Eurosurveillance最新文献

We report four confirmed autochthonously transmitted gonorrhoea cases in Germany in 2025, with Neisseria gonorrhoeae isolates exhibiting high-level azithromycin and cefixime resistance. Regarding ceftriaxone, isolates were susceptible for two cases and resistant for two, rendering the later extensively drug-resistant (XDR-NG). Cases, all heterosexual males, were in their late teens to mid-60s. Three isolates were MLST ST18091, with the mosaic penA-60.001 allele and the 23S rRNA A2045G mutation and were related to an XDR-NG detected in the United Kingdom in 2024.

Oropouche fever is a vector-borne disease endemic in Central and South America. Infection with Oropouche virus (OROV) was confirmed in June and July 2024 in 13 patients travelling from Cuba to Spain. These patients presented fever, headache, myalgia and arthralgia, and three patients exhibited a biphasic course, with two developing transient neurological symptoms. Oropouche virus infection was diagnosed using reverse transcription quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) and neutralisation tests. Viral RNA was detected in specimens from serum, urine, plasma and whole blood; from four urine samples up to 24 days post-symptom onset. Phylogenetic analysis of one OROV strain (OROV SP2024) isolated from one patient, demonstrated it clustered closely with reassortant strains circulating in Brazil and imported cases in Italy. These findings underscore the importance of including OROV in the differential diagnosis of febrile illnesses in returning travellers and demonstrate the diagnostic value of analysing multiple sample types. Enhanced clinical awareness and diagnostic capacity are essential to improve detection and surveillance of OROV among international travellers from affected regions.

BACKGROUNDRotavirus is a main gastroenteritis cause in children ≤ 5 years old. In 2017, when few Italian regions had rotavirus vaccination programmes, rotavirus vaccines were included in the National Plan for Preventive Vaccination (PNPV). Although all Italian regions follow the PNPV, they each decide how to implement it, contributing to rotavirus vaccination coverage differences across the country.AIMThe objective was to assess rotavirus vaccination national/regional policies in Italy and, between 2016 and 2023, vaccination coverage trends at national and regional level.METHODSScientific and grey literature was systematically reviewed for reports on Italian national/regional policies or programmes concerning rotavirus vaccination. Their key features and strategies to increase vaccination coverage were recorded. Vaccination coverage data originating from the Ministry of Health, were analysed descriptively, or with linear regression, for national and regional trends.RESULTSAmong 418 policy/programme reports identified, 25 were included. Between 2013 and 2015, Sicilia, Calabria and Puglia had already initiated universal vaccination programmes. The PNPV 2017-19 standardised regions' offer of rotavirus vaccination. Between 2016 and 2023, vaccination coverage in Italy significantly increased (p = 0.0005) from 10.5% to 70.76%, with a 140% rise in 2019-20. Regional coverage disparities existed. Throughout 2016-23, most central Italian regions had annual coverages below national values. Bolzano annual coverage was consistently < 50%, while in Veneto, coverage reached 85.10% in 2021. In 2023, five regions had > 80% coverage.CONCLUSIONSWhile rotavirus vaccination coverage improved in Italy in 2016-23, regional disparities persist. Addressing these requires overcoming logistical and societal challenges, as well as harmonised policies.

BACKGROUNDMandatory reporting of healthcare-associated infections (HCAI) in England is conducted locally by acute hospital groups and can be a large burden on healthcare staff.AIMWe aimed to determine the case ascertainment of a potential centrally-implemented, automated HCAI surveillance system in England using preexisting data feeds at the UK Health Security Agency.METHODSWe compared monthly case numbers submitted between 1 April 2016 and 31 March 2023 by acute hospital groups (locally-implemented surveillance) to routinely-collected laboratory and hospital encounter records (centrally-implemented surveillance) for all infections under mandatory surveillance in England. Since laboratories can serve multiple hospitals, we compared several methods of assigning laboratory-confirmed cases to hospital groups.RESULTSLocally-implemented vs centrally-implemented surveillance identified: meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemias 5,453 vs 5,859 (ratio 1.07), meticillin-susceptible S. aureus bacteraemias 84,680 vs 83,326 (0.98), Escherichia coli bacteraemias 281,100 vs 275,133 (0.98), Klebsiella species bacteraemias 65,877 vs 67,301 (1.02), Pseudomonas aeruginosa bacteraemias 25,862 vs 25,715 (0.99), Clostridioides difficile infections (CDI) 94,054 v 90,942 (0. 97) respectively. Assigning hospital groups by linking laboratory records to hospital encounters produced lower monthly mean absolute difference (MAD) vs locally-implemented surveillance than using laboratory records alone. MAD was 0.65 cases/month for bacteraemias, 2.99 for CDI; differences occurred in both directions. MAD decreased over time for bacteraemias but increased from April 2021 onwards for CDI.CONCLUSIONCentrally-implemented surveillance could be feasible for bacteraemias in England due to comparable case numbers with local surveillance. However, more research is needed around understanding and managing data quality of automated feeds, particularly for CDI.

BACKGROUNDOne Health (OH) is a multisectoral approach that aims to optimise health of people, animals and the environment, recognising their interconnection. Despite gaining political support in recent years, examples of successful OH implementation among governmental institutions across the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) remain limited.AIMTo identify key enablers and barriers to collaboration across human, animal and environmental health sectors, and provide a framework to support national OH operationalisation in the EU/EEA.METHODSSemi-structured interviews were conducted with 26 experts from national public health institutes in 15 EU/EEA countries, recruited through European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control networks. Transcripts were analysed through qualitative content analysis.RESULTSCollaborations between human and animal health sectors were reported, but greater integration of the environmental sector is needed to strengthen OH partnerships. Analysis of opportunities and challenges highlighted key interlinked elements that can facilitate sustainable OH implementation. Strong political leadership emerged as pivotal to drive policy coherence in nexus areas, embed collaborative activities within core funding, and facilitate cross-sectoral partnerships at the technical level.CONCLUSIONThis qualitative study provides an overview of enablers and barriers to OH collaboration at the national level. The findings constitute the basis for an empirically derived framework emphasising the cyclical relationship between political leadership and cross-sectoral technical collaboration. Incremental steps, starting with strengthening existing cross-sectoral relationships, have the potential to generate self-reinforcing progress and enhance emergency preparedness. These empirical insights provide a foundation for developing and evaluating OH policies in EU/EEA countries, complementing existing international guidelines.

Identifying and controlling food-borne disease outbreaks (FBDO) remain important public health objectives. There is plenty of guidance on how to detect potential FBDO, e.g. epidemiologically or microbiologically. Likewise, the conduct of an outbreak investigation has long been codified in steps and adapted for FBDO. However, what is less clear is when to act, mainly when to implement appropriate control measures. This is particularly challenging when the causative agent has not yet been detected in the suspected food vehicle(s). The decision on when to act is complex and depends, besides the available evidence, also on other factors, such as the dynamic of the outbreak or the disease severity. No guidance exists for this decision. Notably, an FBDO investigation provides circumstantial evidence on the culprit, and its careful assessment entails an inherently subjective element. There is a need across sectors and countries in Europe for harmonising the view on what constitutes sufficient evidence for furthering investigations and timely taking action, depending on the outbreak situation. A common understanding and possibly a harmonised legislation are the basis for streamlining discussions and decisions during FBDO, thereby preventing the delay of implementing necessary control measures.

Finland experienced three invasive pneumococcal disease (IPD) outbreaks among shipyard workers at the same shipyard, in 2019, 2023 and 2025. During the latest outbreak (30 April-6 June 2025), 13 cases were reported, with six confirmed. All five isolates from blood culture-positive cases were serotype 4 - sequence type 801. These were nearly indistinguishable from three isolates from the 2019 outbreak, nine Finnish IPD surveillance isolates and isolates of a 2019 Norwegian shipyard outbreak. We found an association with welding.

Notifications of Salmonella Strathcona infections increased in Europe in 2023 prompting a multi-country outbreak investigation. We aimed to describe the epidemiology of S. Strathcona infections in 17 European countries 2011-2024, investigate the genetic relatedness of S. Strathcona isolates and identify the vehicle. Cases were persons residing in the study area and with a laboratory-confirmed S. Strathcona infection 2011-2024. Confirmed cases had a S. Strathcona isolate clustering with the outbreak reference strain in core genome multilocus sequence typing (cgMLST) within 7 allelic differences (AD) and possible cases within 8-13 AD. Probable cases had an epidemiological link to a confirmed case and non-outbreak cases had an isolate > 13 AD from the outbreak reference strain. Since 2011, 662 S. Strathcona infections have been identified: 469 confirmed, 161 probable, 13 possible and 19 non-outbreak cases. Median age of the cases was 34 years (IQR: 19-58 years) and 306 (47.5%) were notified in 2023-2024. Most sequenced isolates (469/496; 94.5%) were highly genetically related (≤ 7 AD) over time and across countries, compatible with a common source. Epidemiological and traceback investigations identified small tomatoes from Sicily as the suspect food vehicle. Stringent control measures at the source are needed to stop the contamination and prevent future cases.