Schadenfreude and sympathy are often experienced at the intergroup level; however, little research has been conducted to examine their role in one of the most prominent and emotionally evocative intergroup contexts: the political arena. In this study, we assessed a sample of 506 Americans’ (Age M = 41.69 years, SD = 13.94; 57% women) schadenfreude and sympathy (and related cognitions) in response to then-President Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis (a salient misfortune of a contentious political figure), and how their schadenfreude, sympathy, and related cognitions were associated with shifts in voting intentions (own and public’s) in the 2020 Presidential Election. We also examined trends in, and associations between, these variables by political affiliation (focusing on Democrats and Republicans) and gender (focusing on men and women). Unsurprisingly, compared to Republicans, Democrats expressed more schadenfreude and less sympathy. Contrary to previous research, however, Democrats’ experiences of schadenfreude were tempered and were primarily driven by deservingness beliefs rather than intergroup competition or malice). Amongst Republicans only, men experienced stronger schadenfreude than women. Regarding voting intentions, participants were more likely to report that the diagnosis would impact shifts in the public’s voting than their own voting, primarily in favor of the Democratic Party. Feelings of schadenfreude and sympathy were not significantly associated with anticipated shifts—rather, those who believed then-President Trump’s diagnosis was deserved (cognition strongly associated with schadenfreude) were four times more likely to believe the public would change their vote to the Democratic Party. These findings are discussed in relation to research at the intersection of psychology and political science and have implications for politicians and psychologists who aim to understand emotions underlying partisanship and voting behavior.
{"title":"Schadenfreude and sympathy following President Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis: Influence on pre-election voting intentions","authors":"Joanna Peplak, J. Z. Klemfuss, P. Ditto","doi":"10.5964/jspp.6611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.6611","url":null,"abstract":"Schadenfreude and sympathy are often experienced at the intergroup level; however, little research has been conducted to examine their role in one of the most prominent and emotionally evocative intergroup contexts: the political arena. In this study, we assessed a sample of 506 Americans’ (Age M = 41.69 years, SD = 13.94; 57% women) schadenfreude and sympathy (and related cognitions) in response to then-President Trump’s COVID-19 diagnosis (a salient misfortune of a contentious political figure), and how their schadenfreude, sympathy, and related cognitions were associated with shifts in voting intentions (own and public’s) in the 2020 Presidential Election. We also examined trends in, and associations between, these variables by political affiliation (focusing on Democrats and Republicans) and gender (focusing on men and women). Unsurprisingly, compared to Republicans, Democrats expressed more schadenfreude and less sympathy. Contrary to previous research, however, Democrats’ experiences of schadenfreude were tempered and were primarily driven by deservingness beliefs rather than intergroup competition or malice). Amongst Republicans only, men experienced stronger schadenfreude than women. Regarding voting intentions, participants were more likely to report that the diagnosis would impact shifts in the public’s voting than their own voting, primarily in favor of the Democratic Party. Feelings of schadenfreude and sympathy were not significantly associated with anticipated shifts—rather, those who believed then-President Trump’s diagnosis was deserved (cognition strongly associated with schadenfreude) were four times more likely to believe the public would change their vote to the Democratic Party. These findings are discussed in relation to research at the intersection of psychology and political science and have implications for politicians and psychologists who aim to understand emotions underlying partisanship and voting behavior.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45065018","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sarah Leveaux, Kenzo Nera, Pierre Fagnoni, P. Klein
Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.
{"title":"Defining and explaining conspiracy theories: Comparing the lay representations of conspiracy believers and non-believers","authors":"Sarah Leveaux, Kenzo Nera, Pierre Fagnoni, P. Klein","doi":"10.5964/jspp.6201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.6201","url":null,"abstract":"Despite a growing literature on the topic, little is known about how individuals perceive the label “conspiracy theory”. In two studies, we compare social representations of conspiracy theories, and how these are influenced by individuals’ own conspiracy beliefs. In addition, we examine how these representations relate to how scholars define and explain conspiracy theories. In Study 1, we used lexicometric analysis to explore the vocabulary that French participants (n = 939) spontaneously associated with the notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ and the personal definitions they provided. The representation of participants scoring high on the generic conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the content of conspiracy theories (e.g., “lies” or “government”). By contrast, the representation of participants scoring low on the conspiracist beliefs scale was centred on the believer (e.g., “paranoia” or “cognitive biases”). They proposed definitions of conspiracy theories centred on the function(s) conspiracy theories supposedly fulfil for the believer (e.g., simplify complex realities). To make sure that these results did not merely express participants’ endorsement or rejection of conspiracy theories, we carried out a second study. In Study 2 (n = 272), we found that the more participants endorsed generic conspiracist beliefs, the less they mobilised intra-individual causes (e.g., reasoning biases) to explain why some people believe in conspiracy theories that they did not endorse themselves. This research shows that people’s representations of conspiracy theories differ depending on their conspiracy beliefs.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44776747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Polling data indicate that in the USA, Republicans, compared to Democrats, have been less inclined to take preventive measures against coronavirus. In three studies (Ns = 380, 430, and 393), we sought to find evidence for partisan motivations and to illuminate how they translate into attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual behaviors. Results revealed a consensus that the Democratic party wants people take coronavirus seriously. Thus, while Democrats thought it was aligned with their political interests, Republicans thought it was in their opponents’ interests. Further analyses suggest that perceived party interests mediated the effect of party allegiance on attitudes about the seriousness of coronavirus, and both attitudes and intentions to preventive behaviors (Studies 1 and 2) and specifically attitudes and intentions to wear masks (Study 3). This relationship also held for mask-wearing behavior. Results suggest that people’s responses to coronavirus may reflect a conformity to the perceived wishes and interests of their political party.
{"title":"Toeing the party line: Politically driven responses to the coronavirus pandemic in the USA","authors":"Karen M. Douglas, Robbie M. Sutton","doi":"10.5964/jspp.6089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.6089","url":null,"abstract":"Polling data indicate that in the USA, Republicans, compared to Democrats, have been less inclined to take preventive measures against coronavirus. In three studies (Ns = 380, 430, and 393), we sought to find evidence for partisan motivations and to illuminate how they translate into attitudes, behavioral intentions and actual behaviors. Results revealed a consensus that the Democratic party wants people take coronavirus seriously. Thus, while Democrats thought it was aligned with their political interests, Republicans thought it was in their opponents’ interests. Further analyses suggest that perceived party interests mediated the effect of party allegiance on attitudes about the seriousness of coronavirus, and both attitudes and intentions to preventive behaviors (Studies 1 and 2) and specifically attitudes and intentions to wear masks (Study 3). This relationship also held for mask-wearing behavior. Results suggest that people’s responses to coronavirus may reflect a conformity to the perceived wishes and interests of their political party.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48632088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we examine how meat product advertisements shape the image of meat-eating at a time when alternatives to meat-eating are increasingly being discussed in many Western countries. Drawing on social representations theory, multimodal analysis, and deconstructive reading, we explore how certain meanings are attached to meat-eating while others are put aside. The research material consisted of 65 advertisement videos published by the two largest Finnish meat product companies between 2013 and 2021. We identified naturalness, enjoyment, and Finnishness as the main concepts used to promote meat consumption. The social representations in the advertisements were constituted by three embedded themata namely, edible/inedible, human/animal, and us/them, structuring everyday conceptions regarding meat-eating. Theoretically we seek to show how the advertisements participate in dialogical negotiation on socially salient topics in present-day societies and contribute to the construction of social representations.
{"title":"Natural, enjoyable, and Finnish: Social representations of eating meat in Finnish meat product advertisements","authors":"Timo Häkli, Eemeli Hakoköngäs","doi":"10.5964/jspp.7407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.7407","url":null,"abstract":"In this study, we examine how meat product advertisements shape the image of meat-eating at a time when alternatives to meat-eating are increasingly being discussed in many Western countries. Drawing on social representations theory, multimodal analysis, and deconstructive reading, we explore how certain meanings are attached to meat-eating while others are put aside. The research material consisted of 65 advertisement videos published by the two largest Finnish meat product companies between 2013 and 2021. We identified naturalness, enjoyment, and Finnishness as the main concepts used to promote meat consumption. The social representations in the advertisements were constituted by three embedded themata namely, edible/inedible, human/animal, and us/them, structuring everyday conceptions regarding meat-eating. Theoretically we seek to show how the advertisements participate in dialogical negotiation on socially salient topics in present-day societies and contribute to the construction of social representations.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41954669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much research has demonstrated that Democrats and Republicans use information about party affiliation to discriminate against one another. However, we know little about how people gain the necessary information about other people’s partisanship to engage in discriminatory behavior. We explore whether people perceive partisanship when shown only images of faces, and whether they then use these perceptions to engage in partisan discrimination. We find that they do. Using two studies we show that the partisan perceptions people derive from seeing images of faces influence discrimination of job applicants, and propensities to engage is a wide range of social interactions. People appear to be making judgements about partisanship using only facial appearance, and are willing act on that perception. The implication of this finding is that partisan discrimination is likely widespread, and does not require the explicit communication of partisan affiliations.
{"title":"Partisan discrimination without explicit partisan cues","authors":"J. Lyons, S. Utych","doi":"10.5964/jspp.6491","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.6491","url":null,"abstract":"Much research has demonstrated that Democrats and Republicans use information about party affiliation to discriminate against one another. However, we know little about how people gain the necessary information about other people’s partisanship to engage in discriminatory behavior. We explore whether people perceive partisanship when shown only images of faces, and whether they then use these perceptions to engage in partisan discrimination. We find that they do. Using two studies we show that the partisan perceptions people derive from seeing images of faces influence discrimination of job applicants, and propensities to engage is a wide range of social interactions. People appear to be making judgements about partisanship using only facial appearance, and are willing act on that perception. The implication of this finding is that partisan discrimination is likely widespread, and does not require the explicit communication of partisan affiliations.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45231216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This research examines digital gender advocacy campaigns in India during the 2010s. By employing thematic analysis and conceptual tools of the social representations theory into the analysis of 250 gender advocacy videos published on YouTube, we answer the following questions: a) How are dangers to women in India discussed in recent video campaigns? b) How is the topic objectified and anchored in multimodal narration? c) How is hegemonic womanhood constructed in the campaigns? The findings suggest that campaigns present two social representations of dangers with sexual harassment depicted as a danger for urban middle-class women and the issues of early marriage, lack of female education, and gender-biased sex selection as rural dangers. The primary solution suggested by the campaigns is to encourage women to actively claim their place in society, placing the main responsibility for changing the situation on women themselves. The secondary solution suggested is to encourage families to support girls and women. Thus, the analysis shows how social representations created by gender advocacy in India put responsibility on individuals and excuse social institutions from addressing inequality, while maintaining power relations and class disparities.
{"title":"Empowered but endangered? An analysis of hegemonic womanhood in Indian gender advocacy campaigns","authors":"Keshia D'silva, Eemeli Hakoköngäs","doi":"10.5964/jspp.5619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.5619","url":null,"abstract":"This research examines digital gender advocacy campaigns in India during the 2010s. By employing thematic analysis and conceptual tools of the social representations theory into the analysis of 250 gender advocacy videos published on YouTube, we answer the following questions: a) How are dangers to women in India discussed in recent video campaigns? b) How is the topic objectified and anchored in multimodal narration? c) How is hegemonic womanhood constructed in the campaigns? The findings suggest that campaigns present two social representations of dangers with sexual harassment depicted as a danger for urban middle-class women and the issues of early marriage, lack of female education, and gender-biased sex selection as rural dangers. The primary solution suggested by the campaigns is to encourage women to actively claim their place in society, placing the main responsibility for changing the situation on women themselves. The secondary solution suggested is to encourage families to support girls and women. Thus, the analysis shows how social representations created by gender advocacy in India put responsibility on individuals and excuse social institutions from addressing inequality, while maintaining power relations and class disparities.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47217597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political Internet memes significantly contribute to discourse around contemporary events. By studying memes, scholars understand these ‘units of culture’ as forms of participatory content that can fulfill political functions. To explore whether users ascribe memes a political role and consider them an alternative to or supplement of traditional political participation, this study provides a user-centered perspective focusing on core motives of meme use. Via a Delphi method interview approach, participants discuss uses and gratifications of memes in political contexts. A qualitative content analysis provides insight into the role and impact of memes in social movements and everyday politics. The findings show that users perceive memes as a tool for easy, effortless engagement in the public sphere driven by the interplay of self-expression, social identity, and entertainment motives. Participants also discuss potentials and limitations of memes in political contexts, concluding that political memes can only support other efforts. The study contributes to our understanding of memes from a psychological perspective and establishes a basis for further research on deliberative political practices from a user perspective.
{"title":"Psychological perspectives on participatory culture: Core motives for the use of political internet memes","authors":"Anne Leiser","doi":"10.5964/jspp.6377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.6377","url":null,"abstract":"Political Internet memes significantly contribute to discourse around contemporary events. By studying memes, scholars understand these ‘units of culture’ as forms of participatory content that can fulfill political functions. To explore whether users ascribe memes a political role and consider them an alternative to or supplement of traditional political participation, this study provides a user-centered perspective focusing on core motives of meme use. Via a Delphi method interview approach, participants discuss uses and gratifications of memes in political contexts. A qualitative content analysis provides insight into the role and impact of memes in social movements and everyday politics. The findings show that users perceive memes as a tool for easy, effortless engagement in the public sphere driven by the interplay of self-expression, social identity, and entertainment motives. Participants also discuss potentials and limitations of memes in political contexts, concluding that political memes can only support other efforts. The study contributes to our understanding of memes from a psychological perspective and establishes a basis for further research on deliberative political practices from a user perspective.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44665990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When faced with the aftermath of a divisive political event, how do citizens make sense of the political opinions of those who voted differently to them? Drawing on the Social Representations Approach (SRA) and its emphasis on communication as a medium through which meaning making occurs, we utilize dialogical analysis of focus group data (N = 36) collected after the UK’s referendum on leaving the EU. We focus on how voters engage with the perspective of the other in an intragroup dialogue setting. In doing so, this paper aims to explore the role of meta-representations, or ‘what we think other people think’, in contexts of contested political issues. We show the value of considering how meta-representations function to delegitimize different political views and vote choices, and by implication serve an important role in socially representing the ‘other’, constructing and reproducing intergroup boundaries. This process is achieved through drawing on semantic barriers, communicative tools that play a crucial role in safeguarding one’s own beliefs from the threat of alterity.
{"title":"Dialogue with difference: Meta-representations in political dialogue and their role in constructing the ‘other’","authors":"S. Obradović, H. Draper","doi":"10.5964/jspp.7529","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.7529","url":null,"abstract":"When faced with the aftermath of a divisive political event, how do citizens make sense of the political opinions of those who voted differently to them? Drawing on the Social Representations Approach (SRA) and its emphasis on communication as a medium through which meaning making occurs, we utilize dialogical analysis of focus group data (N = 36) collected after the UK’s referendum on leaving the EU. We focus on how voters engage with the perspective of the other in an intragroup dialogue setting. In doing so, this paper aims to explore the role of meta-representations, or ‘what we think other people think’, in contexts of contested political issues. We show the value of considering how meta-representations function to delegitimize different political views and vote choices, and by implication serve an important role in socially representing the ‘other’, constructing and reproducing intergroup boundaries. This process is achieved through drawing on semantic barriers, communicative tools that play a crucial role in safeguarding one’s own beliefs from the threat of alterity.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44662138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Caroline da Silva, Judith de Jong, Allard R. Feddes, B. Doosje, Andreea Gruev-Vintila
We investigate experiences of misrecognition through comparative focus groups with headscarf-wearing Muslim women students in France (N = 46) and in the Netherlands (N = 32). In both countries, women reported experiencing misrecognition across four interrelated dimensions: (1) totalising misrecognition, having their Muslim identity highlighted at the expense of other group affiliations; (2) membership misrecognition, having their national belonging denied; (3) content misrecognition, having negative characteristics associated with their religious identity, and (4) invisibility, having their voices unheard in society and/or their identities excluded from (public) professions. Participants conceptualised misrecognition as a product of deficient intergroup (Muslims vs. non-Muslims) contact and as being worse in France. French women felt relatively more invisible in the public sphere than their Dutch counterparts and perceived politicians across the political spectrum as an important source of misrecognition. These findings suggest that misrecognition is present in Europe, and potentially worse in France, raising the question about what measures might be taken to counter this form of group-based exclusion.
{"title":"Where are you really from? Understanding misrecognition from the experiences of French and Dutch Muslim women students","authors":"Caroline da Silva, Judith de Jong, Allard R. Feddes, B. Doosje, Andreea Gruev-Vintila","doi":"10.5964/jspp.9395","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.9395","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate experiences of misrecognition through comparative focus groups with headscarf-wearing Muslim women students in France (N = 46) and in the Netherlands (N = 32). In both countries, women reported experiencing misrecognition across four interrelated dimensions: (1) totalising misrecognition, having their Muslim identity highlighted at the expense of other group affiliations; (2) membership misrecognition, having their national belonging denied; (3) content misrecognition, having negative characteristics associated with their religious identity, and (4) invisibility, having their voices unheard in society and/or their identities excluded from (public) professions. Participants conceptualised misrecognition as a product of deficient intergroup (Muslims vs. non-Muslims) contact and as being worse in France. French women felt relatively more invisible in the public sphere than their Dutch counterparts and perceived politicians across the political spectrum as an important source of misrecognition. These findings suggest that misrecognition is present in Europe, and potentially worse in France, raising the question about what measures might be taken to counter this form of group-based exclusion.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42919811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Right-wing authoritarianism is concerned with adhering to conventional norms, while social dominance orientation supports racial hierarchy. As such, if conventional norms are opposed to racial hierarchy, it is possible that RWA and SDO would function in opposite directions. In South Africa, a normative view regarding equal civil rights across races has been promoted since the fall of apartheid. Therefore, RWA and SDO might have opposite relationships regarding beliefs in equal civil rights. To test this, South African undergraduates completed scales measuring RWA, SDO and two types of prejudice: beliefs in inequality regarding civil rights and desires for racial separation. For Black participants, RWA was a negative predictor of inequality regarding civil rights but was a positive predictor of racial separation. For White participants, these relationships involving RWA were nonsignificant. On the other hand, SDO was a positive predictor of both prejudices for both Black and White participants. Overall, SDO was a consistent predictor of prejudice while RWA was more variable and even supported egalitarian views.
{"title":"RWA, SDO and race: A study of prejudice in South Africa","authors":"Michael R Brubacher, J. Sidanius, F. Silinda","doi":"10.5964/jspp.9353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.9353","url":null,"abstract":"Right-wing authoritarianism is concerned with adhering to conventional norms, while social dominance orientation supports racial hierarchy. As such, if conventional norms are opposed to racial hierarchy, it is possible that RWA and SDO would function in opposite directions. In South Africa, a normative view regarding equal civil rights across races has been promoted since the fall of apartheid. Therefore, RWA and SDO might have opposite relationships regarding beliefs in equal civil rights. To test this, South African undergraduates completed scales measuring RWA, SDO and two types of prejudice: beliefs in inequality regarding civil rights and desires for racial separation. For Black participants, RWA was a negative predictor of inequality regarding civil rights but was a positive predictor of racial separation. For White participants, these relationships involving RWA were nonsignificant. On the other hand, SDO was a positive predictor of both prejudices for both Black and White participants. Overall, SDO was a consistent predictor of prejudice while RWA was more variable and even supported egalitarian views.","PeriodicalId":16973,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Social and Political Psychology","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.1,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43099119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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