Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science最新文献

A workshop on animal botulism was held in Uppsala, Sweden, in June 2012. Its purpose was to explore the current status of the disease in Europe by gathering the European experts in animal botulism and to raise awareness of the disease among veterinarians and others involved in biopreparedness. Animal botulism is underreported and underdiagnosed, but an increasing number of reports, as well as the information gathered from this workshop, show that it is an emerging problem in Europe. The workshop was divided into 4 sessions: animal botulism in Europe, the bacteria behind the disease, detection and diagnostics, and European collaboration and surveillance. An electronic survey was conducted before the workshop to identify the 3 most needed discussion points, which were: prevention, preparedness and outbreak response; detection and diagnostics; and European collaboration and surveillance. The main conclusions drawn from these discussions were that there is an urgent need to replace the mouse bioassay for botulinum toxin detection with an in vitro test and that there is a need for a European network to function as a reference laboratory, which could also organize a European supply of botulinum antitoxin and vaccines. The foundation of such a network was discussed, and the proposals are presented here along with the outcome of discussions and a summary of the workshop itself.

Botulism is a severe neuroparalytic disease that affects humans, all warm-blooded animals, and some fishes. The disease is caused by exposure to toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum and other botulinum toxin-producing clostridia. Botulism in animals represents a severe environmental and economic concern because of its high mortality rate. Moreover, meat or other products from affected animals entering the food chain may result in a public health problem. To this end, early diagnosis is crucial to define and apply appropriate veterinary public health measures. Clinical diagnosis is based on clinical findings eliminating other causes of neuromuscular disorders and on the absence of internal lesions observed during postmortem examination. Since clinical signs alone are often insufficient to make a definitive diagnosis, laboratory confirmation is required. Botulinum antitoxin administration and supportive therapies are used to treat sick animals. Once the diagnosis has been made, euthanasia is frequently advisable. Vaccine administration is subject to health authorities' permission, and it is restricted to a small number of animal species. Several measures can be adopted to prevent or minimize outbreaks. In this article we outline all phases of management of animal botulism outbreaks occurring in wet wild birds, poultry, cattle, horses, and fur farm animals.

Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most feared of transboundary animal diseases. Accidental or deliberate release of the causative agent can have both direct and indirect effects that result in massive economic losses and disruption. The direct effects of an FMD outbreak include immediate losses to agricultural production and disruption of local economies, while the indirect effects are mainly related to disease control measures such as restriction of market access at local and global levels and the high costs of disease control. To improve the capacity of the European Union (EU) to counter animal bioterrorism threats, AniBioThreat was launched with a special focus on threats to living animals, feed, and food of animal origin. As part of this project, several zoonotic or animal pathogenic agents are considered from different perspectives. FMD virus was selected as one agent to be scrutinized because it is highly contagious and an outbreak can have a severe economic impact. Ways to fight a deliberate outbreak can be demonstrated through the example of FMD. In this article, the virology and epidemiology of FMD virus are discussed with special attention to the related law enforcement aspects.

Agroterrorism targeting livestock can be described as the intentional introduction of an animal disease agent against livestock with the purpose of causing economic damage, disrupting socioeconomic stability of a country, and creating panic and distress. This type of terrorism can be alluring to terrorists because animal disease agents are easily available. This review addresses the vulnerabilities of the livestock industry to agroterrorism. However, we also show that early detection systems have recently been developed for agroterrorism and deliberate spread of animal pathogens in livestock, including an agroterrorism intelligence cycle, syndromic surveillance programs, and computer-based clinical decision support systems that can be used for early detection of notifiable animal diseases. The development of DIVA-vaccines in the past 10 to 15 years has created, in principle, an excellent response instrument to counter intentional animal disease outbreaks. These developments have made our animal agriculture less vulnerable to agroterrorism. But we cannot relax; there are still many challenges, in particular with respect to integration of first line of defense, law enforcement, and early detection systems for animal diseases.

This article presents a historical perspective on agroterrorism cases from 1945 until 2012. The threat groups and perpetrators associated with bio- and agroterrorism are clustered into several groups: apocalyptic sects, lone wolves, political groups, and religious groups. We used open-source information, and 4 biological agroterrorism cases are described: (1) in 1952, Mau Mau poisoned cattle in Kenya by using a plant toxin from the African milk bush plant; (2) in 1985, the USDA claimed that Mexican contract workers were involved in deliberately spreading screwworm (Cochliomyia hominivorax) among livestock; (3) in 2000, Palestinian media reported that Israeli settlers released sewer water into Palestinian agricultural fields; and (4) in 2011, a person was sentenced to prison after threatening US and UK livestock with the deliberate spread of foot-and-mouth disease virus. All 4 cases can be assigned to political groups. These cases have not attracted much attention in literature nor in the public media, and the credibility of the sources of information varies. We concluded that agroterrorism has not been a problem during the period studied. Lessons learned from the few cases have generated awareness about the fact that nontypical biological weapons and non-high-risk agents, such as African milk bush, screwworm, and sewer water, have been used by attackers to influence local decision makers. This review will be useful in improving future preparedness planning and developing countermeasures.

Current trends in biosecurity and cybersecurity include (1) the wide availability of technology and specialized knowledge that previously were available only to governments; (2) the global economic recession, which may increase the spread of radical non-state actors; and (3) recent US and EU commission reports that reflect concerns about non-state actors in asymmetric threats. The intersectoral and international nature of bioterrorism and agroterrorism threats requires collaboration across several sectors including intelligence, police, forensics, customs, and other law enforcement organizations who must work together with public and animal health organizations as well as environmental and social science organizations. This requires coordinated decision making among these organizations, based on actionable knowledge and information sharing. The risk of not sharing information among organizations compared to the benefit of sharing information can be considered in an "information sharing risk-benefit analysis" to prevent a terrorism incident from occurring and to build a rapid response capability. In the EU project AniBioThreat, early warning is the main topic in work package 3 (WP 3). A strategy has been generated based on an iterative approach to bring law enforcement agencies and human and animal health institutes together. Workshops and exercises have taken place during the first half of the project, and spin-off activities include new preparedness plans for institutes and the formation of a legal adviser network for decision making. In addition, a seminar on actionable knowledge was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 2012, which identified the need to bring various agency cultures together to work on developing a resilient capability to identify early signs of bio- and agroterrorism threats. The seminar concluded that there are a number of challenges in building a collaborative culture, including developing an education program that supports collaboration and shared situational awareness.

In the aftermath of a CBRN incident, there is an urgent need to reconstruct events in order to bring the perpetrators to court and to take preventive actions for the future. The challenge is to discriminate, based on available information, between alternative scenarios. Forensic interpretation is used to evaluate to what extent results from the forensic investigation favor the prosecutors' or the defendants' arguments, using the framework of Bayesian hypothesis testing. Recently, several new scientific disciplines have been used in a forensic context. In the AniBioThreat project, the framework was applied to veterinary forensic pathology, tracing of pathogenic microorganisms, and forensic entomology. Forensic entomology is an important tool for estimating the postmortem interval in, for example, homicide investigations as a complement to more traditional methods. In this article we demonstrate the applicability of the Bayesian framework for evaluating entomological evidence in a forensic investigation through the analysis of a hypothetical scenario involving suspect movement of carcasses from a clandestine laboratory. Probabilities of different findings under the alternative hypotheses were estimated using a combination of statistical analysis of data, expert knowledge, and simulation, and entomological findings are used to update the beliefs about the prosecutors' and defendants' hypotheses and to calculate the value of evidence. The Bayesian framework proved useful for evaluating complex hypotheses using findings from several insect species, accounting for uncertainty about development rate, temperature, and precolonization. The applicability of the forensic statistic approach to evaluating forensic results from a CBRN incident is discussed.

Since the 2001 anthrax attack in the United States, awareness of threats originating from bioterrorism has grown. This led internationally to increased research efforts to improve knowledge of and approaches to protecting human and animal populations against the threat from such attacks. A collaborative effort in this context is the extension of the open-source Spatiotemporal Epidemiological Modeler (STEM) simulation and modeling software for agro- or bioterrorist crisis scenarios. STEM, originally designed to enable community-driven public health disease models and simulations, was extended with new features that enable integration of proprietary data as well as visualization of agent spread along supply and production chains. STEM now provides a fully developed open-source software infrastructure supporting critical modeling tasks such as ad hoc model generation, parameter estimation, simulation of scenario evolution, estimation of effects of mitigation or management measures, and documentation. This open-source software resource can be used free of charge. Additionally, STEM provides critical features like built-in worldwide data on administrative boundaries, transportation networks, or environmental conditions (eg, rainfall, temperature, elevation, vegetation). Users can easily combine their own confidential data with built-in public data to create customized models of desired resolution. STEM also supports collaborative and joint efforts in crisis situations by extended import and export functionalities. In this article we demonstrate specifically those new software features implemented to accomplish STEM application in agro- or bioterrorist crisis scenarios.