I examine the extent to which public sector outsourcing relates to public employment in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. I use new panel data on public sector outsourcing. The sample includes 26 countries over the period 2009–2015. Contrary to common expectations, the results do not suggest that public sector outsourcing expenditure was negatively related to public employment in the full sample. The relation between public sector outsourcing and public employment, however, does vary across countries. If anything, the growth in public sector outsourcing in period t − 1 was positively correlated with the growth in public employment in period t. When public sector outsourcing gives rise to regrouping public employees but not reducing public employment, outsourcing may even increase inefficiencies in the public sector. (JEL codes: L33, J45, P16, C23).
{"title":"Does Public Sector Outsourcing Decrease Public Employment? Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries","authors":"N. Potrafke","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 I examine the extent to which public sector outsourcing relates to public employment in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. I use new panel data on public sector outsourcing. The sample includes 26 countries over the period 2009–2015. Contrary to common expectations, the results do not suggest that public sector outsourcing expenditure was negatively related to public employment in the full sample. The relation between public sector outsourcing and public employment, however, does vary across countries. If anything, the growth in public sector outsourcing in period t − 1 was positively correlated with the growth in public employment in period t. When public sector outsourcing gives rise to regrouping public employees but not reducing public employment, outsourcing may even increase inefficiencies in the public sector. (JEL codes: L33, J45, P16, C23).","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131286149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the economic rationale for investing in science? Based on an open economy model of creative destruction, we characterize four key factors of optimal investment in basic research: the stage of economic development, the strength of the manufacturing base, the degree of openness, and the share of foreign-owned firms. For each of these factors, we analyse its bearings on optimal basic research investment. We then show that the predicted effects are consistent with patterns observed in the data and discuss how the factor-based approach might inform basic research policies.
{"title":"Economic Rationales for Investments in Science","authors":"H. Gersbach, Ulrich Schetter, Maik T. Schneider","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3269295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3269295","url":null,"abstract":"What is the economic rationale for investing in science? Based on an open economy model of creative destruction, we characterize four key factors of optimal investment in basic research: the stage of economic development, the strength of the manufacturing base, the degree of openness, and the share of foreign-owned firms. For each of these factors, we analyse its bearings on optimal basic research investment. We then show that the predicted effects are consistent with patterns observed in the data and discuss how the factor-based approach might inform basic research policies.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127712731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
N. Bharathi, D. Malghan, S. Mishra, Andaleeb Rahman
We develop a general multi-scale diversity framework to account for spatial segregation of hierarchically-ordered ethnic groups residing in politically and administratively nested geographic aggregations. We explicate how ethnic diversity, ethnic segregation, and ethnic hierarchy interact with the "public goods catchment area" to cast doubt on extant hypotheses linking diversity and public goods provisioning. We not only show how the celebrated "diversity debit" relationship is incomplete at best but also call into question the more recent literature that posits a positive association between ethnic segregation and public goods. We test our framework using a large national census dataset containing ethnicity information (aggregate caste categories) for 830 million rural residents in India. Our nested-geography models use data from villages (n 600; 000) and sub-districts containing these villages (n 6; 000) for twenty-five different public goods. We show how not accounting for the spatial structure of diversity, segregation, and hierarchy result in biased empirical models of diversity and public goods. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical evidence in this paper comes from the largest dataset used in the politics of public goods literature.
{"title":"Public Goods, and Nested Subnational Units: Diversity, Segregation, or Hierarchy?","authors":"N. Bharathi, D. Malghan, S. Mishra, Andaleeb Rahman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3254095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3254095","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a general multi-scale diversity framework to account for spatial segregation of hierarchically-ordered ethnic groups residing in politically and administratively nested geographic aggregations. We explicate how ethnic diversity, ethnic segregation, and ethnic hierarchy interact with the \"public goods catchment area\" to cast doubt on extant hypotheses linking diversity and public goods provisioning. We not only show how the celebrated \"diversity debit\" relationship is incomplete at best but also call into question the more recent literature that posits a positive association between ethnic segregation and public goods. We test our framework using a large national census dataset containing ethnicity information (aggregate caste categories) for 830 million rural residents in India. Our nested-geography models use data from villages (n 600; 000) and sub-districts containing these villages (n 6; 000) for twenty-five different public goods. We show how not accounting for the spatial structure of diversity, segregation, and hierarchy result in biased empirical models of diversity and public goods. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical evidence in this paper comes from the largest dataset used in the politics of public goods literature.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129258364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans’ unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect unanimous preferences only when doing so does not lead to a decrease in the welfare of other species. Social preferences satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns for other species, egalitarianism among humans, and unanimity: the latter two imply a form of dictatorship from humans with the strongest preference for the welfare of other species. (JEL D11, D63, H41)
{"title":"Fair Social Ordering, Egalitarianism, and Animal Welfare","authors":"M. Fleurbaey, Martin Van der Linden","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3151808","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3151808","url":null,"abstract":"We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans’ unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect unanimous preferences only when doing so does not lead to a decrease in the welfare of other species. Social preferences satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns for other species, egalitarianism among humans, and unanimity: the latter two imply a form of dictatorship from humans with the strongest preference for the welfare of other species. (JEL D11, D63, H41)","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"64 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115674345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ukrainian Abstract: У статті висвітлюється недостатньо досліджена проблема фінансування пунктів ліквідації неписьменності під час здійснення політики ліквідації неписьменності у 20-х роках ХХ століття на Сумщині. Авторами охарактеризовано стан матеріального забезпечення лікнепів у визначений період, проаналізовано основні джерела грошових надходжень, виявлений рівень реального матеріального забезпечення лікнепів. Встановлено, що низький рівень фінансування часто ставав причиною неякісного рівня викладання. Розглянуто питання забезпечення підручниками і навчальними посібниками як українською мовою, так і мовами інших національностей, в тому числі, наведено окремі статистичні дані про централізовані надходження навчальної літератури, надано коротку характеристику найбільш популярних навчальних книг, які використовувалися викладачами лікнепів під час ліквідації неписьменності на Сумщині.
У статті наведено цитати із документів зі справ Державного архіву Сумської області, які безпосередньо розкривають реальний стан фінансування і матеріального забезпечення лікнепів на Сумщині у 20 рр. ХХ ст. і дають можливість об’єктивно оцінити дійсне матеріальне і фінансове становище пунктів лікнепу. Автори статті надають коротку характеристику щодо діяльності пунктів ліквідації неписьменності у різних містах нинішньої Сумської області: Конотопі, Глухові, Шостці, Краснопіллі Сумах, наголошуючи на їх кількісному зростанні і, як наслідок, збільшенні відсотка письменного населення. Автори статті роблять висновок, що попри недостатнє фінансування пунктів лікнепу, недосконалу систему забезпечення навчальною літературою, шкільним приладдям, канцтоварами робота цих закладів мала позитивний результат, який виявився у збільшенні кількості письменного населення в Сумській області, яке навчилося читати і писати українською мовою, що мало, в свою чергу, велике значення для пробудження національної самосвідомості українського населення.
English Abstract: The article deals with the insufficiently studied problem of financing illiteracy issues during the implementation of the illiteracy elimination policy in Sumy region in the 1920s. The authors describe the state of material maintenance of illiteracy elimination centers at a certain period, analyze the main sources of funding, and define the level of the real material maintenance of illiteracy elimination points. It has been found out that a low level of funding often leads to poor teaching quality. The issue of providing textbooks and teaching aids in both Ukrainian and the languages of other nationalities is considered, including some statistics on the centralized inflow of educational literature, a brief description of the most popular textbooks used by teachers of educational centers during the process of eliminating illiteracy in Sumy region.
The article cites quotations from the documents of the State Archive of the Sumy region, which directly reveal the real state of financing and mater
{"title":"Система фінансування лікпунктів у 20 рр. ХХ ст. на Сумщині (The System of Financing Illiteracy Elimination Centers in Sumy Region in the 1920s)","authors":"Larisa Yepik, N. Petrenko","doi":"10.22178/pos.37-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22178/pos.37-8","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Ukrainian Abstract:</b> У статті висвітлюється недостатньо досліджена проблема фінансування пунктів ліквідації неписьменності під час здійснення політики ліквідації неписьменності у 20-х роках ХХ століття на Сумщині. Авторами охарактеризовано стан матеріального забезпечення лікнепів у визначений період, проаналізовано основні джерела грошових надходжень, виявлений рівень реального матеріального забезпечення лікнепів. Встановлено, що низький рівень фінансування часто ставав причиною неякісного рівня викладання. Розглянуто питання забезпечення підручниками і навчальними посібниками як українською мовою, так і мовами інших національностей, в тому числі, наведено окремі статистичні дані про централізовані надходження навчальної літератури, надано коротку характеристику найбільш популярних навчальних книг, які використовувалися викладачами лікнепів під час ліквідації неписьменності на Сумщині. <br><br>У статті наведено цитати із документів зі справ Державного архіву Сумської області, які безпосередньо розкривають реальний стан фінансування і матеріального забезпечення лікнепів на Сумщині у 20 рр. ХХ ст. і дають можливість об’єктивно оцінити дійсне матеріальне і фінансове становище пунктів лікнепу. Автори статті надають коротку характеристику щодо діяльності пунктів ліквідації неписьменності у різних містах нинішньої Сумської області: Конотопі, Глухові, Шостці, Краснопіллі Сумах, наголошуючи на їх кількісному зростанні і, як наслідок, збільшенні відсотка письменного населення. Автори статті роблять висновок, що попри недостатнє фінансування пунктів лікнепу, недосконалу систему забезпечення навчальною літературою, шкільним приладдям, канцтоварами робота цих закладів мала позитивний результат, який виявився у збільшенні кількості письменного населення в Сумській області, яке навчилося читати і писати українською мовою, що мало, в свою чергу, велике значення для пробудження національної самосвідомості українського населення.<br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The article deals with the insufficiently studied problem of financing illiteracy issues during the implementation of the illiteracy elimination policy in Sumy region in the 1920s. The authors describe the state of material maintenance of illiteracy elimination centers at a certain period, analyze the main sources of funding, and define the level of the real material maintenance of illiteracy elimination points. It has been found out that a low level of funding often leads to poor teaching quality. The issue of providing textbooks and teaching aids in both Ukrainian and the languages of other nationalities is considered, including some statistics on the centralized inflow of educational literature, a brief description of the most popular textbooks used by teachers of educational centers during the process of eliminating illiteracy in Sumy region. <br><br>The article cites quotations from the documents of the State Archive of the Sumy region, which directly reveal the real state of financing and mater","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"35 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121946064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide a bargaining foundation for the concept of ratio equilibrium in public good economies. We define a bargaining game of alternating offers in which players bargain to determine their cost shares of public good production and a level of public good. We study the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay of the bargaining game. We demonstrate that when the players are perfectly patient, they are indifferent between the equilibrium offers of all players. We also show that every stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay in which the ratios offered by all players are the same leads to a ratio equilibrium. In addition, we demonstrate that all equilibrium ratios are offered by the players at some stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay. We use these results to discuss the case when the assumption of perfectly patient players is relaxed and the cost of delay vanishes.
{"title":"Bargaining Foundation for Ratio Equilibrium in Public Good Economies","authors":"A. van den Nouweland, A. Rusinowska","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3122863","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3122863","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a bargaining foundation for the concept of ratio equilibrium in public good economies. We define a bargaining game of alternating offers in which players bargain to determine their cost shares of public good production and a level of public good. We study the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay of the bargaining game. We demonstrate that when the players are perfectly patient, they are indifferent between the equilibrium offers of all players. We also show that every stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay in which the ratios offered by all players are the same leads to a ratio equilibrium. In addition, we demonstrate that all equilibrium ratios are offered by the players at some stationary subgame perfect equilibrium without delay. We use these results to discuss the case when the assumption of perfectly patient players is relaxed and the cost of delay vanishes.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121851558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper reviews recent literature on the impacts of various components of power sector reform on the performance of electric utilities in developing countries. Recent literature is heavily focused on statistical testing of the significance of the links between four components of sector reform (unbundling, private sector participation, regulation, and competition) and various performance indicators (relating to utility performance, user outcomes, and broader economic development). Some studies exhibit methodological shortcomings in failing to account for interactions between reforms or degrees of reform; however, others appear to be robust. The strongest result is that the introduction of private sector participation is linked to a significant improvement in labor productivity and distribution losses. Moreover, unbundling reforms in isolation is found to have hardly any significant impact on utility performance. The introduction of an independent regulator or competition is not generally significant across studies. A notable feature of all of the studies is very limited testing of the effects of policy introduction on performance indicators, such as bill collection and the duration and frequency of outages. Poor performance on these indicators of state-owned power companies is well documented and bill collection has been identified as a major hidden cost of unreformed power sectors. The materiality of the impact of private sector participation, on the various performance indictors found to be significant, is calculated for studies that provide sufficient information to do so. The size of the impact of private sector participation on utility performance is substantial in a couple of studies, although much more modest in others.
{"title":"Taking Stock of the Impact of Power Utility Reform in Developing Countries: A Literature Review","authors":"R. Bacon","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8460","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews recent literature on the impacts of various components of power sector reform on the performance of electric utilities in developing countries. Recent literature is heavily focused on statistical testing of the significance of the links between four components of sector reform (unbundling, private sector participation, regulation, and competition) and various performance indicators (relating to utility performance, user outcomes, and broader economic development). Some studies exhibit methodological shortcomings in failing to account for interactions between reforms or degrees of reform; however, others appear to be robust. The strongest result is that the introduction of private sector participation is linked to a significant improvement in labor productivity and distribution losses. Moreover, unbundling reforms in isolation is found to have hardly any significant impact on utility performance. The introduction of an independent regulator or competition is not generally significant across studies. A notable feature of all of the studies is very limited testing of the effects of policy introduction on performance indicators, such as bill collection and the duration and frequency of outages. Poor performance on these indicators of state-owned power companies is well documented and bill collection has been identified as a major hidden cost of unreformed power sectors. The materiality of the impact of private sector participation, on the various performance indictors found to be significant, is calculated for studies that provide sufficient information to do so. The size of the impact of private sector participation on utility performance is substantial in a couple of studies, although much more modest in others.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"153 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133914580","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sanctions are a common method to discourage free-riding in the provision of public goods. However, we can usually only sanction those who are detected performing the bad act of free-riding. There has been considerable research on the type of sanctions imposed, but this research almost always automatically detects everyone's actions and broadcasts them to the group. This is akin to assuming that a group always has a police force or motivated peer reporting to detect and announce the actions of bad actors. However, in many situations bad acts go undetected and unknown to others. We use a lab experiment to compare public good contribution decisions in an environment where we relax the assumption that detection is automated. The common result that sanctions and the likelihood of detection share an inverse relationship continues to be found in our results. However, free-riders are unwilling to pay for detection when sanctioning is conducted at the group level, because a criminal does not want to fund the police who will catch his bad acts. But, when detection is conducted among peers, free-riders are willing to pay to detect other individuals that free-ride.
{"title":"Peers or Police? Detection and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods","authors":"Gregory J. DeAngelo, Laura K. Gee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3185233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3185233","url":null,"abstract":"Sanctions are a common method to discourage free-riding in the provision of public goods. However, we can usually only sanction those who are detected performing the bad act of free-riding. There has been considerable research on the type of sanctions imposed, but this research almost always automatically detects everyone's actions and broadcasts them to the group. This is akin to assuming that a group always has a police force or motivated peer reporting to detect and announce the actions of bad actors. However, in many situations bad acts go undetected and unknown to others. We use a lab experiment to compare public good contribution decisions in an environment where we relax the assumption that detection is automated. The common result that sanctions and the likelihood of detection share an inverse relationship continues to be found in our results. However, free-riders are unwilling to pay for detection when sanctioning is conducted at the group level, because a criminal does not want to fund the police who will catch his bad acts. But, when detection is conducted among peers, free-riders are willing to pay to detect other individuals that free-ride.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128847642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the evolution of educational assistance in Indonesia, following two decades of government decentralization, and its effect on education quality. Using Indonesia Family Life Survey data, we exploit as exogenous rule the variation in the implementation of government decentralization to compute difference-in-difference estimators. Indicative evidence suggests decentralization has facilitated collusion between village authorities and marginalized private schools, with substantial increases in educational assistance and financial resources, especially to religious schools. Despite dominant rent-seeking behaviour and self-interest motives, increased public resource allocation to private schools impacted positively on student achievement. Our results also emphasize the role of social norms in undermining efficient public goods allocation after decentralization.
{"title":"Educational Assistance and Education Quality in Indonesia: The Role of Decentralization","authors":"V. Sari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3235791","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235791","url":null,"abstract":"We examine the evolution of educational assistance in Indonesia, following two decades of government decentralization, and its effect on education quality. Using Indonesia Family Life Survey data, we exploit as exogenous rule the variation in the implementation of government decentralization to compute difference-in-difference estimators. Indicative evidence suggests decentralization has facilitated collusion between village authorities and marginalized private schools, with substantial increases in educational assistance and financial resources, especially to religious schools. Despite dominant rent-seeking behaviour and self-interest motives, increased public resource allocation to private schools impacted positively on student achievement. Our results also emphasize the role of social norms in undermining efficient public goods allocation after decentralization.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127473134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In some instances charities insist on donors giving more than a minimum amount. In other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.
{"title":"Charitable Giving When Donors are Constrained to Give a Minimum Amount","authors":"E. Cartwright, Zarak Mirza","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3108527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3108527","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In some instances charities insist on donors giving more than a minimum amount. In other instances charities frame appeals for funds in a way that suggests there is a minimum donation. So, what are the effects on charitable giving if a minimum donation is required? We first provide a simple theoretical model that shows the effects are ambiguous. We then report the results of two lab experiments that consider very different settings. In the first experiment the only incentive to give is intrinsic motivation. Here we find that a minimum constraint lowers giving. The second experiment involves group interaction with extrinsic incentives to give. Here we find that a minimum constraint increases giving. Our results suggest that the effects of a minimum constraint may depend critically on the mix of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121376596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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