Pub Date : 2022-06-07DOI: 10.1177/14651165221104907
Thomas Winzen
Does differentiated integration undermine the motivation of parliamentarians from less integrated member states to become involved in European Union affairs? Focusing on the European Union's new interparliamentary conferences in economic governance, and justice and home affairs, this study examines whether voluntary and involuntary as well as comprehensive and partial differentiation influence parliamentary involvement, measured as participation in interparliamentary conferences. Based on new data and Coarsened Exact Matching, the results indicate that the effect of differentiation depends on its political origins and design. Only voluntary and comprehensive differentiation depress parliamentary involvement. The results can be seen as favourable regarding the legitimacy of differentiation and compatible with the European Union's ambition to limit the institutional implications of differentiation. They also indicate a targeted parliamentary response to differentiated integration.
{"title":"Does differentiated integration weaken parliamentary involvement? Evidence from the European Union's interparliamentary conferences","authors":"Thomas Winzen","doi":"10.1177/14651165221104907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221104907","url":null,"abstract":"Does differentiated integration undermine the motivation of parliamentarians from less integrated member states to become involved in European Union affairs? Focusing on the European Union's new interparliamentary conferences in economic governance, and justice and home affairs, this study examines whether voluntary and involuntary as well as comprehensive and partial differentiation influence parliamentary involvement, measured as participation in interparliamentary conferences. Based on new data and Coarsened Exact Matching, the results indicate that the effect of differentiation depends on its political origins and design. Only voluntary and comprehensive differentiation depress parliamentary involvement. The results can be seen as favourable regarding the legitimacy of differentiation and compatible with the European Union's ambition to limit the institutional implications of differentiation. They also indicate a targeted parliamentary response to differentiated integration.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"24 1","pages":"42 - 62"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43979626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-26DOI: 10.1177/14651165221102696
J. Cova
As part of the European Semester, the European Commission issues country-specific recommendations for all member states. I contribute to the literature on this political instrument, by considering the determinants of recommendations calling for greater wage moderation and enhanced cost competitiveness. For the most part, research on European economic governance has either understood the European Commission as a politicized and ‘ideological’ institution or as a de-politicized, technocratic actor. My analysis shows that the European Commission's ideological preferences on labour markets and wage bargaining institutions are more convincing predictors than explanations based on economic indicators. By testing a series of multilevel models, I find that irrespective of developments in competitiveness, countries with stronger social actors are more likely to be recipients of country-specific recommendations calling for wage restraint.
{"title":"Reconsidering the drivers of country-specific recommendations: The Commission's ideological preferences on wage policies","authors":"J. Cova","doi":"10.1177/14651165221102696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221102696","url":null,"abstract":"As part of the European Semester, the European Commission issues country-specific recommendations for all member states. I contribute to the literature on this political instrument, by considering the determinants of recommendations calling for greater wage moderation and enhanced cost competitiveness. For the most part, research on European economic governance has either understood the European Commission as a politicized and ‘ideological’ institution or as a de-politicized, technocratic actor. My analysis shows that the European Commission's ideological preferences on labour markets and wage bargaining institutions are more convincing predictors than explanations based on economic indicators. By testing a series of multilevel models, I find that irrespective of developments in competitiveness, countries with stronger social actors are more likely to be recipients of country-specific recommendations calling for wage restraint.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"639 - 661"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47851346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-24DOI: 10.1177/14651165221101505
Elske van den Hoogen, Stijn Daenekindt, W. de Koster, J. van der Waal
While ample research has scrutinised the causes and consequences of support for the European Union, a pressing question remains: what do people actually mean when they express support for, or opposition to, their country’s membership of the institution? We use Correlational Class Analysis to assess this. Our analysis of high-quality representative Dutch survey data (n = 2053), including novel items informed by in-depth qualitative research, reveals that European Union support comes in three guises: federalist, non-federalist and instrumental-pragmatist Strikingly, many Europhiles are not federalists. In addition, we reveal that the social bases of the three types of support especially differ regarding political competence, political orientation, and media consumption. The implications for ongoing debates on European Union atttidues are discussed.
{"title":"Support for European Union membership comes in various guises: Evidence from a Correlational Class Analysis of novel Dutch survey data","authors":"Elske van den Hoogen, Stijn Daenekindt, W. de Koster, J. van der Waal","doi":"10.1177/14651165221101505","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221101505","url":null,"abstract":"While ample research has scrutinised the causes and consequences of support for the European Union, a pressing question remains: what do people actually mean when they express support for, or opposition to, their country’s membership of the institution? We use Correlational Class Analysis to assess this. Our analysis of high-quality representative Dutch survey data (n = 2053), including novel items informed by in-depth qualitative research, reveals that European Union support comes in three guises: federalist, non-federalist and instrumental-pragmatist Strikingly, many Europhiles are not federalists. In addition, we reveal that the social bases of the three types of support especially differ regarding political competence, political orientation, and media consumption. The implications for ongoing debates on European Union atttidues are discussed.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"489 - 508"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46917489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-16DOI: 10.1177/14651165221098487
Markus Gastinger, Eugénia C. Heldt
One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.
{"title":"Measuring actual discretion of the European Commission: Using the discretion index to guide empirical research","authors":"Markus Gastinger, Eugénia C. Heldt","doi":"10.1177/14651165221098487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221098487","url":null,"abstract":"One key question in the study of the European Union has always been the extent of Commission discretion. We take the discretion index, typically used by principal–agent scholars to measure the Commission's designed discretion, to measure its actual discretion. Commission designed discretion can today be computationally generated with sufficient accuracy across all secondary acts. The study of designed discretion thus reaches considerable maturity. Therefore, we argue that scholars should prioritize studying Commission actual discretion. We present a systematic and transparent investigative technique based on the discretion index, which we use as a roadmap to guide our empirical investigation. The index facilitates the accumulation of knowledge across policy areas and time by providing exact values for Commission discretion. We illustrate our approach with the Development Cooperation Instrument.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"541 - 558"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41583479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-13DOI: 10.1177/14651165221098541
Sebastian Blesse, M. Bordignon, P. Boyer, P. Carapella, F. Heinemann, E. Janeba, Anasuya Raj
Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and Euro Area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the right is most opposed to a more developed European fiscal union, while a non-populist politician on the political left in France or Italy is most integrationist. Furthermore, the relative position of French and Italian policymakers is issue dependent and the left dimension outweighs the German dimension in two out of seven reform issues. Finally, populism intensifies the polarizing impact of national interests.
{"title":"European fiscal reform preferences of parliamentarians in France, Germany and Italy","authors":"Sebastian Blesse, M. Bordignon, P. Boyer, P. Carapella, F. Heinemann, E. Janeba, Anasuya Raj","doi":"10.1177/14651165221098541","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221098541","url":null,"abstract":"Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and Euro Area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the right is most opposed to a more developed European fiscal union, while a non-populist politician on the political left in France or Italy is most integrationist. Furthermore, the relative position of French and Italian policymakers is issue dependent and the left dimension outweighs the German dimension in two out of seven reform issues. Finally, populism intensifies the polarizing impact of national interests.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"529 - 540"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47708262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-24DOI: 10.1177/14651165221087635
Sivaram Cheruvu
Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.
{"title":"When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance?","authors":"Sivaram Cheruvu","doi":"10.1177/14651165221087635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221087635","url":null,"abstract":"Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"375 - 397"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44939320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-24DOI: 10.1177/14651165221090743
Moritz Müller, Caelesta Braun, B. Fraussen
The bureaucratic reputation literature stipulates that bureaucracies strategically aim to maximize reputational benefits and minimize reputational damages through targeted communication strategies. Departing from this assumption and using an extensive dataset on the media coverage of 54 legislative acts, we examine the conditions under which commissioners appear in the news and which communication strategies they pursue. Our analyses show that commissioners are more likely to appear in news coverage in the context of technically complex issues. We find that if a regulation is less politically conflictual, they are more likely to promote the commission's policy preferences, whereas they adopt a more passive style of communication in the face of political conflict. The findings further our understanding of regulatory policymaking by explaining bureaucratic behaviour through a communicational lens.
{"title":"Cautious communicators: Strategic communication of European Union commissioners in regulatory decision-making","authors":"Moritz Müller, Caelesta Braun, B. Fraussen","doi":"10.1177/14651165221090743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221090743","url":null,"abstract":"The bureaucratic reputation literature stipulates that bureaucracies strategically aim to maximize reputational benefits and minimize reputational damages through targeted communication strategies. Departing from this assumption and using an extensive dataset on the media coverage of 54 legislative acts, we examine the conditions under which commissioners appear in the news and which communication strategies they pursue. Our analyses show that commissioners are more likely to appear in news coverage in the context of technically complex issues. We find that if a regulation is less politically conflictual, they are more likely to promote the commission's policy preferences, whereas they adopt a more passive style of communication in the face of political conflict. The findings further our understanding of regulatory policymaking by explaining bureaucratic behaviour through a communicational lens.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"509 - 528"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48127146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-18DOI: 10.1177/14651165221090740
Tal Sadeh, Yoav Raskin, Eyal Rubinson
This study is motivated by the puzzle of diminishing gains in the European Union budget bargaining for governments with a Eurosceptic domestic audience, even as Euroscepticism is increasingly represented in national legislatures. Engaging literature on fiscal federalism in the European Union and the institutionalist politics of its budgetary process, we argue that European integration diminishes the ability of member states’ governments to leverage Euroscepticism to extract concessions from the European Union budget. This is because Euroscepticism is becoming less exceptional, and greater differentiation in integration reduces the will to reward those seen as systematically less committed to integration. Running panel-corrected standard errors regressions on Operating Budgetary Balances since 1977, we find that in intergovernmental bargaining, domestic popular Euroscepticism is an advantage, but parliamentary Euroscepticism is not.
{"title":"Big politics, small money: Euroscepticism's diminishing return in EU budget allocations","authors":"Tal Sadeh, Yoav Raskin, Eyal Rubinson","doi":"10.1177/14651165221090740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221090740","url":null,"abstract":"This study is motivated by the puzzle of diminishing gains in the European Union budget bargaining for governments with a Eurosceptic domestic audience, even as Euroscepticism is increasingly represented in national legislatures. Engaging literature on fiscal federalism in the European Union and the institutionalist politics of its budgetary process, we argue that European integration diminishes the ability of member states’ governments to leverage Euroscepticism to extract concessions from the European Union budget. This is because Euroscepticism is becoming less exceptional, and greater differentiation in integration reduces the will to reward those seen as systematically less committed to integration. Running panel-corrected standard errors regressions on Operating Budgetary Balances since 1977, we find that in intergovernmental bargaining, domestic popular Euroscepticism is an advantage, but parliamentary Euroscepticism is not.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"437 - 461"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42247117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-11DOI: 10.1177/14651165221094281
Jan P. Vogler
{"title":"SAGE Award for the best article published in European Union Politics, Volume 22","authors":"Jan P. Vogler","doi":"10.1177/14651165221094281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221094281","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"559 - 559"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45998415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-29DOI: 10.1177/14651165221076444
Gabriela Borz, H. Brandenburg, Carlos Mendez
This article investigates the role of European Union Cohesion Policy in the development of European identity, drawing on an original and representative survey in 17 regions across 12 member states. We advance a theoretical model which distinguishes cognitive, instrumental and communicative drivers of identity formation. Contrary to existing scholarship, we find that EU Cohesion Policy does contribute to European identity. Citizens that perceive benefits for themselves and for their region's development from EU Cohesion Policy are more likely to develop a European identity. We also find that awareness of the EU Cohesion Fund and exposure to publicity on EU funded projects is positively correlated with European identity. However, while Cohesion Policy contributes to citizens’ self-categorization as European, it does not associate with their emotional attachment to Europe. The study has important implications for understanding European identity formation and communicating the benefits and role of the EU in regional policy.
{"title":"The impact of EU Cohesion Policy on European identity: A comparative analysis of EU regions","authors":"Gabriela Borz, H. Brandenburg, Carlos Mendez","doi":"10.1177/14651165221076444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221076444","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates the role of European Union Cohesion Policy in the development of European identity, drawing on an original and representative survey in 17 regions across 12 member states. We advance a theoretical model which distinguishes cognitive, instrumental and communicative drivers of identity formation. Contrary to existing scholarship, we find that EU Cohesion Policy does contribute to European identity. Citizens that perceive benefits for themselves and for their region's development from EU Cohesion Policy are more likely to develop a European identity. We also find that awareness of the EU Cohesion Fund and exposure to publicity on EU funded projects is positively correlated with European identity. However, while Cohesion Policy contributes to citizens’ self-categorization as European, it does not associate with their emotional attachment to Europe. The study has important implications for understanding European identity formation and communicating the benefits and role of the EU in regional policy.","PeriodicalId":12077,"journal":{"name":"European Union Politics","volume":"23 1","pages":"259 - 281"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48074268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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