"The military operations conducted on the territory of Ukraine during the conflict started by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 show that the chances for large-scale combat operations in Europe have significantly increased. Consequently, the way those operations are carried out must be carefully reconsidered. Adapting to the requirements of the modern battlefield requires a rapid multi-domain integration of new technologies and modern weapon systems. Therefore, doctrinal changes are required. There is no doubt that the Battle of Kiev is a valuable source of information for military leaders, regarding the conduct of military operations at each level. Therefore, a pertinent analysis in relation to the factors that have contributed to the battle’s outcome could be very helpful. The main objective of the analysis is to highlight lessons on the topic of planning and carrying out military operations at tactical level. It emphasises both the determining factors for the failure of the Russian offensive and the features that gave the Ukrainian forces the upper hand, ensuring the successful defence operation. The research methodology is based on the qualitative evaluation of the available information, to enable an assessment of the battle from the combat functions perspective with the aim to identify possible gaps in Western armies’ way to carry out combat operations."
{"title":"\"The Battle of Kyiv – Aspects Regarding the Conduct of Military Operations at Tactical Level –\"","authors":"Claudiu Valer Nistorescu","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.4.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.4.07","url":null,"abstract":"\"The military operations conducted on the territory of Ukraine during the conflict started by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022 show that the chances for large-scale combat operations in Europe have significantly increased. Consequently, the way those operations are carried out must be carefully reconsidered. Adapting to the requirements of the modern battlefield requires a rapid multi-domain integration of new technologies and modern weapon systems. Therefore, doctrinal changes are required. There is no doubt that the Battle of Kiev is a valuable source of information for military leaders, regarding the conduct of military operations at each level. Therefore, a pertinent analysis in relation to the factors that have contributed to the battle’s outcome could be very helpful. The main objective of the analysis is to highlight lessons on the topic of planning and carrying out military operations at tactical level. It emphasises both the determining factors for the failure of the Russian offensive and the features that gave the Ukrainian forces the upper hand, ensuring the successful defence operation. The research methodology is based on the qualitative evaluation of the available information, to enable an assessment of the battle from the combat functions perspective with the aim to identify possible gaps in Western armies’ way to carry out combat operations.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123712703","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"The February 2022 military aggression on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across European capitals as well as across the Atlantic. This “new normal”, namely a conventional war in twenty-first century Europe, is both hard to process and inherently ominous as to the future of the European security architecture and strategic stability on the continent. The aim of the article is to analyse the combined effects of technological advances in information/computing technologies and human cognition on strategic choices such as nuclear deterrence strategies. The paper is looking to address the proposed research questions through a cognitive psychology lens, with a particular focus on perception and cognitive dissonance. The plasticity of both the geopolitical environment and the information space present the optimal conditions for propagation of cognitive errors in human decision-making. The article is taking a closer look at what said vulnerability means for the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, most specifically for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."
{"title":"Perception, Cognitive Dissonance and Nuclear Deterrence in the Information Age, Possible Implications for the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture in the Context of a New NATO Strategic Concept","authors":"Olga R. Chiriac","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.4.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.4.01","url":null,"abstract":"\"The February 2022 military aggression on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across European capitals as well as across the Atlantic. This “new normal”, namely a conventional war in twenty-first century Europe, is both hard to process and inherently ominous as to the future of the European security architecture and strategic stability on the continent. The aim of the article is to analyse the combined effects of technological advances in information/computing technologies and human cognition on strategic choices such as nuclear deterrence strategies. The paper is looking to address the proposed research questions through a cognitive psychology lens, with a particular focus on perception and cognitive dissonance. The plasticity of both the geopolitical environment and the information space present the optimal conditions for propagation of cognitive errors in human decision-making. The article is taking a closer look at what said vulnerability means for the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, most specifically for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114896037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"The scientific and technological progress registered in the last decades has contributed to the development of radars with supreme radar detection abilities to better detect the air attack means of the enemy. These means, in turn, have contributed to the improvement of the parameters of the airborne surveillance systems in order to detect and to counter aerial threats. The structural and functional dynamics of the aerial surveillance systems have pursued continuous adaptation to the complexity of the battlefield environment in modern warfare, ensuring the information necessary for the coherent and effective engagement of forces in the conduct of military operations."
{"title":"Aerial Surveillance – Evolutions and Enduring Trends","authors":"Pătru Pîrjol","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.09","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.09","url":null,"abstract":"\"The scientific and technological progress registered in the last decades has contributed to the development of radars with supreme radar detection abilities to better detect the air attack means of the enemy. These means, in turn, have contributed to the improvement of the parameters of the airborne surveillance systems in order to detect and to counter aerial threats. The structural and functional dynamics of the aerial surveillance systems have pursued continuous adaptation to the complexity of the battlefield environment in modern warfare, ensuring the information necessary for the coherent and effective engagement of forces in the conduct of military operations.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124532276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"The development of the command and control capability for the crisis management operations conducted by the European Union has been a constant element in the context of European security and defence cooperation. The particular profile of the regulatory framework governing the activities performed under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy has led to a specific EU capability building process. The formulas promoted in relation to both civilian and military components have taken various forms. However, the constant trend is to consolidate the options that the EU can employ in generating and conducting its own operations. They will add to the EU-NATO cooperation framework, developed from the earliest moments of the launch of European military operations. The developments in terms of the potential to generate and lead mixed civil-military commitments have been placed on similar coordinates. In practice, the stage in the development of the EU’s command and control capabilities attests to the existence of a comprehensive and equally complex instrument that the EU can employ in managing its own operational commitments."
{"title":"Development of the European Union Autonomous Command and Control Capability in the Context of European Security and Defence Cooperation","authors":"Dragos Ilinca","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.07","url":null,"abstract":"\"The development of the command and control capability for the crisis management operations conducted by the European Union has been a constant element in the context of European security and defence cooperation. The particular profile of the regulatory framework governing the activities performed under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy has led to a specific EU capability building process. The formulas promoted in relation to both civilian and military components have taken various forms. However, the constant trend is to consolidate the options that the EU can employ in generating and conducting its own operations. They will add to the EU-NATO cooperation framework, developed from the earliest moments of the launch of European military operations. The developments in terms of the potential to generate and lead mixed civil-military commitments have been placed on similar coordinates. In practice, the stage in the development of the EU’s command and control capabilities attests to the existence of a comprehensive and equally complex instrument that the EU can employ in managing its own operational commitments.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"113935404","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"The national security strategies of the European Union Member States emphasise the role of critical infrastructure in providing essential services to society and the necessity to protect them in the context of national security and defence. Thus, the protection of critical infrastructure lies not only with the critical infrastructure operator or administrator, but also with governmental institutions. Threats to critical infrastructure are actually threats to national security. An unwanted event involving one or more critical infrastructures involves the intervention of local, regional and national structures. The EU Member States are aware that threats to critical infrastructure pose serious threats to national security and even to the EU’s security and defence. In this regard, the EU Member States have included in their national security strategies a number of critical infrastructure issues, such as their importance, necessity, development, functionality, efficiency and last but not least their protection and resilience to all types of threats. This study highlights the inclusion of critical infrastructure in the security strategies of the EU Member States and the involvement of states in ensuring and strengthening the appropriate protection of national and European critical infrastructures."
{"title":"National Security Strategies and Critical Infrastructure: An Analysis of the European Union Member States","authors":"Petrișor Pătrașcu","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.01","url":null,"abstract":"\"The national security strategies of the European Union Member States emphasise the role of critical infrastructure in providing essential services to society and the necessity to protect them in the context of national security and defence. Thus, the protection of critical infrastructure lies not only with the critical infrastructure operator or administrator, but also with governmental institutions. Threats to critical infrastructure are actually threats to national security. An unwanted event involving one or more critical infrastructures involves the intervention of local, regional and national structures. The EU Member States are aware that threats to critical infrastructure pose serious threats to national security and even to the EU’s security and defence. In this regard, the EU Member States have included in their national security strategies a number of critical infrastructure issues, such as their importance, necessity, development, functionality, efficiency and last but not least their protection and resilience to all types of threats. This study highlights the inclusion of critical infrastructure in the security strategies of the EU Member States and the involvement of states in ensuring and strengthening the appropriate protection of national and European critical infrastructures.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129869401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"The maritime power of a state is not built overnight. That is the result of a long process based on articulated strategies, the needs of a state to defend and promote its maritime interests, and it depends on the economic power as well as the maritime ambition. In this regard, it must be said that the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet has not appeared from nowhere. It has had a step-by-step strategy with relevant presence and military actions having significant strategic influences in the region. As part of this endeavour, a presentation will be made on the emergence, evolution, and modernisation of the Black Sea Fleet, in relation to the geopolitical realities and regional interests of the Russian Federation. Thus, the purpose of this approach is to identify the principles that underpin the promotion of a maritime strategy in the Black Sea region, in relation to the peculiarities of a semi-enclosed sea, and how they influence the development of the fleet. The novelty is determined by some important lessons learned. One of the main tasks of naval strategy in peacetime is to obtain sufficient space for the operations of one’s naval forces and aircraft in times of war, so the size, configuration, and strategic position of the coast in a Narrow Sea do matter. Having this relevant example, we can highlight some characteristics of the centuries-old strategy for the development of Russian maritime power (especially that of the Black Sea) and its projection capacity in the World Ocean. From these conclusions, the Black Sea littoral states, members of NATO, can extract some lessons to be capitalised on. As a result of this analysis, we can underline the fact that, throughout history, the states involved could learn to win more through war than through peace."
{"title":"The Black Sea Russian Navy Is Not an Overnight Creation – A Brief History of the Black Sea Russian Navy","authors":"Lucian valeriu Scipanov, Florin Nistor","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.10","url":null,"abstract":"\"The maritime power of a state is not built overnight. That is the result of a long process based on articulated strategies, the needs of a state to defend and promote its maritime interests, and it depends on the economic power as well as the maritime ambition. In this regard, it must be said that the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet has not appeared from nowhere. It has had a step-by-step strategy with relevant presence and military actions having significant strategic influences in the region. As part of this endeavour, a presentation will be made on the emergence, evolution, and modernisation of the Black Sea Fleet, in relation to the geopolitical realities and regional interests of the Russian Federation. Thus, the purpose of this approach is to identify the principles that underpin the promotion of a maritime strategy in the Black Sea region, in relation to the peculiarities of a semi-enclosed sea, and how they influence the development of the fleet. The novelty is determined by some important lessons learned. One of the main tasks of naval strategy in peacetime is to obtain sufficient space for the operations of one’s naval forces and aircraft in times of war, so the size, configuration, and strategic position of the coast in a Narrow Sea do matter. Having this relevant example, we can highlight some characteristics of the centuries-old strategy for the development of Russian maritime power (especially that of the Black Sea) and its projection capacity in the World Ocean. From these conclusions, the Black Sea littoral states, members of NATO, can extract some lessons to be capitalised on. As a result of this analysis, we can underline the fact that, throughout history, the states involved could learn to win more through war than through peace.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133568720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"The psychological operations (PSYOPS) doctrines of many NATO member states, including Romania, do not allow the use of influence activities on internal audiences. While this is an ethical provision, difficulties arise when formulating an adequate counter-propaganda strategy, as domestic groups that are susceptible to influence are targeted by an effective propaganda conducted by the adversary. The 2014 edition of the NATO doctrine on PSYOPS (psychological operations) was ambiguous with regard to this limitation, while the Romanian doctrine from 2016 kept it, in accordance with the older NATO doctrine from 2007. With this limitation PSYOPS risk being ineffective in countering propaganda, their role being restricted to analysing the effects of the propaganda on the audiences and making recommendations to counter it. Without using influence activities, the recommendations would be, based on the scenario, addressing the public or not (choosing “silence”) with information activities through the responsible structures. Going further, inform and influence activities (IIA) intertwine, which leads to the need for more clarity in the doctrines that regulate their employment. The propaganda of the Russian Federation in Donbas, that victimised the separatists leading to their support for the invasion of Ukraine is a relevant example for situations when PSYOPS should be allowed to target internal audiences. The present paper does not go into detail on the case of Ukraine but problematises on the above-mentioned ethical limitation that has the advantage of giving the adversary advantages on multiple levels."
{"title":"Influence Operations, between the Ethical and Critical Facet","authors":"Angela-Karina Avădănei","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.05","url":null,"abstract":"\"The psychological operations (PSYOPS) doctrines of many NATO member states, including Romania, do not allow the use of influence activities on internal audiences. While this is an ethical provision, difficulties arise when formulating an adequate counter-propaganda strategy, as domestic groups that are susceptible to influence are targeted by an effective propaganda conducted by the adversary. The 2014 edition of the NATO doctrine on PSYOPS (psychological operations) was ambiguous with regard to this limitation, while the Romanian doctrine from 2016 kept it, in accordance with the older NATO doctrine from 2007. With this limitation PSYOPS risk being ineffective in countering propaganda, their role being restricted to analysing the effects of the propaganda on the audiences and making recommendations to counter it. Without using influence activities, the recommendations would be, based on the scenario, addressing the public or not (choosing “silence”) with information activities through the responsible structures. Going further, inform and influence activities (IIA) intertwine, which leads to the need for more clarity in the doctrines that regulate their employment. The propaganda of the Russian Federation in Donbas, that victimised the separatists leading to their support for the invasion of Ukraine is a relevant example for situations when PSYOPS should be allowed to target internal audiences. The present paper does not go into detail on the case of Ukraine but problematises on the above-mentioned ethical limitation that has the advantage of giving the adversary advantages on multiple levels.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133137528","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Since its establishment, the two organisations, NATO and the European Union (EU) have acted to find the most effective ways, adapted to the constantly changing international environment, to carry out their basic missions and to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship. The EU, especially after the end of the Cold War, has made significant progress in the direction of building and strengthening a common defence policy as well as the necessary means for its implementation in accordance with its security interests.During the resolution of certain security crises in Europe, but also outside it, there were certain differences between the USA and certain allies, some of them members of both NATO and the EU, regarding the necessary actions to perform the security responsibilities. The differences between the two organisations were mainly represented by the assessment of the threats, the institutions involved in the decision-making to trigger military actions, the requirements for military capabilities, the optimal ratio between political and military means in resolving crises and the share of military expenses in the gross domestic product. Moreover, the steps taken at the EU level have not always been the most appropriate for the development of credible military capabilities and for independent military actions, in crises where NATO as a whole is not involved."
{"title":"Considerations on the EU and NATO Security Responsibilities","authors":"Romică Cernat","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.08","url":null,"abstract":"\"Since its establishment, the two organisations, NATO and the European Union (EU) have acted to find the most effective ways, adapted to the constantly changing international environment, to carry out their basic missions and to maintain a strong transatlantic relationship. The EU, especially after the end of the Cold War, has made significant progress in the direction of building and strengthening a common defence policy as well as the necessary means for its implementation in accordance with its security interests.During the resolution of certain security crises in Europe, but also outside it, there were certain differences between the USA and certain allies, some of them members of both NATO and the EU, regarding the necessary actions to perform the security responsibilities. The differences between the two organisations were mainly represented by the assessment of the threats, the institutions involved in the decision-making to trigger military actions, the requirements for military capabilities, the optimal ratio between political and military means in resolving crises and the share of military expenses in the gross domestic product. Moreover, the steps taken at the EU level have not always been the most appropriate for the development of credible military capabilities and for independent military actions, in crises where NATO as a whole is not involved.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134331194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"Industrial revolutions have generated major changes in the economy, politics and military affairs throughout human history and have led to innovation in all social fields, resulting in new approaches to military affairs. Companies are transforming and preparing their transition from an environment based on technological tools (physical) to one based on social mass engineering (mainly in the virtual environment), extremely refined, which subtly combines manipulation with addiction. The industrial society, as we have known it for more than a century, has become an information society and produces major changes in society and, implicitly, in the thinking of military strategies. In this context, due to the unprecedented development of information technology, the military confrontations of the future will change their main feature, namely violence, a component that will be increasingly mitigated and replaced, gradually, with non-kinetic means: political, economic, media, psychological and informational situations. There are, today, new military doctrines and strategies, characterised by the lack of classical rules for waging a war, through the ambiguity of the enemy or through the lack of dichotomy between war and peace, which have as characteristic another way of organising and conducting the fight. The present article focuses on aspects related to non-kinetic and cognitive combat means. We consider that the research is of interest because the implications of these means on the way of waging the war and their long-term effects that have not yet been fully known. In this context, we approach the field of social engineering, starting from the first references to this concept up to the present day, emphasising its applicability in social and political sciences as well as in psychology and cyber security."
{"title":"Social Engineering – Major Component of Cognitive Warfare","authors":"Claudiu Marius Ionescu, Florian Răpan","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.03","url":null,"abstract":"\"Industrial revolutions have generated major changes in the economy, politics and military affairs throughout human history and have led to innovation in all social fields, resulting in new approaches to military affairs. Companies are transforming and preparing their transition from an environment based on technological tools (physical) to one based on social mass engineering (mainly in the virtual environment), extremely refined, which subtly combines manipulation with addiction. The industrial society, as we have known it for more than a century, has become an information society and produces major changes in society and, implicitly, in the thinking of military strategies. In this context, due to the unprecedented development of information technology, the military confrontations of the future will change their main feature, namely violence, a component that will be increasingly mitigated and replaced, gradually, with non-kinetic means: political, economic, media, psychological and informational situations. There are, today, new military doctrines and strategies, characterised by the lack of classical rules for waging a war, through the ambiguity of the enemy or through the lack of dichotomy between war and peace, which have as characteristic another way of organising and conducting the fight. The present article focuses on aspects related to non-kinetic and cognitive combat means. We consider that the research is of interest because the implications of these means on the way of waging the war and their long-term effects that have not yet been fully known. In this context, we approach the field of social engineering, starting from the first references to this concept up to the present day, emphasising its applicability in social and political sciences as well as in psychology and cyber security.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126536774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
"In the current geopolitical context, the Black Sea region has become the scene of the conflict in which a wide range of weapons and ammunition are used. It is their directing/guiding by using signals transmitted by satellite navigation networks – GNSS that categorically makes the difference. Their contribution can be instantly noticed, even though it is not a novelty. The weapons that benefited from the augmentation of the satellite signal proved the accuracy of their shots. This is the reason why the actions of jamming or falsification of the satellite signal appeared in the battlefield and even threats of GNSS attack were launched. In the present article, I intend a disambiguation of the subject, in an attempt to delimit military declarations from political ones, in the space environment, which has become essential in the conduct of modern military actions."
{"title":"Satellite Navigation Systems – An Avoided Target?","authors":"Dorian Luparu","doi":"10.55535/rmt.2022.3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.55535/rmt.2022.3.04","url":null,"abstract":"\"In the current geopolitical context, the Black Sea region has become the scene of the conflict in which a wide range of weapons and ammunition are used. It is their directing/guiding by using signals transmitted by satellite navigation networks – GNSS that categorically makes the difference. Their contribution can be instantly noticed, even though it is not a novelty. The weapons that benefited from the augmentation of the satellite signal proved the accuracy of their shots. This is the reason why the actions of jamming or falsification of the satellite signal appeared in the battlefield and even threats of GNSS attack were launched. In the present article, I intend a disambiguation of the subject, in an attempt to delimit military declarations from political ones, in the space environment, which has become essential in the conduct of modern military actions.\"","PeriodicalId":137367,"journal":{"name":"Romanian Military Thinking","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121588323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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