This study examines how early business relationships in company networks may predict later performance and centrality. We define a way of classifying centrality trajectories in social networks, providing a method that can be used more generally to predict network change over time. Employing a game simulation, we show that there are strategies that correlate with eventual centrality and profit, and other strategies that correlate with poor performance.
{"title":"Social networks analysis: a game experiment","authors":"T. Ben-Zvi","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807490","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines how early business relationships in company networks may predict later performance and centrality. We define a way of classifying centrality trajectories in social networks, providing a method that can be used more generally to predict network change over time. Employing a game simulation, we show that there are strategies that correlate with eventual centrality and profit, and other strategies that correlate with poor performance.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132402631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Belief-dependent motivation is important for understanding economic outcomes regarding e.g. anxiety & health, status & conformity, vengeance & wage rigidity, and guilt & contracts. The intellectual/mathematical home for describing belief-dependent motivation is an extension of traditional game theory labeled psychological game theory. My lecture will present this framework, as well as discuss how one can shed light on the empirical relevance of applications through experimental tests.
{"title":"Psychological games: theory & experiments","authors":"M. Dufwenberg","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807493","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807493","url":null,"abstract":"Belief-dependent motivation is important for understanding economic outcomes regarding e.g. anxiety & health, status & conformity, vengeance & wage rigidity, and guilt & contracts. The intellectual/mathematical home for describing belief-dependent motivation is an extension of traditional game theory labeled psychological game theory. My lecture will present this framework, as well as discuss how one can shed light on the empirical relevance of applications through experimental tests.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126953836","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper continues the stream of literature observed in Olsen and Parker (2008) where retailers compete under a Markov equilibrium solution concept. In this presentation, we consider a duopoly where retailers compete by providing inventory under the circumstances where unsatisfied customers may seek satisfaction elsewhere or leave. A very general framework is formulated to address a variety of customer avenues when stock is unavailable. We find a base-stock inventory policy is the equilibrium policy in the infinite horizon (open loop) under several mild conditions; this model's solution is known as an equilibrium in stationary strategies (ESS). We consequently determine conditions under which the parsimonious base-stock policy is the Markov equilibrium (closed loop) in a discrete-time dynamic game for a general time horizon, coinciding with the ESS base-stock levels. Importantly, when these conditions do not apply, we have counterexamples where a firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the ESS, stocking at a higher level. These examples demonstrate a value of inventory commitment, where the retailer may extract a benefit over multiple periods through committing to a higher stocking level and forcing her rival to understock. Our conclusion is that when the Markov solution is base-stock, it coincides with the ESS, but other Markov solutions also exist.
{"title":"Dynamic inventory competition with stockout-based substitution","authors":"Rodney P. Parker, T. Olsen","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807443","url":null,"abstract":"This paper continues the stream of literature observed in Olsen and Parker (2008) where retailers compete under a Markov equilibrium solution concept. In this presentation, we consider a duopoly where retailers compete by providing inventory under the circumstances where unsatisfied customers may seek satisfaction elsewhere or leave. A very general framework is formulated to address a variety of customer avenues when stock is unavailable. We find a base-stock inventory policy is the equilibrium policy in the infinite horizon (open loop) under several mild conditions; this model's solution is known as an equilibrium in stationary strategies (ESS). We consequently determine conditions under which the parsimonious base-stock policy is the Markov equilibrium (closed loop) in a discrete-time dynamic game for a general time horizon, coinciding with the ESS base-stock levels. Importantly, when these conditions do not apply, we have counterexamples where a firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the ESS, stocking at a higher level. These examples demonstrate a value of inventory commitment, where the retailer may extract a benefit over multiple periods through committing to a higher stocking level and forcing her rival to understock. Our conclusion is that when the Markov solution is base-stock, it coincides with the ESS, but other Markov solutions also exist.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132519087","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers a special type of technology evolution, referred to in the literature as disruptive technology vs. sustaining technology. In general, "old" products based on sustaining technology are perceived to be superior to the "new" ones based on disruptive technology. However, the latter have distinctive features that allow them to attract an exclusive set of customers. Examples include notebooks vs. netbooks, hard-disk drives vs. solid-state drives, laser printers vs. inkjet printers, etc. We set up a model with an established firm and an entrant firm that have heterogeneous product-offering capabilities: the established firm can offer either or both types of products, while the entrant firm can only offer the new products. Firms make capacity, pricing, and quantity decisions that maximize their ex-ante profit. Within this framework, we analyze deterministic games with perfect information and stochastic games with uncertain valuation of the disruptive technology. Equilibriums decisions are discussed under various market conditions as well as dedicated vs. flexible capacity assumptions. While over-investment and over-production may occur in a stochastic game with dedicated capacities, the equilibrium capacity decision seems to be more rational if the establish firm utilizes flexibly capacity or if the dedicated capacity can be converted ex-post at some expense.
{"title":"Industry equilibrium with sustaining and disruptive technology","authors":"Xiao Huang, Greys Sošić","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807473","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers a special type of technology evolution, referred to in the literature as disruptive technology vs. sustaining technology. In general, \"old\" products based on sustaining technology are perceived to be superior to the \"new\" ones based on disruptive technology. However, the latter have distinctive features that allow them to attract an exclusive set of customers. Examples include notebooks vs. netbooks, hard-disk drives vs. solid-state drives, laser printers vs. inkjet printers, etc. We set up a model with an established firm and an entrant firm that have heterogeneous product-offering capabilities: the established firm can offer either or both types of products, while the entrant firm can only offer the new products. Firms make capacity, pricing, and quantity decisions that maximize their ex-ante profit. Within this framework, we analyze deterministic games with perfect information and stochastic games with uncertain valuation of the disruptive technology. Equilibriums decisions are discussed under various market conditions as well as dedicated vs. flexible capacity assumptions. While over-investment and over-production may occur in a stochastic game with dedicated capacities, the equilibrium capacity decision seems to be more rational if the establish firm utilizes flexibly capacity or if the dedicated capacity can be converted ex-post at some expense.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131880299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I consider several variants of dictator and ultimatum games in which the proposer not only offers an allocation of funds but also selects the rules that will govern that distribution. In the dictator/ultimatum choice game, the proposer first selects whether or not the receiver will have the power to reject the offer. Effectively, the proposer decides between playing a dictator and an ultimatum game. Whether a player is self-regarding or motivated by distributive concerns, the player should elect the dictator game as it enables full control over the allocation. Yet, a majority of subjects select the ultimatum game. Further, even those selecting the dictator game make substantially higher offers than those in a control dictator experiment. Additional experiments and surveys explore various explanations for these results. The additional experiments suggest that players' willingness to share decision-making power with other players is quite robust. I conclude that subjects have an innate preference for "voice," a key component of procedural justice.
{"title":"Procedural justice in bargaining games","authors":"Mikhael Shor","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807487","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807487","url":null,"abstract":"I consider several variants of dictator and ultimatum games in which the proposer not only offers an allocation of funds but also selects the rules that will govern that distribution. In the dictator/ultimatum choice game, the proposer first selects whether or not the receiver will have the power to reject the offer. Effectively, the proposer decides between playing a dictator and an ultimatum game. Whether a player is self-regarding or motivated by distributive concerns, the player should elect the dictator game as it enables full control over the allocation. Yet, a majority of subjects select the ultimatum game. Further, even those selecting the dictator game make substantially higher offers than those in a control dictator experiment. Additional experiments and surveys explore various explanations for these results. The additional experiments suggest that players' willingness to share decision-making power with other players is quite robust. I conclude that subjects have an innate preference for \"voice,\" a key component of procedural justice.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125776207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The talk will be an overview of mechanisms for the one-sided matching problem, also called the house-allocation problem. This and related problems serve as useful models for many allocation problems that arise in practice: prominent recent examples include organizing kidney exchanges and assigning students to schools. We'll briefly discuss these applications, and discuss a recent result that establishes the equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms to the uniform lottery mechanism (also called the random priority mechanism).
{"title":"Matching mechanisms and their application to school choice","authors":"J. Sethuraman","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807478","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807478","url":null,"abstract":"The talk will be an overview of mechanisms for the one-sided matching problem, also called the house-allocation problem. This and related problems serve as useful models for many allocation problems that arise in practice: prominent recent examples include organizing kidney exchanges and assigning students to schools. We'll briefly discuss these applications, and discuss a recent result that establishes the equivalence of a broad class of mechanisms to the uniform lottery mechanism (also called the random priority mechanism).","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122167634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. We propose a new iterative method to analyze these games. With respect to the expected average reward, we prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. Moreover, if all transitions are deterministic, we obtain a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
{"title":"Subgame-perfection in positive recursive games","authors":"J. Flesch, G. Schoenmakers, J. Kuipers, K. Vrieze","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807415","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a class of n-player stochastic games with the following properties: (1) in every state, the transitions are controlled by one player, (2) the payoffs are equal to zero in every non-absorbing state, (3) the payoffs are non-negative in every absorbing state. We propose a new iterative method to analyze these games. With respect to the expected average reward, we prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for every ε > 0. Moreover, if all transitions are deterministic, we obtain a subgame-perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114735523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We show that the problem of computing an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-hard, even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear, and concave utility functions. We will also discuss the extension of this result to Fisher's model.
{"title":"On the complexity of equilibria in markets with additively separable utilities","authors":"X. Chen, Decheng Dai, Ye Du, S. Teng","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807467","url":null,"abstract":"We show that the problem of computing an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-hard, even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear, and concave utility functions. We will also discuss the extension of this result to Fisher's model.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132871288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Taisuke Imai, Alec Smith, Stephanie W. Wang, Colin Camerer
Behavior in two-player laboratory games has been observed to depend upon choices that the other player "could have made," in violation of the principle of subgame perfection. Models of other-regarding preferences that only transform payoffs at end-nodes (e.g. inequality aversion) cannot explain this behavior, and various explanations (e.g. models of intention-based reciprocity) have been proposed. We explore the mechanisms by which foregone payoffs influence decision-making in a variety of two-player, two-stage games using mousetracking, a technology that allows us to observe which payoffs subjects attend to, and for how long, when making strategic decisions.
{"title":"The power of foregone payoffs: a mousetracking study","authors":"Taisuke Imai, Alec Smith, Stephanie W. Wang, Colin Camerer","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807465","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807465","url":null,"abstract":"Behavior in two-player laboratory games has been observed to depend upon choices that the other player \"could have made,\" in violation of the principle of subgame perfection. Models of other-regarding preferences that only transform payoffs at end-nodes (e.g. inequality aversion) cannot explain this behavior, and various explanations (e.g. models of intention-based reciprocity) have been proposed. We explore the mechanisms by which foregone payoffs influence decision-making in a variety of two-player, two-stage games using mousetracking, a technology that allows us to observe which payoffs subjects attend to, and for how long, when making strategic decisions.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133988060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A firm is more than a black box production function described by its labor and capital inputs. Firms have capacity constraints that lead to inventory, shortages, queues and markdown prices. Consumers are aware of these messy details and they respond accordingly and strategically. Recent research in operations management, using tools from game theory, has concentrated on how such operational realities influence the dynamics of competition among firms. This talk will survey results from this literature and discuss opportunities for future directions.
{"title":"Game theory and operations management","authors":"Gérard P. Cachon","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807458","url":null,"abstract":"A firm is more than a black box production function described by its labor and capital inputs. Firms have capacity constraints that lead to inventory, shortages, queues and markdown prices. Consumers are aware of these messy details and they respond accordingly and strategically. Recent research in operations management, using tools from game theory, has concentrated on how such operational realities influence the dynamics of competition among firms. This talk will survey results from this literature and discuss opportunities for future directions.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114073102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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