This note, working from the basis of the author's prior paper, argues that the relatively high consumption standard associated with American "middle classness" was defined by the requirements of providing a household a minimum of comfort, mobility, security and economic opportunity in a context of (to use John Kenneth Galbraith's terminology) "private affluence" and "public poverty."
{"title":"Public Poverty and the Middle Class Living Standard: A Note","authors":"N. Elhefnawy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3872658","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3872658","url":null,"abstract":"This note, working from the basis of the author's prior paper, argues that the relatively high consumption standard associated with American \"middle classness\" was defined by the requirements of providing a household a minimum of comfort, mobility, security and economic opportunity in a context of (to use John Kenneth Galbraith's terminology) \"private affluence\" and \"public poverty.\"","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74861146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Arnab Dutta, Richard K. Green, Venkatesh Panchapagesan, Madalasa Venkataraman
A large share of residential properties on sale in developing countries is under construction. This is partly due to lengthy periods of construction. But purchasing under-construction properties can be costly and risky because of construction delays and the possibility of stalled construction. Hence, property sellers would expect buyers to pay higher prices for completed or move-in ready properties relative to under-construction ones. Prolonged construction times can also lead to higher resale prices. Buyers with an appetite for risk might purchase new under-construction properties at lower costs and resell these at higher prices, either when construction is complete, or when market prices increase, or both. In this paper, we use residential property listings data from the six largest urban agglomerations (UAs) in India - Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi - between 2010-2012 and estimate the sellers' expected premium for move-in ready properties in each UA. Hedonic regressions of listed prices on property attributes reveal that the expected move-in ready premium is statistically significant in Bangalore, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi, and its magnitude varies between 3-14%. At unconditional average property prices, the move-in ready premium is 23-150% of an average household's income in these UAs. We also find that the expected resale premium is significant and varies between 2-16% in three UAs. The resale premium is partly explained by a higher move-in ready premium among resale properties and possible speculative behavior.
{"title":"Are Move-in Ready Properties More Expensive?","authors":"Arnab Dutta, Richard K. Green, Venkatesh Panchapagesan, Madalasa Venkataraman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3851745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3851745","url":null,"abstract":"A large share of residential properties on sale in developing countries is under construction. This is partly due to lengthy periods of construction. But purchasing under-construction properties can be costly and risky because of construction delays and the possibility of stalled construction. Hence, property sellers would expect buyers to pay higher prices for completed or move-in ready properties relative to under-construction ones. Prolonged construction times can also lead to higher resale prices. Buyers with an appetite for risk might purchase new under-construction properties at lower costs and resell these at higher prices, either when construction is complete, or when market prices increase, or both. In this paper, we use residential property listings data from the six largest urban agglomerations (UAs) in India - Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi - between 2010-2012 and estimate the sellers' expected premium for move-in ready properties in each UA. Hedonic regressions of listed prices on property attributes reveal that the expected move-in ready premium is statistically significant in Bangalore, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Delhi, and its magnitude varies between 3-14%. At unconditional average property prices, the move-in ready premium is 23-150% of an average household's income in these UAs. We also find that the expected resale premium is significant and varies between 2-16% in three UAs. The resale premium is partly explained by a higher move-in ready premium among resale properties and possible speculative behavior.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"94 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77033943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We exploit variation from an unanticipated labor market reform in 2012 Spain to causally estimate the effects of pro-cyclical unemployment assistance (UA) reductions on job search behavior and re-employment outcomes. Shorter benefit durations effectively bring individuals back to work and reduce non-employment duration. However, they also induce displacements out of the labor force and strong substitution patterns towards other, less generous, welfare programs, highlighting the social insurance role of long-term benefits during economic downturns. Despite the sharp drop in non-employment duration, we also document a significant decrease in re-employment wages, consistent with reduced workers' reservation wages and limited duration dependence. Heterogeneity analyses show that relatively younger workers are the ones that are brought back into re-employment in lower-quality jobs, while older workers are pushed out of the labor force. Looking at responses over the non-employment spell, we provide evidence against the standard assumption of forward-looking behavior of benefit recipients, as we do not detect any change in workers' behavior before benefit exhaustion. Overall, we estimate that the reform induced only moderate fiscal savings for the government.
{"title":"Bringing Them In or Pushing Them Out? The Labor Market Effects of Pro-cyclical Unemployment Assistance Reductions","authors":"Gerard Domènech-Arumí, Silvia Vannutelli","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3854130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3854130","url":null,"abstract":"We exploit variation from an unanticipated labor market reform in 2012 Spain to causally estimate the effects of pro-cyclical unemployment assistance (UA) reductions on job search behavior and re-employment outcomes. Shorter benefit durations effectively bring individuals back to work and reduce non-employment duration. However, they also induce displacements out of the labor force and strong substitution patterns towards other, less generous, welfare programs, highlighting the social insurance role of long-term benefits during economic downturns. Despite the sharp drop in non-employment duration, we also document a significant decrease in re-employment wages, consistent with reduced workers' reservation wages and limited duration dependence. Heterogeneity analyses show that relatively younger workers are the ones that are brought back into re-employment in lower-quality jobs, while older workers are pushed out of the labor force. Looking at responses over the non-employment spell, we provide evidence against the standard assumption of forward-looking behavior of benefit recipients, as we do not detect any change in workers' behavior before benefit exhaustion. Overall, we estimate that the reform induced only moderate fiscal savings for the government.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91206591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under the recently proposed EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), ‘gatekeeper’ digital platforms have to comply with a number of ex-ante obligations, including narrow ex-ante data-sharing mandates that have been proposed as a viable solution to the phenomenon of data-driven market tipping. Digital platforms will also be subject to ex-post competition interventions, some of which are already ongoing. Given that both ex-ante regulatory and ex-post competition enforcement can address the issue of data-driven market tipping, there is a significant chance that thought from one policy domain will influence the other. This can be readily seen in the DMA, which heavily borrows from competition doctrine.
Such intellectual cross-fertilization needs to be approached with care, however. For one, the objectives and reasons of existence of the two domains are different. Second, data-driven markets are dynamic and always evolving, which means that rigorous ex-post effects analysis that does not simply fall back on ideas and practices from ex-ante regulation is of pivotal importance for i) correctly assessing anti-competitive behavior and ii) devising an appropriate ex-post remedy. This latter point can be seen with regard to data-sharing mandates, which will continue being important as possible ex-post competition remedies even after the adoption of the DMA with its ex-ante solution in that regard. However, a fine-grained, effects-driven assessment of the need for data sharing obligations in an ex-post enforcement setting will be vital, given new political and business-led data-sharing initiatives, novel techniques for generating synthetic data, and companies’ increasing skill at drawing powerful conclusions from small data sets.
In sum, authorities need to proceed carefully with regard to ex-post interventions in dynamic data-driven markets already governed by ex-ante obligations, in particular in two respects: i) establishing that abuse of dominance has taken place (especially given that ex-ante obligations will soon be in place) and ii) choosing the right remedies if such abuse is found. With regard to the former, we propose a ‘multiple counterfactual causation test’ for establishing anticompetitive foreclosure. With regard to the latter, we maintain that ex-post data-sharing mandates should only be imposed after careful proportionality analysis vis-à-vis the counterfactually identified abusive behavior; otherwise, they are unlikely to be effective remedies and other remedial actions need to be considered.
{"title":"Old Tools for the New Economy? Counterfactual Causation in Foreclosure Assessment and Choice of Remedies on Data-driven Markets","authors":"Nora von Ingersleben‐Seip, Z. Georgieva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3861967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3861967","url":null,"abstract":"Under the recently proposed EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), ‘gatekeeper’ digital platforms have to comply with a number of ex-ante obligations, including narrow ex-ante data-sharing mandates that have been proposed as a viable solution to the phenomenon of data-driven market tipping. Digital platforms will also be subject to ex-post competition interventions, some of which are already ongoing. Given that both ex-ante regulatory and ex-post competition enforcement can address the issue of data-driven market tipping, there is a significant chance that thought from one policy domain will influence the other. This can be readily seen in the DMA, which heavily borrows from competition doctrine.<br><br>Such intellectual cross-fertilization needs to be approached with care, however. For one, the objectives and reasons of existence of the two domains are different. Second, data-driven markets are dynamic and always evolving, which means that rigorous ex-post effects analysis that does not simply fall back on ideas and practices from ex-ante regulation is of pivotal importance for i) correctly assessing anti-competitive behavior and ii) devising an appropriate ex-post remedy. This latter point can be seen with regard to data-sharing mandates, which will continue being important as possible ex-post competition remedies even after the adoption of the DMA with its ex-ante solution in that regard. However, a fine-grained, effects-driven assessment of the need for data sharing obligations in an ex-post enforcement setting will be vital, given new political and business-led data-sharing initiatives, novel techniques for generating synthetic data, and companies’ increasing skill at drawing powerful conclusions from small data sets.<br><br>In sum, authorities need to proceed carefully with regard to ex-post interventions in dynamic data-driven markets already governed by ex-ante obligations, in particular in two respects: i) establishing that abuse of dominance has taken place (especially given that ex-ante obligations will soon be in place) and ii) choosing the right remedies if such abuse is found. With regard to the former, we propose a ‘multiple counterfactual causation test’ for establishing anticompetitive foreclosure. With regard to the latter, we maintain that ex-post data-sharing mandates should only be imposed after careful proportionality analysis vis-à-vis the counterfactually identified abusive behavior; otherwise, they are unlikely to be effective remedies and other remedial actions need to be considered.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78217405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Giles, Xiaoyan Lei, Gewei Wang, Stephen Yafeng Wang, Yaohui Zhao
This paper documents the patterns and correlates of retirement in China using a nationally representative survey, the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. After documenting stark differences in retirement ages between urban and rural residents, the paper shows that China's urban residents retire earlier than workers in many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries and that rural residents continue to work until advanced ages. Differences in access to generous pensions and economic resources explain much of the urban-rural difference in retirement rates. The paper suggests that reducing disincentives created by China's Urban Employee Pension system, improving health status, providing childcare and elder care support may all facilitate longer working lives. Given spouse preferences for joint retirement, creating incentives for women to retire later may facilitate longer working lives for both men and women.
{"title":"One Country, Two Systems: Evidence on Retirement Patterns in China","authors":"J. Giles, Xiaoyan Lei, Gewei Wang, Stephen Yafeng Wang, Yaohui Zhao","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-9650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-9650","url":null,"abstract":"This paper documents the patterns and correlates of retirement in China using a nationally representative survey, the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. After documenting stark differences in retirement ages between urban and rural residents, the paper shows that China's urban residents retire earlier than workers in many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries and that rural residents continue to work until advanced ages. Differences in access to generous pensions and economic resources explain much of the urban-rural difference in retirement rates. The paper suggests that reducing disincentives created by China's Urban Employee Pension system, improving health status, providing childcare and elder care support may all facilitate longer working lives. Given spouse preferences for joint retirement, creating incentives for women to retire later may facilitate longer working lives for both men and women.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78979633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We define high cost lenders as lenders that issue a disproportionate number of high cost loans. We develop a shift-share measure to capture the market representation of these high cost lenders in housing submarkets. After conditioning on housing submarket fixed effects, origination year fixed effects and trends over origination years based on housing submarket attributes, the magnitude of the estimated relationship is very stable as detailed controls for borrower attributes, credit score and loan terms are added. The relationship between the representation of high cost lenders and foreclosure is broad based across borrowers and types of loans, but is strongest for loans originated by high cost lenders whether or not the loans themselves are high cost. We investigate three potential mechanisms: reverse causality where high cost lenders respond to an increase in demand from higher risk borrowers, the types of mortgages issued when high cost lenders increase their market presence, and the behavior of loan servicers when a cohort of loans contains a large number of loans issued by high cost lenders. While we do not have direct information on loan servicers, our evidence points towards foreclosure decisions during the crisis as the primary mechanism behind our findings.
{"title":"High Cost Lenders and the Geographic Concentration of Foreclosures","authors":"Stephen L. Ross, Yuan-Hsin Wang","doi":"10.3386/W28781","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W28781","url":null,"abstract":"We define high cost lenders as lenders that issue a disproportionate number of high cost loans. We develop a shift-share measure to capture the market representation of these high cost lenders in housing submarkets. After conditioning on housing submarket fixed effects, origination year fixed effects and trends over origination years based on housing submarket attributes, the magnitude of the estimated relationship is very stable as detailed controls for borrower attributes, credit score and loan terms are added. The relationship between the representation of high cost lenders and foreclosure is broad based across borrowers and types of loans, but is strongest for loans originated by high cost lenders whether or not the loans themselves are high cost. We investigate three potential mechanisms: reverse causality where high cost lenders respond to an increase in demand from higher risk borrowers, the types of mortgages issued when high cost lenders increase their market presence, and the behavior of loan servicers when a cohort of loans contains a large number of loans issued by high cost lenders. While we do not have direct information on loan servicers, our evidence points towards foreclosure decisions during the crisis as the primary mechanism behind our findings.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"119 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74572166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This Working Paper looks at the CJEU’s changing interpretation of Article 8 of Directive 2008/94/EC (protecting pension rights on employer insolvency) over the last 14 years through its decisions in Robins, Hogan, Webb-Sämann, Hampshire and Bauer. The CJEU both decided that pension protection arrangements did not satisfy the Article 8 requirements and imposed a number of underpins as to the level of protection required. In Bauer the CJEU introduced an additional underpin of a 100% minimum protection level up to the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty threshold (€14,767 pa after income tax in the Netherlands (for 2019) and £11,142 pa after income tax in the UK (for 2018)).
{"title":"Bauer and Beyond: The Changing Interpretation of Article 8 of Directive 2008/94/Ec (Protection of Employees’ Pension Rights on Employer Insolvency) and Its Impact on Member State Pension Protection Arrangements on Employer Insolvency’","authors":"P. Bennett, H. V. Meerten","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3837600","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3837600","url":null,"abstract":"This Working Paper looks at the CJEU’s changing interpretation of Article 8 of Directive 2008/94/EC (protecting pension rights on employer insolvency) over the last 14 years through its decisions in Robins, Hogan, Webb-Sämann, Hampshire and Bauer. The CJEU both decided that pension protection arrangements did not satisfy the Article 8 requirements and imposed a number of underpins as to the level of protection required. In Bauer the CJEU introduced an additional underpin of a 100% minimum protection level up to the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty threshold (€14,767 pa after income tax in the Netherlands (for 2019) and £11,142 pa after income tax in the UK (for 2018)).","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86468885","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Blanchett, Michael S. Finke, Branislav Nikolic
The 2019 SECURE Act provides safe harbor protections to employers who evaluate the costs of providing guaranteed income including gathering information on competing providers. Annuities can be more difficult to evaluate than mutual funds because annuity expenses can be opaque, financial strength matters, and insurer competitiveness can change over time. We find significant variation in the payout rates across providers over time. While the payout rankings of annuity companies (e.g., best to worst) are fairly sticky over the short-term, over the full period of the analysis the correlation declines effectively to zero (versus the initial rankings). This suggests individuals or institutions who choose a single annuity provider based on income payout should revisit the decision regularly to ensure the quotes are still competitive. Companies for which immediate annuities are a higher fraction of total sales tend to rank higher and remain so more persistently over time.
{"title":"How Competitive Are Income Annuity Providers Over Time?","authors":"David Blanchett, Michael S. Finke, Branislav Nikolic","doi":"10.1111/RMIR.12182","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/RMIR.12182","url":null,"abstract":"The 2019 SECURE Act provides safe harbor protections to employers who evaluate the costs of providing guaranteed income including gathering information on competing providers. Annuities can be more difficult to evaluate than mutual funds because annuity expenses can be opaque, financial strength matters, and insurer competitiveness can change over time. We find significant variation in the payout rates across providers over time. While the payout rankings of annuity companies (e.g., best to worst) are fairly sticky over the short-term, over the full period of the analysis the correlation declines effectively to zero (versus the initial rankings). This suggests individuals or institutions who choose a single annuity provider based on income payout should revisit the decision regularly to ensure the quotes are still competitive. Companies for which immediate annuities are a higher fraction of total sales tend to rank higher and remain so more persistently over time.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81647715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public employee pension funds, endowment funds and other nonprofit institutional investors in the U.S. have a serious performance problem. They have underperformed properly-constructed, passively-investable benchmarks by a wide margin since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, some 13 years ago. Moreover, they have underperformed with remarkable consistency. The poor performance is no accident. Rather, it is structural in nature. Improving performance will require that fund managers make significant changes in their approach to asset management. Institutional investors across the board would be better off investing purely passively. Evidence for this is compelling. Institutions determined to outperform market benchmarks should (1) simplify their approach to asset allocation, (2) use far fewer managers and (3) significantly reduce cost.
{"title":"How to Improve Institutional Fund Performance","authors":"Richard M. Ennis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3816608","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3816608","url":null,"abstract":"Public employee pension funds, endowment funds and other nonprofit institutional investors in the U.S. have a serious performance problem. They have underperformed properly-constructed, passively-investable benchmarks by a wide margin since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008, some 13 years ago. Moreover, they have underperformed with remarkable consistency. The poor performance is no accident. Rather, it is structural in nature. Improving performance will require that fund managers make significant changes in their approach to asset management. Institutional investors across the board would be better off investing purely passively. Evidence for this is compelling. Institutions determined to outperform market benchmarks should (1) simplify their approach to asset allocation, (2) use far fewer managers and (3) significantly reduce cost.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87377851","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Eriksen's “The Location of Affordable and Subsidized Rental Housing Across and Within the Largest Cities in the United States” (March 2021) provides evidence on changes in rent levels and the availability of subsidized rental housing for LMI households over the last two decades in the nation’s 50 largest MSAs. Analyzes how the mandatory adoption of Small Area Fair Market Rents in 24 metro areas in 2018 affected the surrounding neighborhood poverty rates of HCV recipients.
{"title":"The Location of Affordable and Subsidized Rental Housing Across and Within the Largest Cities in the United States","authors":"Michael D. Eriksen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3912773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3912773","url":null,"abstract":"Michael Eriksen's “The Location of Affordable and Subsidized Rental Housing Across and Within the Largest Cities in the United States” (March 2021) provides evidence on changes in rent levels and the availability of subsidized rental housing for LMI households over the last two decades in the nation’s 50 largest MSAs. Analyzes how the mandatory adoption of Small Area Fair Market Rents in 24 metro areas in 2018 affected the surrounding neighborhood poverty rates of HCV recipients.","PeriodicalId":10619,"journal":{"name":"Comparative Political Economy: Social Welfare Policy eJournal","volume":"22 2","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91438602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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