We demonstrate that correlated equilibrium can express conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a social group structure (a partition of players into social groups), we propose three properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent with social group structures satisfying behavioral conformity. These are: (a) within-group anonymity (conformity within groups); (b) group independence (no conformity between groups), and (c) predictable social group behavior (ex-post stability). We also consider stereotyped beliefs --- beliefs that all (other) players in a social group can be expected to behave in the same way. We demonstrate that: (1) Correlated equilibrium satisfying both (a) and (b) exist very generally; (2) If there are many players then a correlated equilibrium satisfying (a), (b) and (c) exists; (3) Stereotyping is not costly to the player who stereotypes.
{"title":"Correlated equilibrium, conformity and stereotyping","authors":"E. Cartwright, M. Wooders","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807419","url":null,"abstract":"We demonstrate that correlated equilibrium can express conformity to norms and the coordination of behavior within social groups. Given a social group structure (a partition of players into social groups), we propose three properties that one may expect of a correlated equilibrium consistent with social group structures satisfying behavioral conformity. These are: (a) within-group anonymity (conformity within groups); (b) group independence (no conformity between groups), and (c) predictable social group behavior (ex-post stability). We also consider stereotyped beliefs --- beliefs that all (other) players in a social group can be expected to behave in the same way. We demonstrate that:\u0000 (1) Correlated equilibrium satisfying both (a) and (b) exist very generally;\u0000 (2) If there are many players then a correlated equilibrium satisfying (a), (b) and (c) exists;\u0000 (3) Stereotyping is not costly to the player who stereotypes.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127480867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) is a theory of reciprocity that is grounded in neoclassical preference theory. The unconditional preferences included in revealed altruism (RA) theory are neoclassical; they satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) and are independent of irrelevant alternatives. The reciprocal preferences included in RA theory do not satisfy GARP and they can be dependent on choices not made by another. This paper introduces an inconsistency with independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) into the non-reciprocal preference component of RA theory. This dependence is inspired by the axiom of monotonicity (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) introduced into bargaining theory as an alternative to Nash's IIA axiom. The extended RA theory can rationalize patterns of giving and taking in dictator games (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008) previously thought to be anomalous. It also rationalizes effects of earned vs. unearned endowments on dictators' choices (Cherry, et al., 2002). And the theory continues to rationalize data from many games involving reciprocity.
显性利他主义理论(Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008)是一种以新古典偏好理论为基础的互惠理论。显性利他主义(RA)理论中包含的无条件偏好是新古典主义的;它们满足揭示偏好的广义公理(GARP)，并且独立于不相关的选择。RA理论中包含的互惠偏好不满足GARP，它们可以依赖于非他人做出的选择。本文将不相关选择独立性(IIA)与不相关选择独立性(IIA)的不一致引入到RA理论的非互惠偏好成分中。这种依赖性是由单调性公理(Kalai和Smorodinsky, 1975)启发的，单调性公理作为纳什IIA公理的替代引入了议价理论。扩展的RA理论可以合理化独裁者博弈中的给予和接受模式(List, 2007;Bardsley, 2008)之前被认为是异常的。它还合理化了赚取与非赚取的禀赋对独裁者选择的影响(Cherry, et al, 2002)。这一理论继续将许多涉及互惠的游戏数据合理化。
{"title":"Revealed altruism without independence of irrelevant alternatives","authors":"James C. Cox, V. Sadiraj","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807486","url":null,"abstract":"Revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) is a theory of reciprocity that is grounded in neoclassical preference theory. The unconditional preferences included in revealed altruism (RA) theory are neoclassical; they satisfy the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) and are independent of irrelevant alternatives. The reciprocal preferences included in RA theory do not satisfy GARP and they can be dependent on choices not made by another. This paper introduces an inconsistency with independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) into the non-reciprocal preference component of RA theory. This dependence is inspired by the axiom of monotonicity (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) introduced into bargaining theory as an alternative to Nash's IIA axiom. The extended RA theory can rationalize patterns of giving and taking in dictator games (List, 2007; Bardsley, 2008) previously thought to be anomalous. It also rationalizes effects of earned vs. unearned endowments on dictators' choices (Cherry, et al., 2002). And the theory continues to rationalize data from many games involving reciprocity.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132116246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma is neither normatively nor descriptively reasonable. However, new problems arise when considering Nash equilibrium from a computer science perspective: for example, Nash equilibrium is not robust (it does not tolerate "faulty" or "unexpected" behavior), it does not deal with coalitions, it does not take computation cost into account, and it does not deal with cases where players are not aware of all aspects of the game. In this talk, I discuss solution concepts that try to address these shortcomings of Nash equilibrium. This talk represents joint work with various collaborators, including Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Rica Gonen, Rafael Pass, and Leandro Rego.
纳什均衡是博弈论中最常用的均衡概念。然而，它也有许多问题。有些在博弈论社区中很有名;例如，重复囚徒困境的纳什均衡在规范和描述上都不合理。然而，当从计算机科学的角度考虑纳什均衡时，出现了新的问题:例如，纳什均衡不是鲁棒的(它不容忍“错误”或“意外”的行为)，它不处理联盟，它不考虑计算成本，它不处理玩家不知道游戏所有方面的情况。在这次演讲中，我将讨论解决纳什均衡的这些缺点的概念。这次谈话代表了与各种合作者的联合工作，包括Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Rica Gonen, Rafael Pass和Leandro Rego。
{"title":"Beyond Nash equilibrium: solution concepts for the 21st century","authors":"Joseph Y. Halpern","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807475","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807475","url":null,"abstract":"Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma is neither normatively nor descriptively reasonable. However, new problems arise when considering Nash equilibrium from a computer science perspective: for example, Nash equilibrium is not robust (it does not tolerate \"faulty\" or \"unexpected\" behavior), it does not deal with coalitions, it does not take computation cost into account, and it does not deal with cases where players are not aware of all aspects of the game. In this talk, I discuss solution concepts that try to address these shortcomings of Nash equilibrium. This talk represents joint work with various collaborators, including Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev, Rica Gonen, Rafael Pass, and Leandro Rego.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132284394","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is proved that the bilateral consistent prekernel is not empty and intersects the core of (boundary) balanced games. The proof is introduced in a general framework, which enables us to apply it to pure exchange economy environments. As a result a family of non-empty ordinal solution concepts that intersect the core is defined directly on the economy environment. Such solution concepts that are defined by means of individual excesses associated with the economy may be considered as ordinal (pre) kernels. While a canonical ordinal (pre) kernel does not arise naturally, a parallel approach to that used to derive an ordinal Shapley value yields one of them.
{"title":"The bilateral consistent prekernel for (boundary) balanced games and ordinal prekernels for economic environments","authors":"G. Orshan, Peter Sudhölter, J. Zarzuelo","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807412","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807412","url":null,"abstract":"It is proved that the bilateral consistent prekernel is not empty and intersects the core of (boundary) balanced games. The proof is introduced in a general framework, which enables us to apply it to pure exchange economy environments. As a result a family of non-empty ordinal solution concepts that intersect the core is defined directly on the economy environment. Such solution concepts that are defined by means of individual excesses associated with the economy may be considered as ordinal (pre) kernels. While a canonical ordinal (pre) kernel does not arise naturally, a parallel approach to that used to derive an ordinal Shapley value yields one of them.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134063841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Owen set is a well-know solution concept for the class of Linear Production games, which is included in the core. Despite their stability, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players which are absolutely necessary for any possible benefit to arise. We introduce a new solution set that overcomes such drawbacks. Some of its properties are shown as well as an axiomatic characterization.
{"title":"Avoiding unfairness of Owen solutions in linear production games","authors":"F. Fernández, Federico Perea, J. Puerto","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807483","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807483","url":null,"abstract":"The Owen set is a well-know solution concept for the class of Linear Production games, which is included in the core. Despite their stability, Owen allocations might give null payoff to players which are absolutely necessary for any possible benefit to arise. We introduce a new solution set that overcomes such drawbacks. Some of its properties are shown as well as an axiomatic characterization.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127931695","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we study the problem of oligopoly pricing in congested markets when the demand faced by every firm is stochastic. In particular, we consider a general network, where every link is owned by a firm which charges prices in order to maximize its profits. In this environment we show the existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium, where the latency functions are assumed to satisfy continuity, monotonicity and convexity. Given this existence result, we show how to compute bounds for the inefficiency and how the result can be adapted to study price and capacity competition.
{"title":"Oligopoly pricing in congested networks","authors":"E. Melo","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807409","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we study the problem of oligopoly pricing in congested markets when the demand faced by every firm is stochastic. In particular, we consider a general network, where every link is owned by a firm which charges prices in order to maximize its profits. In this environment we show the existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium, where the latency functions are assumed to satisfy continuity, monotonicity and convexity. Given this existence result, we show how to compute bounds for the inefficiency and how the result can be adapted to study price and capacity competition.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123201121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As internet retailing has become increasingly prevalent, firms have continued to innovate by adopting multi-channel strategies. One of these innovations is the introduction of a distribution channel, commonly known as site-to-store or online-to-store, where consumers can purchase online and pick up in-store. In this project, our focus is on understanding the effects of the site-to-store channel on the retailer's pricing strategy, profitability, and demand realization.
{"title":"Implications of \"online-to-store\" on retailers' pricing strategy and consumers' demand allocation","authors":"Shuya Yin, James Cao, Rick So","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807448","url":null,"abstract":"As internet retailing has become increasingly prevalent, firms have continued to innovate by adopting multi-channel strategies. One of these innovations is the introduction of a distribution channel, commonly known as site-to-store or online-to-store, where consumers can purchase online and pick up in-store. In this project, our focus is on understanding the effects of the site-to-store channel on the retailer's pricing strategy, profitability, and demand realization.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122628128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study stochastic games with a large number of players, where players are coupled via their payoff functions. A standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). It is well known that the computation of MPE suffers from the "curse of dimensionality." To deal with this complexity, several researchers have introduced a notion of mean field equilibrium that we call oblivious equilibrium (OE). In OE, each player reacts to only the average behavior of other players. In this paper, we develop a unified framework to study OE in large population stochastic games. In particular, we prove that under a set of simple assumptions on the model, an OE always exists. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we prove that OE approximates MPE well: we show that from the viewpoint of a single agent, a near optimal decision making policy is one that reacts only to the average behavior of its environment. We also study two different classes for games, competition and coordination games. For these classes of games, we isolate key assumptions on the model primitives under which OE exists and approximates MPE asymptotically.
{"title":"Asymptotic analysis of large population stochastic games","authors":"Ramesh Johari, S. Adlakha, G. Weintraub","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807474","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807474","url":null,"abstract":"We study stochastic games with a large number of players, where players are coupled via their payoff functions. A standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). It is well known that the computation of MPE suffers from the \"curse of dimensionality.\" To deal with this complexity, several researchers have introduced a notion of mean field equilibrium that we call oblivious equilibrium (OE). In OE, each player reacts to only the average behavior of other players. In this paper, we develop a unified framework to study OE in large population stochastic games. In particular, we prove that under a set of simple assumptions on the model, an OE always exists. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we prove that OE approximates MPE well: we show that from the viewpoint of a single agent, a near optimal decision making policy is one that reacts only to the average behavior of its environment. We also study two different classes for games, competition and coordination games. For these classes of games, we isolate key assumptions on the model primitives under which OE exists and approximates MPE asymptotically.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123146850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent developments in voting theory show that Condorcet profiles embedded in electorates are responsible for distortions in pairwise election tallies of any pair of candidates from a given set. Such distortions are the sole cause of conflicts between the various pairwise voting methods and of reversals of rankings, when candidates are dropped from or added to the set. Because of the strong symmetry of the rankings of the candidates within these profiles, it can be argued that Condorcet profiles represent complete ties between the candidates. Hence removing their influence from the pairwise scores should not matter and moreover is justified because of the distortions they induce. The paper discusses a method of removing or reducing the influence of Condorcet profiles from pairwise elections data.
{"title":"On reducing the influence of Condorcet cycles from pairwise election data","authors":"Sunanda Roy, Abhijit Chandra","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807462","url":null,"abstract":"Recent developments in voting theory show that Condorcet profiles embedded in electorates are responsible for distortions in pairwise election tallies of any pair of candidates from a given set. Such distortions are the sole cause of conflicts between the various pairwise voting methods and of reversals of rankings, when candidates are dropped from or added to the set. Because of the strong symmetry of the rankings of the candidates within these profiles, it can be argued that Condorcet profiles represent complete ties between the candidates. Hence removing their influence from the pairwise scores should not matter and moreover is justified because of the distortions they induce. The paper discusses a method of removing or reducing the influence of Condorcet profiles from pairwise elections data.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127925252","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Motivated by online matching marketplaces such as social lending, we study markets where capacity-constrained bidders participate in multiple auctions that they have preferences over. While bidders have explicit preferences over auctions, we observe that the auctioneer side of the market has implicit preferences over bidders induced by the bids; this allows us to model these marketplaces in a matching framework with two-sided preferences. The problem of clearing the market leads naturally to the algorithmic question of computing Pareto-optimal stable matchings in a many-to-many setting with ties and incomplete lists. We will provide a fast algorithm for computing Pareto-stable assignments for this very general multi-unit matching problem with arbitrary preference lists on both sides, with running time that is polynomial in the number of agents in the market, rather than the sum of capacities of all agents.
{"title":"Pareto stability in matching marketplaces","authors":"Ning Chen","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807468","url":null,"abstract":"Motivated by online matching marketplaces such as social lending, we study markets where capacity-constrained bidders participate in multiple auctions that they have preferences over. While bidders have explicit preferences over auctions, we observe that the auctioneer side of the market has implicit preferences over bidders induced by the bids; this allows us to model these marketplaces in a matching framework with two-sided preferences. The problem of clearing the market leads naturally to the algorithmic question of computing Pareto-optimal stable matchings in a many-to-many setting with ties and incomplete lists. We will provide a fast algorithm for computing Pareto-stable assignments for this very general multi-unit matching problem with arbitrary preference lists on both sides, with running time that is polynomial in the number of agents in the market, rather than the sum of capacities of all agents.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132424781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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