports on the design, evaluation framework, and results from the Meta-Leadership Summit for Preparedness Initiative. The Meta-Leadership Summit for Preparedness was a 5-year initiative based on the premise that national preparedness and emergency response is not solely the responsibility of government. From 2006 to 2011, 36 Meta-Leadership Summits were delivered in communities across the country. Summits were customized, 10-hour leadership development, networking, and community action planning events. They included participation from targeted federal, state, local, nonprofit/philanthropic, and private sector leaders who are directly involved in decision making during a major community or state-wide emergency. A total of 4,971 government, nonprofit, and business leaders attended Meta-Leadership Summits; distribution of attendees by sector was balanced. Ninety-three percent of respondents reported the summit was a valuable use of time, 91% reported the overall quality as "good" or "outstanding," and 91% would recommend the summit to their colleagues. In addition, approximately 6 months after attending a summit, 80% of respondents reported that they had used meta-leadership concepts or principles. Of these, 93% reported that using meta-leadership concepts or principles had made a positive difference for them and their organizations. The Meta-Leadership Summit for Preparedness Initiative was a value-added opportunity for communities, providing the venue for learning the concepts and practice of meta-leadership, multisector collaboration, and resource sharing with the intent of substantively improving preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.