Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people’s opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new measure of influence, and I highlight how opinion fluctuations impact influence campaigns. If agents interact less frequently with those holding different opinions, the variance of public opinion decreases. Consequently, a risk-averse planner focuses on persuading a large majority of agents in a small set of tightly knit groups, while a risk-loving planner makes much broader appeals. (JEL D11, D72, D83, D85, Z13)
{"title":"Influence Campaigns","authors":"E. Sadler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3371835","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3371835","url":null,"abstract":"Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people’s opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new measure of influence, and I highlight how opinion fluctuations impact influence campaigns. If agents interact less frequently with those holding different opinions, the variance of public opinion decreases. Consequently, a risk-averse planner focuses on persuading a large majority of agents in a small set of tightly knit groups, while a risk-loving planner makes much broader appeals. (JEL D11, D72, D83, D85, Z13)","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123758155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the impact of cell phone access on election fraud. I combine cell phone coverage maps with the location of polling centers during the 2009 Afghan presidential election to pinpoint which centers were exposed to coverage. Results from a spatial regression discontinuity design along the two-dimensional coverage boundary suggest that coverage deters corrupt behavior. Polling centers just inside coverage report a drop in the share of fraudulent votes of 4 percentage points, while the likelihood of a fraudulent station decreases by 8 percentage points. Analyses of the effect of coverage on citizen participation in election monitoring, election-related insurgent violence, and the tribal composition of villages suggest that the observed declines in fraud are likely attributed to cell phone access strengthening social monitoring capacity. (JEL D72, K16, K42, O17, Z13)
{"title":"Cell Phone Access and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Spatial Regression Discontinuity Design in Afghanistan","authors":"R. Gonzalez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3561120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561120","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the impact of cell phone access on election fraud. I combine cell phone coverage maps with the location of polling centers during the 2009 Afghan presidential election to pinpoint which centers were exposed to coverage. Results from a spatial regression discontinuity design along the two-dimensional coverage boundary suggest that coverage deters corrupt behavior. Polling centers just inside coverage report a drop in the share of fraudulent votes of 4 percentage points, while the likelihood of a fraudulent station decreases by 8 percentage points. Analyses of the effect of coverage on citizen participation in election monitoring, election-related insurgent violence, and the tribal composition of villages suggest that the observed declines in fraud are likely attributed to cell phone access strengthening social monitoring capacity. (JEL D72, K16, K42, O17, Z13)","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125041214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given the increased prominence of a border poll in Ireland, particularly following the outcome of the Brexit referendum, this paper provides an initial assessment of some of the issues that are likely to become central in any debate on this issue. We examine the relative income and growth position of Northern Ireland within a UK and Irish regional framework over time. We further compare, and contrast, in detail aspects of the structure of both economies on the island of Ireland in the areas of educational attainment, trade orientation and the role of Foreign Direct Investment. The paper goes on to analyse other relevant issues, such as the relative strength and weaknesses of the healthcare systems and the factors determining the potential economic cost of Irish unification. The objective of the research is to initiate an evidence-based approach to the question of a border poll and to provide an initial indication of the breadth of detail and analysis required for any debate to proceed in a meaningful manner.
{"title":"The Political Economy of a Northern Ireland Border Poll","authors":"S. McGuinness, A. Bergin","doi":"10.1093/CJE/BEAA007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CJE/BEAA007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Given the increased prominence of a border poll in Ireland, particularly following the outcome of the Brexit referendum, this paper provides an initial assessment of some of the issues that are likely to become central in any debate on this issue. We examine the relative income and growth position of Northern Ireland within a UK and Irish regional framework over time. We further compare, and contrast, in detail aspects of the structure of both economies on the island of Ireland in the areas of educational attainment, trade orientation and the role of Foreign Direct Investment. The paper goes on to analyse other relevant issues, such as the relative strength and weaknesses of the healthcare systems and the factors determining the potential economic cost of Irish unification. The objective of the research is to initiate an evidence-based approach to the question of a border poll and to provide an initial indication of the breadth of detail and analysis required for any debate to proceed in a meaningful manner.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132994304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three‐country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.
{"title":"US–Brazilian Cotton Policies","authors":"S. Devadoss, Jeff Luckstead","doi":"10.1111/twec.12941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/twec.12941","url":null,"abstract":"Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three‐country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133516621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines basic but very important questions in the democratic process: do individual candidates represent the will of their own district constituency, even in a parliamentary system with well-disciplined legislative parties? The answer is clearly yes: this paper demonstrates dyadic representation, or the link between the policy preference of the constituencies and their representatives in the Japanese Lower House. I also demonstrate that constituencies provide more votes to candidates who better represent their preferences, which would strengthen the link by electing those better fulfilling the responsibility.
{"title":"Dyadic Representation in Parliamentary Democracy with Disciplined Legislative Parties in Japan","authors":"Michio Umeda","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3320439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3320439","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines basic but very important questions in the democratic process: do individual candidates represent the will of their own district constituency, even in a parliamentary system with well-disciplined legislative parties? The answer is clearly yes: this paper demonstrates dyadic representation, or the link between the policy preference of the constituencies and their representatives in the Japanese Lower House. I also demonstrate that constituencies provide more votes to candidates who better represent their preferences, which would strengthen the link by electing those better fulfilling the responsibility.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133376762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-02-13DOI: 10.22394/1682-2358-2019-6-48-56
Mereke Gabdualiev, O. Kuznetsova
Russian Abstract: Исследуется конституционно-правовое регулирование выборов президента в Казахстане и в России. Особое внимание уделяется анализу взаимного влияния выборов и политической системы в Казахстане и в России.
English Abstract: The constitutional and legal regulation of presidential elections in Kazakhstan and in Russia is investigated. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the mutual influence of elections and the political system in Kazakhstan and Russia.
{"title":"Особенности конституционно-правового регулирования выборов Президента в Казахстане и России (Features of Constitutional and Legal Regulation of Presidential Elections in Kazakhstan and Russia)","authors":"Mereke Gabdualiev, O. Kuznetsova","doi":"10.22394/1682-2358-2019-6-48-56","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22394/1682-2358-2019-6-48-56","url":null,"abstract":"<b>Russian Abstract:</b> Исследуется конституционно-правовое регулирование выборов президента в Казахстане и в России. Особое внимание уделяется анализу взаимного влияния выборов и политической системы в Казахстане и в России. <br><br><b>English Abstract:</b> The constitutional and legal regulation of presidential elections in Kazakhstan and in Russia is investigated. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the mutual influence of elections and the political system in Kazakhstan and Russia. <br>","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116207025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Concerns over digital interference in elections are widespread. Yet evidence of its impact is still thin and fragmented. How do malicious uses of social media shape, transform, and distort democratic processes? And how should we characterize this impact? Existing research into the effects of social media manipulation has largely focused on measuring its purported impact on opinion swings and voting behavior. Though laudable, this focus might be too reductive. Drawing on normative theories of liberal democracy, this paper argues that the threat of digital interference techniques lies beyond their capacity to change individuals’ political viewpoints and demonstrates how social media manipulation may undermine popular perceptions of electoral integrity, with potentially far-reaching consequences for public trust. Following this assessment, a preliminary research agenda is formulated, highlighting previously overlooked relationships that can be explored to better understand how malicious uses of social media might shape such attitudes and to what effect.
{"title":"Conceptualizing the Impact of Digital Interference in Elections: A Framework and Agenda for Future Research","authors":"Nahema Marchal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3536281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3536281","url":null,"abstract":"Concerns over digital interference in elections are widespread. Yet evidence of its impact is still thin and fragmented. How do malicious uses of social media shape, transform, and distort democratic processes? And how should we characterize this impact? Existing research into the effects of social media manipulation has largely focused on measuring its purported impact on opinion swings and voting behavior. Though laudable, this focus might be too reductive. Drawing on normative theories of liberal democracy, this paper argues that the threat of digital interference techniques lies beyond their capacity to change individuals’ political viewpoints and demonstrates how social media manipulation may undermine popular perceptions of electoral integrity, with potentially far-reaching consequences for public trust. Following this assessment, a preliminary research agenda is formulated, highlighting previously overlooked relationships that can be explored to better understand how malicious uses of social media might shape such attitudes and to what effect.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116007004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-02-01DOI: 10.1017/9781108883870.005
E. Foley
This chapter of an edited volume on presidential primaries focuses on the relationship of the primaries to the general election. It does not suffice that the rules are sound for each stage of the overall electoral system considered separately. Instead, the relationship of the two stages must also be sound for the overall system to be coherent. The chapter analyzes this relationship by examining the possibility of a “bolt” from a brokered convention, as occurred in 1912 when ex-president Theodore Roosevelt launched his separate Progressive Party (“Bull Moose”) candidacy after losing his bid for the GOP nomination. The chapter considers the hypothetical possibility that something similar might occur in the context of the 2020 Democratic Party primary, where deep ideological divisions between two wings of the party have become evident. If Democrats are internally torn between progressives and moderates, what is the relationship between this internal party split and the general presidential election that inevitably must follow? The chapter considers whether the use of Ranked Choice Voting in the general election and eliminating so-called “sore loser” laws, to permit the losing candidate of a divisive primary election to run in the general election as an independent candidate, would provide a more coherent relationship between the two stages of the overall process than what currently exists.
{"title":"Winnowing and Endorsing: Separating the Two Distinct Functions of Party Primaries","authors":"E. Foley","doi":"10.1017/9781108883870.005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108883870.005","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter of an edited volume on presidential primaries focuses on the relationship of the primaries to the general election. It does not suffice that the rules are sound for each stage of the overall electoral system considered separately. Instead, the relationship of the two stages must also be sound for the overall system to be coherent. The chapter analyzes this relationship by examining the possibility of a “bolt” from a brokered convention, as occurred in 1912 when ex-president Theodore Roosevelt launched his separate Progressive Party (“Bull Moose”) candidacy after losing his bid for the GOP nomination. The chapter considers the hypothetical possibility that something similar might occur in the context of the 2020 Democratic Party primary, where deep ideological divisions between two wings of the party have become evident. If Democrats are internally torn between progressives and moderates, what is the relationship between this internal party split and the general presidential election that inevitably must follow? The chapter considers whether the use of Ranked Choice Voting in the general election and eliminating so-called “sore loser” laws, to permit the losing candidate of a divisive primary election to run in the general election as an independent candidate, would provide a more coherent relationship between the two stages of the overall process than what currently exists.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123648248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We synthesize the literature on the recent rise of populism. First, we discuss definitions and present descriptive evidence on the recent increase in support for populists. Second, we cover the historical evolution of populist regimes since the late nineteenth century. Third, we discuss the role of secular economic factors related to cross-border trade and automation. Fourth, we review studies on the role of the 2008–09 global financial crisis and subsequent austerity, connect them to historical work covering the Great Depression, and discuss likely mechanisms. Fifth, we discuss studies on identity politics, trust, and cultural backlash. Sixth, we discuss economic and cultural consequences of growth in immigration and the recent refugee crisis. We also discuss the gap between perceptions and reality regarding immigration. Seventh, we review studies on the impact of the internet and social media. Eighth, we discuss the literature on the implications of populism’s recent rise. We conclude outlining avenues for further research. (JEL D72, E32, G01, J15, N30, N40, Z13)
{"title":"The Political Economy of Populism","authors":"S. Guriev, E. Papaioannou","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3542052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3542052","url":null,"abstract":"We synthesize the literature on the recent rise of populism. First, we discuss definitions and present descriptive evidence on the recent increase in support for populists. Second, we cover the historical evolution of populist regimes since the late nineteenth century. Third, we discuss the role of secular economic factors related to cross-border trade and automation. Fourth, we review studies on the role of the 2008–09 global financial crisis and subsequent austerity, connect them to historical work covering the Great Depression, and discuss likely mechanisms. Fifth, we discuss studies on identity politics, trust, and cultural backlash. Sixth, we discuss economic and cultural consequences of growth in immigration and the recent refugee crisis. We also discuss the gap between perceptions and reality regarding immigration. Seventh, we review studies on the impact of the internet and social media. Eighth, we discuss the literature on the implications of populism’s recent rise. We conclude outlining avenues for further research. (JEL D72, E32, G01, J15, N30, N40, Z13)","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131012674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nikolas Tsakas, Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros
Vote trading in power-sharing systems—i.e., systems in which a voter’s utility with respect to the election’s outcome is proportional to the vote share of her favourite party—is, in theory, welfare improving. However, trading votes for money in majoritarian systems may have detrimental welfare effects, especially when voters’ preference intensities are similar (Casella et al., 2012). We use a laboratory experiment to test the effect of vote trading in each of these popular electoral systems on voter welfare and find strong evidence in support of the above intuitions: vote trading in power-sharing systems boosts aggregate welfare across all considered specifications, but it is not welfare improving in majoritarian systems. Importantly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a substantial share of subjects consistently loses from vote trading even in power-sharing systems, indicating that its welfare effects are not unambiguous.
权力分享系统中的投票交易。在美国，如果选民对选举结果的效用与其所支持政党的得票比例成正比，那么从理论上讲，这种制度会改善福利。然而，在多数制度下，用选票换金钱可能会对福利产生不利影响，尤其是当选民的偏好强度相似时(Casella et al.， 2012)。我们使用实验室实验来测试这些受欢迎的选举制度中的选票交易对选民福利的影响，并找到了支持上述直觉的有力证据:权力分享制度中的选票交易在所有考虑的规范中都提高了总福利，但在多数主义制度中并没有改善福利。重要的是，与理论预测相反的是，即使在权力分享制度下，也有相当一部分人一直在投票交易中失利，这表明其福利效应并非明确无疑。
{"title":"Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation","authors":"Nikolas Tsakas, Dimitrios Xefteris, Nicholas Ziros","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3261141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3261141","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Vote trading in power-sharing systems—i.e., systems in which a voter’s utility with respect to the election’s outcome is proportional to the vote share of her favourite party—is, in theory, welfare improving. However, trading votes for money in majoritarian systems may have detrimental welfare effects, especially when voters’ preference intensities are similar (Casella et al., 2012). We use a laboratory experiment to test the effect of vote trading in each of these popular electoral systems on voter welfare and find strong evidence in support of the above intuitions: vote trading in power-sharing systems boosts aggregate welfare across all considered specifications, but it is not welfare improving in majoritarian systems. Importantly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a substantial share of subjects consistently loses from vote trading even in power-sharing systems, indicating that its welfare effects are not unambiguous.","PeriodicalId":170831,"journal":{"name":"Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116077782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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