Pub Date : 2020-05-20DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p49
Darlei Dall'Agnol
Trata-se, neste trabalho, de mostrar a irredutibilidade do saber, em especial do saber moral, ao conhecimento de tipo proposicional. A partir das contribuições da neurociência cognitiva para a epistemologia moral, argumenta-se que o saber-como (knowing-how) não pode ser completamente analisado em termos do saber-que (knowing-that). Critica-se, então, as tentativas recentes, em especial de Stanley, de mostrar que todo conhecimento é proposicional. Finalmente, o trabalho ilustra como o saber moral pode ser identificado em atitudes, por exemplo, saber-como cuidar de um indivíduo vulnerável, saber-como respeitar pessoas etc. A conclusão, então, é que o saber moral não é identificável com o conhecimento factual.
{"title":"Neurociência cognitiva e epistemologia moral: sobre a irredutibilidade do saber ao conhecimento","authors":"Darlei Dall'Agnol","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p49","url":null,"abstract":"Trata-se, neste trabalho, de mostrar a irredutibilidade do saber, em especial do saber moral, ao conhecimento de tipo proposicional. A partir das contribuições da neurociência cognitiva para a epistemologia moral, argumenta-se que o saber-como (knowing-how) não pode ser completamente analisado em termos do saber-que (knowing-that). Critica-se, então, as tentativas recentes, em especial de Stanley, de mostrar que todo conhecimento é proposicional. Finalmente, o trabalho ilustra como o saber moral pode ser identificado em atitudes, por exemplo, saber-como cuidar de um indivíduo vulnerável, saber-como respeitar pessoas etc. A conclusão, então, é que o saber moral não é identificável com o conhecimento factual. ","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131112573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-20DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p105
B. Andrade, Marco Antonio Azevedo
A abordagem conhecida como Saúde Centrada na Pessoa (SCP) tem seu foco nos indivíduos tomados como pessoas e não apenas como pacientes. Contudo, em filosofia, segundo as abordagens tradicionais, nem todos os seres humanos são (estritamente) “pessoas”. Ora, se para a SCP, importa tomar a todos os pacientes como pessoas, é preciso repensar as definições e conceitos propostos pelas mais diferentes abordagens ontológicas sobre a personalidade. Afinal, não são apenas os indivíduos com um self maduro e racional que demandam cuidados em saúde. Para a SCP, recém-nascidos, bebês, crianças, deficientes mentais e idosos com demência, e mesmo as pessoas portadoras de transtornos graves de consciência (TGC), também são pessoas com direitos a cuidados de saúde. Portanto, levando a SCP a sério, parece necessário que o conceito de pessoa seja estendido para incluir indivíduos com níveis de consciência insipientes ou imaturos, bem como aqueles com deficiências mentais graves ou permanentes. Neste artigo, discutiremos criticamente alguns conceitos filosóficos influentes sobre o que entendemos ou devemos entender por “pessoa”, buscando uma abordagem mais ampla e inclusiva. Propomos uma abordagem ontológica segundo a qual pessoas são compreendidas como seres dotados de uma biografia socialmente reconhecida, o que implica reconhecer esses indivíduos como portadores não apenas de necessidades em saúde, mas de interesses e demandas legítimas. Tais interesses e demandas, além das necessidades em bem-estar, não são expressos diretamente por elas devido, dadas suas deficiências graves, como ocorre com os indivíduos com TGC. Disso resulta que, no âmbito de uma SCP, para os pacientes que padecem de TGC, não é apenas o cuidado que importa, mas também o respeito. Os cuidadores, portanto, devem não apenas cuidar, movidos por simpatia ou compaixão, do bem-estar desses indivíduos, mas também devem se preocupar em respeitar seus interesses e direitos, interpretando-os de forma empática, à luz de sua história pessoal ou biográfica. Nossa conclusão é que, para ser coerente, a SCP deve considerar pessoas com TGC como pessoas, e que nosso conceito revisado de personalidade se adapta perfeitamente a essa exigência.
{"title":"Respeitando biografias até o fim: uma concepção de personalidade mais adequada ao cuidado centrado na pessoa de indivíduos com transtornos graves da consciência","authors":"B. Andrade, Marco Antonio Azevedo","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p105","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2020v19n1p105","url":null,"abstract":"A abordagem conhecida como Saúde Centrada na Pessoa (SCP) tem seu foco nos indivíduos tomados como pessoas e não apenas como pacientes. Contudo, em filosofia, segundo as abordagens tradicionais, nem todos os seres humanos são (estritamente) “pessoas”. Ora, se para a SCP, importa tomar a todos os pacientes como pessoas, é preciso repensar as definições e conceitos propostos pelas mais diferentes abordagens ontológicas sobre a personalidade. Afinal, não são apenas os indivíduos com um self maduro e racional que demandam cuidados em saúde. Para a SCP, recém-nascidos, bebês, crianças, deficientes mentais e idosos com demência, e mesmo as pessoas portadoras de transtornos graves de consciência (TGC), também são pessoas com direitos a cuidados de saúde. Portanto, levando a SCP a sério, parece necessário que o conceito de pessoa seja estendido para incluir indivíduos com níveis de consciência insipientes ou imaturos, bem como aqueles com deficiências mentais graves ou permanentes. Neste artigo, discutiremos criticamente alguns conceitos filosóficos influentes sobre o que entendemos ou devemos entender por “pessoa”, buscando uma abordagem mais ampla e inclusiva. Propomos uma abordagem ontológica segundo a qual pessoas são compreendidas como seres dotados de uma biografia socialmente reconhecida, o que implica reconhecer esses indivíduos como portadores não apenas de necessidades em saúde, mas de interesses e demandas legítimas. Tais interesses e demandas, além das necessidades em bem-estar, não são expressos diretamente por elas devido, dadas suas deficiências graves, como ocorre com os indivíduos com TGC. Disso resulta que, no âmbito de uma SCP, para os pacientes que padecem de TGC, não é apenas o cuidado que importa, mas também o respeito. Os cuidadores, portanto, devem não apenas cuidar, movidos por simpatia ou compaixão, do bem-estar desses indivíduos, mas também devem se preocupar em respeitar seus interesses e direitos, interpretando-os de forma empática, à luz de sua história pessoal ou biográfica. Nossa conclusão é que, para ser coerente, a SCP deve considerar pessoas com TGC como pessoas, e que nosso conceito revisado de personalidade se adapta perfeitamente a essa exigência.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128685347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p299
R. Almeida
Estas reflexões têm como objetivo principal analisar a questão do fim do sujeito a partir da tradição filosófica ocidental. Assim, após uma breve introdução histórica que, partindo de Platão e passando por Aristóteles, Agostinho de Hipona e Tomás de Aquino, o texto se propõe examinar a questão do sujeito e da subjetividade na filosofia moderna e, principalmente, na filosofia contemporânea: Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Com Freud e Lacan, é finalmente levada em consideração a problemática do fim do sujeito, que se exprime essencialmente como o paradoxo de uma exclusão interna. O sujeito da filosofia e da psicologia é, pois, ressignificado, reinterpretado e superado, mas a partir e através do próprio universo simbólico, no qual ele se move e do qual, paradoxalmente, ele se exclui.
{"title":"A tradição filosófica e o paradoxo do fim do sujeito","authors":"R. Almeida","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p299","url":null,"abstract":"Estas reflexões têm como objetivo principal analisar a questão do fim do sujeito a partir da tradição filosófica ocidental. Assim, após uma breve introdução histórica que, partindo de Platão e passando por Aristóteles, Agostinho de Hipona e Tomás de Aquino, o texto se propõe examinar a questão do sujeito e da subjetividade na filosofia moderna e, principalmente, na filosofia contemporânea: Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Com Freud e Lacan, é finalmente levada em consideração a problemática do fim do sujeito, que se exprime essencialmente como o paradoxo de uma exclusão interna. O sujeito da filosofia e da psicologia é, pois, ressignificado, reinterpretado e superado, mas a partir e através do próprio universo simbólico, no qual ele se move e do qual, paradoxalmente, ele se exclui. ","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123956400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p319
R. Peres
From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version of the sources thesis (which is what Raz intends to prove). In conclusion, we return to the arguments presented, concluding with a possible difficulty for the adoption of exclusive positivism by people inside a legal practice.
{"title":"Interpreting the Claim to Legitimate Authority: an Analysis of Joseph Raz's Objection Against Incorporating Moral Norms into Law","authors":"R. Peres","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2019v18n3p319","url":null,"abstract":"From a critical review of the literature, we analyze the incompatibility between the possibility of incorporating moral principles to the law and its authoritative nature, as argued by exclusive positivists, such as J. Raz. After presenting his argument in second section, we argue in the third section that it is incompatible with commonly accepted (even by Raz) premises of the theory of legal interpretation, or else it would lead to contradiction - unless one presupposes, within the premises, a strong version of the sources thesis (which is what Raz intends to prove). In conclusion, we return to the arguments presented, concluding with a possible difficulty for the adoption of exclusive positivism by people inside a legal practice. ","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128749558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p363
Alex Richardson
In this paper, I will draw on the capabilities approach to social justice and human development as advanced, among others, by Martha Nussbaum, and seek to provide some theoretical resources for better understanding our obligations to future persons. My argumentative strategy is as follows: First, I’ll briefly reconstruct a capabilities approach to justice, examining this sort of view’s normative foundations and methodology. Using Nussbaum’s capabilities list as a basis, I will argue that various social and environmental functions which are threatened by climate change are crucial with respect to enabling morally and politically central capabilities for both current and future people. Here, I will draw on recent work by Breena Holland to establish the notion of a sustainable climate system as a necessary precondition for the enablement and protection of these entitlements. Then, I’ll extend this strategy to argue that the capabilities approach provides a uniquely useful threshold conception of harm to inform our thinking about our relationship to our posterity. It is my hope that the capabilities approach so applied can give us a novel way of understanding our responsibilities toward future people in a time where such an understanding is both unfortunately lacking and increasingly dire. Finally, I will discuss some implications of a capability-based account in the intergenerational context and some justifications for applying the approach in this way. Ultimately, I submit that this sort of view seems more well-fitted to this context than other approaches (e.g., contractarianism and consequentialism), and that it offers a unique vehicle for understanding our relations and obligations to future people.
{"title":"Toward a Capability-Based Account of Intergenerational Justice","authors":"Alex Richardson","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p363","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p363","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I will draw on the capabilities approach to social justice and human development as advanced, among others, by Martha Nussbaum, and seek to provide some theoretical resources for better understanding our obligations to future persons. My argumentative strategy is as follows: First, I’ll briefly reconstruct a capabilities approach to justice, examining this sort of view’s normative foundations and methodology. Using Nussbaum’s capabilities list as a basis, I will argue that various social and environmental functions which are threatened by climate change are crucial with respect to enabling morally and politically central capabilities for both current and future people. Here, I will draw on recent work by Breena Holland to establish the notion of a sustainable climate system as a necessary precondition for the enablement and protection of these entitlements. Then, I’ll extend this strategy to argue that the capabilities approach provides a uniquely useful threshold conception of harm to inform our thinking about our relationship to our posterity. It is my hope that the capabilities approach so applied can give us a novel way of understanding our responsibilities toward future people in a time where such an understanding is both unfortunately lacking and increasingly dire. Finally, I will discuss some implications of a capability-based account in the intergenerational context and some justifications for applying the approach in this way. Ultimately, I submit that this sort of view seems more well-fitted to this context than other approaches (e.g., contractarianism and consequentialism), and that it offers a unique vehicle for understanding our relations and obligations to future people.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122413114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p445
Reyes Espinoza
This research advocates a strategy to mitigate or prevent further anthropogenic climate change and preserve natural resources. The strategy takes into account mechanisms of social and moral norms, which are innate in humanity due to millions of years of evolution. Social norms themselves are not innate, but the mechanisms to acquire them and implement them are. To slow down anthropogenic climate change global forces, inclusive of governments, NGOs, and collective humanity, should help indigenous peoples to protect their territories and property. Important to the moral argument is highlighting the murder of Berta Caceres, a Honduran environmental activist, in 2015 by military members of Honduras at the instruction of the Honduran joint chiefs of staff as well as the likely involvement of an energy company. To conclude, if global forces were to enforce protection of indigenous communities affected by the negative effects of urbanization and globalization, then there would be a mitigating effect on anthropogenic climate change.
{"title":"Indigenous Environmental Interests and their Connection to Anthropogenic Climate Change","authors":"Reyes Espinoza","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p445","url":null,"abstract":"This research advocates a strategy to mitigate or prevent further anthropogenic climate change and preserve natural resources. The strategy takes into account mechanisms of social and moral norms, which are innate in humanity due to millions of years of evolution. Social norms themselves are not innate, but the mechanisms to acquire them and implement them are. To slow down anthropogenic climate change global forces, inclusive of governments, NGOs, and collective humanity, should help indigenous peoples to protect their territories and property. Important to the moral argument is highlighting the murder of Berta Caceres, a Honduran environmental activist, in 2015 by military members of Honduras at the instruction of the Honduran joint chiefs of staff as well as the likely involvement of an energy company. To conclude, if global forces were to enforce protection of indigenous communities affected by the negative effects of urbanization and globalization, then there would be a mitigating effect on anthropogenic climate change.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114395944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p389
Antoine Verret-Hamelin
While carbon markets have been increasingly scrutinized for their moral merits, the egalitarian critique of carbon markets has been largely neglected. Many admit that emission-trading schemes (ETSs), in their actual form, reproduce pre-existing inequalities. However, this is often seen as a contingent, easily-fixed problem, as carbon markets can fulfill egalitarian goals as long as the initial allocation of permits is made according to an egalitarian ideal. The goal of this paper is to challenge this idealistic rejection of the egalitarian critique of carbon markets by underlying seven structural features of carbon markets that explain why, in all likelihood, ETSs will always reproduce pre-existing inequalities (without even curbing carbonemissions). First, carbon markets are bound to cover mainly the activities of wealthy and powerful corporations. Second, carbon markets are excessively complex and their operations typically lack transparency. Third, information asymmetries persist between public servants and private firms regarding ETSs. Fourth, target setting is a political, highly partisan process. These four features give private firms the power to manipulate at their advantage the rules of a carbon market. Three other features explain why the motivations of agents under an ETS will most of the time be corrupted: carbon markets trivialize the harm done by carbon emissions; they alter our perception of nature’s value; and they crowd-out our intrinsic motivations. Thus, influential private firms will have the power and willingness to bend carbon markets at their advantage.
{"title":"Carbon Markets: Rehabilitationg the Egalitarian Objection","authors":"Antoine Verret-Hamelin","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p389","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p389","url":null,"abstract":"While carbon markets have been increasingly scrutinized for their moral merits, the egalitarian critique of carbon markets has been largely neglected. Many admit that emission-trading schemes (ETSs), in their actual form, reproduce pre-existing inequalities. However, this is often seen as a contingent, easily-fixed problem, as carbon markets can fulfill egalitarian goals as long as the initial allocation of permits is made according to an egalitarian ideal. The goal of this paper is to challenge this idealistic rejection of the egalitarian critique of carbon markets by underlying seven structural features of carbon markets that explain why, in all likelihood, ETSs will always reproduce pre-existing inequalities (without even curbing carbonemissions). First, carbon markets are bound to cover mainly the activities of wealthy and powerful corporations. Second, carbon markets are excessively complex and their operations typically lack transparency. Third, information asymmetries persist between public servants and private firms regarding ETSs. Fourth, target setting is a political, highly partisan process. These four features give private firms the power to manipulate at their advantage the rules of a carbon market. Three other features explain why the motivations of agents under an ETS will most of the time be corrupted: carbon markets trivialize the harm done by carbon emissions; they alter our perception of nature’s value; and they crowd-out our intrinsic motivations. Thus, influential private firms will have the power and willingness to bend carbon markets at their advantage.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123651291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p409
C. Dimitriu
In this article, I make the idea that poverty outcomes are not necessarily morally relevant for assessing policies as clear as possible by discussing a specific case within the global justice debate: sovereign debts. The claim I would like to defend is that generating poverty among the population of a poor state as a result of a loan is independent from the fact that such debt is morally binding. People might become poorer as a result of a loan, and the loan might still be binding; and people might not be negatively affected as a result of a loan, and the loan might be non-binding. It is of course often the case that there is something wrong with lending that generates massive poverty. However, in my view, the fact that lending and poverty exist parallel to each other is not what makes a loan binding or non-binding. Thus, it is misguided to measure poverty as a way of testing the bindingness of a debt. I will proceed as follows. First, I will explain in some detail Pogge’s view about lending and justice, as he is the main defender of the outcome-view that I am trying to refute. Second, I will show two possible worries about Pogge’s view. I will call the first one the “agnosticism objection” and the second one the “normative limitation objection”. Third, I will briefly describe my own account of the conditions under which lending would count as non-binding. This account does not necessarily rely on outcomes.
{"title":"Debts, Poverty and Justice","authors":"C. Dimitriu","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p409","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I make the idea that poverty outcomes are not necessarily morally relevant for assessing policies as clear as possible by discussing a specific case within the global justice debate: sovereign debts. The claim I would like to defend is that generating poverty among the population of a poor state as a result of a loan is independent from the fact that such debt is morally binding. People might become poorer as a result of a loan, and the loan might still be binding; and people might not be negatively affected as a result of a loan, and the loan might be non-binding. It is of course often the case that there is something wrong with lending that generates massive poverty. However, in my view, the fact that lending and poverty exist parallel to each other is not what makes a loan binding or non-binding. Thus, it is misguided to measure poverty as a way of testing the bindingness of a debt. I will proceed as follows. First, I will explain in some detail Pogge’s view about lending and justice, as he is the main defender of the outcome-view that I am trying to refute. Second, I will show two possible worries about Pogge’s view. I will call the first one the “agnosticism objection” and the second one the “normative limitation objection”. Third, I will briefly describe my own account of the conditions under which lending would count as non-binding. This account does not necessarily rely on outcomes.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115805700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p423
Andrés Cruz
In mainstream democratic theory, non-agents are only considered indirectly: their interests matter if and only if a group of agents cares about them. In this paper, I argue that democratic patients, non-agents whose interests are affected by democratic decisions, have a place of their own in democratic theory. That is, they are entitled to the fair consideration of their interests in the democratic decision-making process. I defend the case for democratic patients by building upon the idea of epistemic democracy as proposed by David Estlund . If democratic procedures ought to be epistemically designed towards achieving right decisions, as Estlund argues, they should consider all relevant evidence fairly, like a jury does. Since democratic patients’ interests are affected by democratic decisions, I argue that they do count as relevant evidence via the All-Affected Principle, which lies at the core of democracy. Then I present some candidates for being democratic patients, which include young children, severely cognitively disabled humans, non-existent future humans, sentient animals and even non-sentient life forms. Whether they turn out to be democratic patients depends on what theories one accepts about agency, interests, and the impact of the outcomes of democracy on interests. I illustrate that point by discussing future humans as possible candidates. Finally, I briefly explore the challenge of designing real-world institutions derived from my argument, outlining what objectives they should aim for and some of the problems they might face.
{"title":"The Case for Democratic Patients: Epistemic Democracy Goes Green","authors":"Andrés Cruz","doi":"10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p423","url":null,"abstract":"In mainstream democratic theory, non-agents are only considered indirectly: their interests matter if and only if a group of agents cares about them. In this paper, I argue that democratic patients, non-agents whose interests are affected by democratic decisions, have a place of their own in democratic theory. That is, they are entitled to the fair consideration of their interests in the democratic decision-making process. I defend the case for democratic patients by building upon the idea of epistemic democracy as proposed by David Estlund . If democratic procedures ought to be epistemically designed towards achieving right decisions, as Estlund argues, they should consider all relevant evidence fairly, like a jury does. Since democratic patients’ interests are affected by democratic decisions, I argue that they do count as relevant evidence via the All-Affected Principle, which lies at the core of democracy. Then I present some candidates for being democratic patients, which include young children, severely cognitively disabled humans, non-existent future humans, sentient animals and even non-sentient life forms. Whether they turn out to be democratic patients depends on what theories one accepts about agency, interests, and the impact of the outcomes of democracy on interests. I illustrate that point by discussing future humans as possible candidates. Finally, I briefly explore the challenge of designing real-world institutions derived from my argument, outlining what objectives they should aim for and some of the problems they might face.","PeriodicalId":104826,"journal":{"name":"ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129587034","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-25DOI: 10.5007/1677-2954.2018v17n3p461
Ushana Jayasuriya
My research explores climate justice and non-ideal theory. Using Laura Valentini’s conception of non-ideal theory, this is applied to the distribution of climate mitigation obligations, with a particular focus on the common but differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing countries. I wish to evaluate this distribution of obligations and determine whether it is an effective method of climate change mitigation, with consideration to non-ideal elements of partial or non-compliance. Climate change is one of the biggest challenges faced by the international community, and it is a problem that requires collective action. However, due to ineffective international agreements and a lack of willingness to alter lifestyles, this action is often not achieved. Agreements commonly result in targets that are not sufficient to exact the change required, instead representing only the states’ willingness to mitigate the destructive aspects of climate change while maintaining economic growth. I suggest that a shift in focus is required to obtain relevant and effective agreements that will reach the required targets. I propose that an Ability to Pay approach and a turn to investment incentives may result in more favourable outcomes. Recent climate agreements have focused more on the investment in clean energy and sharing of resources, however, I argue that this needs to be taken further in order to achieve the collective goal of mitigating climate change.
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