Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2266979
Nakul Nayak
ABSTRACTThis article critiques the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 (“the Rules”) as they relate to online journalism. The Government’s stated objective for making the Rules is to “level the playing field” of online journalism with print journalism. I examine whether and how the Government satisfies this objective. I make two broad claims. First, the Rules fail to “level the playing field”. The objectives, philosophical approach, and substance of the new regulatory scheme are significantly different from those that govern print journalism, and to the disadvantage of online journalism. Second, rather than “levelling the playing field”, the Rules give the Government overwhelming control of online journalism. The Government exercises ultimate control over the regulatory structures and gives itself unprecedented censorship powers over online journalism. If my claims are correct, the Rules will have catastrophic consequences for online journalism and Indian democracy.KEYWORDS: Digital Media Ethics CodePress Council of Indiaonline journalismPress Commissiondigital media ethics AcknowledgmentsFor research support, I am grateful to Arunima Das, Kaustubha Kalidindi, and Ananya Narain. Thanks to Sukumar Muralidharan, Siddharth Narrain, Aakanksha Kumar, Shohini Sengupta, Keerti Pendyal, Ashaawari Datta Chaudhuri, Sandeep Suresh, Rajesh Nayak, and Neytra Nayak for valuable discussions. Errors are mine alone. To Sagarika Nayak, for her unwavering support during good and bad.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 A notable exception was the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010. Sections 3(1)(g) and 3(1)(h) prohibit “any association or company engaged in the production or broadcast of … current affairs programmes through any electronic mode” or their “correspondent or columnist, cartoonist, editor, owner” from accepting any “foreign contribution”.2 Akriti Gaur, Aniruddh Nigam and Sreyan Chatterjee, “The future of news in India” Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy 33 (30 April 2020) accessed 6 July 2023.3 The lack of specific regulatory frameworks for DNMs and DNM’s ability to engage in target advertising have resulted in dynamic business models in online journalism. See ibid 18–22.4 Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet approves proposal for Review of FDI policy on various sectors” (28 August 2019) accessed 6 July 2023.5 Soumyarendra Barik, “Watch: Why New FDI Rules For Digital Media Companies Are Regressive For The Internet Space In India” Medianama (New Delhi, 5 September 2019) accessed 6 July 2023.6 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, ‘Soliciting Suggestions/Comments/Inputs from the Stakeholders on the Draft ”Registration of Press and Periodicals Bill
{"title":"Legalizing executive control: on the law of online journalism in India","authors":"Nakul Nayak","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2266979","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2266979","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis article critiques the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules 2021 (“the Rules”) as they relate to online journalism. The Government’s stated objective for making the Rules is to “level the playing field” of online journalism with print journalism. I examine whether and how the Government satisfies this objective. I make two broad claims. First, the Rules fail to “level the playing field”. The objectives, philosophical approach, and substance of the new regulatory scheme are significantly different from those that govern print journalism, and to the disadvantage of online journalism. Second, rather than “levelling the playing field”, the Rules give the Government overwhelming control of online journalism. The Government exercises ultimate control over the regulatory structures and gives itself unprecedented censorship powers over online journalism. If my claims are correct, the Rules will have catastrophic consequences for online journalism and Indian democracy.KEYWORDS: Digital Media Ethics CodePress Council of Indiaonline journalismPress Commissiondigital media ethics AcknowledgmentsFor research support, I am grateful to Arunima Das, Kaustubha Kalidindi, and Ananya Narain. Thanks to Sukumar Muralidharan, Siddharth Narrain, Aakanksha Kumar, Shohini Sengupta, Keerti Pendyal, Ashaawari Datta Chaudhuri, Sandeep Suresh, Rajesh Nayak, and Neytra Nayak for valuable discussions. Errors are mine alone. To Sagarika Nayak, for her unwavering support during good and bad.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 A notable exception was the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010. Sections 3(1)(g) and 3(1)(h) prohibit “any association or company engaged in the production or broadcast of … current affairs programmes through any electronic mode” or their “correspondent or columnist, cartoonist, editor, owner” from accepting any “foreign contribution”.2 Akriti Gaur, Aniruddh Nigam and Sreyan Chatterjee, “The future of news in India” Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy 33 (30 April 2020) <https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/research/the-future-of-news-in-india/> accessed 6 July 2023.3 The lack of specific regulatory frameworks for DNMs and DNM’s ability to engage in target advertising have resulted in dynamic business models in online journalism. See ibid 18–22.4 Press Information Bureau, “Cabinet approves proposal for Review of FDI policy on various sectors” (28 August 2019) <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetail.aspx?PRID=1583294> accessed 6 July 2023.5 Soumyarendra Barik, “Watch: Why New FDI Rules For Digital Media Companies Are Regressive For The Internet Space In India” Medianama (New Delhi, 5 September 2019) <https://www.medianama.com/2019/09/223-fdi-in-digital-media-regressive/> accessed 6 July 2023.6 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, ‘Soliciting Suggestions/Comments/Inputs from the Stakeholders on the Draft ”Registration of Press and Periodicals Bill ","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113605","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-20DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2255478
John Sebastian
ABSTRACTIt has been widely argued that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (“CAA”) breaches Article 14’s equality guarantee due to its under-inclusiveness i.e. it does not include within its ambit many migrants who faced persecution similar to the persons it covers. However, it is often argued that under-inclusive laws are subjected to a low standard of review, which increases the justificatory burden on those who challenge its validity. I argue that there is no support in principle or case law for the argument that under-inclusive laws are subject to lower scrutiny than over-inclusive ones. Linked to this is the question of constitutional remedies for under-inclusive laws, which I analyse drawing on jurisprudence from India and other jurisdictions. Contrary to dominant opinion, I argue that, were the CAA to be declared unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy would be to extend its benefits to those hitherto uncovered by it, rather than striking it down.KEYWORDS: Citizenship Amendment Act 2019CAAunder-inclusive lawsstandard of reviewconstitutional remediesseveranceextension of benefits AcknowledgmentsI thank Tarunabh Khaitan, Faiza Rahman, Apoorva Sharma and Anshuman Singh for their detailed comments on previous versions of this paper. I thank the participants in the session on Constitutional Remedies at the ICON.S 2021 conference, where this paper was presented, and two anonymous reviewers for their careful and detailed feedback. I am grateful to Amber Darr, Nakul Nayak, Arun Thiruvengadam and the editorial team at the Indian Law Review for their patient and thoughtful engagement with the paper. Thanks also to the Melbourne Research Scholarship for supporting my research. Any errors are mine alone.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019, ss 2–4, 6 (CAA).2 Murali Krishnan, “In 10 points, Supreme Court hearing on Citizenship Act petitions explained” Hindustan Times (New Delhi, 30 August 2020) accessed 29 July 2023.3 Constitution of India 1950, art 14 (Constitution).4 Abhinav Chandrachud, “Secularism and the Citizenship Amendment Act” (2020) 4 Indian Law Review 138, 154.5 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2019, statement of objects and reasons. See also Preliminary Counter-Affidavit on Behalf of the Union of India 26, 81, in Indian Union of Muslim League v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No 1470 of 2019 accessed 29 July 2023.6 See Kanika Gauba and Anshuman Singh, “Voter, Citizen, Enemy” (2017) 52(23) Economic and Political Weekly 12; Mohsin Alam Bhat, “The Constitutional Case Against the Citizenship Amendment Bill” (2019) 54(3) Economic and Political Weekly 12, 13; Chandrachud (n 4); Jaideep Singh Lalli, “Communalisation of Citizenship Law:
摘要:人们普遍认为,《2019年公民(修正)法》(“CAA”)违反了第14条的平等保障,因为它的包容性不足,即它没有将许多面临与它所涵盖的人相似迫害的移民纳入其范围。然而,人们常常认为,包容性不足的法律受到的审查标准较低,这增加了质疑其有效性的人的辩护负担。我认为,在原则上或判例法上都没有证据支持包容性不足的法律比包容性过大的法律受到更少的审查。与此相关的是对包容性不足的法律的宪法补救问题,我分析了印度和其他司法管辖区的判例。与主流观点相反,我认为,如果《民航法》被宣布违宪,适当的补救措施将是将其利益扩大到迄今为止未被它覆盖的人,而不是废除它。关键词:《2019年公民身份修正案》(Citizenship Amendment Act 2019)、《包容性法律》、审查标准、宪法救济、福利延长致谢感谢tarunh Khaitan、Faiza Rahman、Apoorva Sharma和Anshuman Singh对本文之前版本的详细评论。我感谢参加宪法救济会议的与会者。在S 2021会议上发表了这篇论文,并感谢两位匿名审稿人的仔细和详细的反馈。我要感谢Amber Darr、Nakul Nayak、Arun Thiruvengadam和《印度法律评论》的编辑团队,感谢他们耐心而周到的参与。同时也感谢墨尔本研究奖学金对我的研究的支持。任何错误都是我的错。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1《2019年公民(修订)法》,第2-4条,第6条(CAA)《印度斯坦时报》(2020年8月30日,新德里)查阅了2023.3年7月29日《1950年印度宪法》第14条(宪法)Abhinav Chandrachud,“世俗主义与公民身份修正案”(2020)4印度法律评论138,154.5《2019年公民身份(修正案)法案》,目的和理由陈述。另见代表印度联邦的初步反宣誓书26,81,在印度穆斯林联盟联盟诉印度联盟中,2019年第1470号书面请愿书(民事)于2023.6年7月29日访问。见Kanika Gauba和Anshuman Singh,“选民,公民,敌人”(2017)52(23)经济和政治周刊12;Mohsin Alam Bhat:《反对公民身份修正案的宪法案例》(2019)54(3)《经济与政治周刊》第12、13期;Chandrachud (n 4);Jaideep Singh Lalli,《公民权法的社群化:从印度宪法的棱镜看2019年《公民权(修正案)法》》(2020)3(1),牛津大学人权中心杂志95,104.7 Chandrachud (n 4).8同上;Lalli (n 6)另见Nivedhitha K,“客座文章:公民身份(修正案)法案违宪”(印度宪法法律与哲学,2019年12月5日),2023.9 Ram Krishan Grover诉印度联邦(2020)12 SCC 506 [41].10tarunh Khaitan,“超越合理性——对第15条侵权行为的严格审查标准”(2008),《中国法学研究》第17卷第1期。Moiz Tundawala,《印度要求严格审查:为什么反对?》(2010) 3《法学评论》465,466;约翰·塞巴斯蒂安,“第15条和公民身份(修正案)法——一种思想实验”(2021年)17《社会法律评论》200,209.12,参见一般Khaitan (n 11);图达瓦拉(11年);阿帕纳·钱德拉,《印度的比例:通往虚无的桥梁?》(2020) 3(2)牛津大学人权中心期刊55.13 Agnidipto Tarafder和Adrija Ghosh,“印度婚内强奸豁免的违宪性”(2020)3(2)牛津大学人权中心期刊202;Saurav Das,《婚姻平等:政府说只有议会才能改变法律:最高法院有5次这样做》(2023年4月28日第14条),可于2023年7月29日查阅尼维德希塔(8).16Bhat (n 6) 13.17 Deb Mukharji的诉状20,在Deb Mukharji v Union of India中,于2023.7月29日访问Lalli (n 6) 110-11.19,然而,它在美国和加拿大的宪法法学中受到了很多关注。参见Evan Caminker,“基于规范的不包容性法规补救模型”(1986)95 Yale Law Journal 1185;Dianne Pothier,《宪章对包容性不足立法的挑战:不作为之罪的复杂性》(1993)19 Queen’s Law Journal 261.20,除了对立法意图和一致性(结构和文本)的广泛讨论之外,几乎没有涉及补救措施的选择。此外,不平等法律所提出的特殊补救问题值得特别注意。参见下面的第4节。 21肯特·罗奇,“对话救济”(2019)17国际宪法杂志860,863;另见Tundawala (n 11) 469.22 DS Nakara v Union of India (1983) 1 SCC 305 [60].23Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri诉印度联邦(1950)SCR 869 [86] (SR Das J).25辛格议员:第15(4)条和第16(4)条是基本权利吗?(1994) 3最高法院学报33,35.26 (Chandrachud J).27同上。28 Joseph Tussman和Jacobus tenBroek,“法律的平等保护”(1949)37加州法律评论341,348.29 See n 11.30 Khaitan (n 11) 195.31 Lon Fuller,“裁决的形式和限制”(1978-79)92哈佛法律评论353,394-99.32 Navtej Johar诉印度联邦(2018)10最高法院1 [608](Chandrachud J).33tarabh Khaitan,“平等:第14条下的立法审查”,载于Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla和Pratap Bhanu Mehta(编),《印度宪法牛津手册》(OUP 2016) 700, 707-08.34 Tundawala (n 11) 466, 470.35宪法,第14.36 Tundawala (n 11) 466.37 Ambica Mills (n 23).38法律事务监督和追诉人诉Girish Navalakha (1975) 4 SCC 754 bb0;Prag Ice诉印度联邦(1978)3 SCC 459 [51];先锋城市有限公司诉印度联邦(2019)8 SCC 416 bb0 .39Ambica Mills(2003年)40同上b[7].41根据1948年的《工厂法》,工厂可以包括一个至少有10名工人的场所。参见《1948年工厂法》第2(m).42条Ambica Mills(2003年)43同上[61]引用Mutual Loan Co .诉马泰尔案56 L Ed 175.44同上[57]引用西海岸酒店公司诉Parrish案300 US 379.45同上[58],[59],[61]。46同上[67]。47同上[72]-[76]。48同上[72]。[72] - [76].50Giri
{"title":"Under-inclusive laws and constitutional remedies: an exploration of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019","authors":"John Sebastian","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2255478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2255478","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIt has been widely argued that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (“CAA”) breaches Article 14’s equality guarantee due to its under-inclusiveness i.e. it does not include within its ambit many migrants who faced persecution similar to the persons it covers. However, it is often argued that under-inclusive laws are subjected to a low standard of review, which increases the justificatory burden on those who challenge its validity. I argue that there is no support in principle or case law for the argument that under-inclusive laws are subject to lower scrutiny than over-inclusive ones. Linked to this is the question of constitutional remedies for under-inclusive laws, which I analyse drawing on jurisprudence from India and other jurisdictions. Contrary to dominant opinion, I argue that, were the CAA to be declared unconstitutional, the appropriate remedy would be to extend its benefits to those hitherto uncovered by it, rather than striking it down.KEYWORDS: Citizenship Amendment Act 2019CAAunder-inclusive lawsstandard of reviewconstitutional remediesseveranceextension of benefits AcknowledgmentsI thank Tarunabh Khaitan, Faiza Rahman, Apoorva Sharma and Anshuman Singh for their detailed comments on previous versions of this paper. I thank the participants in the session on Constitutional Remedies at the ICON.S 2021 conference, where this paper was presented, and two anonymous reviewers for their careful and detailed feedback. I am grateful to Amber Darr, Nakul Nayak, Arun Thiruvengadam and the editorial team at the Indian Law Review for their patient and thoughtful engagement with the paper. Thanks also to the Melbourne Research Scholarship for supporting my research. Any errors are mine alone.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019, ss 2–4, 6 (CAA).2 Murali Krishnan, “In 10 points, Supreme Court hearing on Citizenship Act petitions explained” Hindustan Times (New Delhi, 30 August 2020) <www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/supreme-court-to-hear-144-petitions-on-citizenship-act-petitions-shortly/story-LHiqENFSldrRfSFPBq4OGO.html> accessed 29 July 2023.3 Constitution of India 1950, art 14 (Constitution).4 Abhinav Chandrachud, “Secularism and the Citizenship Amendment Act” (2020) 4 Indian Law Review 138, 154.5 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill 2019, statement of objects and reasons. See also Preliminary Counter-Affidavit on Behalf of the Union of India 26, 81, in Indian Union of Muslim League v Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No 1470 of 2019 <www.scobserver.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Counter_Affidavit_filed_by_Union.pdf> accessed 29 July 2023.6 See Kanika Gauba and Anshuman Singh, “Voter, Citizen, Enemy” (2017) 52(23) Economic and Political Weekly 12; Mohsin Alam Bhat, “The Constitutional Case Against the Citizenship Amendment Bill” (2019) 54(3) Economic and Political Weekly 12, 13; Chandrachud (n 4); Jaideep Singh Lalli, “Communalisation of Citizenship Law:","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136373959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-18DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2259259
Vishvesh Vikram, Kannan Shailesh Jhunjhunwala
ABSTRACTThis paper argues that the non-obstante clause in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC), which gives supremacy to the IBC over all previous laws in case of conflict, does not serve its purpose of asset preservation, and highlights problems that arise due to its presence. The paper analyses this provision considering the test for determining inconsistency between statutes in Indian law. It argues that the impact of IBC across different fields of operation brings forth several inconsistencies when deciding a conflict between the IBC and another statute. It presents problems arising due to the supremacy given to the IBC through the non-obstante clause, and exhibits how its application sometimes defeats its purpose. Lastly, the paper analyses insolvency regimes of the UK and Singapore, as well as the UNCITRAL Guide on Insolvency, and presents an example of instituting better cooperation between authorities initiating proceedings against a company under different statutes.KEYWORDS: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Codeinsolvencynon-obstanteSection 238IBCIndian lawnotwithstandingoverarchingblanketconflict Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 South India Corporation (P) Ltd v Secy, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum AIR 1964 SC 207 [215]; Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v Ashalata S Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447; PEK Kalliani Amma (Smt) v K Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76; Moreshwar Balkrishna Pandare v Vithal Vyanku Chavan (2001) 5 SCC 551; Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Inc (2005) 2 SCC 145.2 Waman Shrinivas Kini v Ratilal Bhagwandas & Co AIR 1959 SC 689.3 ibid.4 ibid.5 M Venugopal v Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation AIR 1994 SC 1343; Hindu Marriage Act 1955, s 16.6 See e.g. Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002; Electricity Act 2003; Income Tax Act 1961.7 Sandeep Bhalla, Principles of Interpretation in India with Legal Maxims (Lawmystery.com 2006) 121.8 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, s 238.9 Ministry of Finance, Government of India, The Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Volume I: Rationale and Design (2015) 12 accessed 09 August 2023.10 Aravind Gayam, ‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code: All you need to know’ (PRS Legislative Research, 10 May 2016) accessed 09 August 2023.11 Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular, Prudential norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning pertaining to Advances, RBI/2015–16/101, Issued on October 1, 2021, Paragraph 2, Part A.12 The World Bank, ‘Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) – United Kingdom, India’ (World Bank Open Data) accessed 09 August 2023.13 Ministry of Finance, Government of India, The Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Volume I: Rationale an
摘要本文认为,2016年《破产破产法》(IBC)中的非反对条款在发生冲突时赋予了IBC高于以往所有法律的优先权,但这一条款并没有达到资产保全的目的,并突出了因其存在而产生的问题。本文结合印度法律中确定成文法之间不一致的检验来分析这一规定。它认为,在判定中型企业法与另一法规之间的冲突时,中型企业法对不同业务领域的影响造成了若干不一致之处。它提出了由于通过非反对条款给予IBC至高无上地位而产生的问题,并展示了其应用有时如何违背其目的。最后,本文分析了英国和新加坡的破产制度以及《联合国国际贸易法委员会破产指南》,并提供了一个在根据不同法规对公司提起诉讼的当局之间建立更好合作的例子。关键词:资不抵债和破产法典,无偿付能力,无异议,第238ibc条款,尽管印度法律管辖全面冲突披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 South India Corporation (P) Ltd诉税务局秘书,Trivandrum AIR 1964 SC 207 [215];Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao诉Ashalata S Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447;PEK Kalliani Amma (Smt) vs K Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76;Moreshwar Balkrishna Pandare诉Vithal Vyanku Chavan (2001) 5 SCC 551;印度铱电信有限公司诉摩托罗拉公司(2005)2 SCC 145.2 Waman Shrinivas Kini诉ratial Bhagwandas & Co AIR 1959 SC 689.3同上,同上,5 M Venugopal诉部门经理,人寿保险公司AIR 1994 SC 1343;《1955年印度婚姻法》,第16.6条参见例如《2002年防止洗钱法》;2003年电力法;Sandeep Bhalla,《用法律准则解释印度的原则》(Lawmystery.com 2006) 121.8《破产和破产法2016》,s 238.9印度政府财政部,《破产法改革委员会报告》卷一:理由和设计(2015)12访问2023.8月9日Aravind Gayam,《破产和破产法》:“你需要知道的一切”(PRS立法研究,2016年5月10日),查阅2023.8月9日。11印度储备银行,总通告,关于收入确认、资产分类和预支拨备的审慎规范,RBI/ 2015-16/101, 2021年10月1日发布,A.12部分第2段。世界银行,“银行不良贷款占总贷款总额(%)-英国,印度”(世界银行开放数据),查阅2023.8月9日。破产法改革委员会报告第一册:原理与设计(2015)12查阅2023.8月9日同上15《2016年破产和破产法》,第7和9.16条《2016年破产和破产法》,第13.17条《2016年破产和破产法》,第14.18条《2016年破产和破产法》,第21.19条Karunjit Singh和Aashish Aryan,“在IBC的5年里,贷款人对索赔进行了61%的削减,显示数据”(印度快报,2021年7月27日)查阅2023.20年8月9日《2016年破产和破产法》,《破产与破产法》2016年第3章第21条。但是,尚未通知$ 243《破产与破产法2016》,第255.23条《破产与破产法2016》,第245.24条《破产与破产法2016》,第249.25条《破产与破产法2016》,第251.26条Sati Mukund,“2016年破产与破产法——为所有人提供公平的竞争环境”(2018)11(44)国际内部法律顾问杂志1,4.27 Ashish Pandey,“印度破产与破产法:六十年的制定”(2016)8(1)印度管理杂志26.28 (2018)1 SCC 407 [50].29Sara Jain,“分析2016年破产和破产法的主要影响”(2020)13 NUJS法律评论39,45.30 Madhusudan Sahoo,“CIRP中价值最大化的艺术”(破产和破产新闻,IBBI)访问2023年8月9日31印度财政部,破产法改革委员会报告第一卷:基本原理和设计(2015)22访问2023年8月9日32 2018 SCC OnLine NCLAT 565[17]。印度电网公司诉Jyoti结构公司(2017)SCC OnLine Del 12189.36同上[8].3738 .无论法院是否适用非反对条款的检验标准,这些案件都可作为先例,以了解在发生任何冲突时哪一部法规将适用Deep Chand诉UP AIR州1959 sc648;M Karunanidhi诉印度联邦(1979)3 SCR 254.39 [39](1979) 1 SCC 92.42 Shobha Ltd诉Pancard Clubs Ltd 2017 SCC OnLine NCLT 7486.43 ICICI Bank Ltd诉ABG Shipyard Ltd 2017 SCC OnLine NCLT 12031 [2.2].44《2016年企业破产解决程序条例》,第32条。 45 Jain (n 29) 39, 46.46同上。47 Bhanu Ram v HBN dairy & Allied Ltd Tax Pub (CL) 0050, (NCLAT: 2019);Anju Agarwal诉Bombay Stock Exchange and Ors (2019) SCC OnLine NCLAT 789。例如,在Anju Agarwal案中,NCLAT认为,IBC第14条将优先于SEBI法案第28A条,该条款涉及SEBI通过IBC中的非反对条款收回金额,包括通过扣押动产和银行账户。仲裁庭进一步指出,根据IBC本身,应付给SEBI的任何金额或罚款都可以由SEBI作为业务债权人提出索赔,但在决议过程中无法收回Shobha Ltd (n . 42).49执法局诉Axis Bank (2019) SCC OnLine Del 7854.50同上[146];印度证券交易委员会,关于加强董事会执行机制的措施和附带问题的报告(2020)410,查阅于2023年8月9日。《2016年破产和破产法》,第32A.52条印度中央银行诉喀拉拉邦(2009)4 SCC 94;Bhoruka Steel Ltd诉Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd (1997) 89 Comp Cas 547;Solidaire India Ltd诉Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd (2001) 3 SCC 71;KSL及工业有限公司诉Arihant Threads Limited (2008) 9 SCC 763 [70], [92].53印度工业信贷投资银行有限公司(n . 43)Shobha Ltd (n 42).55这与前面描述的同一操作领域不同。以前,确定是否存在冲突需要同一行动领域。在这里,一旦确定了冲突,立法的目的就有助于确定哪一方应占上风Swaran Singh诉Kasturilal AIR 1977
{"title":"The non-obstante nuisance: a critique of Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code","authors":"Vishvesh Vikram, Kannan Shailesh Jhunjhunwala","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2259259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2259259","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper argues that the non-obstante clause in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016 (IBC), which gives supremacy to the IBC over all previous laws in case of conflict, does not serve its purpose of asset preservation, and highlights problems that arise due to its presence. The paper analyses this provision considering the test for determining inconsistency between statutes in Indian law. It argues that the impact of IBC across different fields of operation brings forth several inconsistencies when deciding a conflict between the IBC and another statute. It presents problems arising due to the supremacy given to the IBC through the non-obstante clause, and exhibits how its application sometimes defeats its purpose. Lastly, the paper analyses insolvency regimes of the UK and Singapore, as well as the UNCITRAL Guide on Insolvency, and presents an example of instituting better cooperation between authorities initiating proceedings against a company under different statutes.KEYWORDS: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Codeinsolvencynon-obstanteSection 238IBCIndian lawnotwithstandingoverarchingblanketconflict Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 South India Corporation (P) Ltd v Secy, Board of Revenue, Trivandrum AIR 1964 SC 207 [215]; Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v Ashalata S Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447; PEK Kalliani Amma (Smt) v K Devi (1996) 4 SCC 76; Moreshwar Balkrishna Pandare v Vithal Vyanku Chavan (2001) 5 SCC 551; Iridium India Telecom Ltd v Motorola Inc (2005) 2 SCC 145.2 Waman Shrinivas Kini v Ratilal Bhagwandas & Co AIR 1959 SC 689.3 ibid.4 ibid.5 M Venugopal v Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation AIR 1994 SC 1343; Hindu Marriage Act 1955, s 16.6 See e.g. Prevention of Money Laundering Act 2002; Electricity Act 2003; Income Tax Act 1961.7 Sandeep Bhalla, Principles of Interpretation in India with Legal Maxims (Lawmystery.com 2006) 121.8 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016, s 238.9 Ministry of Finance, Government of India, The Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Volume I: Rationale and Design (2015) 12 <https://ibbi.gov.in/BLRCReportVol1_04112015.pdf> accessed 09 August 2023.10 Aravind Gayam, ‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code: All you need to know’ (PRS Legislative Research, 10 May 2016) <https://prsindia.org/theprsblog/the-insolvency-and-bankruptcy-code-all-you-need-to-know> accessed 09 August 2023.11 Reserve Bank of India, Master Circular, Prudential norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning pertaining to Advances, RBI/2015–16/101, Issued on October 1, 2021, Paragraph 2, Part A.12 The World Bank, ‘Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) – United Kingdom, India’ (World Bank Open Data) <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS?end = 2022&locations=GB-IN&start = 2005&view=chart> accessed 09 August 2023.13 Ministry of Finance, Government of India, The Report of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Volume I: Rationale an","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135148683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-20DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2235937
Prabha Kotiswaran, S. Rajam
ABSTRACT Trafficking is a transnational legal problem that has attracted considerable attention since the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In derogation of a robust indigenous jurisprudence on forced labour, the Indian state has, since 2000, imported the criminal law model of the Convention culminating in the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation) Bill 2021. This Bill is a hypercarceral law, the relationship of which with pre-existing labour laws is unclear even as it seeks to abolish sex work. In its zeal to crack down on criminals, its provisions violate fundamental principles of criminal liability and Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution even while it casts the net of the criminal law wide, threatening to freeze sections of the economy and render the Indian worker a victim who is confined to rehabilitation homes. The article argues for a fundamental rethink of the Bill.
{"title":"When hypercriminalization falls afoul of the constitution: the need to rethink the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation) Bill 2021","authors":"Prabha Kotiswaran, S. Rajam","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2235937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2235937","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Trafficking is a transnational legal problem that has attracted considerable attention since the adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. In derogation of a robust indigenous jurisprudence on forced labour, the Indian state has, since 2000, imported the criminal law model of the Convention culminating in the Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Care and Rehabilitation) Bill 2021. This Bill is a hypercarceral law, the relationship of which with pre-existing labour laws is unclear even as it seeks to abolish sex work. In its zeal to crack down on criminals, its provisions violate fundamental principles of criminal liability and Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution even while it casts the net of the criminal law wide, threatening to freeze sections of the economy and render the Indian worker a victim who is confined to rehabilitation homes. The article argues for a fundamental rethink of the Bill.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79407145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-15DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2213030
Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi
ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of Pakistan plays an important mediatory role in managing political conflict. While there is a growing body of literature on the merits of the Eighteenth Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution, not much has been written about how those changes have actually played out in practice before the courts. This paper tries to plug this gap by critically examining the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd v Federation of Pakistan. This paper argues that while the outcome is consistent with a general tendency of constitutional courts to centralize power, the expansive rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not square up with the spirit of the Eighteenth Amendment which was intended to resolve long-standing disputes between the centre and the provinces by conferring greater provincial autonomy.
{"title":"The Eighteenth Amendment at trial in Pakistan’s Supreme Court","authors":"Bakhtawar Bilal Soofi","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2213030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2213030","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Supreme Court of Pakistan plays an important mediatory role in managing political conflict. While there is a growing body of literature on the merits of the Eighteenth Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution, not much has been written about how those changes have actually played out in practice before the courts. This paper tries to plug this gap by critically examining the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd v Federation of Pakistan. This paper argues that while the outcome is consistent with a general tendency of constitutional courts to centralize power, the expansive rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not square up with the spirit of the Eighteenth Amendment which was intended to resolve long-standing disputes between the centre and the provinces by conferring greater provincial autonomy.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76759424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2232638
Dinesha Samararatne
In states that are in or emerging out of conflict, what can we learn about constitutionmaking and implementation when we examine them from the status of that conflict, that is to say whether the state is post-war or post-conflict? What specific insights can we obtain when we ask this question from a South Asian perspective? This Special Issue was curated along these two main questions. The insights that emerge confirm that the prospects for constitutional reform can vary significantly depending on whether a state is in the midst of conflict or whether (for an identifiable reason) it can be designated as being post-conflict. It is possible to have an in-between stage too, a state where the “war” is concluded (at least formally) but a formal solution to the conflict has not been reached, known commonly as a post-war stage. These stages are of course not easy to identify but are indicative of distinctions that are useful to bear in mind when considering constitutional reform. In this Special Issue, five authors (including myself) reflect on these broader questions from the experiences of three South Asian jurisdictions. It has become clear that work on South Asia can benefit from intra-regional comparative work on the lesser known jurisdictions. Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, in particular, are proximate jurisdictions that easily lend themselves to an intra-regional comparison on experiences and questions related to conflict. When I planned this project in 2019, it included Myanmar but the papers focusing mainly on Myanmar could not be finalized due to the ongoing crisis in the country. Draft papers were presented at an online workshop in 2020 on all three jurisdictions. After the Peace Agreement of 2006 and the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, Nepal is described as a post-conflict state. Even though sustained violence has ceased in Sri Lanka since 2009, a political settlement to the conflict has not yet been reached. The need for a constitutional solution to the conflict is raised from time to time. In Myanmar, reforms of the Constitution of 2008 were on the agenda over the last decade until the coup of 2021. In all three states, constitution-making and implementation have been closely linked with issues related to transitional justice, restoration of the rule of law, security sector reforms, and economic development. All three jurisdictions have had a settlement or agreement relating to the conflict. The conflicts involve ethnicity, historic injustices, religion, and gender in each of these societies. The experience of constitutionmaking and/or implementation in each of these states has been influenced and impacted by international or regional actors as well as international law. This Issue aims to add fresh voices to ongoing debates on these issues. Every effort was made, therefore, to seek submissions from authors who were from these jurisdictions and at an early stage in their career. Power-sharing is a key concern in all three jurisdict
{"title":"Making Constitutions Work Post-War","authors":"Dinesha Samararatne","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2232638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2232638","url":null,"abstract":"In states that are in or emerging out of conflict, what can we learn about constitutionmaking and implementation when we examine them from the status of that conflict, that is to say whether the state is post-war or post-conflict? What specific insights can we obtain when we ask this question from a South Asian perspective? This Special Issue was curated along these two main questions. The insights that emerge confirm that the prospects for constitutional reform can vary significantly depending on whether a state is in the midst of conflict or whether (for an identifiable reason) it can be designated as being post-conflict. It is possible to have an in-between stage too, a state where the “war” is concluded (at least formally) but a formal solution to the conflict has not been reached, known commonly as a post-war stage. These stages are of course not easy to identify but are indicative of distinctions that are useful to bear in mind when considering constitutional reform. In this Special Issue, five authors (including myself) reflect on these broader questions from the experiences of three South Asian jurisdictions. It has become clear that work on South Asia can benefit from intra-regional comparative work on the lesser known jurisdictions. Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, in particular, are proximate jurisdictions that easily lend themselves to an intra-regional comparison on experiences and questions related to conflict. When I planned this project in 2019, it included Myanmar but the papers focusing mainly on Myanmar could not be finalized due to the ongoing crisis in the country. Draft papers were presented at an online workshop in 2020 on all three jurisdictions. After the Peace Agreement of 2006 and the adoption of a new constitution in 2015, Nepal is described as a post-conflict state. Even though sustained violence has ceased in Sri Lanka since 2009, a political settlement to the conflict has not yet been reached. The need for a constitutional solution to the conflict is raised from time to time. In Myanmar, reforms of the Constitution of 2008 were on the agenda over the last decade until the coup of 2021. In all three states, constitution-making and implementation have been closely linked with issues related to transitional justice, restoration of the rule of law, security sector reforms, and economic development. All three jurisdictions have had a settlement or agreement relating to the conflict. The conflicts involve ethnicity, historic injustices, religion, and gender in each of these societies. The experience of constitutionmaking and/or implementation in each of these states has been influenced and impacted by international or regional actors as well as international law. This Issue aims to add fresh voices to ongoing debates on these issues. Every effort was made, therefore, to seek submissions from authors who were from these jurisdictions and at an early stage in their career. Power-sharing is a key concern in all three jurisdict","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72860593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-10DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2193931
P. Arun
ABSTRACT India’s communications surveillance regime can be aptly described as a legal mosaic with different provisions in various statutes, yet they are neatly dovetailed with each other. This Conspectus paper examines India’s communications surveillance law and analyses the characteristics of the state’s surveillance power, the nature and scope of the legal restraints and procedural safeguards afforded to prevent arbitrariness, indiscriminate use and violation of the right to communications privacy. It further identifies the key issues and major decisions of the European courts on mass surveillance in post-Puttaswamy years.
{"title":"A mosaic of dovetailing laws: India’s communications surveillance regime","authors":"P. Arun","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2193931","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2193931","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT India’s communications surveillance regime can be aptly described as a legal mosaic with different provisions in various statutes, yet they are neatly dovetailed with each other. This Conspectus paper examines India’s communications surveillance law and analyses the characteristics of the state’s surveillance power, the nature and scope of the legal restraints and procedural safeguards afforded to prevent arbitrariness, indiscriminate use and violation of the right to communications privacy. It further identifies the key issues and major decisions of the European courts on mass surveillance in post-Puttaswamy years.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73875137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-05DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2197317
M. Sharafi
ABSTRACT Parsi legal culture produced clear benefits for Zoroastrians in the late colonial era. It also played an underacknowledged role in the constitutional life of modern India, helping nationalists pivot from extra-legal resistance to the business of running a state. Independent India could re-activate constitutionalism and the rule of law as ideals because these values were well established among nationalists, albeit in a tradition that had been relegated to the back burner in the run-up to independence. This tradition, exemplified by early Congress figures like Dadabhai Naoroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, and Dinsha Wacha, was heavily influenced by Parsi legal culture. This article also suggests that rule-of-law values were not inescapably colonial. As an ideal, the rule of law caused division within the colonial state, powered anti-colonial critique, and reinforced constitutionalism. Because the rule-of-law agenda was distinct from colonialism, there was no inherent contradiction between Parsi legal culture and the rejection of colonial rule.
{"title":"Indian constitutionalism, the rule of law, and Parsi legal culture","authors":"M. Sharafi","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2197317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2197317","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Parsi legal culture produced clear benefits for Zoroastrians in the late colonial era. It also played an underacknowledged role in the constitutional life of modern India, helping nationalists pivot from extra-legal resistance to the business of running a state. Independent India could re-activate constitutionalism and the rule of law as ideals because these values were well established among nationalists, albeit in a tradition that had been relegated to the back burner in the run-up to independence. This tradition, exemplified by early Congress figures like Dadabhai Naoroji, Pherozeshah Mehta, and Dinsha Wacha, was heavily influenced by Parsi legal culture. This article also suggests that rule-of-law values were not inescapably colonial. As an ideal, the rule of law caused division within the colonial state, powered anti-colonial critique, and reinforced constitutionalism. Because the rule-of-law agenda was distinct from colonialism, there was no inherent contradiction between Parsi legal culture and the rejection of colonial rule.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73068513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2175433
Isabelle Lassée
ABSTRACT In 2015, Sri Lanka underwent a major political change, with the opening of a window of opportunity for both constitutional reform and Transitional Justice (TJ). However, TJ and constitutional reform were routinely presented in mainstream political discourses as two agendas in tension competing for political capital. Furthermore, TJ was perceived as controversial and, for this reason, was isolated conceptually and procedurally from other reform agendas. This reinforced the perception that TJ was a measure benefiting solely minority communities and imposed by foreign powers. This misperception, in turn, fuelled continued opposition to this agenda. After recalling the important links between TJ and the rule of law, I argue that a well-designed communication strategy around TJ should have harnessed the pre-2015 momentum for good governance and rule of law reforms in order to foster greater support for TJ.
{"title":"Post-war reforms in Sri Lanka: need to tie minority demands to a rule of law discourse","authors":"Isabelle Lassée","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2175433","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2175433","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 2015, Sri Lanka underwent a major political change, with the opening of a window of opportunity for both constitutional reform and Transitional Justice (TJ). However, TJ and constitutional reform were routinely presented in mainstream political discourses as two agendas in tension competing for political capital. Furthermore, TJ was perceived as controversial and, for this reason, was isolated conceptually and procedurally from other reform agendas. This reinforced the perception that TJ was a measure benefiting solely minority communities and imposed by foreign powers. This misperception, in turn, fuelled continued opposition to this agenda. After recalling the important links between TJ and the rule of law, I argue that a well-designed communication strategy around TJ should have harnessed the pre-2015 momentum for good governance and rule of law reforms in order to foster greater support for TJ.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79204105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24730580.2023.2177813
Pranav Verma
ABSTRACT The article attempts a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of the National Capital Territory (“NCT”) of Delhi’s legislative productivity in the year 2020. The Legislative Assembly of Delhi produced only one piece of substantive legislation throughout the year, sitting for one of its fewest number of sessions. However, the business of the Government continued to run apace through several subordinate legislations. While most of these pertained to routine matters of day-to-day administration, two primary regulations embodied the entirety of the State’s pandemic response on the back of a colonial-era skeleton legislation. The article discusses the constitutional questions of concern raised by such promulgation of subordinate legislations, while acknowledging the backdrop of the emergency nature of the pandemic and the unique power-sharing arrangement in the Constitution of India regarding the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
{"title":"COVID-19 And Rule By Decree – A Case Study Of The NCT of Delhi","authors":"Pranav Verma","doi":"10.1080/24730580.2023.2177813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24730580.2023.2177813","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article attempts a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of the National Capital Territory (“NCT”) of Delhi’s legislative productivity in the year 2020. The Legislative Assembly of Delhi produced only one piece of substantive legislation throughout the year, sitting for one of its fewest number of sessions. However, the business of the Government continued to run apace through several subordinate legislations. While most of these pertained to routine matters of day-to-day administration, two primary regulations embodied the entirety of the State’s pandemic response on the back of a colonial-era skeleton legislation. The article discusses the constitutional questions of concern raised by such promulgation of subordinate legislations, while acknowledging the backdrop of the emergency nature of the pandemic and the unique power-sharing arrangement in the Constitution of India regarding the National Capital Territory of Delhi.","PeriodicalId":13511,"journal":{"name":"Indian Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79494407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}