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The Economics of Data Externalities 数据外部性经济学
Pub Date : 2020-12-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3778397
Shota Ichihashi
I study a model of a firm that buys data from consumers. There are data externalities, whereby data of some consumers reveal information about others. I characterize data externalities that maximize or minimize consumer surplus and the firm’s profit. I use the results to solve an information design problem in which the firm chooses what information to collect from consumers, taking into account the impact of data externalities on the cost of buying data. The firm collects no less information than the efficient amount. In some cases, we can solve the firm’s problem using a two-step concavification method.
我研究了一个从消费者那里购买数据的公司模型。存在数据外部性,即一些消费者的数据揭示了其他消费者的信息。我描述了最大化或最小化消费者剩余和企业利润的数据外部性。我用这些结果来解决一个信息设计问题,在这个问题中,公司选择从消费者那里收集什么信息,同时考虑到数据外部性对购买数据成本的影响。公司收集的信息不少于有效的数量。在某些情况下,我们可以使用两步简化法来解决公司的问题。
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引用次数: 42
The Demand-Driven Information Market 需求驱动的信息市场
Pub Date : 2020-12-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3920444
Shiyang Huang, Dan Li, Bohui Zhang
We hypothesize a demand-driven information market where information production is tailored by investors’ investment constraints. Using a comprehensive data set of news releases and institutional equity holdings during the 2000–2016 period, we show that more negative (positive) news are produced for stocks overweighed (underweighted) by institutions. A natural experiment based on the 2003 mutual funds scandal confirms the negative relation between institutional investment constraints and news sentiment. The effect is more pronounced when the cost of information production is higher, especially when the distance between the information producer and a firm headquarter is larger. The asymmetry in information production causes stock returns to display negative skewness, increasing the probability for overweighed stocks to experience large negative price movement in the future.
我们假设一个需求驱动的信息市场,其中信息生产是由投资者的投资约束来定制的。使用2000-2016年期间的新闻发布和机构股票持有量的综合数据集,我们表明,对于机构增持(减持)的股票,会产生更多的负面(正面)新闻。基于2003年共同基金丑闻的自然实验证实了机构投资约束与新闻情绪之间的负相关关系。当信息生产成本较高时,特别是当信息生产者与企业总部的距离较大时,这种效应更为明显。信息生产的不对称导致股票收益呈现负偏态,增加了权重过重的股票在未来经历大幅负价格变动的可能性。
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引用次数: 0
Delegated Screening and Robustness 委托筛选和稳健性
Pub Date : 2020-11-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3740206
Suraj Malladi
A policymaker relies on regulators or bureaucrats to screen agents on her behalf. How can she maintain some control over the design of the screening process? She solves a two-layer mechanism design problem: she restricts the set of allowable allocations, after which a screener picks a menu that maps an agent's costly evidence to this restricted set. In general, the policymaker can set a floor in a way that dominates full delegation no matter how the screener's objectives are misaligned. When this misalignment is only over the relative importance of reducing allocation errors or agent's screening costs, the effectiveness of this restriction hinges sharply on the direction of the screener's bias. If the screener is more concerned with reducing errors, setting this floor is in fact robustly optimal for the policymaker. But if the screener is more concerned with keeping costs down, not only does this particular floor have no effect: any restriction that strictly improves over full delegation is complex and sensitive to the details of the screener's preferences. I consider the implications for regulatory governance.
政策制定者依靠监管机构或官僚来代表她筛选代理人。她如何对筛选过程的设计保持一定的控制?她解决了一个两层机制设计问题:她限制了允许分配的集合,之后筛选器选择一个菜单,将代理的昂贵证据映射到这个受限的集合。一般来说,无论筛选者的目标如何偏离,政策制定者都可以以一种主导全部授权的方式设定最低标准。当这种偏差仅超过减少分配错误或代理人筛选成本的相对重要性时,这种限制的有效性在很大程度上取决于筛选者偏见的方向。如果筛选者更关心的是减少错误,那么设定这个下限实际上对政策制定者来说是最理想的。但如果筛选者更关心的是降低成本,那么这个特定的下限不仅没有效果:任何严格改进于完全授权的限制都是复杂的,而且对筛选者偏好的细节很敏感。我考虑了对监管治理的影响。
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引用次数: 1
3 Years, 2 Papers, 1 Course Off: Optimal Non-Monetary Reward Policies 3年,2篇论文,1门课程:最优非货币奖励政策
Pub Date : 2020-11-24 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3647569
Wei Chen, Shivam Gupta, Milind Dawande, G. Janakiraman
We consider a principal who periodically offers a fixed, binary, and costly non-monetary reward to agents endowed with private information, to incentivize the agents to invest effort over the long run. An agent's output, as a function of his effort, is a priori uncertain and is worth a fixed per-unit value to the principal. The principal's goal is to design an attractive reward policy that specifies how the rewards are to be given to an agent over time, based on that agent's past performance. This problem, which we denote by P, is motivated by practical examples from both academia (a reduced teaching load for achieving a certain research-productivity threshold) and industry ("Supplier of the Year" awards in recognition of excellent past performance). The following "limited-term'' reward policy structure has been quite popular in practice: The principal evaluates each agent periodically; if an agent's performance over a certain (limited) number of periods in the immediate past exceeds a pre-defined threshold, then the principal rewards him for a certain (limited) number of periods in the immediate future. For the deterministic special case of problem P, where there is no uncertainty in any agent's output given his effort, we show that there always exists an optimal policy that is a limited-term policy and also obtain such a policy. When agents' outputs are stochastic, we show that the class of limited-term policies may not contain any optimal policy of problem P but is guaranteed to contain policies that are arbitrarily near-optimal: Given any epsilon>0, we show how to obtain a limited-term policy whose performance is within epsilon of that of an optimal policy. This guarantee depends crucially on the use of sufficiently long histories of the agents' outputs for the determination of the rewards. In situations where access to this historical information is limited, we derive structural insights on the role played by (i) the length of the available history and (ii) the variability in the random variable governing an agent's output, on the performance of this class of policies. Finally, we introduce and analyze the class of "score-based'' reward policies - we show that this class is guaranteed to contain an optimal policy and also obtain such a policy.
我们考虑一个委托人,他定期向拥有私人信息的代理人提供固定的、二元的、昂贵的非货币性奖励,以激励代理人在长期内投入努力。作为其努力的函数,代理的输出是先验的不确定的,并且对委托人的单位价值是固定的。委托人的目标是设计一个有吸引力的奖励政策,根据代理人过去的表现,指定随着时间的推移如何给予奖励。这个问题,我们用P表示,是由来自学术界(减少教学负担以达到一定的研究生产力门槛)和工业界(“年度供应商”奖,以表彰过去的出色表现)的实际例子所激发的。实践中普遍采用的“有限期限”奖励政策结构是:委托人定期对代理人进行评估;如果代理人在过去一定(有限)时间内的表现超过了预先定义的阈值,那么委托人就会在不久的将来一定(有限)时间内奖励他。对于问题P的确定性特例,在给定智能体努力的情况下,任何智能体的输出都不存在不确定性,我们证明了总是存在一个最优策略,该策略是有限期限策略,并且也得到了这样一个策略。当智能体的输出是随机的时,我们证明了有限期策略类可能不包含问题P的任何最优策略,但保证包含任意接近最优的策略:给定任意epsilon>0,我们展示了如何获得性能在最优策略的epsilon内的有限期策略。这种保证关键依赖于使用足够长的代理输出历史来确定奖励。在对历史信息的访问受到限制的情况下,我们对(i)可用历史的长度和(ii)控制代理输出的随机变量的可变性对这类策略的性能所起的作用得出了结构性的见解。最后,我们引入并分析了一类“基于分数”的奖励策略,我们证明了该类保证包含一个最优策略,并且也获得了这样一个最优策略。
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引用次数: 0
Dissecting Bankruptcy Frictions 剖析破产摩擦
Pub Date : 2020-11-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3383837
W. Dou, Lucian A. Taylor, Wei Wang, Wenyu Wang
How efficient is corporate bankruptcy in the U.S.? Two frictions, asymmetric information and conflicts of interest among creditors, can cause several inefficiencies: excess liquidation, excess continuation, and excess delay. We find that the bankruptcy process is quite inefficient, mainly due to excess delay. Eliminating information asymmetries would increase average total payouts by 4%, and eliminating conflicts of interest would increase them by 18% more. Without these frictions, 14% more cases would be resolved pre-court, and the remaining court cases would be 73% shorter. With less delay, bankruptcy’s indirect costs would be much lower. In contrast, inefficiencies from excess liquidation and excess continuation are quite small.
美国的企业破产效率如何?两种摩擦,即信息不对称和债权人之间的利益冲突,可能导致几种低效率:过度清算、过度延续和过度延迟。我们发现破产程序效率低下,主要是由于过度拖延。消除信息不对称将使平均总支出增加4%,消除利益冲突将使其增加18%以上。如果没有这些摩擦,14%的案件将在法庭前得到解决,剩余的法庭案件将缩短73%。如果延迟减少,破产的间接成本将大大降低。相比之下,过度清算和过度延续造成的低效率相当小。
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引用次数: 33
The Effect of Market Sentiment and Information Asymmetry on Option Pricing 市场情绪和信息不对称对期权定价的影响
Pub Date : 2020-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3725455
Imen Zghal, Salah Ben Hamad, H. Eleuch, Haitham Nobanee
Abstract This work addresses the impact of imperfections, such as information asymmetry and market sentiment, on the performance of option pricing models. More precisely, this work compares the option pricing model of Black and Scholes and the same model in the presence of imperfections. This study is based on S&P 500 options that cover the period between 17/03/2000 and 14/06/2013. The achieved results show that, in general, in the presence of imperfections, the model is more effective than the Black and Scholes model. This research appears to be promising for the incorporation of imperfections into the assessment of options.
摘要本文研究了信息不对称和市场情绪等不完善因素对期权定价模型性能的影响。更准确地说,这项工作比较了Black和Scholes的期权定价模型和存在缺陷的同一模型。这项研究基于2000年3月17日至2013年6月14日期间的标准普尔500期权。所取得的结果表明,一般来说,在存在缺陷的情况下,该模型比Black和Scholes模型更有效。这项研究似乎很有希望将不完美纳入选择评估中。
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引用次数: 8
Contracting, Pricing, and Data Collection Under the AI Flywheel Effect 人工智能飞轮效应下的合同、定价和数据收集
Pub Date : 2020-10-19 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3566894
Huseyin Gurkan, F. Véricourt
This paper explores how firms that lack expertise in machine learning (ML) can leverage the so-called AI Flywheel effect. This effect designates a virtuous cycle by which as an ML product is adopted and new user data are fed back to the algorithm, the product improves, enabling further adoptions. However, managing this feedback loop is difficult, especially when the algorithm is contracted out. Indeed, the additional data that the AI Flywheel effect generates may change the provider’s incentives to improve the algorithm over time. We formalize this problem in a simple two-period moral hazard framework that captures the main dynamics among ML, data acquisition, pricing, and contracting. We find that the firm’s decisions crucially depend on how the amount of data on which the machine is trained interacts with the provider’s effort. If this effort has a more (less) significant impact on accuracy for larger volumes of data, the firm underprices (overprices) the product. Interestingly, these distortions sometimes improve social welfare, which accounts for the customer surplus and profits of both the firm and provider. Further, the interaction between incentive issues and the positive externalities of the AI Flywheel effect has important implications for the firm’s data collection strategy. In particular, the firm can boost its profit by increasing the product’s capacity to acquire usage data only up to a certain level. If the product collects too much data per user, the firm’s profit may actually decrease (i.e., more data are not necessarily better). This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.
本文探讨了缺乏机器学习(ML)专业知识的公司如何利用所谓的人工智能飞轮效应。这种效果标志着一个良性循环,通过这个良性循环,随着机器学习产品被采用,新的用户数据被反馈到算法中,产品得到改进,从而使进一步的采用成为可能。然而,管理这个反馈循环是困难的,特别是当算法被外包时。事实上,随着时间的推移,人工智能飞轮效应产生的额外数据可能会改变供应商改进算法的动机。我们将这个问题形式化为一个简单的两期道德风险框架,该框架捕捉了机器学习、数据获取、定价和合同之间的主要动态。我们发现,公司的决策在很大程度上取决于训练机器的数据量如何与提供者的努力相互作用。如果这种努力对更大数据量的准确性有更大(更小)的影响,公司就会低估(高估)产品的价格。有趣的是,这些扭曲有时会改善社会福利,这解释了客户剩余和企业和供应商的利润。此外,激励问题与人工智能飞轮效应的正外部性之间的相互作用对公司的数据收集策略具有重要意义。特别是,公司可以通过增加产品获取一定程度使用数据的能力来提高利润。如果产品在每个用户身上收集了太多的数据,公司的利润实际上可能会减少(也就是说,数据越多不一定越好)。这篇论文被运营管理的Jayashankar Swaminathan接受。
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引用次数: 6
A Structural Analysis of Simple Contracts 简单契约的结构分析
Pub Date : 2020-10-02 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3697409
Yonghong An, Shengjie Hong, Daiqiang Zhang
This paper provides an econometric framework for analyzing simple contracts where an agent chooses between a fixed-price option and a cost-reimbursement option provided by a principal in each contracting period during possibly multiple periods. First, we propose a consistent procedure for testing the null hypothesis of a corresponding cost function being linear, which is widely assumed for tractability in the literature. Motivated by the rejection of such a null based on our empirical data, next we establish nonparametric identification, without restricting the cost function to be linear, for all model primitives conditioned on the agent exerting nonzero effort. These primitives include agent's cost and disutility functions, distribution of agent efficiency type, and parameters that characterize agent's bargaining power and intertemporal preference. Moreover we propose a consistent procedure to implement the identification results for estimation. In our empirical study, we find strong evidence against linearity of the cost function. The importance of this empirical finding is further evidenced by a welfare analysis, which shows the welfare assessment to be sensitive to the specification of cost function.
本文提供了一个计量经济学框架来分析简单的合同,其中代理人在每个合同期间(可能是多个期间)在委托人提供的固定价格选项和成本补偿选项之间进行选择。首先,我们提出了一个一致的过程来检验相应的成本函数是线性的零假设,这在文献中被广泛认为是可追溯的。基于我们的经验数据拒绝这样一个零的动机,接下来我们建立非参数识别,而不限制成本函数为线性,对于所有模型原语,条件是代理施加非零努力。这些原语包括代理的成本和负效用函数、代理效率类型的分布以及表征代理议价能力和跨期偏好的参数。此外,我们提出了一个一致的程序来实现估计的识别结果。在我们的实证研究中,我们发现了反对线性成本函数的有力证据。福利分析进一步证明了这一实证发现的重要性,福利评估对成本函数的规范很敏感。
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引用次数: 0
Asymmetric Information and Corporate Lending: Evidence from SME Bond Markets 信息不对称与企业贷款:来自中小企业债券市场的证据
Pub Date : 2020-09-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3710104
Stefano Nobili, Antonio Scalia, Luana Zaccaria, Alessandra Iannamorelli
Using a comprehensive dataset of Italian SMEs, we find that differences between private and public information on firm creditworthiness affect the decision to issue bonds. Our evidence supports favorable (rather than adverse) selection in corporate bond markets. Specifically, holding public information constant, firms with better private fundamentals are more likely to access bond markets. These effects are weaker for opaque firms and stronger for firms with worse publicly observable risk. Additionally, credit conditions improve for issuers following the bond placement, compared with a matched sample of non-issuers. This is consistent with a model where banks offer more flexibility than markets during financial distress and firms use market lending to signal credit quality to outside stakeholders.
利用意大利中小企业的综合数据集,我们发现公司信誉的私人和公共信息之间的差异影响了发行债券的决定。我们的证据支持公司债券市场的有利(而非不利)选择。具体来说,如果公开信息不变,私人基本面较好的公司更有可能进入债券市场。这些影响对不透明的公司较弱,对公众可观察到的风险较差的公司较强。此外,与非发行人的匹配样本相比,债券配售后发行人的信贷状况有所改善。这与一种模式是一致的,即银行在金融困境中提供比市场更大的灵活性,企业利用市场贷款向外部利益相关者表明信贷质量。
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引用次数: 16
Self-Deception: Adopting False Beliefs for a Favorable Self-View 自我欺骗:采用错误的信念来获得有利的自我看法
Pub Date : 2020-09-27 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3673992
Zeeshan Samad
This paper demonstrates how people deceive themselves into thinking of themselves as altruistic. I present a lab experiment in which subjects need to decide whether to behave altruistically or selfishly in an ambiguous environment. Due to the nature of ambiguity in this environment, those who are pessimistic have a legitimate reason to behave selfishly, even if they are inherently altruistic. For people who are inherently selfish but like to think of themselves as altruistic, this environment can serve as a scapegoat for selfish behavior. That is, by falsely claiming to be pessimistic, individuals can behave selfishly without damaging their self-image of being altruistic. Through two seemingly unrelated experimental tasks, I elicit subjects’ adopted beliefs and true beliefs about the same probability. I find that selfish subjects adopt beliefs that are systematically more pessimistic beliefs than their true beliefs, whereas altruistic subjects adopt beliefs that are in alignment with their true beliefs. The most plausible explanation for why only selfish subjects manipulate their beliefs is that selfish behavior damages their self-image and belief manipulation helps them mitigate that damage; altruistic subjects, by contrast, have no such need for belief manipulation because their behavior does not damage their self-image.
这篇论文展示了人们如何欺骗自己,使自己认为自己是无私的。我提出了一个实验室实验,在这个实验中,受试者需要决定在一个模糊的环境中是利他还是自私。由于这种环境的模糊性,那些悲观的人有正当的理由表现得自私,即使他们天生是利他的。对于那些天生自私但喜欢认为自己是利他的人来说,这种环境可以成为自私行为的替罪羊。也就是说,通过谎称自己悲观,个人可以表现得自私,而不会损害他们利他的自我形象。通过两个看似无关的实验任务,我引出了受试者对同一概率的接受信念和真实信念。我发现自私的实验对象所接受的信念比他们的真实信念更悲观,而利他的实验对象所接受的信念则与他们的真实信念一致。对于为什么只有自私的实验对象操纵他们的信念,最合理的解释是,自私的行为损害了他们的自我形象,而信念操纵帮助他们减轻了这种损害;相比之下,利他主义的受试者不需要操纵信念,因为他们的行为不会损害他们的自我形象。
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引用次数: 0
期刊
Microeconomics: Asymmetric & Private Information eJournal
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