Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2162203
Farrah Ahmed, B. Nair
ABSTRACT Primary legislation on Indian citizenship – particularly the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 – has recently attracted a great deal of attention. However, secondary legislation, and administrative policies and practices, which form the backbone of citizenship administration in India, have mostly escaped scholarly and public attention. This is concerning since the lawfulness of some of these critical policies and secondary legislation is highly questionable. Against this background, we survey and analyse the main policies and secondary legislation that constitute India’s citizenship administration. We then argue that despite government’s efforts to argue for immunity from judicial review, and some judicial statements characterizing administrative discretion in this area as “absolute and unfettered”, judicial review of citizenship administration is very much available. Finally, we argue that some of the most important policies and rules relating to citizenship administration in India breach public law norms.
{"title":"Administering Indian citizenship","authors":"Farrah Ahmed, B. Nair","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2162203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2162203","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Primary legislation on Indian citizenship – particularly the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 – has recently attracted a great deal of attention. However, secondary legislation, and administrative policies and practices, which form the backbone of citizenship administration in India, have mostly escaped scholarly and public attention. This is concerning since the lawfulness of some of these critical policies and secondary legislation is highly questionable. Against this background, we survey and analyse the main policies and secondary legislation that constitute India’s citizenship administration. We then argue that despite government’s efforts to argue for immunity from judicial review, and some judicial statements characterizing administrative discretion in this area as “absolute and unfettered”, judicial review of citizenship administration is very much available. Finally, we argue that some of the most important policies and rules relating to citizenship administration in India breach public law norms.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81558207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2173834
Manasi Kumar
ABSTRACT The law of impossibility contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is a slight oddity in the common law world as it does not make any mention of the parties’ intention. While Indian courts have subordinated it to the intent of the parties, they have also insisted that it is a “positive law” that is unconcerned with the terms of the contract, which have been relegated, at least superficially, to Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that only imperfectly deals with the vast terrain of impossibility. It is argued that the contradictory stance is, in part, the result of an unwarranted importance being attached to theEnglish debates surrounding the juristic bases of the law of frustration. It is also argued that the jurisprudence would benefit from delinking the terms of the contract, specifically the terms that do not constitute conditions precedent, from Section 32.
{"title":"The “positive law” of impossibility in the Indian Contract Act","authors":"Manasi Kumar","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2173834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2173834","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The law of impossibility contained in Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 is a slight oddity in the common law world as it does not make any mention of the parties’ intention. While Indian courts have subordinated it to the intent of the parties, they have also insisted that it is a “positive law” that is unconcerned with the terms of the contract, which have been relegated, at least superficially, to Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that only imperfectly deals with the vast terrain of impossibility. It is argued that the contradictory stance is, in part, the result of an unwarranted importance being attached to theEnglish debates surrounding the juristic bases of the law of frustration. It is also argued that the jurisprudence would benefit from delinking the terms of the contract, specifically the terms that do not constitute conditions precedent, from Section 32.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74196222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2161241
Senu Nizar, Mayank Pandey
ABSTRACT The authors discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Saurav Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, which relates to reservation for women candidates in public offices under Articles 15(3) and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The question which arose for consideration was whether candidates belonging to Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, or Scheduled Tribes categories could be accommodated to the open category on securing the cut-off marks prescribed for candidates in the open category – which was answered in the affirmative. We first analyse the position of law as it stood prior to the decision. Then, we go on to analyse the judgement in detail, including an intersectional analysis from the perspective of “women” as a class. The authors also critique the judgement for its overemphasis on merit while resolving the dispute in question. Finally, the authors discuss the importance of providing relaxations and concessions to the reserved candidates.
{"title":"Application of horizontal reservation for women in India: the conundrum resolved by the supreme court","authors":"Senu Nizar, Mayank Pandey","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2161241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2161241","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The authors discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Saurav Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, which relates to reservation for women candidates in public offices under Articles 15(3) and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The question which arose for consideration was whether candidates belonging to Other Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes, or Scheduled Tribes categories could be accommodated to the open category on securing the cut-off marks prescribed for candidates in the open category – which was answered in the affirmative. We first analyse the position of law as it stood prior to the decision. Then, we go on to analyse the judgement in detail, including an intersectional analysis from the perspective of “women” as a class. The authors also critique the judgement for its overemphasis on merit while resolving the dispute in question. Finally, the authors discuss the importance of providing relaxations and concessions to the reserved candidates.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77458969","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-29DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2162281
Iain Payne, M. Breen
ABSTRACT Federalism is the centrepiece reform of Nepal’s 2015 post-conflict Constitution. However, the seven new provinces face considerable challenges as they seek to facilitate the redressal of socio-economic inequality and improve sensitivity to regional difference – historic drivers of conflict. Building on the concept of hourglass federalism to engage the discourse on decentralization in conflict-affected contexts, we highlight how Nepal’s constitutionally enshrined, autonomous third tier of local government may be better situated to work towards these ends. We argue that while the hourglass schematic has already delivered on some of the key aims of the new Constitution (like inclusion), several important challenges remain, including the decentralization of the political party system and economies of scale. Unless the initial inclusion dividend and increased responsiveness of government are consolidated, there is a risk that the state will be gradually recentralized (in practice), undermining the gains of the post-conflict constitution-making process.
{"title":"Hourglass federalism in Nepal: the role of local government in post-conflict constitutions","authors":"Iain Payne, M. Breen","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2162281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2162281","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Federalism is the centrepiece reform of Nepal’s 2015 post-conflict Constitution. However, the seven new provinces face considerable challenges as they seek to facilitate the redressal of socio-economic inequality and improve sensitivity to regional difference – historic drivers of conflict. Building on the concept of hourglass federalism to engage the discourse on decentralization in conflict-affected contexts, we highlight how Nepal’s constitutionally enshrined, autonomous third tier of local government may be better situated to work towards these ends. We argue that while the hourglass schematic has already delivered on some of the key aims of the new Constitution (like inclusion), several important challenges remain, including the decentralization of the political party system and economies of scale. Unless the initial inclusion dividend and increased responsiveness of government are consolidated, there is a risk that the state will be gradually recentralized (in practice), undermining the gains of the post-conflict constitution-making process.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75316525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-21DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2160154
Pratik Datta
ABSTRACT Central banks are unique institutions of profound economic significance. Judicial review of central bank actions raises concerns regarding the appropriate zone of judicial deference. Over the last decade, the frequency of judicial review challenges before the Supreme Court of India involving the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) appears to have substantially increased. I attempt to contextualize this trend against the evolving nature of judicial deference towards the RBI. From 1960s to late 1990s, the Court was extremely deferential towards the RBI. With the turn of the century, several exogenous factors compelled the RBI to act beyond its uncontested traditional functions, affecting stakeholders beyond its immediate jurisdiction. This explains the increase in judicial review challenges involving the RBI since 2015. This trend also provides evidence of the eroding judicial deference towards the Central Bank at least on the regulatory (process) aspects, if not as much on the substantive economic policies themselves.
{"title":"Judicial review of central banks: an Indian perspective","authors":"Pratik Datta","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2160154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2160154","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Central banks are unique institutions of profound economic significance. Judicial review of central bank actions raises concerns regarding the appropriate zone of judicial deference. Over the last decade, the frequency of judicial review challenges before the Supreme Court of India involving the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) appears to have substantially increased. I attempt to contextualize this trend against the evolving nature of judicial deference towards the RBI. From 1960s to late 1990s, the Court was extremely deferential towards the RBI. With the turn of the century, several exogenous factors compelled the RBI to act beyond its uncontested traditional functions, affecting stakeholders beyond its immediate jurisdiction. This explains the increase in judicial review challenges involving the RBI since 2015. This trend also provides evidence of the eroding judicial deference towards the Central Bank at least on the regulatory (process) aspects, if not as much on the substantive economic policies themselves.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89592906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-14DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2146276
C. Saunders
ABSTRACT This paper explores the search for constitutional settlement in Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In recent decades in each of these states, constitutional change has been mooted as an at least partial solution to severe and sustained internal armed conflict. However, in each of them, change of a kind that responds effectively to the conflict has been, and continues to be, elusive. Inevitably, the trajectories of both the conflict and the responses to it are distinctive. Nevertheless, these cases have enough in common for collective insights to be drawn from them, which may also have relevance for conflict-affected constitutional initiatives elsewhere.
{"title":"POST-WAR CONSTITUTION-MAKING: insights from South Asia","authors":"C. Saunders","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2146276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2146276","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper explores the search for constitutional settlement in Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In recent decades in each of these states, constitutional change has been mooted as an at least partial solution to severe and sustained internal armed conflict. However, in each of them, change of a kind that responds effectively to the conflict has been, and continues to be, elusive. Inevitably, the trajectories of both the conflict and the responses to it are distinctive. Nevertheless, these cases have enough in common for collective insights to be drawn from them, which may also have relevance for conflict-affected constitutional initiatives elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86946312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-27DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2140909
A. Bhaduri
ABSTRACT As a modification on the general system of cartel leniency, leniency plus allows a cartelist who failed to secure complete immunity under the general leniency programme to obtain further reduction in sanctions in exchange of information regarding the operation of another anticompetitive agreement. Leniency plus originated in the US and has since been transplanted into various jurisdictions with a variety of modifications. Recently, the Indian government proposed the introduction of leniency plus into the Indian competition law framework with a view to to enhancing the efficiency of the Indian cartel leniency programme. This paper argues that the transplantation of leniency plus into the Indian competition regime might not yield the desired benefits, and might be counterproductive. It goes on to propose an increase in individual sanctions and introduction of clear guidelines as more apt remedies to help the Indian leniency regime.
{"title":"Sweeter carrots, same stick: transplanting leniency plus into Indian competition law","authors":"A. Bhaduri","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2140909","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2140909","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As a modification on the general system of cartel leniency, leniency plus allows a cartelist who failed to secure complete immunity under the general leniency programme to obtain further reduction in sanctions in exchange of information regarding the operation of another anticompetitive agreement. Leniency plus originated in the US and has since been transplanted into various jurisdictions with a variety of modifications. Recently, the Indian government proposed the introduction of leniency plus into the Indian competition law framework with a view to to enhancing the efficiency of the Indian cartel leniency programme. This paper argues that the transplantation of leniency plus into the Indian competition regime might not yield the desired benefits, and might be counterproductive. It goes on to propose an increase in individual sanctions and introduction of clear guidelines as more apt remedies to help the Indian leniency regime.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91329746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-26DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2139584
Karan Gulati, Tushar Anand
ABSTRACT This paper studies the inheritance rights of transgender persons in India. It examines the legal framework for inheritance and provides an overview of all court decisions between 1950 and 2021 that mention the term transgender (and its analogous terms, i.e., aravani, kinner, etc.). Though the Indian Constitution bars discrimination based on sex or gender, inheritance laws do not envisage transgender persons or a change in gender identity. They are based on a binary notion of gender. individuals must choose between conforming to their assigned gender or not availing their rights. Moreover, successors are often difficult to identify as individuals may lack documentation, could not marry, or cannot prove adoption. While courts attempt to address these challenges, they leave it to their subjective satisfaction on when to secure the rights of transgender persons. These are important issues that must be addressed through changes in the law.
{"title":"Inheritance rights of transgender persons in India","authors":"Karan Gulati, Tushar Anand","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2139584","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2139584","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper studies the inheritance rights of transgender persons in India. It examines the legal framework for inheritance and provides an overview of all court decisions between 1950 and 2021 that mention the term transgender (and its analogous terms, i.e., aravani, kinner, etc.). Though the Indian Constitution bars discrimination based on sex or gender, inheritance laws do not envisage transgender persons or a change in gender identity. They are based on a binary notion of gender. individuals must choose between conforming to their assigned gender or not availing their rights. Moreover, successors are often difficult to identify as individuals may lack documentation, could not marry, or cannot prove adoption. While courts attempt to address these challenges, they leave it to their subjective satisfaction on when to secure the rights of transgender persons. These are important issues that must be addressed through changes in the law.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83898364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2129198
Sanjit Dias
ABSTRACT The Attorney-General of Sri Lanka makes representations to the Supreme Court in fundamental rights applications. The constitution envisions the Attorney-General acting independently and impartially in this regard, in the character of an “institution protecting democracy” within a “guarantor branch”. However, the Attorney-General typically defends the respondents in all such fundamental rights cases. This is particularly true under article 35 of the constitution, where fundamental rights applications challenging official acts of the President must be instituted against the Attorney-General. This provision has long been interpreted as requiring the Attorney-General to defend these actions. A close examination of the whole constitutional scheme reveals, however, that no such requirement exists, and the Attorney-General has discretion on whether or not to defend any such action instituted against him. Adopting this approach would promote constitutional compliance by the executive branch, and has the potential to transform the landscape of constitutional practice in Sri Lanka.
{"title":"Between a rock and a hard place: the constitutional role of the Attorney-General in Sri Lanka","authors":"Sanjit Dias","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2129198","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2129198","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Attorney-General of Sri Lanka makes representations to the Supreme Court in fundamental rights applications. The constitution envisions the Attorney-General acting independently and impartially in this regard, in the character of an “institution protecting democracy” within a “guarantor branch”. However, the Attorney-General typically defends the respondents in all such fundamental rights cases. This is particularly true under article 35 of the constitution, where fundamental rights applications challenging official acts of the President must be instituted against the Attorney-General. This provision has long been interpreted as requiring the Attorney-General to defend these actions. A close examination of the whole constitutional scheme reveals, however, that no such requirement exists, and the Attorney-General has discretion on whether or not to defend any such action instituted against him. Adopting this approach would promote constitutional compliance by the executive branch, and has the potential to transform the landscape of constitutional practice in Sri Lanka.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90352306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2022.2129197
R. M P
ABSTRACT In determining whether a company is solvent or insolvent, two tests are generally used by the bankruptcy courts across all jurisdictions: the Commercial Cash Flow test and the Balance Sheet test. While enacting the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016, India has moved away from the traditional dual test approach followed by Indian courts under the Indian companies Act to a specific Cash Flow test. This paper discusses the conceptual basis of the two tests as evolved under insolvency laws of the United Kingdom and the United States, with a view to comparatively study the nascent Indian insolvency regime. The paper concludes that irrespective of the statutorily prescribed test, over the years, courts across jurisdictions have taken recourse to both the tests to ascertain the overall commercial viability. In this lies an answer for India’s work in progress – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.
{"title":"The role of insolvency tests: implications for Indian insolvency law","authors":"R. M P","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2022.2129197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2022.2129197","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In determining whether a company is solvent or insolvent, two tests are generally used by the bankruptcy courts across all jurisdictions: the Commercial Cash Flow test and the Balance Sheet test. While enacting the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code in 2016, India has moved away from the traditional dual test approach followed by Indian courts under the Indian companies Act to a specific Cash Flow test. This paper discusses the conceptual basis of the two tests as evolved under insolvency laws of the United Kingdom and the United States, with a view to comparatively study the nascent Indian insolvency regime. The paper concludes that irrespective of the statutorily prescribed test, over the years, courts across jurisdictions have taken recourse to both the tests to ascertain the overall commercial viability. In this lies an answer for India’s work in progress – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89913658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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