A model of learning, adaptation and innovation is used to simulate the evolution of Moore machines (executing strategies) in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. In contrast to previous simulations that assumed perfect informational and implementation accuracy, the agents' machines are prone to two types of errors: (a) action-implementation errors, and (b) perception errors. The impact of bounded rationality on the agents' machines is examined under different error-levels. The computations indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality is sufficient to alter the evolutionary structure of the agents' machines. In particular, the evolution of cooperative machines becomes less likely as the likelihood of errors increases.
{"title":"Algorithmic bounded rationality, optimality and noise","authors":"C. Ioannou, Ioannis Nompel","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807489","url":null,"abstract":"A model of learning, adaptation and innovation is used to simulate the evolution of Moore machines (executing strategies) in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma stage-game. In contrast to previous simulations that assumed perfect informational and implementation accuracy, the agents' machines are prone to two types of errors: (a) action-implementation errors, and (b) perception errors. The impact of bounded rationality on the agents' machines is examined under different error-levels. The computations indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality is sufficient to alter the evolutionary structure of the agents' machines. In particular, the evolution of cooperative machines becomes less likely as the likelihood of errors increases.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126919576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Consider the clever cheating that occurred during an FCC spectrum auction in 1995 (see Cramton and J. Schwartz '02 for a history). Auction rules forbade companies from openly colluding to divide the spectrum cheaply; nonetheless, the major players circumvented the rules by using the least significant digits of their public messages to coordinate their overall bidding strategies. In other words, these parties used the auction protocol itself to cheat. Standard notions of security for cryptographic protocols do not prevent this type of cheating. In this talk, we propose the idea of collusion-free protocols. Such protocols do not create any new opportunities---such as using the protocol messages and headers themselves---for malicious participants to coordinate their cheating during the execution of the protocol. We discuss both positive and negative results regarding this notion by showing that it is possible to construct such protocols but special communication assumptions are provably necessary. The conceptual barrier to achieving this novel security property is captured in the following paradox: it is widely acknowledged that players must use randomness to pick their messages in any secure protocol, but the presence of randomized messages also enables perfect steganography and thus perfect collusion. We give an overview of two conceptually different approaches to overcome this paradox. The first method is based on the concept of verifiable determinism. This is a way to organize communication so that a player's next message is unpredictable, but once the message has been sent, everyone can verify that it was the one-and-only such message that an honest player could have sent. As a result, steganography becomes impossible. The second method takes an opposite approach: players generate arbitrary messages but send them to each other via a mediator who "re-randomizes"' the messages to eliminate steganographic channels. The goal is to design protocols where collusion-freeness is guaranteed as long as the mediator is honest, while standard security guarantees hold if the mediator is dishonest. This new approach enables us to use a less exotic communication channel to construct protocols that achieve a strong collusion-free property. This talk is based on 4 papers with the following set of coauthors: Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali, Joel Alwen and Ivan Visconti, and Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Giuseppe Persiano, and Visconti.
想想1995年美国联邦通信委员会频谱拍卖期间发生的聪明的作弊行为(参见克拉姆顿和J.施瓦茨2002年的历史)。拍卖规则禁止公司公开串通低价分割频谱;然而，主要参与者通过使用公开信息中的最低有效数字来协调他们的整体竞标策略，从而规避了规则。换句话说，这些各方利用拍卖协议本身来作弊。加密协议的标准安全概念并不能防止这种类型的欺骗。在这次演讲中，我们提出了无合谋协议的想法。这样的协议不会创造任何新的机会——比如使用协议消息和报头本身——让恶意的参与者在协议执行期间协调他们的作弊行为。我们讨论了关于这一概念的积极和消极结果，表明有可能构建这样的协议，但可以证明特殊的通信假设是必要的。实现这种新型安全属性的概念障碍体现在以下悖论中:人们普遍认为，在任何安全协议中，玩家必须使用随机性来选择他们的消息，但随机消息的存在也会实现完美的隐写，从而实现完美的共谋。我们概述了克服这一悖论的两种概念上不同的方法。第一种方法是基于可验证决定论的概念。这是一种组织交流的方式，这样玩家的下一条信息是不可预测的，但一旦消息被发送，每个人都可以验证这是一个诚实的玩家可以发送的唯一的信息。因此，隐写术变得不可能。第二种方法则采取相反的方法:玩家生成任意信息，但通过中介将其发送给彼此，中介将“重新随机化”信息以消除隐写通道。我们的目标是设计这样的协议:只要中介者是诚实的，就可以保证无合谋，而如果中介者是不诚实的，就可以保证标准的安全保证。这种新方法使我们能够使用较少的外部通信通道来构建实现强无合谋特性的协议。本次演讲基于以下四篇论文:Matt Lepinski和Silvio Micali, Joel Alwen和Ivan Visconti, Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Giuseppe Persiano和Visconti。
{"title":"Collusion-free protocols","authors":"Abhi Shelat","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807497","url":null,"abstract":"Consider the clever cheating that occurred during an FCC spectrum auction in 1995 (see Cramton and J. Schwartz '02 for a history). Auction rules forbade companies from openly colluding to divide the spectrum cheaply; nonetheless, the major players circumvented the rules by using the least significant digits of their public messages to coordinate their overall bidding strategies. In other words, these parties used the auction protocol itself to cheat.\u0000 Standard notions of security for cryptographic protocols do not prevent this type of cheating. In this talk, we propose the idea of collusion-free protocols. Such protocols do not create any new opportunities---such as using the protocol messages and headers themselves---for malicious participants to coordinate their cheating during the execution of the protocol. We discuss both positive and negative results regarding this notion by showing that it is possible to construct such protocols but special communication assumptions are provably necessary. The conceptual barrier to achieving this novel security property is captured in the following paradox: it is widely acknowledged that players must use randomness to pick their messages in any secure protocol, but the presence of randomized messages also enables perfect steganography and thus perfect collusion.\u0000 We give an overview of two conceptually different approaches to overcome this paradox. The first method is based on the concept of verifiable determinism. This is a way to organize communication so that a player's next message is unpredictable, but once the message has been sent, everyone can verify that it was the one-and-only such message that an honest player could have sent. As a result, steganography becomes impossible. The second method takes an opposite approach: players generate arbitrary messages but send them to each other via a mediator who \"re-randomizes\"' the messages to eliminate steganographic channels. The goal is to design protocols where collusion-freeness is guaranteed as long as the mediator is honest, while standard security guarantees hold if the mediator is dishonest. This new approach enables us to use a less exotic communication channel to construct protocols that achieve a strong collusion-free property.\u0000 This talk is based on 4 papers with the following set of coauthors: Matt Lepinski and Silvio Micali, Joel Alwen and Ivan Visconti, and Alwen, Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Giuseppe Persiano, and Visconti.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126007429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The collection and recycling of electronic waste (e-waste) has become one of the key issues in environmental protection, and many state-operated programs have been launched to mandate the recycling of e-waste state-wide in the US. The costs incurred under the state-run operations are allocated to manufacturers according to collective Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation which is widely adopted in e-waste programs. In this paper, we study the problem of allocating cost among manufacturers in a fair manner, which is essential for maintaining an efficient and stable state-operated program. We introduce a new cooperative game model where sub-coalitions can access external resources that are not owned by their members at predesigned unit prices. It is indicated in (Kalai and Zemel 1982) that the existence of external resources accessible to sub-coalitions may lead to an empty core of the resulting game and thus undermines the stability of a collaborative system. Our result shows that by proper pricing mechanisms of the external resources that are centrally controlled, such potential negative impacts on the coalition stability can be eliminated and a fair cost allocation is guaranteed to exist.
{"title":"Fair cost allocation mechanisms in electronic waste collection and recycling networks","authors":"Luyi Gui, A. Atasu, Özlem Ergun, L. B. Toktay","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807420","url":null,"abstract":"The collection and recycling of electronic waste (e-waste) has become one of the key issues in environmental protection, and many state-operated programs have been launched to mandate the recycling of e-waste state-wide in the US. The costs incurred under the state-run operations are allocated to manufacturers according to collective Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation which is widely adopted in e-waste programs. In this paper, we study the problem of allocating cost among manufacturers in a fair manner, which is essential for maintaining an efficient and stable state-operated program. We introduce a new cooperative game model where sub-coalitions can access external resources that are not owned by their members at predesigned unit prices. It is indicated in (Kalai and Zemel 1982) that the existence of external resources accessible to sub-coalitions may lead to an empty core of the resulting game and thus undermines the stability of a collaborative system. Our result shows that by proper pricing mechanisms of the external resources that are centrally controlled, such potential negative impacts on the coalition stability can be eliminated and a fair cost allocation is guaranteed to exist.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129309210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another. Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so. Our egalitarian transfer solution rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency, and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.
{"title":"Clearing supply and demand under bilateral constraints","authors":"Olivier Bochet, H. Moulin, Rahmi Ilkiliç","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807436","url":null,"abstract":"In a moneyless market, a non storable, non transferable homogeneous commodity is reallocated between agents with single-peaked preferences. Agents are either suppliers or demanders. Transfers between a supplier and a demander are feasible only if they are linked, and the links form an arbitrary bipartite graph. Typically, supply is short in one segment of the market, while demand is short in another. Information about individual preferences is private, and so is information about feasible links: an agent may unilaterally close one of her links if it is in her interest to do so. Our egalitarian transfer solution rations only the long side in each market segment, equalizing the net transfers of rationed agents as much as permitted by the bilateral constraints. It elicits a truthful report of both preferences and links: removing a feasible link is never profitable to either one of its two agents. Together with efficiency, and a version of equal treatment of equals, these properties are characteristic.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133492408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Eyran J. Gisches, R. Lindsey, Terry Daniel, A. Rapoport
In this paper, we examine the impact of information on the routing decisions that drivers make in a congestible two route traffic network. We present a model and theoretical predictions of driver choices in this network and compare outcomes under conditions of full information and partial information regarding the capacities of each route. In certain circumstances, the model predicts a paradox: aggregate travel delays increase once drivers are a priori informed regarding (stochastic) travel conditions such as adverse weather. We report evidence supporting this paradox in a computerized laboratory experiment in which a large group of subjects repeatedly interact with one another. We analyze both the travel costs associated with each information condition and the individual and aggregate route choices that generate these costs.
{"title":"Information paradoxes in traffic networks","authors":"Eyran J. Gisches, R. Lindsey, Terry Daniel, A. Rapoport","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807459","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine the impact of information on the routing decisions that drivers make in a congestible two route traffic network. We present a model and theoretical predictions of driver choices in this network and compare outcomes under conditions of full information and partial information regarding the capacities of each route. In certain circumstances, the model predicts a paradox: aggregate travel delays increase once drivers are a priori informed regarding (stochastic) travel conditions such as adverse weather. We report evidence supporting this paradox in a computerized laboratory experiment in which a large group of subjects repeatedly interact with one another. We analyze both the travel costs associated with each information condition and the individual and aggregate route choices that generate these costs.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128026027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Social dilemmas characterize environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self-interest can produce inefficient allocations. Two such environments are those characterized by public goods and common pool resources, in which the social dilemmas can be manifested in free riding and tragedy of the commons outcomes. Much field and laboratory research has focused on the effectiveness of alternative political-economic institutions in counteracting individuals' tendencies to under-provide public goods and over-extract common pool resources. Previous research has not focused on the implications of power asymmetries in paired public good and common pool resource environments. In our baseline treatments, we experiment with simultaneous move games in which paired comparisons can be made across environments with public goods and common pool resources. In our central treatments, we experiment with pairs of sequential move games in which second movers with asymmetric power -- bosses and kings -- can have large effects on efficiency and equity. The central questions are whether the bosses and kings do have significant effects on outcomes, and whether those effects differ across the paired public good and common pool resource environments.
{"title":"Bosses and kings: asymmetric power in paired common pool and public good games","authors":"James C. Cox, E. Ostrom, James M. Walker","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807488","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807488","url":null,"abstract":"Social dilemmas characterize environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self-interest can produce inefficient allocations. Two such environments are those characterized by public goods and common pool resources, in which the social dilemmas can be manifested in free riding and tragedy of the commons outcomes. Much field and laboratory research has focused on the effectiveness of alternative political-economic institutions in counteracting individuals' tendencies to under-provide public goods and over-extract common pool resources. Previous research has not focused on the implications of power asymmetries in paired public good and common pool resource environments. In our baseline treatments, we experiment with simultaneous move games in which paired comparisons can be made across environments with public goods and common pool resources. In our central treatments, we experiment with pairs of sequential move games in which second movers with asymmetric power -- bosses and kings -- can have large effects on efficiency and equity. The central questions are whether the bosses and kings do have significant effects on outcomes, and whether those effects differ across the paired public good and common pool resource environments.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130504651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Rapoport, W. Stein, Vincent Mak, R. Zwick, Darryl A. Seale
We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing systems, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of twenty subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.
{"title":"Endogenous arrivals in batch queues with constant or variable capacity","authors":"A. Rapoport, W. Stein, Vincent Mak, R. Zwick, Darryl A. Seale","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807460","url":null,"abstract":"We study batch queueing systems with continuous time, finite commuter populations, single server, and endogenously determined arrival times. Symmetric equilibrium solutions in mixed strategies are constructed and subsequently tested in two experiments that examine two different batch queueing systems, one with a fixed server capacity, and the other with a variable server capacity. With experience in playing the stage queueing game repeatedly, experimental results from groups of twenty subjects support equilibrium play on the aggregate level when the server capacity is fixed and commonly known. When it is known to be variable, randomly changing from round to round, subjects diverge from equilibrium play and increase their individual payoffs substantially by significantly shortening their waiting time.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131509284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatible mechanisms, namely that of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves; and the central approach for circumventing computational obstacles, that of approximation algorithms, are fundamentally incompatible: natural applications of the VCG approach to an approximation algorithm fails to yield an incentive compatible mechanism. We consider relaxing the desideratum of (ex post) incentive compatibility (IC) to Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), where truthtelling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (the standard notion of incentive compatibility in economics). For welfare maximization in single-parameter agent settings, we give a general black-box reduction that turns any approximation algorithm into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with essentially the same approximation factor.
{"title":"Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design","authors":"Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807425","url":null,"abstract":"The principal problem in algorithmic mechanism design is in merging the incentive constraints imposed by selfish behavior with the algorithmic constraints imposed by computational intractability. This field is motivated by the observation that the preeminent approach for designing incentive compatible mechanisms, namely that of Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves; and the central approach for circumventing computational obstacles, that of approximation algorithms, are fundamentally incompatible: natural applications of the VCG approach to an approximation algorithm fails to yield an incentive compatible mechanism. We consider relaxing the desideratum of (ex post) incentive compatibility (IC) to Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), where truthtelling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium (the standard notion of incentive compatibility in economics). For welfare maximization in single-parameter agent settings, we give a general black-box reduction that turns any approximation algorithm into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with essentially the same approximation factor.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117078109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This talk surveys three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them. Challenge 1: optimal mechanisms are parameterized by knowledge of the distribution of agent's private types. Challenge 2: optimal mechanisms require precise distributional information. Challenge 3: in multi-dimensional settings economic analysis has failed to characterize optimal mechanisms. The theory of approximation is well suited to address these challenges. While the optimal mechanism may be parameterized by the distribution of agent's private types, there may be a single mechanism that approximates the optimal mechanism for any distribution. While the optimal mechanism may require precise distributional assumptions, there may be approximately optimal mechanism that depends only on natural characteristics of the distribution. While the multi-dimensional optimal mechanism may resist precise economic characterization, there may be simple description of approximately optimal mechanisms. Finally, these approximately optimal mechanisms, because of their simplicity and tractability, may be much more likely to arise in practice, thus making the theory of approximately optimal mechanism more descriptive than that of (precisely) optimal mechanisms. The talk will cover positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques, relevance to practice, and future research directions.
{"title":"Approximation in mechanism design","authors":"Jason D. Hartline","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807441","url":null,"abstract":"This talk surveys three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them. Challenge 1: optimal mechanisms are parameterized by knowledge of the distribution of agent's private types. Challenge 2: optimal mechanisms require precise distributional information. Challenge 3: in multi-dimensional settings economic analysis has failed to characterize optimal mechanisms. The theory of approximation is well suited to address these challenges. While the optimal mechanism may be parameterized by the distribution of agent's private types, there may be a single mechanism that approximates the optimal mechanism for any distribution. While the optimal mechanism may require precise distributional assumptions, there may be approximately optimal mechanism that depends only on natural characteristics of the distribution. While the multi-dimensional optimal mechanism may resist precise economic characterization, there may be simple description of approximately optimal mechanisms. Finally, these approximately optimal mechanisms, because of their simplicity and tractability, may be much more likely to arise in practice, thus making the theory of approximately optimal mechanism more descriptive than that of (precisely) optimal mechanisms. The talk will cover positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques, relevance to practice, and future research directions.","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"393 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123093551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility location models defined on general metric spaces. The players are the customers (demand points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is either the service radius or the diameter of the coalition. We study the existence of core allocations for these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge lengths, and on finite dimension vector spaces endowed with a norm (Rd).
{"title":"Some new cooperative coverage facility location games","authors":"J. Puerto, A. Tamir, Federico Perea","doi":"10.1145/1807406.1807484","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1807406.1807484","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility location models defined on general metric spaces. The players are the customers (demand points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is either the service radius or the diameter of the coalition.\u0000 We study the existence of core allocations for these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge lengths, and on finite dimension vector spaces endowed with a norm (Rd).","PeriodicalId":142982,"journal":{"name":"Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128216612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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